Larrick v. W&S Constr., L.L.C.

[Cite as Larrick v. W&S Constr., L.L.C., 2026-Ohio-1338.]




                          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                              THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                   LOGAN COUNTY




JEREMY L. LARRICK,
                                                            CASE NO. 8-25-14
         PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

    v.

W&S CONSTRUCTION LLC, ET AL.,                               OPINION AND
                                                            JUDGMENT ENTRY
         DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.




                      Appeal from Logan County Common Pleas Court
                                      General Division
                               Trial Court No. CV 25 02 0092

                                         Judgment Affirmed

                                  Date of Decision: April 13, 2026




APPEARANCES:

         Jana K. Yenyo for Appellant

         Michael Soto for Appellee W&S Construction, LLC

         Diane Burris for Appellee Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation
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MILLER, J.

       {¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Jeremy L. Larrick (“Larrick”), appeals the July 7, 2025

judgment entry of the Logan County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his complaint

against defendants-appellees, W&S Construction, LLC (“W&S”) and the Ohio Bureau of

Workers’ Compensation (“BWC”). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

                             Facts and Procedural History

       {¶2} On August 2, 2024, Larrick filed a First Report of Injury, Occupational

Disease, or Death (FROI-1) with the BWC, in which he claimed he suffered an injury

arising from the course of his employment with W&S on November 10, 2023. On August

29, 2024, the BWC denied Larrick’s claim. Larrick timely appealed.

       {¶3} On October 22, 2024, a District Hearing Officer (“DHO”) for the Industrial

Commission of Ohio (“Commission”) heard Larrick’s appeal. The DHO affirmed the

August 29, 2024, order, finding that Larrick had not met his burden of proof by a

preponderance of the evidence that an employee/employer relationship existed between

Larrick and W&S. The DHO did not address any specific medical issues or conditions in

its order.

       {¶4} Larrick timely appealed the DHO’s decision. Larrick’s appeal was heard on

December 10, 2024, by a Staff Hearing Officer (“SHO”) for the Commission. The SHO

issued an order on December 13, 2024, affirming the DHO’s order, again finding that

Larrick failed to prove an employment relationship between the parties. No medical issues


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or conditions were mentioned in the SHO order. On December 23, 2024, Larrick appealed

the SHO order.

       {¶5} On January 2, 2025, the Commission issued an order refusing his appeal and

denying Larrick’s right to participate in the state fund. Upon the issuance of this final order

by the Commission, Larrick exhausted his administrative appeals. Pursuant to R.C.

4123.512, Larrick appealed the matter to the Logan County Court of Common Pleas on

February 27, 2025, by filing both a notice of appeal and a complaint as required by R.C.

4123.512. While his complaint states in general terms that he suffered “an accidental

injury”, he did not identify any specific medical conditions or injuries for which he seeks

the right to participate in the state fund. The BWC filed an answer to Larrick’s complaint

on March 24, 2025.

       {¶6} W&S filed a motion for a more definite statement on April 1, 2025, in which

it requested the trial court order Larrick to provide (1) the mechanism of injury, (2) the

specific medical conditions for which he seeks to participate in the state fund, and (3) proof

the Commission addressed the specific medical conditions for which he wishes to

participate in the funds. Larrick did not immediately respond to this motion. Accordingly,

on April 16, 2025, the trial court ordered Larrick to provide a more definite statement as

requested by W&S, noting that neither Larrick nor the BWC objected to the request.

Larrick provided his more definite statement on May 6, 2025, in which he stated that

“[w]hile doing his work for [W&S], [Larrick] was struck in the neck and shoulder by a ball

on the end of a crane being used to construct [a] pole barn.” Neither specific medical

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conditions for which Larrick seeks to participate in the state fund nor proof that the

Commission addressed any specific medical conditions were provided.

       {¶7} On May 12, 2025, W&S filed a motion to dismiss, asserting Civ.R. 12(B)(6)

and 12(C) and that Larrick failed to comply with the court’s order. In Larrick’s response

to the motion to dismiss, he described the location of the injuries, namely his head, neck,

back and shoulder, and referred to a medical report filed with the BWC that purports to be

general medically supported conditions that could have resulted from his injury. This

medical report was not included as an exhibit to this filing. Furthermore, Larrick claimed

that because the Commission failed to specifically address his medical injuries and

conditions in their orders, he was free to present all legal and medical issues at trial and

claimed “further discovery is necessary in this case in order to determine what conditions,

if any, will supplement those current conditions.”

       {¶8} The trial court issued a judgment granting W&S’s motion to dismiss on July

7, 2025. In its reasoning, the trial court relied on Ward v. Kroger Co., 2005-Ohio-3560 in

finding “[t]he jury’s role in a worker’s compensation trial is not to identify medical

conditions from which Plaintiff may suffer. It is to consider whether Plaintiff suffers from

a specific medical condition identified by Plaintiff. When a Plaintiff fails to identify any

specific medical condition before the Commission, his claim fails as a matter of law in the

court of common pleas.”

       {¶9} Larrick filed his notice of appeal on August 6, 2025. Larrick raises two

assignments of error for our review.

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                                First Assignment of Error

       The Trial Court erred in ordering Appellant to submit a more definite
       statement.
                           Second Assignment of Error

       The Trial Court erred in granting Appellee, W&S Construction’s,
       Motion to Dismiss.

                             First Assignment of Error

       {¶10} In his first assignment of error, Larrick argues because Ohio is a notice

pleading state and R.C. 4123.512 does not require the claimant to plead with specificity,

the trial court erred when it ordered him to provide a more definite statement.

                                      Analysis

       {¶11} Larrick did not initially responded to W&S’s motion for a more definite

statement, nor did he object to the trial court’s order that he provide a more definite

statement. Instead, Larrick responded to the trial court’s order by stating he “gladly

provides a more definite statement and additional information to this Court as this Court

has directed.” While Larrick contended multiple times in his more definite statement that

he satisfied the requirements of R.C. 4123.512 to initiate the appeal thus granting the trial

court subject-matter jurisdiction over his claim, he never objected to either the motion or

order for a more definite statement. “A first principle of appellate jurisdiction is that a

party ordinarily may not present an argument on appeal that it failed to raise below.” State

v. Wintermeyer, 2019-Ohio-5156, ¶ 10. “It is well-settled that an appellate court ‘will not

consider a question not presented, considered, or decided by a lower court.’” In re

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Goodman, 2005-Ohio-2364, ¶ 26 (11th Dist.), quoting Kalish v Trans World Airlines, Inc.,

50 Ohio St.2d 73, 79 (1977). Larrick has not presented any arguments that his case

represents an exception to this foundational principle of appellate jurisprudence nor has he

pointed to any objections on the record. Since Larrick did not object to the order for a more

definite statement before the trial court, he has waived his right to argue on appeal that it

was wrongly ordered. Larrick’s first assignment of error is without merit and is, therefore,

overruled.

                                Second Assignment of Error

       {¶12} In his second assignment of error, Larrick contends the trial court erred in

granting W&S’s motion to dismiss. According to Larrick, the trial court’s decision was

not supported by R.C. 4123.512 and Civ.R. 8(A) and incorrectly applied Ward v. Kroger

Co., 2005-Ohio-3560 in finding that Larrick failed to provide a specific claim for which

relief can be granted.     He argues the trial court’s decision “distorts the pleading

requirements and intentions of R.C. 4123.512 and Civ.R. 8(A) beyond recognition.”

(Appellant’s Brief at 9). Because Larrick timely filed his notice of appeal and petition

containing a general statement of facts, a cause of action, and setting forth the basis for the

trial court’s jurisdiction, Larrick claims he was not required to provide in his petition the

specific medical condition from which he is seeking to participate in the state fund. We

disagree.




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                                    Standard of Review

       {¶13} W&S filed its motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) and 12(C).

