NC Ents., L.L.C. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as NC
Ents., L.L.C. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1429.]




                                         NOTICE
     This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
     advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
     promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
     South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
     formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
     the opinion is published.




                          SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-1429
  NC ENTERPRISES, L.L.C., APPELLEE, v. NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY
       COMPANY; NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, APPELLANT.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
  may be cited as NC Ents., L.L.C. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., Slip Opinion No.
                                    2026-Ohio-1429.]
Real property—Adverse possession—An open-and-notorious use of parcels of land
        must be obvious and apparent enough to hold a title owner accountable for
        knowing that an adverse possessor is using the parcels—Appellee failed to
        establish that its possession of appellant’s parcels was open and notorious
        for the required 21-year period—Appellee’s lawn maintenance on
        appellant’s parcels was not sufficiently open and notorious to have put
        appellant on notice that appellee was adversely possessing and using the
        parcels—Court of appeals’ judgment affirming trial court’s judgment
        granting summary judgment in favor of appellee reversed and cause
        remanded to trial court.
      (No. 2024-0776—Submitted May 14, 2025—Decided April 24, 2026.)
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




              APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County,
                            No. 30652, 2024-Ohio-1454.
                                  __________________
       HAWKINS, J., authored the opinion of the court, which KENNEDY, C.J., and
DEWINE, DETERS, and SHANAHAN, JJ., joined. FISCHER, J., dissented. BRUNNER,
J., dissented, with an opinion.


       HAWKINS, J.
       {¶ 1} Appellee, NC Enterprises, L.L.C., filed a complaint claiming two
parcels of land by adverse possession. The trial court granted summary judgment
on NC Enterprises’ adverse-possession claim, and the Ninth District Court of
Appeals affirmed. We reverse the Ninth District’s judgment because even if NC
Enterprises could establish all other elements of adverse possession, it failed to
establish that its possession of the parcels was open and notorious for the required
21-year period.
                                     Background
       {¶ 2} Appellant, Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Norfolk Railway”),
is title owner of three parcels of land in Tallmadge, two of which are at issue in this
case. Combined, those two parcels comprise just under 1.5 acres. The two parcels
are long and narrow, abut the larger 34.2-acre parcel owned by Norfolk Railway on
one end and Munroe Falls Road on the other end, and abut property owned by NC
Enterprises along almost their entire combined length.
       {¶ 3} Approximately four months after NC Enterprises purchased its
property in December 1997, it started regular and significant landscape
maintenance on its property and the two parcels by hiring independent contractors
to perform tasks like mowing; weeding; fertilizing; trimming bushes, shrubs, and
trees; edging; mulching; planting; and providing spring and winter cleanups. NC
Enterprises continued hiring independent contractors to perform these tasks on its




                                          2
                                January Term, 2026




property and the parcels through 2021.          NC Enterprises did not perform
nonlandscape work on the parcels until September 2000, when it erected a fence
along the road to deter theft. Thereafter, it erected a six-foot-tall chain-link fence
with three strands of barbed wire in 2003 and installed drainage pipes on both its
property and the parcels in 2011 to alleviate flooding. NC Enterprises always
believed that it owned the parcels, right up until Norfolk Railway posted for-sale
signs for them in 2021.
        {¶ 4} Norfolk Railway paid property taxes on the two parcels throughout
the period that NC Enterprises claims that it adversely possessed them. Some trees
that were removed from the parcels during this period were not removed by NC
Enterprises. And Norfolk Railway listed the parcels for sale at various times
between 2003 and 2020, though whether for-sale signs were placed on them during
this period is unclear.
        {¶ 5} In a letter dated July 2, 2020, counsel for NC Enterprises notified
Norfolk Railway that NC Enterprises was asserting an adverse-possession claim for
the two parcels. On July 22, 2020, counsel for Norfolk Railway replied, stating that
Norfolk Railway was refuting that claim.
        {¶ 6} In August 2021, NC Enterprises filed a complaint against Norfolk
Railway, seeking a declaratory judgment that NC Enterprises had adversely
possessed the two parcels, a quieting of title to the parcels, and damages for unjust
enrichment. In August 2022, NC Enterprises filed a motion for summary judgment,
asserting that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on evidence of
the landscape maintenance on the parcels, the erection of the chain-link fence, and
the installation of the drainage pipes. Norfolk Railway opposed the motion and
filed a cross motion for summary judgment, arguing that NC Enterprises’ acts on
the parcels were insufficient to establish adverse possession for the required 21-
year period.




                                          3
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




       {¶ 7} The trial court granted NC Enterprises’ motion for summary
judgment, concluding that NC Enterprises “ha[d] proven by clear and convincing
evidence, exclusive possession and open, notorious, continuous, and adverse use of
the parcels at issue for a period of at least 21 years.” Summit C.P. No. CV-2021-
08-2641, 7 (Mar. 16, 2023). The trial court did not rule on NC Enterprises’ unjust-
enrichment claim. Norfolk Railway appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed,
stating that Norfolk Railway had “provided no evidence to refute [NC Enterprises’]
clear and convincing evidence that it openly, exclusively, notoriously, adversely,
and continuously used and possessed [the two parcels] for over 21-years.” 2024-
Ohio-1454, ¶ 34 (9th Dist.). The court of appeals concluded that landscaping and
maintenance may be combined with other acts to establish adverse possession,
relying on several cases from various courts of appeals. Id. at ¶ 28-33. The court
of appeals did not address NC Enterprises’ unjust-enrichment claim.
       {¶ 8} Norfolk Railway appealed to this court, and we accepted jurisdiction
over three propositions of law:


               Proposition of Law No. 1: Lawn maintenance, in and of
       itself, is insufficient as a matter of law to establish adverse
       possession.
               Proposition of Law No. 2: If lawn maintenance is legally
       insufficient on its own, the statute of limitations on an adverse
       possessor’s claim cannot even begin to run until it engages in a
       legally sufficient use.
               Proposition of Law No. 3: Lawn maintenance can only be
       considered relevant evidence to support continuous use when a
       structure or change to the land apart from maintenance has existed
       for twenty-one years.




                                        4
                                 January Term, 2026




See 2024-Ohio-3096.
                                       Analysis
                           The law of summary judgment
        {¶ 9} “Summary judgment is appropriate when an examination of all
relevant materials filed in the action reveals that ‘there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”
Smith v. McBride, 2011-Ohio-4674, ¶ 12, quoting Civ.R. 56(C).                Summary
judgment shall not be granted unless it appears from the evidence “that reasonable
minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party
against whom the motion for summary judgment is made.” Civ.R. 56(C). This
court reviews a decision granting summary judgment de novo. State ex rel. Parker
v. Russo, 2019-Ohio-4420, ¶ 5.
                           The law of adverse possession
        {¶ 10} “The very essence of an adverse possession is, that the holder of it
claims the right to his possession, not under, but in opposition to the title to which
his possession is alleged to be adverse.” Dietrick v. Noel, 42 Ohio St.18, 21 (1884).
In this case, NC Enterprises claims that it adversely possessed the two parcels such
that it can now claim title to them against their owner, Norfolk Railway.
        {¶ 11} “To acquire title by adverse possession, a party must prove, by clear
and convincing evidence, exclusive possession and open, notorious, continuous,
and adverse use for a period of twenty-one years.” Grace v. Koch, 1998-Ohio-607,
syllabus. “Failure of proof as to any of the elements results in failure to acquire
title by adverse possession.” Id. at ¶ 10, citing Pennsylvania RR. Co. v. Donovan,
111 Ohio St. 341, 349-350 (1924).          We have also emphasized that adverse
possession is disfavored and that “the elements of adverse possession are stringent.”
Id. at ¶ 12.
        {¶ 12} First, we note that Norfolk Railway opposed NC Enterprises’
adverse-possession claim on July 22, 2020, when counsel for Norfolk Railway



