Joy v. MetroHealth Sys.

[Cite as Joy v. MetroHealth Sys., 2026-Ohio-1557.]


                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

MATTHEW JOY,                                         :

                Plaintiff-Appellant,                 :
                                                              No. 115437
                v.                                   :

THE METROHEALTH SYSTEM,                              :

                Defendant-Appellee.                  :


                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 30, 2026


            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CV-25-115532


                                            Appearances:

                Walter | Haverfield, LLP, John E. Schiller, and Alexandra
                V. Dattilo, for appellant.

                Zashin & Rich Co., L.P.A., Stephen S. Zashin, and Lauren
                M. Drabic, for appellee.


EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J.:

                   Plaintiff-appellant Matthew Joy (“Dr. Joy”) appeals the trial court’s

granting of defendant-appellee The MetroHealth System dba MetroHealth Medical

Center’s (“MetroHealth”) motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing his

complaint with prejudice. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s decision.
   I.      Facts and Procedural History

                 In April 2025, Dr. Joy — an anesthesiologist who formerly worked for

MetroHealth for over 23 years — filed a complaint against MetroHealth asserting

two causes of action: (1) breach of contract and (2) wrongful termination in violation

of public policy.1 Therein, Dr. Joy asserted that his employment was renewed every

two years since his initial hiring in 1999, the latest being in March 2022. According

to Dr. Joy, his employment was wrongfully terminated in June 2023 “in retaliation

for his persistent dedication to patient safety and his refusal to look the other way

when MetroHealth staff failed to properly follow protocol and important patient

safety guidelines.” Dr. Joy claimed that he made written and oral complaints to

appropriate medical staff, but MetroHealth justified his immediate termination by

falsely claiming that he lacked professionalism and failed to perform his duties in

accordance with its value system.

                 Dr. Joy asserted that MetroHealth’s employee handbook and system

policy titled “EC-04 — Reporting Concerns” (“Reporting Policy”) prohibited



        1 In his appellate briefs, Dr. Joy argues — for the first time — that the facts pled in

his two-count complaint are sufficient to support a third claim or legal theory: promissory
estoppel. As noted by MetroHealth, this argument was not introduced at the trial-court
level and, therefore, was not preserved for appellate review. A party cannot raise new
claims or arguments for the first time on appeal, and a failure to present an issue before
the trial court results in a waiver of that issue for appellate purposes. Garrett v. Cuyahoga
Cty., 2022-Ohio-2770, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.), citing Lycan v. Cleveland, 2019-Ohio-3510, ¶ 32-
33 (8th Dist.) (“It is well-established that arguments raised for the first time on appeal
are generally barred and a reviewing court will not consider issues that the appellant
failed to raise in the trial court.”), and Cleveland Town Ctr., L.L.C. v. Fin. Exchange Co.
of Ohio, Inc., 2017-Ohio-384, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). Therefore, we limit our review to the two
claims contemplated at the trial-court level: breach of contract and wrongful termination
in violation of public policy.
retaliation against employees for raising patient safety concerns or reporting

suspected wrongdoing in good faith. Dr. Joy alleged that MetroHealth did not

enforce its value system uniformly, consistently, or predictably and his immediate

dismissal was unreasonable, unjustified, and in violation of MetroHealth’s

disciplinary procedures. Dr. Joy further alleged that MetroHealth’s policies against

retaliation constitute a clear and important expression of public policy since it is a

governmental entity.

               Based on these facts, Dr. Joy claimed that MetroHealth breached his

employment contract — created by his March 2022 renewal and MetroHealth’s

handbook, Reporting Policy, and other relevant policies and procedures — “by

terminating [him] improperly in retaliation for reporting issues of patient safety and

violations of policies and procedures, and federal regulations, that required

MetroHealth employees to follow his instructions in furnishing anesthesia services.”

Dr. Joy also claimed that his wrongful termination was motivated by his reporting

of patient concerns “stemming from MetroHealth employees’ failure to follow his

instructions in furnishing anesthesia services” despite the existence of (1) “[a] clear

public policy against retaliation for reporting patient safety concerns . . . manifested

in Ohio law,” (2) “its own policies against retaliation,” and (3) “a clear public policy

for the orderly and supervised furnishing of anesthesia . . . under state and federal

law.”

               Dr. Joy attached a copy of the two-page Reporting Policy to the

complaint. The Reporting Policy applied to “Workforce Members,” which included
“employees, providers, volunteers, trainees, and other persons whose conduct, in

the performance of work for [MetroHealth], [was] under direct control of such

entity, whether or not they [were] paid by [MetroHealth].” The Reporting Policy

“outline[d] the expectations and procedures for Workforce Members to timely

report potential violations of [MetroHealth’s] Code of Conduct, policies, procedures,

laws or regulations applicable to [MetroHealth].” Finally, the Reporting Policy

established that MetroHealth maintained an “open-door policy”; encouraged

Workforce Members, patients, visitors, vendors, and community members to report

concerns; and “prohibit[ed] retaliation against Workforce Members who report

suspected wrongdoing in good faith.”

              In response, MetroHealth filed an answer and asserted several

affirmative defenses.   In its answer, MetroHealth denied the existence of an

employment contract, countering that Dr. Joy was an at-will employee who “was last

approved for reappointment based on continuation of clinical privileges” via a letter

dated March 15, 2022 (“Reappointment Letter”). MetroHealth also denied Dr. Joy’s

characterization of MetroHealth’s policies, asserting that it had “numerous

unilaterally-issued system-wide employment policies, including [the Reporting

Policy], that [were] made available to employees and posted on MetroHealth’s

intranet.” Finally, MetroHealth denied that Dr. Joy was wrongfully terminated for

reporting patient safety concerns.        MetroHealth attached a copy of the

Reappointment Letter, which stated in relevant part: “This reappointment is

effective 02/01/2022 with clinical privileges continuing until your next scheduled
reappointment date of 01/30/2024 unless circumstances warrant consideration of

status change or employment change prior to the expiration date.”               The

Reappointment did not contain any terms of employment beyond the general

requirement that medical staff comply with MetroHealth’s policies, provisions, and

emergency plans.

              Along with its answer, MetroHealth filed a motion for judgment on

the pleadings. MetroHealth argued that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of

law since (1) no contract existed between MetroHealth and Dr. Joy — an at-will

employee — and (2) the complaint failed to identify the existence of a clear public

policy in connection with Dr. Joy’s wrongful-termination claim. First, MetroHealth

argued that Dr. Joy failed to assert that the parties entered into a contractual

agreement. MetroHealth claimed that the Reappointment Letter’s language “did

not guarantee [Dr. Joy’s] continued employment with MetroHealth” or

“demonstrate[d] an intent to create an agreement” with him; rather, “it simply

granted a continuation of [Dr. Joy’s] clinical privileges while making clear that

MetroHealth could reconsider his employment status at any time.” (Emphasis

omitted.) MetroHealth further asserted that its unilaterally issued Reporting Policy

“simply outline[d] the expectations and procedures for MetroHealth employees to

report violations” and did “not contain any language expressly or implicitly

guaranteeing MetroHealth employees continued employment.”             MetroHealth

argued that there was no mutual assent to the terms of the Reporting Policy and
nothing in it altered the at-will nature of Dr. Joy’s employment or created an

employment contract between Dr. Joy and MetroHealth.

               Second, MetroHealth argued that Dr. Joy’s wrongful-termination-in-

violation-of-public-policy claim failed as a matter of law since he did not sufficiently

plead the cause of action’s “clarity element.” MetroHealth asserted that Dr. Joy was

required to articulate, with specificity, the existence of a clear public policy and its

manifestation in a state or federal constitution, statute, administrative regulation,

or in common law. MetroHealth claimed that Dr. Joy’s “reliance on an internal

system policy and vague references to state and federal law fall far short of satisfying

the clarity element.” According to MetroHealth, the Reporting Policy could not be

used as a basis for Dr. Joy’s claim since “it [did] not even apply county-wide, much

less statewide,” and Dr. Joy failed to cite any source for his contention that a public

policy existed related to the orderly and supervised furnishing of anesthesia.