Civ.R. 12 (B)(6) provides for dismissal where the complaint fails “to state a claim for which

relief can be granted.” In deciding a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, the trial court’s

consideration is limited to the four corners of the complaint, and dismissal is warranted

only when the complaint demonstrates, beyond doubt, that the plaintiff can prove no set of

facts in support of their claim. Price v. Aspen Dental, 2024-Ohio-5251, ¶ 9-10 (3d Dist.).

“If there is a set of facts consistent with the plaintiff’s complaint that would allow for

recovery, the court must not grant the motion to dismiss.” Id, at ¶ 10, citing York v Ohio

State Hwy. Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 145 (1991). “On review, ‘[t]he allegations of the

complaint must be taken as true, and those allegations and any reasonable inferences drawn

from them must be constructed in the nonmoving party’s favor.’” Faber v. Seneca Cty.

Sherrif’s Dep’t, 2018-Ohio-786, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.), quoting Ohio Bur. Of Workers’ Comp. v.

McKinley, 2011-Ohio-4432, ¶ 12.

       {¶14} A motion to dismiss filed after the pleadings have closed but within such time

as not to delay trial is considered a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings.

Lin v. Gatehouse Constr.Co., 84 Ohio App.3d 96, 99 (8th Dist. 1992). When “considering

a Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court is limited to the statements

contained in the parties’ pleadings and any ‘written instruments’ attached as exhibits to

those pleadings.” Jones v. Gilbert, 2023-Ohio-754, ¶ 10 (3d Dist.), citing Socha v. Weiss,

2017-Ohio-7610, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.) and Civ.R. 10(C) (stating that a “copy of any written

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instrument attached to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes”). “Civ.R. 12(C)

requires a determination that no material factual issues exist and that the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Id at ¶ 11, quoting State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v.

Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570 (1996).

       {¶15} When analyzing a dismissal under either Civ.R. 12(B)(6) or 12(C), an

appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision de novo and considers all legal issues

without deference to the trial court’s decision. See Price at ¶ 11 (Civ.R. 12(B)(6)); and

Wentworth v. Village of Coldwater, 2015-Ohio-1424, ¶ 15 (3d Dist.) (Civ.R. 12(C)).

                                           Analysis

       {¶16} The trial court granted W&S’s motion to dismiss on the basis that Larrick

failed to identify a specific medical condition for which he seeks to participate in the state’s

workers’ compensation fund. In his complaint Larrick claimed “he sustained an accidental

injury, either by direct causation or by substantial aggravation of a pre-existing condition,

or developed an occupational disease to his body. . . .” In the more definite statement he

provided in response to the trial court’s order, Larrick stated “[he] was struck in the neck

and shoulder by a ball on the end of a crane being used to construct [a] pole barn.” While

this statement identified the location and cause of his alleged injuries, it failed to identify

any specific medical condition from which he suffered as instructed by the trial court in its

order. Only in his later memorandum contra to W&S’s motion to dismiss, did Larrick

reference the BWC’s website to which he submitted a medical report from 2024, but he


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did not seek to amend his complaint with the information in the report or enter the report

into the record for the trial court to consider.1 Larrick claims that “[t]he only issue should

this matter proceed to a trial is whether he would be entitled to participate in the workers’

compensation fund for any medical conditions that are proven to be a direct result of injury

with [W&S].” (Emphasis added.) (More Definite Statement, at 4).

         {¶17} All parties to this appeal have presented significant arguments regarding their

interpretation of Ward v. Kroger, therefore, a brief discussion of Ward is warranted. In

Ward, a claimant appealed the Commission’s decision to deny certain right knee conditions

that resulted from his injury. Ward, 2005-Ohio-3560 at ¶ 1. Before the common pleas

court, he amended his complaint to add new conditions not previously presented to or

decided upon at the administrative level. Id. at ¶ 1-2. The court of appeals reversed the

judgment of the trial court which ruled in favor of the claimant for those additional claims

and the Supreme Court affirmed on the basis that “the claimant in an R.C. 4123.512 appeal

may seek to participate in the Workers’ Compensation Fund only for those conditions that

were addressed in the administrative order from which the appeal is taken.” Id. at ¶ 4, 17.