                                           5
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




provided notice that Norfolk Railway was refuting NC Enterprises’ claim. Thus,
the period of adverse possession must have started on or before July 22, 1999,
which is 21 years earlier. See R.C. 2305.04.
       {¶ 13} Second, to establish adverse possession, NC Enterprises need not
have intended to take the two parcels but it must have intended to occupy and treat
them as its own. Evanich v. Bridge, 2008-Ohio-3820, ¶ 12; see also Yetzer v.
Thoman, 17 Ohio St. 130, 133 (1866), quoting French v. Pearce, 8 Conn. 439, 443
(1831) (“‘it is the visible and adverse possession, with an intention to possess, that
constitutes its adverse character’ ”); Humphries v. Huffman, 33 Ohio St. 395, 402
(1878) (intent to possess constitutes adversity, not the remote motives or purposes
of the occupant). The evidence here suggests that NC Enterprises intended to
occupy and treat the two parcels as its own.
       {¶ 14} Third, we turn to the elements of adverse possession to determine
whether NC Enterprises has established all of them by clear and convincing
evidence. We conclude that whether it has established that it exclusively possessed
and continuously and adversely used the parcels for 21 years is not relevant
because, even if it did, NC Enterprises has failed to establish that it did so openly
and notoriously for 21 years.
       {¶ 15} The open-and-notorious standard has been part of Ohio caselaw for
almost two centuries. In Henrietta Twp. v. Brownhelm Twp., which addressed a
“settlement,” a predecessor concept of adverse possession, we stated that “[t]he
residence must not only be continuous, it must also be open and notorious, and
attended with such circumstances as to lead the authorities of the township in the
exercise of proper vigilance, to the conclusion that there is an intention to gain a
settlement” (emphasis deleted), 9 Ohio 76, 77 (1839). In Williams v. Sprigg, we
provided the following explanation of open and notorious: “There must be
something in the acts which accompany possession of property, in order to give
constructive notice, which can be seen and understood—something that will induce




                                          6
                                 January Term, 2026




inquiry—that will naturally raise the question as to who may have rights there.” 6
Ohio St. 585, 595 (1856).
       {¶ 16} These early cases illustrate that there can be no ambiguity—the
ostensible adverse use must be apparent, clearly indicating that possession of the
land, if not ownership, is being asserted. An open-and-notorious use must enable
the title landowner to have reason to know of the adverse use, though the landowner
need not actually know. See State ex rel. A.A.A. Invests. v. Columbus, 17 Ohio St.3d
151, 153 (1985) (“Actual knowledge is not a necessary element of adverse
possession.”).
       {¶ 17} Fences played a prominent role in many early cases, though the
consideration of them varied. In Lane v. Kennedy, a “mere fence” was insufficient
to manifest an intention to permanently appropriate land, in part because it was “a
worm fence and crooked at that.” (Emphasis deleted.) 13 Ohio St. 42, 47 (1861).
In Clark v. Potter, we noted that “‘[i]t is well settled, that to constitute an adverse
possession, there need not be a fence, building, or other improvements made.’” 32
Ohio St. 49, 63 (1876), quoting Lessee of Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U.S. 41, 52 (1837).
Two years later, we stated that a party “must show a substantial inclosure [sic], an
actual occupancy, . . . which is definite, positive, and notorious.” Humphries, 33
Ohio St. at 403. A fence also features in this case because the erection of a fence
was NC Enterprises’ first open-and-notorious act of adverse possession that showed
a substantial enclosure and an actual occupancy of the two parcels.
       {¶ 18} Despite the seeming disparate consideration of fences, we have been
consistent in our approach to open and notorious. In Clark, we stated: “The
principle upon which the limitation operates, is, that the adverse claim is
accompanied by such an invasion of the rights of the opposite party as to give him
a cause of action, which he has failed to prosecute within the time limited by law,
and which he is therefore presumed to have surrendered or abandoned.” Clark at
63-64. We have also stated that “[t]he occupancy must be such as to give notice to



                                          7
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




the real owner of the extent of the adverse claim,” Humphries at 404, a statement
we subsequently quoted in Evanich, 2008-Ohio-3820, at ¶ 8. Courts of appeals
have also applied the same standard. See, e.g., Dunn v. Ransom, 2011-Ohio-4253,
¶ 78 (4th Dist.) (open and notorious “requires that the actual use be of a character
that is capable of giving the legal owner notice”); Hardert v. Neumann, 2014-Ohio-
1770, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.), quoting Dunn at ¶ 78, quoting Hindall v. Martinez, 69 Ohio
App.3d 580, 583 (3d Dist. 1990) (notorious use must be “‘“known to some who
might reasonably be expected to communicate their knowledge to the owner if he
maintained a reasonable degree of supervision”’”); Hindall at 583 (“the use of the
property must be so patent that the true owner of the property could not be deceived
as to the property’s use”).
       {¶ 19} Although we have not wavered in our open-and-notorious analysis,
we have noted that it is “‘difficult to lay down any precise rule, adapted to all
cases’” (emphasis deleted), Clark at 63, quoting Lessee of Ewing at 53. This is
because “‘[s]o much depends on the nature and situation of the property, the uses
to which it can be applied, or to which the owner or claimant may choose to apply
it.’” (Emphasis deleted.) Id., quoting Lessee of Ewing at 53. Nevertheless, “‘it
may safely be said, that where acts of ownership have been done upon land, which
from their nature indicate a notorious claim of property in it, and are continued for
twenty-one years, . . . such acts are evidence of an ouster of a former owner, and an
actual adverse possession against him.’” (Emphasis deleted.) Id., quoting Lessee
of Ewing at 53.
       {¶ 20} With this in mind, we have also identified scenarios that do not
satisfy the open-and-notorious standard. We know that a “secret trespass” is not
open and notorious. Gill v. Fletcher, 74 Ohio St. 295, 305 (1906), superseded by
statute on other grounds as stated in Peppertree Farms, L.L.C. v. Thonen, 2022-
Ohio-395, ¶ 17-21. We know that when the “occupation [is] under the surface,” it
is not open and notorious. Elster v. Springfield, 49 Ohio St. 82, 94 (1892). And we




                                         8
                               January Term, 2026




know that when an adverse possessor merely “hangs out clothes [on the property]
to dry after being washed,” the use is not open and notorious. Williams, 6 Ohio St.
at 594-595. An open-and-notorious use must be obvious and apparent enough to
hold a title owner accountable for knowing that an adverse possessor is using the
land.
                           Applying the law to this case
        {¶ 21} There is no question that many of the acts engaged in by NC
Enterprises, for example, erecting fences and installing drainage pipes, are
characteristic of use and possession and were open and notorious as delineated in
the above caselaw. But the real question is whether NC Enterprises engaged in
open-and-notorious acts on the two parcels for 21 years. We hold that it did not.
        {¶ 22} Before July 22, 1999, NC Enterprises’ only adverse use of the two
parcels was landscape maintenance. That use was not sufficiently open and
notorious to have put Norfolk Railway on notice that NC Enterprises was adversely
possessing and using the parcels. Nothing that occurred before the erection of the
fence in September 2000 is akin to unfurling a “‘flag on the land, and keep[ing] it
flying so that the owner may see, if he will, that an enemy has invaded his
dominions and planted his standard of conquest,’” Grace, 1998-Ohio-607, at ¶ 15,
quoting Darling v. Ennis, 138 Vt. 311, 313 (1980).
        {¶ 23} Moreover, it is not obvious that mowing grass and trimming bushes
are adverse acts. No permanent structure (such as a fence) was built and used, and
no improvement (such as installation of drainage pipes) was made and used, until
September 2000, not quite 20 years before NC Enterprises notified Norfolk
Railway of its adverse-possession claim. Our decision might be different in this
case if, for example, a fence had been built by NC Enterprises on the two parcels
on or before July 22, 1999, but NC Enterprises did not erect a fence on them until
September 2000.




                                         9
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




        {¶ 24} The dissent finds it difficult to accept Norfolk Railway’s claim that
NC Enterprises’ activities were not sufficiently open and notorious when Norfolk
Railway “failed to oppose the most open and notorious activities,” including the
construction of the fence in September 2000 and the drainage work in 2011.
(Emphasis in original.) Dissenting opinion, ¶ 36. But neither the construction of
the fence nor the drainage work occurred before the date necessary to establish
adverse possession under Ohio law. Any opposition, or lack thereof, on the part of
Norfolk Railway to these activities is simply irrelevant.
        {¶ 25} It is easy to say, as NC Enterprises claims, that Norfolk Railway
should have paid closer attention to its two parcels. But the fact is that Norfolk
Railway does not have to prove possession and use, because it is the owner of the
parcels.
        {¶ 26} NC Enterprises must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it
adversely possessed the two parcels and did so openly and notoriously for 21 years,
such that the world would know of its intention to possess them. See Grace, 1998-
Ohio-607, at syllabus. Mowing grass and trimming bushes are not sufficient to
notify the world that NC Enterprises had exercised dominion over the parcels.
These types of lawn-maintenance activities are more in the nature of hanging
laundry, see Williams, 6 Ohio St. at 594-595, than of unfurling a flag, see Grace at
¶ 15.
        {¶ 27} The dissent suggests that our decision today creates a “bright-line
rule” for lawn-maintenance activities in adverse-possession cases. Dissenting
opinion at ¶ 37. But our decision does no such thing. Rather, we recognize that
ordinary lawn-maintenance activities, such as mowing grass and trimming bushes,
are simply not obvious enough to satisfy the open and notorious elements of an
adverse-possession claim. Indeed, if we were to reject Norfolk Railway’s first
proposition of law and hold that lawn maintenance is sufficient to establish adverse