               Dr. Joy opposed the motion, countering that he properly pled his

claims and dismissal was inappropriate at this stage of the proceedings since the

complaint’s allegations must be accepted as true and reasonable inferences must be

construed in his favor. Dr. Joy reiterated his allegation that his March 2022

reappointment, MetroHealth’s handbook, the Reporting Policy, and “potentially

other relevant policies and procedures” created a contract of employment between

him and MetroHealth. According to Dr. Joy, the Reporting Policy formed “part of

his employment contract with MetroHealth” since it created “a specific condition of

employment that MetroHealth employees [would] not be retaliated against for good
faith reports of suspected wrongdoing.” Dr. Joy further argued that his allegations

related to the wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim satisfied

Civ.R. 8(A)’s pleading requirements. Dr. Joy also referenced — for the first time —

two specific examples of the alleged “clear public policies related to the supervised

furnishing of anesthesia under Ohio law, i.e., public policies related to patient

safety.”

               In response, MetroHealth filed a reply in support of its motion,

arguing that — even after accepting the complaint’s allegations as true — Dr. Joy

could prove no set of facts entitling him to relief. MetroHealth reiterated that a

contract did not exist between the parties and asserted that Dr. Joy “effectively

concedes as much [by] disingenuously attempting to repackage a MetroHealth

employment policy into an employment agreement, despite no intent whatsoever —

express or implied — by either party to create such an agreement.” MetroHealth

further reiterated that Dr. Joy’s complaint “assert[ed] in a conclusory fashion” that

clear public policies existed but failed to cite any specific source for that conclusion.

According to MetroHealth, the clarity element of Dr. Joy’s wrongful-termination-in-

violation-of-public-policy claim could not be satisfied by vague references to its

policies or “general purported policies.” MetroHealth also argued that the two

examples Dr. Joy cited in his brief in opposition — which failed to satisfy the clarity

element in any event — should not be considered since they were not pleaded in the

complaint. MetroHealth emphasized that the trial court should not accept Dr. Joy’s

legal conclusions as true absent any legal basis to support them. Accordingly,
MetroHealth requested that the complaint be dismissed in its entirety since Dr. Joy

could not establish his claims as a matter of law.

                 Ultimately, the trial court granted MetroHealth’s motion for

judgment on the pleadings and dismissed Dr. Joy’s complaint for breach of contract

and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Dr. Joy appealed the trial

court’s ruling, raising a single assignment of error for review.

         Assignment of Error

         The trial court erred in dismissing [Dr. Joy’s] complaint with prejudice
         at the pleading stage. [Dr. Joy’s] complaint alleged specific facts
         supporting his claim that he was terminated from his employment as a
         physician in retaliation for raising bona fide patient safety concerns in
         violation of [MetroHealth’s] policies and public policy.

   II.      Law and Analysis

                 In his sole assignment of error, Dr. Joy argues that the trial court

erred in granting MetroHealth’s motion for judgment on the pleadings since the

“complaint alleged facts that, when assumed as true, supported a cognizable claim

for retaliatory termination in violation of [MetroHealth’s] policies and . . . public

policy.”

                 A motion for judgment on the pleadings only presents questions of

law and tests “the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted.” Crenshaw v. Howard,

2022-Ohio-3914, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing Edwards v. Kelley, 2021-Ohio-2933, ¶ 7

(8th Dist.). Therefore, we apply the de novo standard of review on appeal and

conduct an independent examination without affording deference to the trial court’s

decision. Rowe v. Hoist & Crane Serv. Group, 2022-Ohio-3130, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.),
citing New Riegel Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Buehrer Group Architecture &

Eng., Inc., 2019-Ohio-2851, ¶ 8, citing Rayess v. Edn. Comm. for Foreign Med.

Graduates, 2012-Ohio-5676, ¶ 18.

               Motions for judgment on the pleadings are governed by Civ.R. 12(C),

which provides: “After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay

the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” In ruling on a

Civ.R. 12(C) motion, the court is restricted to the allegations in the pleadings and

any writings attached as exhibits to the pleadings. Schmitt v. Educational Serv. Ctr.,

2012-Ohio-2210, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.); Edwards v. Kelley, 2021-Ohio-2933, ¶ 7-9 (8th

Dist.) (noting that “written instrument” attached to a pleading — a term that “has

primarily been interpreted to include documents that evidence the parties’ rights

and obligations” — qualifies as part of that pleading).

               “‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings does not allow a court to

weigh the evidence; instead, it simply tests the sufficiency of the complaint.’” Koz v.

Newburgh Hts., 2025-Ohio-1555, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.), quoting State ex rel. Ware v.

Booth, 2024-Ohio-2102, ¶ 5. When reviewing a complaint’s sufficiency, courts must

be mindful that Civ.R. 8(A) — which governs the general rules of pleadings —

requires only “(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is

entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to which the party

claims to be entitled.” Nevertheless, “[e]ven under Ohio’s liberal pleading rules and

notice-pleading standard . . . a cause of action must be factually supported and

courts need not accept bare assertions of legal conclusions.” Francis v. Northeast
Ohio Neighborhood Health Servs., 2021-Ohio-3928, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), citing Tuleta

v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 2014-Ohio-396, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.).

               Indeed, it is well-established that “‘[a] well-pled complaint must

include factual allegations going to each element of the claim’” and those factual

allegations must be accepted as true when reviewing a Civ.R 12(C) motion. Mundy

v. Golightly, 2022-Ohio-83, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.), quoting Torrance v. Rom, 2020-Ohio-

3971, ¶ 56 (8th Dist.); Rowe at ¶ 21, citing Pincus v. Dubyak, 2021-Ohio-3034, ¶ 17

(8th Dist.). However, “‘conclusory statements without any factual allegations in

support are insufficient’” and unsupported conclusions cannot defend against a

motion for judgment on the pleadings. Mundy at id., quoting Torrance at id.; Rowe

at id., citing Pincus at id. Thus, judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where,

after considering the material allegations of the pleadings and all reasonable

inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party,

the court finds that no material factual issues exist, and the moving party is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law. Rayess at ¶ 18, citing State ex rel. Midwest Pride

IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570 (1996).

               With these concepts in mind, we consider whether the trial court

erred in granting MetroHealth’s Civ.R. 12(C) motion and dismissing Dr. Joy’s

complaint for breach of contract and wrongful termination in violation of public

policy.
      A. Breach-of-Contract Claim

              “To succeed on a breach-of-contract claim, a plaintiff must

demonstrate ‘the existence of a binding contract or agreement; the non-breaching

party performed its contractual obligations; the other party failed to fulfill its

contractual obligations without legal excuse; and the non-breaching party suffered

damages as a result of the breach.’” Jordan v. Giant Eagle Supermarket, 2020-

Ohio-5622, ¶ 45 (8th Dist.), quoting Garofalo v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 104 Ohio

App.3d 95, 108 (8th Dist. 1995). A binding contract exists only where the following

elements are present: “‘offer, acceptance, contractual capacity, consideration (the

bargained for legal benefit and/or detriment), a manifestation of mutual assent and

legality of object and of consideration.’” Kostelnik v. Helper, 2002-Ohio-2985, ¶ 16,

quoting Perlmuter Printing Co. v. Strome, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 409, 414 (N.D.Ohio

1976). Moreover, a contract is unenforceable where there is no “meeting of the

minds as to the essential terms.” Id., citing Episcopal Retirement Homes, Inc. v.

Ohio Dept. of Indus. Relations, 61 Ohio St. 3d 366, 369 (1991).

              In the instant case, the parties dispute whether an employment

contract exists between Dr. Joy and MetroHealth. In his complaint, Dr. Joy alleged

that the MetroHealth’s renewal of his employment in March 2022, handbook,

Reporting Policy, and other relevant policies and procedures created a contract of

employment between him and MetroHealth. Dr. Joy attached the Reporting Policy

to his complaint to support this conclusion. On appeal, Dr. Joy claims that the

Reporting Policy carved out exceptions to his at-will employment since it created a
duty to report concerns and prohibited MetroHealth from retaliating against

employees who reported.

              In its answer, MetroHealth countered that Dr. Joy was an at-will

employee and an employment contract did not exist. MetroHealth attached the

Reappointment Letter to its answer. On appeal, MetroHealth argues that and the

documents referenced by Dr. Joy do not give rise to an employment contract.

Rather, MetroHealth claims that (1) the Reappointment Letter made clear that Dr.

Joy’s continued reappointment could be terminated at any time and (2) neither the

Reporting Policy nor any other MetroHealth policy altered the at-will nature of Dr.

Joy’s employment.

              “Ohio adheres to the concept of at-will employment, meaning that in

the absence of a contract, employment is terminable at-will by either the employer

or the employee, at any time, and for any reason not contrary to law.” Galgoczy v.

Chagrin Falls Auto Parts, 2010-Ohio-4684, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.). However, the at-will-

employment doctrine is subject to certain exceptions, including: “(1) the existence

of an implied or express contract which alters the terms of discharge; (2) the

existence of promissory estoppel where representations or promises were made to

an employee; and (3) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.” Brunaugh

v. Anomatic Corp., 2025-Ohio-4833, ¶ 15 (5th Dist.). Nevertheless, the party

seeking to prove the existence of a contract “has a heavy burden” since at-will

employment is presumed and “all of the elements of a contract must be established,
including a ‘meeting of the minds’ to show that employment was intended to be

other than at-will.” Galgoczy at ¶ 4.

               Generally, employee handbooks, manuals, and policies will not affect

at-will employment, do not constitute an employment contract, and are insufficient,

by themselves, to create a contractual obligation upon an employer. Strasser v.

Fortney & Weygandt, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 5738, *6 (8th Dist. Dec. 20, 2001);

Evans v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1148, *10 (8th Dist. Mar. 15,

2001); Brunaugh at ¶ 15. To alter the nature of at-will employment, both parties

must have intended for the language in the handbooks, manuals, or policies to be

legally binding. Clayton v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 2015-Ohio-1547, ¶ 11 (8th

Dist.). “In other words, the employee’s belief that the handbook affords him

contractual rights does not mean that it does unless the employer intends it to do

so.” Fennessey v. Mt. Carmel Health Sys., 2009-Ohio-3750, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). Thus,

“‘[a]bsent mutual assent * * * a handbook becomes merely a unilateral statement of

rules and policies which create no obligation[s] and rights.’” Clayton at ¶ 11, quoting

Tohline v. Cent. Trust Co., N.A., 48 Ohio App.3d 280, 282 (1st Dist. 1988); Ney v.

May Eng. Co. LLC, 2025-Ohio-5081, ¶ 66 (7th Dist.) (“Without a manifestation of

mutual assent to be bound by the handbook or policy, the writing is a unilateral

statement of rules and policies.”).

               Nothing in the Reporting Policy or Reappointment Letter supports

the conclusion that an employment contract existed between Dr. Joy and

MetroHealth. The Reporting Policy does not constitute a specific promise of
employment that would modify Dr. Joy’s at-will employment relationship. The two-

page policy applies to all “employees, providers, volunteers, trainees, and other

persons whose conduct, in the performance of work for [MetroHealth], are under

direct control of such entity, whether or not they are paid by [MetroHealth]” and

even encourages patients, visitors, vendors, and community members to report

concerns. The Reporting Policy does not contain any statement that MetroHealth

intends to be bound by a specific termination procedure or that any employee has

job security. It merely states that retaliation is prohibited “against Workforce

Members who report suspected wrongdoing in good faith.” Neither the Reporting

Policy’s language nor the complaint’s factual allegations — as distinguished from

complaint’s conclusory statement that MetroHealth’s handbook, Reporting Policy,

and other relevant policies and procedures created an employment contract —

indicate that the Reporting Policy represents anything more than a unilateral

statement of rules and policies.

              Despite the complaint’s allegations, our review of the Reappointment

Letter further reveals that an employment contract was not created between Dr. Joy

and MetroHealth. The Renewal Letter simply approved Dr. Joy’s reappointment

and granted a continuation of his clinical privileges. Beyond broadly stating that

medical staff are required to comply with MetroHealth’s policies, provisions, and

emergency plans, the Renewal Letter does not contemplate any terms of Dr. Joy’s

employment or contain several of the essential elements of contract formation.
Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court erred in granting MetroHealth’s

Civ.R. 12(C) motion and dismissing Dr. Joy’s breach-of-contract claim.

      B. Wrongful-Termination-in-Violation-of-Public-Policy Claim

              In his single assignment of error, Dr. Joy also challenges the trial

court’s dismissal of his wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim.

              As mentioned above, the tort of wrongful termination in violation of

public policy is an exception to the at-will-employment doctrine. House v. Iacovelli,

2020-Ohio-435, ¶ 11, citing Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contrs., 49 Ohio

St.3d 228 (1990). Such a claim is specifically limited to at-will employees and

cannot be brought by a contract employee. Sullivan v. Walsh Jesuit High School,

2024-Ohio-2437, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.), citing Haynes v. Zoological Soc. of Cincinnati, 73

Ohio St.3d 254, 258 (1995). A plaintiff must establish four elements to prove a

wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim:

      (1) that a clear public policy existed and was manifested either in a state
      or federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation or in the
      common law (“the clarity element”), (2) that dismissing employees
      under circumstances like those involved in the plaintiff’s dismissal
      would jeopardize the public policy (“the jeopardy element”), (3) that
      the plaintiff’s dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public
      policy (“the causation element”), and (4) that the employer lacked an
      overriding legitimate business justification for the dismissal (“the
      overriding-justification element”).

Iacovelli at ¶ 12, quoting Miracle v. Ohio Dept. of Veterans Servs., 2019-Ohio-3308,

¶ 12. While the causation and overriding-justification elements are questions to be

determined by the finder of fact, the clarity and jeopardy elements are questions of
law to be determined by the court. Id., citing Collins v. Rizkana, 73 Ohio St.3d 65,

70 (1995).

               On appeal, Dr. Joy argues that he sufficiently pled facts satisfying the

clarity element for his wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim.2

Dr. Joy asserts that a clear public policy can be discerned from several sources and

identifies various administrative, state, and federal codes and regulations — many

of which are mentioned for the first time on appeal.

               “‘[T]o satisfy the clarity element of a claim of wrongful discharge in

violation of public policy, a terminated employee must articulate a clear public

policy by citation to specific provisions in the federal or state constitution, federal or

state statutes, administrative rules and regulations, or common law.’” Rowe v. Hoist

& Crane Serv. Group, 2022-Ohio-3130, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), citing Dohme v. Eurand

Am., Inc., 2011-Ohio-4609, ¶ 23-24 (“Unless the plaintiff asserts a public policy and

identifies federal or state constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations, or

common law that support the policy, a court may not presume to sua sponte identify

the source of that policy.”). Thus, “‘an employee cannot simply allege that clear

public policy exists because of a general societal interest, but rather must set forth

specific law.’” Logan v. Champaign Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2025-Ohio-297, ¶ 31 (2d

Dist.), quoting Creveling v. Lakepark Indus. Inc., 2021-Ohio-764, ¶ 52 (6th Dist.).


       2 Dr. Joy also claims that he pled sufficient facts to satisfy the jeopardy element of

his claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy. However, the parties did
not raise any issues or present any arguments regarding the jeopardy element before the
trial court. Therefore, we limit our review to the single element contemplated at the trial-
court level: the clarity element.
               Our review of the complaint reveals that Dr. Joy claims that his

wrongful termination was motivated by his reporting of patient concerns “stemming

from MetroHealth employees’ failure to follow his instructions in furnishing

anesthesia services.” However, Dr. Joy did not cite any specific statement of law in

support of his public-policy claim. Rather, Dr. Joy generally alleges that “[a] clear

public policy against retaliation for reporting patient safety concerns exists and is

manifested in Ohio law” and in MetroHealth’s “own policies against retaliation.”

Moreover, Dr. Joy broadly claims that “a clear public policy for the orderly and

supervised furnishing of anesthesia exists under state and federal law.” Dr. Joy was

obligated to articulate specific sources of law — drawn from the state or federal

constitution, statutes, administrative regulations, or the common law — that

support the clear public policy upon which his claim relies. Since Dr. Joy failed to

do so, he did not sufficiently plead the clarity element, an essential element to his

claim’s survival. Logan at ¶ 37 (affirming the granting of a motion for judgment on

the pleadings where the plaintiff did not cite specific statements of law from federal

or state constitutions and statutes, administrative rules and regulations, or common

law in support of her wrongful-termination-in-violation-of-public-policy claim),

citing Dohme. Consequently, the trial court did not err in granting MetroHealth’s

motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing Dr. Joy’s claim for wrongful

termination in violation of public policy.

               Thus, after considering the material allegations of the pleadings and

all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to Dr. Joy,
the trial court properly concluded that material factual issues did not exist and found

that MetroHealth was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under Civ.R. 12(C).

Accordingly, Dr. Joy’s single assignment of error is overruled.

               Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.


___________________________________
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, PRESIDING JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and
TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR