Leghart v. Schuler Painting, Inc.

[Cite as Leghart v. Schuler Painting, Inc., 2026-Ohio-1563.]


                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA


ROBERT A. LEGHART                                       :

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,                   :
                                                               Nos. 115657 and 115663
                 v.                                     :

SCHULER PAINTING, INC., ET AL.,                         :

                 Defendants-Appellants.                 :



                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 30, 2026


              Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
                                 Case No. CV-24-107508


                                             Appearances:

                 Nager, Romaine & Schneiberg, David A. Wolfram, and
                 Jana K. Yenyo, for appellant.

                 Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, and Donna Thomas,
                 Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee Ohio
                 Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.

                 Gembala, McLaughlin & Pecora Co., LPA, Stephen M.
                 Bosak, Jr., and Carl M. Felice IV, for appellee Schuler
                 Painting, Inc.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, A.J.:

      {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant Robert A. Leghart (“Leghart”) appeals from the

trial court’s orders granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees

Schuler Painting, Inc. (“Schuler Painting”) and the Ohio Bureau of Workers’

Compensation (“the Bureau”) (collectively known as “Appellees”). In granting

Appellees’ motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined that Leghart

failed to demonstrate that he was an employee of Schuler Painting at the time he

sustained an injury for which he sought compensation. As such, he was not entitled

to workers’ compensation benefits.

      {¶ 2}   Leghart appeals the trial court orders granting summary judgment.

Having thoroughly reviewed the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial

court’s judgments.

I. Procedural History and Relevant Facts

      A. Background

      {¶ 3}   In June 2022, Leghart sent a text message to Steven Schuler

(“Schuler”) looking for work. Schuler is the owner and operator of Schuler Painting

and has known Leghart for over 30 years. Leghart told Schuler that he was working

in Amherst the following day, but that he would be free afterwards. Schuler

responded, telling Leghart that he could use his services that week, after Leghart had

finished his work in Amherst. Leghart’s job in Amherst was unrelated to Schuler

Painting.
      {¶ 4}    Leghart began work for Schuler Painting on June 28, 2022, but was

never added to Schuler Painting’s payroll. Nor did Leghart sign any paperwork prior

to beginning work for Schuler Painting.

      {¶ 5}    On June 29, 2022, while doing prep work at the job site, Leghart fell

off a rolling scaffold (also known as a perry cart). He fell about four feet, landed on

his hip, and injured himself. Leghart drove himself to the hospital, where he was

diagnosed with a closed right hip fracture.

      {¶ 6}    On July 1, 2022, Leghart provided an invoice to Schuler Painting for

$1,000. Leghart stated that Schuler Painting paid him $1,000, no money was taken

out of that check for tax purposes, and Schuler Painting later issued him a

Form 1099 for $1,000. Leghart also stated that he never received a W-2 from

Schuler Painting for the year 2022.

      B. Procedural History

      {¶ 7}    On August 5, 2022, Leghart filed a workers’ compensation claim with

the Bureau. Leghart’s claim was denied twice by the Bureau. The hearing officer

who heard Leghart’s claims specifically noted that Leghart “was an independent

contractor on the date of the alleged injury, and not an employee of [Schuler

Painting.]”

      {¶ 8}    On February 7, 2023, in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CV-23-975426, Leghart

filed a notice of appeal and complaint in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common

Pleas from the Bureau’s denial. Both Schuler Painting and the Bureau were listed
as defendants.    Leghart voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice on

December 4, 2023.

      {¶ 9}   On November 19, 2024, Leghart refiled the case and filed another

notice of appeal from the Bureau’s denial, along with a complaint in Cuyahoga C.P.

No. CV-24-107508. On June 24, 2025, Schuler Painting filed a motion for summary

judgment. Leghart filed an opposition to summary judgment on July 21, 2025. Less

than a week later, Schuler Painting filed a reply. The Bureau filed its own motion

for summary judgment on August 20, 2025. Leghart also opposed the Bureau’s

motion.

      {¶ 10} On September 8, 2025, the trial court granted both Schuler Painting’s

and the Bureau’s motions for summary judgment. In doing so, the trial court found

that Leghart “was not an employee, rather an independent contractor, at the time of

the injury” and dismissed the case.

      {¶ 11} Leghart filed notices of appeal in 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 115657 and

115663, from each of the trial court’s orders granting summary judgment. We

consolidated both appeals for the purposes of briefing, hearing, and disposition.