         {¶18} Larrick contends that because Ward addressed the addition of new medical

conditions not previously decided upon by the Commission, the ruling in Ward is not

applicable to the present case where the issue is the initial allowance of the BWC claim.

Larrick requests this court find that because the administrative orders of the DHO and SHO


1
 In his appellate brief before this court Larrick again cited multiple medical reports and revealed for the first time that
his “appeal is based on a condition addressed in an administrative order. Specifically, the original BWC order dated
August 29, 2024 . . ., denied [Larrick’s] claim for a contusion of the left shoulder.” (Emphasis in original.)

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denying his appeal failed to address his medical conditions, he is relieved from any burden

to identify a specific medical injury or condition in his petition filed in the common pleas

court and may seek compensation for any medical conditions that can be proven at trial to

be the result of his alleged employment with W&S. Larrick points out that Ohio is a notice

pleading state, which Larrick argues means he is not required to plead his injuries with any

particularity.

       {¶19} However, these arguments are contrary to the rule established in Ward that

the court of common pleas in a R.C. 4123.512 appeal may only consider those medical

conditions previously presented at the administrative level. Id. at ¶ 17. While the facts in

Ward are distinguishable from the current case, this underlying rule is clear and broadly

applicable to all R.C. 4123.512 appeals. See Cosgrove v. Omni Manor, 2016-Ohio-8481,

¶ 41 (7th Dist.) (“The holdings in Ward appear to broadly apply to any appeal under R.C.

4123.512, i.e., Ward limits the triable medical conditions to those presented in the claim[s]

before the administrative body.”) “The requirement that workers’ compensation claims be

presented in the first instance for administrative determination is a necessary and inherent

part of the overall adjudicative framework of the Workers’ Compensation Act.” Ward at

¶ 9. “A claimed right of participation in the fund is not a generic request. There is no such

thing as a workers’ compensation claim for ‘an injury.’ A workers’ compensation claim is

simply the recognition of the employee’s right to participate in the fund for a specific injury

or medical condition, which is defined narrowly, and it is only for that condition as set

forth in the claim, that compensation and benefits provided under the act may be payable.”

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Id. at ¶ 10. Because the claimant in a R.C. 4123.512 appeal may seek to participate in the

Workers’ Compensation Fund only for those conditions that were raised at the

administrative level, it necessarily follows that the claimant must identify for the trial court

what conditions were specifically presented to the BWC for consideration.

       {¶20} Larrick was required to file a specific claim referencing a specific injury and

medical condition with the BWC. As previously stated, a workers’ compensation claim

cannot be filed in general terms; it must identify a specific injury or medical condition.

Ward holds that only those specific medical claims previously brought forth at the

administrative level may be presented to the court of common pleas on appeal. Thus,

Larrick is required in his R.C. 4123.512 appeal to identify those specific claims of injury

for which he seeks to participate in the state fund.

       {¶21} Larrick contends that “[t]o require [him] to submit any additional

information, or to plead with specificity as requested by Appellee, would create a new and

heightened pleading standard not supported by case law, R.C. 4123.512, or Civ.R. 8(A).”

(Appellants Brief at 6). According to Larrick, such specificity is contrary to Ohio’s notice

pleading requirements. This contention ignores the unique nature of a R.C. 4123.512

proceeding. It is an appeal of the Commission’s ruling but is “unique in that it involves a

trial de novo on the issue of the right to participate. . . .” Cosgrove at ¶27, citing Bennett

v. Admr., Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 2012-Ohio-5639, ¶ 17-20, 30.                  It is well

established that for a claimant in a de novo trial brought under R.C. 4123.512 “the evidence

is not limited to that presented in the administrative proceeding, there is no deference to

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the administrative agency, and there is no remand to the administrative body.” Id. at ¶ 27.

However, it is equally established that “[c]laims must be presented in the first instance for

administrative determination.” Id. at ¶39.

         {¶22} The de novo trial aspect of a R.C. 4123.512 proceeding does not negate that

in the first instance it is an appeal to the trial court which then proceeds under the civil

rules. While the evidence is considered de novo, the facts surrounding the claimed right to

participate in the fund and the alleged injury are strictly limited to those medical conditions

previously presented to the Commission. See Marshall v. Oncology/Hematology Care,

Inc., 2014-Ohio-2253, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.) (“The trial court’s jurisdiction in workers’

compensation cases is limited to those conditions that were initiated before and determined

by [the Commission].”). “[R.C. 4123.512] does not give the claimant a cause of action but

rather a right of appeal. It is in no sense an original action.” Yates v. Gen. Motors Corp.,

10 Ohio App.2d 11, 13 (8th Dist., 1967).2 Consequently, a general claim for “an injury”

in a R.C. 4123.512 proceeding is insufficient to put the Defendant on notice of what is

being appealed or to establish the court’s authority to proceed. See Ward, 2005-Ohio-3560,

at ¶ 10. To allow claims to first be heard before the trial court would be “inconsistent with


2
  Larrick points to Yates v. Gen. Motors Corp., 10 Ohio App.2d 11 (8th Dist., 1967) as support for his proposition that
he need not plead with specificity. In Yates, the Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to
overrule the defendant-employer’s motion for a more definite statement after the defendant-employer claimed the
plaintiff-employee did not plead with sufficient specificity in his complaint. However, in that case, the Eighth
District’s ruling implied the specific injuries and medical conditions were readily apparent from the administrative
record before the trial court even if not stated in the complaint. Unlike Yates, the exact nature of Larrick’s injury was
not clearly identified in the trial court record so as to put W&S and the BWC on notice of the injury being appealed.
Larrick had multiple opportunities to provide the trial court with this specific information regarding the nature of his
injuries but failed to do so. We are also mindful that Yates predates the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Ward v.
Kroger.


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the [the] statutory scheme because it usurps the commission’s authority as the initial

adjudicator of claims and casts the common pleas court in the role of a claims processor.”

Id.

       {¶23} Civ.R. 8 requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

party is entitled to relief.” Similarly, R.C. 4123.512(D) requires a claimant to “file a

petition containing a statement of facts in ordinary and concise language showing a cause

of action to participate or to continue to participate in the fund.” Unlike a standard

complaint for relief in an original action where a general claim of injury may be sufficient

to put the defendant on notice, there is no right to proceed under R.C. 4123.512 without

showing that a specific claim was first brought before the Commission. See Ward at ¶ 10.

Absent this showing, it would be impossible for the court of common pleas to establish in

the first instance whether it has authority to proceed or rule in the case. See Cosgrove,

2016-Ohio-8481, at ¶ 52 (7th Dist.) (“Ward. . . did not announce a rule of subject matter

jurisdiction. . . . [Ward] refers to the court’s authority to proceed or rule on a case that is

within the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.”) Accordingly, a short and plain statement

specifying the specific injury or medical condition previously brought before the

Commission must be included as part of the petition to show that the party is entitled to

relief in a R.C. 4123.512 proceeding.

       {¶24} Reviewing the trial court’s decision de novo, we find the trial court did not

err in dismissing Larrick’s complaint. The second assignment of error is overruled, and

the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

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                                       Conclusion

      {¶25} For the foregoing reasons, both of appellant’s assignments of error are

overruled. Having found no error prejudicial to the plaintiff-appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Logan County Court of Common Pleas is

affirmed.

                                                                     Judgment Affirmed



ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.




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                               JUDGMENT ENTRY

       For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error are

overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial court

is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby rendered. The

cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the judgment for costs.

       It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R. 27; and

serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the proceedings

and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.




                                           Mark C. Miller, Judge



                                           William R. Zimmerman, Judge



                                           John R. Willamowski, Judge

DATED:
/jlm




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