                                         10
                                January Term, 2026




possession, such a decision would create a bright-line rule that the dissent would
likely abhor.
       {¶ 28} Reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion here: there is no
clear and convincing evidence that the two parcels were adversely possessed
continuously, openly, notoriously, and hostilely by NC Enterprises for 21 years. See
Civ.R. 56(C). The court of appeals’ judgment, which affirmed the trial court’s
judgment granting summary judgment in favor of NC Enterprises, is therefore
reversed.
       {¶ 29} With respect to Norfolk Railway’s propositions of law, we conclude
that lawn maintenance on a parcel of land is not open and notorious enough to
sufficiently put the owner of the parcel on notice of an adverse use and that the
required 21-year period for an adverse-possession claim cannot begin if the only
“adverse” acts are lawn maintenance.
                                    Conclusion
       {¶ 30} We reverse the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals and
remand this cause to the trial court with instructions for it to grant Norfolk
Railway’s motion for summary judgment as to NC Enterprises’ claim for adverse
possession and to consider NC Enterprises’ claim for unjust enrichment, which has
not yet been addressed.
                                                                 Judgment reversed
                                              and cause remanded to the trial court.
                              __________________
       BRUNNER, J., dissenting.
       {¶ 31} The majority opinion adopts the argument of appellant, Norfolk
Southern Railway Company (“Norfolk Railway”), holding that “[m]owing grass
and trimming bushes” can never be sufficiently open and notorious to put a property
owner on notice that a would-be adverse possessor is taking over the property,
majority opinion, ¶ 26. In creating this bright-line rule, the majority opinion takes



                                         11
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




this court a step closer to becoming a “super fact-finder,” thereby diminishing the
importance of juries and expanding the court’s jurisdiction beyond matters of public
or great general interest to those in which the court engages in error correction, see
Ohio Const., art. IV, § 2(B)(2)(e); see also Acuity, A Mut. Ins. Co. v. Progressive
Specialty Ins. Co., 2023-Ohio-3780, ¶ 32 (Brunner, J., dissenting) (“The more we
engage in error correction, the less time and attention we can devote to issues that
can be resolved only by this court.”). I therefore dissent.
         {¶ 32} When we review a summary-judgment decision, we apply a de novo
standard of review and sit in the same position as the trial court. See Smathers v.
Glass, 2022-Ohio-4595, ¶ 30. But if we reach a different conclusion about the facts
than the trial and appellate courts did, that generally signifies that a genuine issue
of material fact exists and that the evidence must be further examined at trial. See
id. at ¶ 46. Instead of taking that prudent approach here, the majority opinion
imbues this court with unwarranted fact-finding authority, a practice that should be
discontinued. Unless there is truly a misapplication or misunderstanding of the law
when applied to a case like this, we should not engage in deciding as a matter of
law what reasonable minds may readily and naturally come to a different conclusion
about.
         {¶ 33} The majority opinion should have determined whether appellee NC
Enterprises, L.L.C.’s lawn-maintenance activities at the property at issue were
sufficiently open and notorious in light of all the facts presented in this case on
summary judgment. At a minimum, the majority opinion lacks the restraint and
sensibility to conclude that whether NC Enterprises’ activities constituted open and
notorious conduct was a genuine issue of material fact for consideration by the fact-
finder at trial. Unfortunately, the unrestrained majority opinion instead announces
a rule stating that lawn-maintenance activities, as a matter of law, can never
constitute an adverse use for purposes of establishing an adverse-possession claim,
deciding the issue for all time by ruling in favor of Norfolk Railway. See majority




                                         12
                               January Term, 2026




opinion at ¶ 26.
       {¶ 34} A unanimous panel of the Ninth District Court of Appeals concluded
that NC Enterprises’ activities were sufficiently open and notorious. 2024-Ohio-
1454, ¶ 33 (9th Dist.). The trial court reached the same conclusion. Summit C.P.
No. CV-2021-08-2641, 6 (Mar. 16, 2023). While I agree with the judgments of
both the panel and the trial court, those judgments and this court’s judgment
arguably demonstrate that reasonable minds can come to more than one conclusion
about NC Enterprises’ lawn-maintenance activities.
       {¶ 35} It is difficult to believe that a prudent owner of commercial property
would not know that the property’s lawn, trees, and vegetation were being
maintained by another entity. If nothing else, an owner’s bookkeeper or manager
should notice that there are no expenditures for that type of lawn maintenance at
the property. For the period at issue, i.e., beginning in April 1998 until NC
Enterprises erected a fence in September 2000, see majority opinion at ¶ 3, 22, NC
Enterprises presented evidence indicating that it paid an independent contractor to
(1) mow the lawn of the property at issue several times each month from April 1998
through November 1998 and April 1999 through September 1999; (2) complete
“ground maintenance” from May 2000 through August 2000; and (3) perform
annual tree and shrub trimming, mulching, and end-of-the-year “cleanup.” These
activities constitute more than simple lawn maintenance. And although a would-
be adverse possessor must establish that its possession of the property was
sufficiently open and notorious, it need not show that the owner had actual
knowledge of the adverse use. See Vanasdal v. Brinker, 27 Ohio App.3d 298, 299
(9th Dist. 1985). We must consider how a reasonable—not ignorant or absent—
owner would have used the property during the applicable period. See id.
       {¶ 36} It is even more difficult to accept that Norfolk Railway could claim
that some of NC Enterprises’ activities were not sufficiently open and notorious
when Norfolk Railway failed to oppose the most open and notorious activities at



                                        13
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




the property, such as the construction of the fence in September 2000 and the
extensive drainage work completed in 2011. Viewing the facts in a light most
favorable to Norfolk Railway, as we are required to do in determining whether NC
Enterprises was entitled to summary judgment, see Civ.R. 56(C), at best, there
exists a genuine issue of material fact that must be further examined at trial. Yet,
incredibly, the majority opinion goes beyond denying NC Enterprises summary
judgment and concludes that Norfolk Railway is entitled to summary judgment.
See majority opinion at ¶ 30. But in viewing the facts in a light most favorable to
NC Enterprises to determine whether Norfolk Railway was entitled to summary
judgment, at best, there exists a genuine issue of material fact about whether NC
Enterprises’ activities before the construction of the fence in September 2000 were
sufficiently open and notorious.
        {¶ 37} The majority opinion strains to create a bright-line rule for lawn-
maintenance activities in adverse-possession cases when the many and varied
situations involving lawn maintenance and adverse possession do not lend
themselves to following such a rule. By its very nature, an adverse-possession
claim arising from lawn-maintenance activities is a jury question, plain and simple,
because of the complexities and uniqueness of the individual situations in which
those activities occur. Contrary to the majority opinion’s presumption that this
dissent would “abhor” a different bright-line rule regarding Norfolk Railway’s first
proposition of law than what is pointed out here, majority opinion at ¶ 27, the only
bright-line rule that I wish to see is one that preserves the fact-finding role of the
trial court.
        {¶ 38} Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Ninth District Court
of Appeals, or at a minimum, reverse that court’s judgment affirming the trial
court’s judgment granting summary judgment in favor of NC Enterprises and
remand the case for a trial to determine whether NC Enterprises’ lawn-maintenance
activities at the property before September 2000 were sufficiently open and




                                         14
                               January Term, 2026




notorious. Because the court does neither, I dissent.
                              __________________
       Hanna Campbell & Powell, L.L.P., and Frank G. Mazgaj; and Ciccolini &
Associates Co., L.P.A., Maria T. Ciccolini, and Michael E. Ciccolini, for appellee.
       Eastman & Smith, Ltd., Matthew D. Harper, and Nicholas W. Bartlett, for
appellant.
                              __________________




                                        15