      {¶ 12} Leghart raises the following assignment of error for our review:

      The trial court erred in granting [Schuler Painting’s and the Bureau’s]
      Motion[s] for Summary Judgement when genuine issues exist as to
      material facts regarding whether [Leghart] was an employee or an
      independent contractor of [Schuler Painting] at the time of his
      industrial injury.
II. Law and Argument

      {¶ 13} To participate in the workers’ compensation system, a claimant must

first demonstrate that he or she sustained their injury in the course of and arising

out of their employment. See State ex rel. Liposchak v. Indus. Comm., 90 Ohio St.3d

276, 279 (2000). The trial court determined that Leghart was not an employee, but

rather an independent contractor at the time he sustained his injury. Thus, the

salient question before us for the purpose of this appeal is whether there exists a

genuine issue of material fact as to whether Leghart was an employee of Schuler

Painting at the time he sustained his injury or an independent contractor.

      A.   Summary Judgment Standard

      {¶ 14} An appellate court reviews a trial court’s grant of summary judgment

de novo. Tatarunas v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 2025-Ohio-4372, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.),

citing Warthog Mgmt. LLC v. Fares, 2024-Ohio-2065, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.). Pursuant to

Civ.R. 56(C), a party is entitled to summary judgment if “the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence,

and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” “The party moving for summary judgment bears the

burden of demonstrating that no material issues of fact exist for trial.” Edvon v.

Morales, 2018-Ohio-5171, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), citing Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280,

292 (1996). If the party moving for summary judgment satisfies this burden, “the

nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial and if the nonmovant does

not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the

nonmoving party.” Dresher at 293.

      {¶ 15} Summary judgment is appropriate where the record provides

(1) there is no genuine issue of material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law; and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one

conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, who is entitled to

have the evidence construed most strongly in his or her favor. Univ. School v. M.F.,

2025-Ohio-170, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), quoting Bohan v. McDonald Hopkins, L.L.C.,

2021-Ohio-4131, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.), citing Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp., 73 Ohio

St.3d 679 (1995), paragraph three of the syllabus.

      B. Applicable Law — Employee v. Independent Contractor

      {¶ 16} In Ohio, the primary test used to determine whether a person is an

employee or an independent contractor is “if the employer reserves the right to

control the manner or means of doing the work, the relation created is that of master

and servant, while if the manner or means of doing the work or job is left to the one

who is responsible to the employer only for the result, an independent contractor

relationship is created.” Casey v. Erie Ins. Co., 2020-Ohio-4067, ¶ 39 (8th Dist.),

quoting Bobik v. Indus. Comm., 146 Ohio St. 187, 191 (1946). Thus, “[i]f such right

is in the employer, the relationship is that of employer and employee; but if the

manner or means of performing the work is left to one responsible to the employer

for the result alone, an independent contractor relationship is created.” State v. ex
rel. Nese v. State Teachers Retirement Bd. of Ohio, 2013-Ohio-1777, ¶ 33.

Nonetheless, the Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that “as a practical matter,

every contract for work reserves to the employer a certain degree of control to enable

him to ensure that the contract is performed according to specifications.” Id. at ¶

34, citing Gillum v. Indus. Comm., 141 Ohio St. 373, 382 (1943).

      {¶ 17} In determining who maintains the right to control the work, we look

at the facts of each case individually. The Ohio Supreme Court has provided us with

a nonexhaustive list of factors to consider, including (1) who controls the details and

quality of the work, (2) who controls the hours worked, (3) who selects the materials,

tools and personnel used, (4) who selects the routes travelled, (5) the length of

employment, (6) the type of business, (7) the method of payment, and (8) any

pertinent agreements or contracts. State ex rel. Nese at ¶ 35, citing Bostic v. Connor,

37 Ohio St.3d 144, 146 (1988).

      C.     Analysis

      {¶ 18} It is undisputed that prior to beginning work for Schuler Painting,

Leghart never (1) signed a Form I-9, (2) provided a driver’s license or any documents

to Schuler Painting establishing his eligibility to work in the country, (3) executed a

Form W-4, (4) received an employee handbook, or (5) received any employee

benefits, including health insurance. Following the conclusion of this work, Leghart

provided an invoice to Schuler Painting for $1,000, which Schuler Painting paid.

While Leghart claimed in his deposition that Schuler Painting asked him to submit

an invoice, Leghart confirmed that no money had been taken out of the $1,000 check
he received from Schuler Painting. Each of these facts support the finding that

Leghart was not hired as an employee of Schuler Painting.

      {¶ 19} Further, according to the text messages between Leghart and Schuler

prior to beginning work, Schuler indicated that he would need Leghart’s help for the

“rest of the week.” And Leghart testified that he only worked a total of approximately

ten hours that week.      There was no indication within these text messages

demonstrating that Leghart would continue working with Schuler Painting after that

week. This short length of time to which the parties agreed and for which Leghart

submitted an invoice to Schuler Painting, further indicates that the parties intended

the relationship to be temporary, rather than a permanent employer-employee

relationship.

      {¶ 20} Leghart also confirmed that Schuler Painting issued him a Form 1099

for $1,000. The Form 1099 was made out to Robert Leghart Painting, LLC. And

Leghart also confirmed that he never received a W-2 from Schuler Painting for the

year 2022. And while Leghart testified that he believed he was a Form W-2

employee of Schuler Painting at the time, he never contacted the IRS to correct

Schuler Painting’s issuance of a Form 1099.         The Ohio Supreme Court has

recognized that a worker in receipt of a Form 1099 rather than a W-2 supports a

finding that the worker was an independent contractor. State ex rel. Ugicom Ents.

v. Morrison, 2022-Ohio-1689, ¶ 23, citing Northeast Ohio College of Massotherapy

v. Burek, 144 Ohio App.3d 196, 203-204 (7th Dist. 2001) (recognizing that “[t]he

use of [Form 1099s] typically suggests that the parties were not acting in an
employer/employee relationship, but rather in that of an independent contractor

relationship”).

      {¶ 21} Furthermore, Leghart’s medical records were also introduced. The

records indicate that Leghart advised the treating physician that “he is self-

employed.” Nonetheless, Leghart testified that he was “sure [he] never said that.”

      {¶ 22} Notwithstanding the undisputed facts and exigent evidence

presented by the Appellees in their respective motions for summary judgment,

Leghart claims that both parties intended for him to be hired as an employee of

Schuler Painting. However, when a moving party for summary judgment meets its

initial burden demonstrating that they are entitled to a judgment in their favor, the

nonmoving party (Leghart) “assumes a reciprocal obligation to point to specific facts

in the record showing a genuine issue of material fact for trial.” S. Shore Lake Erie

Assets & Operations, L.L.C. v. Johnson, 2025-Ohio-5043, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), citing

Dresher, 75 Ohio St.3d at 293. In doing so, we recognize that “a nonmovant’s own

self-serving assertions, whether made in an affidavit, deposition, or interrogatory

responses, cannot defeat a well-supported summary judgment motion when not

corroborated by any outside evidence.” Lucas v. Perciak, 2012-Ohio-88, ¶ 16 (8th

Dist.), citing N. Eagle, Inc. v. Kosas, 2009-Ohio-4042, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.). Accord

S. Shore Lake Erie Assets & Operations, L.L.C., at ¶ 38.

      {¶ 23} When opposing the Appellees’ motions for summary judgment,

Leghart did not produce any outside evidence corroborating his claims that he was

either an employee of Schuler Painting or that the parties intended him to be hired
as an employee. Rather, the only evidence Leghart presented in support of his

position is his own self-serving deposition testimony. Thus, he failed to demonstrate

a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether he was an employee of Schuler

Painting at the time he was injured. Without any additional evidence in support, the

statements Leghart provided in his deposition are insufficient to meet his reciprocal

burden on summary judgment. See S. Shore Lake Erie Assets & Operations, L.L.C.,

at ¶ 38 (holding that failure to produce any supplemental evidence outside his own

assertions made in an affidavit, deposition, or interrogatory responses, the plaintiff

failed to meet his reciprocal burden to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact

exists).

       {¶ 24} For these reasons, after conducting a de novo review of the trial

court’s judgments, we determine that Leghart was an independent contractor

working for Schuler Painting at the time of the injury. Leghart failed to demonstrate

that there existed a genuine issue of material fact concerning this determination.

Therefore, the trial court properly granted the Appellees’ motions for summary

judgment.

III. Conclusion

       {¶ 25} Based on our review of the record and reviewing all of the evidence in

a light most favorable to Leghart, we find that he has failed to demonstrate a genuine

issue of material fact concerning his status of employment with respect to Schuler

Painting. Accordingly, Appellees are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of

law.
      {¶ 26} Judgments affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.



______________________________________
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and
DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR