Medley v. BMI Fed. Credit Union

[Cite as Medley v. BMI Fed. Credit Union, 2026-Ohio-1525.]


                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Carl Medley,                                         :

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,                :
                                                                               No. 25AP-632
v.                                                   :                     (C.P.C. No. 23CV-6013)

BMI Federal Credit Union,                            :                  (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                 Defendant-Appellee.                 :



                                            D E C I S I O N

                                      Rendered on April 28, 2026


                 On brief: Carl Medley, pro se. Argued: Carl Medley.

                 On brief: Kegler, Brown, Hill & Ritter, Maria Mariano
                 Guthrie, and Peter W. Stoecklein, for appellee. Argued:
                 Maria Mariano Guthrie.

                  APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas

BEATTY BLUNT, J.

        {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Carl Medley, appeals from the July 9, 2025 judgment of

the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, which overruled his objections to the April 8,

2025 magistrate’s decision awarding attorney fees to defendant-appellant, BMI Federal

Credit Union (“BMI”).1 These proceedings followed the trial court’s March 17, 2025 decision

and entry, which granted BMI’s motion for summary judgment both on Medley’s claims



1 Also pending before this court is a motion by Medley, requesting this court to take judicial notice of BMI’s
“contradictory positions in related case No. 24CV-7698 and supplemental authority regarding credibility.”
(Nov. 6 2025 Appellant’s Mot. for Judicial Notice.) We strike this filing as an untimely attempt to expand the
record on appeal. “The court of appeals does not accept new evidence on appeal that is offered to expand upon
the record of evidence heard by the trial court, or otherwise offered to support or rebut the adjudicative facts
determined by the trial court.” Loc.R. 9.1 (Submission of Evidence on Appeal.)
No. 25AP-632                                                                                 2


and on its own counterclaim, denied Medley’s motion for summary judgment, and referred

BMI’s request for attorney fees back to the magistrate for hearing and determination.

       {¶ 2} In February 2022, Medley obtained a $171,000 loan from BMI for the

purchase of a 2018 Audi R8 automobile. Medley was frequently late to make loan payments

during the period of the loan, and in February 2023 he suggested to BMI that he might need

to sell the vehicle. He eventually decided to sell the vehicle to a company known as “Auto

Assets” for $127,000 and was expected to execute a new personal loan with BMI for

approximately $21,500 to cover the remaining deficiency.           He returned a new loan

application to BMI, but that personal loan was never closed—although he signed and

returned the loan, Medley rejected the loan payment terms. He then began to claim that

the sale to Auto Assets satisfied his debt to BMI entirely, based on BMI’s alleged acceptance

of the $127,000 sale amount. In response, BMI notified Medley that it was voiding their

tentative verbal agreement and repossessing the car instead of accepting the proceeds of

the sale. It did so, and the car was subsequently sold at auction for $123,000.

       {¶ 3} Medley, acting pro se, sued BMI. He contended that he had been defrauded,

that the repossession had been “under questionable circumstances and followed by

exposure to damaging elements,” that he was not liable for any of the deficiency, that he

was due a refund of all of his previously-made payments because BMI had wrongly

repossessed the vehicle, that BMI’s actions had caused him wrongful emotional distress,

and that he was entitled to punitive damages. Exhibits attached to his complaint reveal that

Medley maintained that the repossession had been taken prior to the expiration of a 30-

day late grace period and that he had not been given a chance to cure the default. BMI filed

an answer and counterclaim, and argued that Medley was repeatedly in default on the loan,

had breached his loan contract, that his action in filing suit against them was frivolous, that
No. 25AP-632                                                                                  3


it was factually unsupported and unsupportable, and that it was in violation of R.C. 2323.51.

BMI claimed it was entitled to an award of the amount of loan deficiency plus costs, as well

as an award of the costs of unnecessary litigation caused by defending against Medley’s

claims, including attorney fees.

       {¶ 4} Medley filed numerous motions during the litigation, the vast majority of

which were deemed meritless and procedurally improper. (See, e.g., Oct. 19, 2023 Mot. to

Amend Ad Damnum to Increase Punitive Damages to $20 Million, and Feb. 21, 2024

Motion: Sanctions.) He also filed an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s denial of his

motion for default judgment, which was dismissed for lack of a final order. (See Mar. 7,

2024 Journal Entry of Dismissal filed in Medley v. BMI Federal Credit Union, 10th Dist.

No. 24AP-136.)

       {¶ 5} Medley filed a motion for summary judgment in this case on August 6, 2024,

arguing that BMI had provided him the original loan despite its awareness that the

purchase price of the vehicle exceeded its value, that BMI repeatedly accepted payments up

to 55 days after they were due, that BMI never issued a warning accelerating the due date

for the payments, that the loan contract did not include an anti-waiver clause and that

therefore BMI was now obligated to accept his late payments as a result of its course of

dealings with him, that BMI had misled him about the sale of the car to Auto Assets and

that it had “indicat[ed]” to him that it would accept the highest offer available for the auto

as a “short sale arrangement but not calling it a short sale” alleviating his responsibility for

the deficiency, and that when BMI accepted a check from Auto Assets for $127,000 it had

forfeited its right to pursue him for the loan deficiency, despite the fact that it immediately

voided the Auto Assets check “on the heels of [Medley’s] refusal to acquiesce to BMI’s

proposal of an exorbitant second transaction personal loan.” (Aug. 6, 2024 Pl.’s Mot. for
No. 25AP-632                                                                                4


Summ. Jgmt. at 6.) Medley filed a second motion for summary judgment on September 9,

2024, arguing that alleged deficiencies in BMI’s discovery answers required the trial court

to issue judgment in his favor. (Mot. for Summ. Jgmt.)

       {¶ 6} BMI had scheduled a deposition of Medley for September 4, 2024, but

Medley initially refused to appear for an in-person deposition on that date, ostensibly

because BMI “did not ask me what my schedule is or if I’m available [and] I will not come

to your offices.” (Aug. 19, 2024 Def.’s Expedited Mot. to Compel, Ex. 1-B.) The trial court

subsequently ordered Medley to appear for an in-person deposition. (Aug. 30, 2024 Entry.)

       {¶ 7} BMI deposed Medley on October 10, 2024. At that time, he affirmed all of

the following: that the listed cash sale price of the Audi when he purchased it was $160,000,

(Oct. 10, 2024 Depo. of Carl E. Medley, Jr. at 66); that he had traded in his Porsche (which

he had previously financed with BMI) to purchase the Audi, id. at 66-67; that he received a

trade-in allowance for the Porsche of $62,000 less the loan balance owed to BMI, id.; that

he had a balance of $59,000 owed to BMI on the Porsche at the time he purchased the Audi,

id.; that the financed cost of the Audi would have been $171,340, id.; that he entered into a

new loan agreement with BMI for that amount, id. at 69-75; that BMI took a security

interest in the Audi as part of the loan agreement, id. at 72; that there was to be a late fee

added to loan payments made more than ten days after the due date, id. at 73-74; that BMI

was not a party to his sales agreement with Auto Assets, id. at 82; that BMI “accepted late

payments constantly” despite the fact that “in their loan document, it says that any default,

even by a day, they can take the vehicle,” id. at 84; that he was repeatedly late on payments

prior to the repossession of the vehicle and that he was late at the time of the repossession,

id. at 85-88; and that he was aware that he owed more on the loan to BMI than he would

receive from the sale to Auto Assets, id. at 95-96; and that despite the fact that BMI never
No. 25AP-632                                                                                  5


specifically agreed to a “short sale,” he believed that by accepting the plan to sell the car to

Auto Assets and accepting the amount that Auto Assets paid for the car, BMI had engaged

in a “short sale” and he was no longer obligated to pay the deficiency on the loan. Id. at

100-105. BMI then filed a motion for summary judgment on Medley’s claims and on its

own counterclaim, arguing that Medley’s deposition established that he had “initiated this

lawsuit in an attempt to avoid his contractual obligations to pay the deficiency on the loan.”

(Def.’s Mot. for Summ. Jgmt. at 2.)         The magistrate subsequently issued an order

specifically denying Medley’s objections to his deposition. (Oct. 4, 2024 Mag.’s Order.)

         {¶ 8} The trial court’s March 17, 2025 summary judgment decision granted BMI

summary judgment on Medley’s claims—that he was exempt from paying the deficiency

based on BMI’s fraud, that BMI waived its right to claim breach by its course of dealing in

accepting late payments and that BMI’s loan agreement did not contain an anti-waiver

clause, that he was entitled to reimbursement of his payments, that he suffered emotional

distress as a result of BMI’s actions, and that he was entitled to punitive damages. (Mar. 17,

2025 Decision & Entry at 3-4.) The trial court denied Medley’s motion for summary

judgment on his claims, id. at 5, and granted BMI summary judgment on its counterclaim—

awarding BMI the loan deficiency balance of $25,782.85 plus unpaid interest, repossession

fees of $350, and attorney fees. Id. at 6. The trial court referred the matter back to the

magistrate for a hearing to determine the amount of attorney fees Medley owed to BMI.

And after that hearing, the magistrate issued an order awarding BMI fees in the amount of

$151,431.25 and deposition costs in the amount of $1,829.55. (Apr. 8, 2025 Mag.’s Decision

at 5.)

         {¶ 9} Medley then filed objections and a motion to strike the magistrate’s decision,

but on July 9, 2025 the trial court issued a decision overruling both his motion to strike and
No. 25AP-632                                                                                6


his objections. The trial court observed that Medley had not filed a transcript of the

attorney fees hearing, and that he had not objected to the admission of BMI’s billing

exhibits at the hearing. (July 9, 2025 Entry at 1-3.) The trial court concluded that “there is

no error of law or other defect evident on the face of the Magistrate’s Decision, nor any

merit to [Medley]’s objections,” and adopted the magistrate’s decision in its entirety. Id. at

3.

       {¶ 10} Medley now appeals and asserts nine assignments of error. He contends that

              -   the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to BMI;

              -   the court failed to consider evidence suggesting that a
                  negotiated sale price of the vehicle for $127,000 was for the
                  full value of the automobile and was in “full satisfaction” of
                  Medley’s loan, even though that sale was not completed;

              -   BMI’s motion for summary judgment had been filed late
                  and the court erred by considering and granting it;

              -   that the court wrongly considered and granted BMI’s
                  motion for summary judgment without first addressing
                  “unresolved discovery disputes”;

              -   the court erred by interpreting BMI’s loan contract
                  language to contain an anti-waiver clause;

              -   the court erred by relying on Medley’s own deposition to
                  conclude he had not presented evidence of emotional
                  distress;

              -   the court had violated his right to due process by failing to
                  consider “critical and newly discovered evidence” and by
                  determining that several of his motions were moot;

              -   the court violated his right to due process by treating his
                  “supplemental statement of relief” as an amended
                  complaint; and

              -   the court had violated his right to due process by deciding
                  the cross-motions for summary judgment without first
                  ruling on his motion for a preliminary injunction and
                  motion to amend his motion to dismiss.
No. 25AP-632                                                                                 7


Medley also argues that his deposition was “compromised” because he had not been

provided certain discovery prior to the deposition, and because he had not been provided

certain unspecified accommodations he contends were required to be given to him

pursuant to The Americans with Disabilities Act.

       {¶ 11} We must begin by observing that Medley has not raised a single argument

either in his brief or in his reply brief regarding the amount of attorney fees awarded to

BMI by the trial court. Additionally, we will address Medley’s assignments of error

together, as they overlap with each other and do not encompass all of the arguments

presented in his briefing.

       {¶ 12} Medley believes that the trial court erred by failing to specifically rule on all

of his motions prior to ruling on summary judgment, by granting BMI summary judgment

on its claims, and by granting BMI summary judgment on Medley’s own claims. Summary

judgment may be granted under Civ.R. 56(C) when there remains no genuine dispute of

material fact, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and reasonable

minds can come to but one conclusion, adverse to the party opposing the motion. See, e.g.,

Franks v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2013-Ohio-1519, ¶ 5 (10th Dist.). “[T]he moving

party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material

fact concerning an essential element of the opponent’s case.” (Emphasis in original.)

Dresher v. Burt, 1996-Ohio-107, ¶ 17. The moving party must point to some evidence that

affirmatively demonstrates that the non-moving party has no evidence to support each

element of the stated claims. Franks at ¶ 15. The non-moving party must then rebut with

specific facts showing the existence of a genuine probable issue and may not rest on the

mere allegations in their pleadings. Chase Home Fin., LLC v. Dougherty, 2013-Ohio-1464,

¶ 10 (10th Dist.) If any doubt exists, the issue must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving
No. 25AP-632                                                                                 8


party. Id. Only factual disputes that might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law will preclude the entry of a summary judgment. Havely v. Franklin Cty.,

2008-Ohio-4889, ¶ 32 (10th Dist.). Moreover, we observe the rule that where a trial court

“ ‘fails to mention or rule on a pending motion, the appellate court presumes that the

motion was implicitly overruled,’ ” and “ ‘the fact that a court fails to expressly rule on a

motion does not constitute an abuse of discretion.’ ” Columbus v ACM Vision, V, L.L.C.,

2021-Ohio-925, ¶ 22 (10th Dist.), quoting Siemientowski v State Farm Ins. Co., 2005-

Ohio-4295, ¶ 39 (8th Dist.).

       {¶ 13} On review of the record, pleadings, and the undisputed and admissible

evidence submitted, we have little trouble concluding that BMI was entitled to summary

judgment, both on Medley’s claims and on its own counterclaim.

       {¶ 14} First, although some of the exhibits to BMI’s motion for summary judgment

were indeed filed a day late resulting from a technical error in filing, the body of the motion

itself was timely filed. The trial court had full discretion to consider both the motion and

the exhibits, and Medley cannot show that he was unduly prejudiced by the court’s decision

to do so.

       {¶ 15} Next, the trial court was absolutely correct in concluding that the BMI loan

agreement contained an anti-waiver provision and that BMI had discretion to accept late

payments. The agreement specifically provides that BMI “can delay enforcing any of Our

rights under this Agreement any number of times without losing the ability to exercise Our

rights later.” (See Loan & Sec. Agreements & Disclosure Statement, attached as Ex. 1 to

Pl.’s Sept. 25, 2023 Answer to Am. Compl. & Countercl. of Def. at 3.) Medley claims that

this is not an anti-waiver clause, but provides no basis for this assertion other than the fact
No. 25AP-632                                                                               9


that it is not labeled as such. It is self-evident that this contract language permits BMI to

accept late payments without waiving its right to demand timely payments in the future.

       {¶ 16} As to his claim of fraud, Medley’s pleading is less than clear. Compare Civ.R.

9(B) (stating that in “all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting

fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity.”) Medley generally alleged that BMI

engaged in fraud when it told him that it had “voided” the arrangement with Auto Assets

and that Auto Assets had agreed to void the sale. But there is no evidence in the record to

support this claim. Medley instead relies on idiosyncratic and self-serving interpretations

of verbal statements made by BMI’s loan collections manager, Jason Rigano. But those

statements are explained and Medley’s interpretations of them are refuted by Rigano’s own

affidavit.

       {¶ 17} Rigano’s affidavit clearly establishes that BMI agreed to allow Medley to sell

the car and would offer him a personal loan to the cover the deficiency, that Medley verbally

agreed to this plan and completed loan application paperwork, that Medley dropped off the

car at Auto Assets and completed a separate sale agreement with Auto Assets without the

participation of BMI, that Medley then refused to pursue the personal loan once he learned

what the interest rate would be, and that Medley claimed that because Auto Assets

unilaterally transmitted a payment $127,000.00 to BMI that BMI’s security interest had

been forfieted, and that Medley “was not responsible for any deficiency” because “he had a

‘short sale’ agreement with BMI.” (Aff. of Jason Rigano, attached as Ex. 2 to Def.’s Dec. 13,

2024 Mot. for Summ. Jgmt. at ¶ 24-26.) But Rigano’s affidavit also established that

crucially, “[b]ecause Mr. Medley refused to complete an agreement with BMI and was still

in default of his obligations, BMI did not accept the payment for the vehicle, since it was
No. 25AP-632                                                                                  10


less than the full amount of the loan, and then repossessed the vehicle on August 17, 2023.”

(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 26.

       {¶ 18} Medley has offered nothing to refute Rigano’s statements, although he has

the affirmative burden of showing that BMI’s claims could not be supported in the evidence.

See generally Dresher, 1996-Ohio-107. Instead, Medley simply contends that because BMI

was not a party to the contract for sale between himself and Auto Assets, it had no authority

to “void” the deal. But he has not argued (and indeed cannot argue) that BMI was required

to accept a partial payment on the loan as an accord-and-satisfaction of the entire loan

amount. BMI was completely within its contractual rights to refuse that payment, withhold

its required consent to the sale of the Audi, repossess it, sell it at auction, and pursue Medley

for the deficiency amount. The fact that Rigano may have used the term “void” in describing

BMI’s actions relating to the Medley-Auto Assets sale does not ipso facto make BMI’s

actions into some unspecified kind of fraud, nor does it establish that BMI was required to

accept Auto Assets’ partial payment as satisfaction for Medley’s obligations on his

remaining debt to BMI.

       {¶ 19} Likewise, Medley’s idiosyncratic arguments that his deposition was

“compromised” lack any merit. Regarding The Americans with Disabilities Act, Medley

seems to suggest that because he had a stroke that he should have been allowed to refer to

notes during the deposition. He offers no authority for this claim, and more importantly

he has not set forth any particular way in which his testimony might have been altered had

he been able to rely on such notes, nor has he shown that the testimony he did provide was

unknowingly incorrect or false.

       {¶ 20} Next, Medley argues the fact that BMI’s agents had spoken to Auto Assets and

that Rigano indicated to him that Auto Assets had agreed to “void” the sale establishes some
No. 25AP-632                                                                               11


sort of illegal collusion or action. We disagree. Even if Rigano had outright lied to Medley

about this fact—an allegation without any evidentiary support—Medley cannot show that

he was harmed in any way. BMI was under no obligation to accept Medley’s attempt to use

his agreement with Auto Assets to avoid payment of his outstanding debt to BMI, whether

or not the sale to Auto Assets was completed. And given BMI’s security interest in the Audi,

BMI’s consent to the sale was required as a matter of practicality even if it was not required

as a matter of law.

       {¶ 21} Finally, the motions that Medley complains were unresolved were, in

accordance with caselaw, denied by implication. Medley has not made any attempt to argue

he was unfairly denied access to any of the documents or other evidence required to support

his claims of fraud—rather, he has simply misinterpreted the evidence that he does have in

ways that support his arguments. None of those motions—for sanctions, for contempt, to

increase his damages—could have been meritorious, as they are all derivative from his

underlying causes of action, for which he wholly lacks evidentiary support.

       {¶ 22} Throughout this case, Medley has advanced novel and irrational

interpretations of the law in a futile attempt to avoid a debt he clearly and undeniably owes.

Had Medley simply negotiated in good faith regarding the deficiency rather than rashly and

foolhardily pursuing the underlying lawsuit, he might well have been able to avoid the

unenviable position in which he now finds himself.

       {¶ 23} On review, we conclude that all of Medley’s assigned errors clearly lack merit

and are overruled. We affirm the trial court’s decision in its entirety and strike his motion

for judicial notice pursuant to Loc.R. 9.1.

                                                                      Judgment affirmed;
                                                        motion for judicial notice stricken.
No. 25AP-632                                       12


               DORRIAN and JAMISON, JJ., concur.