Hunter v. Dahdouh

[Cite as Hunter v. Dahdouh, 2026-Ohio-1459.]


                             COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                            EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA


DEANGELO HUNTER,                                :

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             :
                                                             No. 115847
                v.                              :

MALIK DAHDOUH,                                  :

                Defendant-Appellant.            :


                              JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 23, 2026


                        Civil Appeal from the Euclid Municipal Court
                                   Small Claims Division
                                  Case No. 25-CVI-03320


                                          Appearances:

                Cleveland State University College of Law, Appellate
                Practice Clinic and Doron M. Kalir, for appellee.

                Sam A. Zingale, for appellant.


EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:

                  Appellant Malik Dahdouh (“Dahdouh”) appeals the trial court’s

denial of his motion for continuance of his trial date that was filed the day before the

scheduled trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
      Facts and Procedural History

              On August 19, 2025, this case was filed in the Euclid Municipal Court,

Small Claims Division, by DeAngelo Hunter (“Hunter”) against Dahdouh asserting

Dahdouh had damaged Hunter’s vehicle while attempting to repair the vehicle.

              On August 20, 2025, a notice and summons scheduling trial for

October 1, 2025 was mailed to the parties. Service was perfected on Dahdouh on

August 22, 2025.

              On September 30, 2025, Dahdouh filed a pro se motion to continue

the trial, scheduled for the next day. In said motion, Dahdouh stated the following

reason for requesting the continuance:

      Continues [sic] date until January 14 be [sic] of travel date set for today.
      Going over seas to Egypt and Syria. Syria just got out of long war so I
      am not sure what or how communications would be.

The magistrate assigned to hear the case denied the motion. The case proceeded to

trial on October 1, 2025. Dahdouh did not appear. Evidence and testimony were

presented and the magistrate recommended judgment in favor of Hunter and

against Dahdouh in his issued decision.

              On October 15, 2025, Dahdouh filed an objection to this decision

through his newly retained attorney. The sole objection alleged the denial of his

motion for continuance amounted to an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.
              On November 3, 2025, the trial court, after reviewing the decision to

deny the motion to continue, overruled Dahdouh’s objections and adopted the

magistrate’s decision.

              Dahdouh now appeals raising two assignments of error:

      I. The trial court did not recognize the scope of its discretion in
      granting or denying a request for a continuance.

      II. The trial court abused its discretion in not granting defendant-
      appellant Khaled Dahdouh’s (“Dahdouh”) request to continue the
      small claims court hearing set for October 1, 2025, and proceeding to
      conduct that hearing without Dahdouh’s presence.

      Law and Argument

              These assignments of error only concern the denial of the motion for

a continuance of the trial and will, therefore, be discussed together. Dahdouh alleges

that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to continue filed the

day before trial. We disagree.

              We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for continuance under an

abuse of discretion standard. D.C. v. J.C., 2025-Ohio-3275, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.). An

abuse-of-discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an unwarranted

way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority. Johnson v.

Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.

              As stated previously by this court:

      Both the United States and Ohio Supreme Courts have recognized that
      ‘“[t]here are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a
      continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process.’” State v. Unger,
      67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67, 423 N.E.2d 1078 (1981), quoting Ungar v.
      Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964). Rather,
      ‘“[t]he answer must be found in the circumstances present in every
      case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time
      the request is denied.’” Id., quoting Ungar at 589.

      Factors to consider when determining whether a trial court abused its
      discretion in denying a continuance include:

                [T]he length of the delay requested; whether other
                continuances have been requested and received; the
                inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel
                and the court; whether the requested delay is for
                legitimate reasons or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or
                contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the
                circumstance which gives rise to the request for a
                continuance; and other relevant factors, depending on the
                unique facts of each case.

      Unger at 67-68.

D.C. at ¶ 19.

                 Dahdouh alleges in his brief that the trial court abused its discretion

in denying the motion and failed to consider, or apply, any of the balancing factors

in Unger. Upon review of the trial court’s journal entry, we find the trial court,

contrary to Dahdouh’s assertions in his brief, did properly consider the Unger

factors and did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.

                 In its November 3, 2025 journal entry, the trial court cited one of our

cases, Am. Surface Solutions, L.L.C. v. Nicholas N. Am., 2019-Ohio-2909, ¶ 33-34

(8th Dist.), which stated the proper Unger test to be applied and listed the six

factors. Applying the factors the trial court made the following findings:

      Ohio Revised Code §1925.04 mandates that “The time set for such trial
      shall be not less than fifteen or more than forty days after the
      commencement of the action.” The trial date of October 1, 2025 was
      forty (40) days after commencement of this case. As such, [] R.C.
      §1925.04 precluded a continuance of trial to January 14.
      Defendant delayed until the day before trial to request a continuance.
      Certainly, Defendant’s overseas travel plans were in place long before
      September 30, 2025. Furthermore, Plaintiff clearly set his schedule to
      appear for trial on October 1, 2025.

      Finally, granting Defendant’s Motion To Continue would frustrate “the
      general philosophy behind small claims proceedings, which is to
      provide parties with an informal, inexpensive and expedited procedure
      for resolution of their disputes.” Simon v. Durham, 98 Ohio App. 3d
      828, 832 citing Blosser v. Carter, 67 Ohio App. 3d 215,218.

              The court clearly weighed the relevant factors in finding against

Dahdouh. The court found the length of the delay until January 14, 2026 (106 days

from the date the motion was filed) was considerable and outside the R.C. 1925.04

mandatory deadline for trial within 40 days after the filing of a complaint in a small

claims division. Similarly, the court found that this was an inconvenience to Hunter

who had “set his schedule to appear for trial on October 1, 2025.” The court also

clearly found, and weighed heavily against Dahdouh, that he contributed to this

delay by waiting until the day before trial to request the continuance when his plans

to travel overseas “were in place long before” filing the motion. See Parma v.

Gardner, 2025-Ohio-5517, ¶ 45 (8th Dist.) (finding the trial court did not abuse its

discretion denying motion to continue filed on the day of trial because, in part, “she

contributed to the circumstances that gave rise to the request”). Last, the court

considered “other relevant factors” including a public policy factor that the purpose

of small-claims proceedings is to provide parties with an expedited resolution and

that such an extensive continuance would frustrate that purpose.

              We find the trial court applied the correct law and did not abuse its

discretion in denying Dahdouh’s 11th-hour motion for a continuance the day before
the scheduled trial. See In re B.B., 2010-Ohio-4618, ¶ 42 (5th Dist.) (trial court did

not abuse its discretion denying 11th-hour motion to continue); Timeoni v.

Ciancibelli, 2007-Ohio-2312, ¶ 30 (11th Dist.) (trial court did not abuse its discretion

denying 11th-hour motion to continue); Citibank (S.D.), N.A. v. Stein, 2006-Ohio-

2674, ¶ 22 (5th Dist.) (trial court did not abuse its discretion denying 11th-hour

continuance).

                Dahdouh’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.

                Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Euclid

Municipal Court, Small Claims Division, to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.


__________________________
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J., and
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR