Toledo v. State

[Cite as Toledo v. State, 2026-Ohio-1625.]




                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT


City of Toledo,                                     :

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,               :               No. 25AP-872
                                                                 (C.P.C. No. 24CV-8714)
v.                                                  :
                                                               (REGULAR CALENDAR)
State of Ohio,                                      :

                 Defendant-Appellee.                :



                                             D E C I S I O N

                                        Rendered on May 5, 2026


                 On brief: John T. Madigan and Jeffrey B. Charles, for
                 appellant. Argued: John T. Madigan.

                 On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, Stephen P.
                 Tabatowski, and Gregory A. Rustico, for appellee. Argued:
                 Stephen P. Tabatowski.

                   APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas


EDELSTEIN, J.

        {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, City of Toledo, appeals from a decision and judgment
entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion for summary
judgment of defendant-appellee, the State of Ohio. For the following reasons, we affirm
with modifications.
I. Facts and Procedural History

        {¶ 2} Under former Toledo Municipal Code 313.12, Toledo operated a municipal
camera-enforced traffic program to issue fines to drivers for both speeding and traffic light
No. 25AP-872                                                                             2



violations within the city. (Compl. at ¶ 1.) When the cameras detected a traffic law
violation, Toledo sent a traffic ticket to the registered owner of the vehicle that committed
the violation. (Compl. at ¶ 2.) The registered owner could avoid responsibility by providing
an affidavit stating the name and address of the person operating the vehicle at the time of
the violation or by providing a law enforcement report indicating the vehicle had been
reported stolen prior to the time of the violation. (Compl. at ¶ 2.)
       {¶ 3} In 2019, as part of H.B. 62, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 5747.502 (“the
spending setoff”) to offset the amount of local government funding the state distributes to
a municipality that chooses to operate a camera-enforced traffic program based on the
amount of money the municipality collected from the program. (Compl. at ¶ 4.) R.C.
5747.502 requires the municipality to file with the tax commissioner a report of the gross
traffic camera fines collected during the preceding fiscal year, and the tax commissioner
then computes a local government fund adjustment or a residual adjustment for the
municipality. The statute specifically directs the commissioner to reduce local government
fund payments to a municipality based on the local government fund adjustment. R.C.
5747.502(C)(1).
       {¶ 4} In May 2019, Toledo filed a complaint in the Lucas County Court of Common
Pleas challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions of H.B. 62, including the
spending setoff in R.C. 5747.502 (“the Lucas County case”). Toledo sought a declaratory
judgment, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction. (Compl. at ¶ 5.) On
July 1, 2019, Toledo obtained a preliminary injunction in the Lucas County case enjoining
the state from enforcing the contested provisions and from reducing Toledo’s local
government funds for noncompliance with R.C. 5747.502. (Compl. at ¶ 7; Ex. 1.) Toledo
continued to operate its camera-enforced traffic program until June 24, 2020, when the
Supreme Court of Ohio issued its decision in State ex rel. Magsig v. Toledo, 2020-Ohio-
3416, holding municipal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over civil traffic enforcement
violations. (Compl. at ¶ 7.) Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Magsig, on
August 18, 2020, the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas partially vacated the portion of
the preliminary injunction in the Lucas County case enjoining the state from enforcing R.C.
1901.20(A)(1) and 1907.02(C). (Compl. at ¶ 7.)
No. 25AP-872                                                                               3



       {¶ 5} The state then moved for summary judgment in the Lucas County case.
(Compl. at ¶ 8.) The trial court determined several of Toledo’s claims were moot based on
Toledo’s suspension of its camera-enforced traffic program. (Compl. at ¶ 8; Ex. 2.)
Additionally, the trial court found the spending setoff provision in R.C. 5747.502 was
unconstitutional and issued a permanent injunction enjoining the enforcement of R.C.
5747.502. (Compl. at ¶ 8; Ex. 2.) Both parties appealed, and the Sixth District Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling that Toledo’s claims were moot, remanding the case
to the trial court for consideration of those claims. Toledo v. State, 2022-Ohio-1192 (6th
Dist.). The Sixth District Court of Appeals did not reach the question of the constitutionality
of R.C. 5747.502. Id. at ¶ 20.
       {¶ 6} While the Lucas County case was still pending on remand, the Supreme Court
issued a decision in Newburgh Heights v. State, 2022-Ohio-1642. The court ruled the
spending setoff provisions of R.C. 5747.502 were constitutional and did not violate the
Home Rule Amendment in Article XVIII of the Ohio Constitution, holding “[t]he General
Assembly therefore has exclusive discretion to reduce the appropriation of local-
government funds to a municipality in the amount that the municipality has collected in
fines from citations issued based on the operation of traffic cameras.” Newburgh Hts. at
¶ 5. Based on Newburgh Heights, the trial court in the Lucas County case vacated its prior
injunction and, in an August 29, 2022 order and judgment, granted the state’s motion for
summary judgment. Toledo v. State, Lucas C.P. No. CI-201802922.
       {¶ 7} After the Supreme Court’s decision in Newburgh Heights, the Department of
Taxation notified Toledo it would enforce R.C. 5747.502 and reduce Toledo’s share of local
government fund distribution by the amount of money Toledo received during the
operation of its camera-enforced traffic system from July 1, 2019 through August 29, 2022,
the duration of the injunction in the Lucas County case. (Compl. at ¶ 22-23.) Toledo
collected $6,856,864 from its camera-enforced traffic system during this timeframe.
(Compl. at ¶ 24.)
       {¶ 8} On June 12, 2024, Toledo filed the instant complaint in the Lucas County
Court of Common Pleas seeking (1) preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the
state from enforcing R.C. 5747.502 or reducing Toledo’s local government funds; (2) an
order requiring the state to restore all local government fund distributions to Toledo that
No. 25AP-872                                                                             4



were withheld related to the effective dates of the injunction from the Lucas County case;
and (3) a declaratory judgment declaring the enforcement of R.C. 5747.502 and reduction
of local government fund distributions to Toledo related to the effective dates of the
injunction is unconstitutional or otherwise invalid. Toledo generally argued the state
cannot enforce R.C. 5747.502 for the period the Lucas County case injunction was in effect,
from July 1, 2019 to August 29, 2022. (Compl. at ¶ 25.) On the state’s motion, the Lucas
County Court of Common Pleas transferred venue to Franklin County.
       {¶ 9} Once venue was transferred to Franklin County, the state moved to dismiss
Toledo’s complaint, arguing it was not violating the injunction, R.C. 5747.502 is and always
has been constitutional, and R.C. 5703.38 deprived the trial court of subject-matter
jurisdiction to enjoin orders, determinations, or directions of the Department of Taxation.
In a March 28, 2025 entry, the trial court denied the state’s motion to dismiss, determining
it would not engage in statutory interpretation at the pleading stage, and finding Toledo
sufficiently pled the elements of declaratory judgment to survive a motion to dismiss.
       {¶ 10} Thereafter, in July 2025, the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The state argued R.C. 5703.38 precludes courts from issuing injunctive relief
suspending or staying any order of the Department of Taxation. Additionally, the state
argued R.C. 5747.502 plainly directs the tax commissioner to compute local government
funds on a rolling basis, and the Supreme Court’s decision in Newburgh Heights expressly
found the spending setoff provisions of R.C. 5747.502 to be constitutional. Toledo argued,
on the other hand, that even though the spending setoff provisions of R.C. 5747.502 are
constitutional, the state was enjoined from enforcing R.C. 5747.502 through August 29,
2022, and the state cannot retroactively enforce R.C. 5747.502 dating back to that
timeframe. Toledo also argued that even if R.C. 5703.38 bars injunctive relief, Toledo is
nonetheless entitled to a judgment declaring the state is wrongfully withholding Toledo’s
share of local government funds.
       {¶ 11} In an October 3, 2025 decision and judgment entry, the trial court granted
the state’s motion for summary judgment and denied Toledo’s motion for summary
judgment. The trial court determined R.C. 5703.38 removed the trial court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction to issue orders that would adjust the spending setoffs of the Department of
Taxation pursuant to R.C. 5747.502. Despite Toledo’s attempt to frame the issue as a
No. 25AP-872                                                                                5



constitutional matter, the trial court determined it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over
Toledo’s request for “monetary relief that unquestionably is at the heart of the dispute.”
(Oct. 3, 2025 Decision and Jgmt. Entry at 5.) Finally, the trial court determined granting
Toledo’s request for declaratory judgment would result in an advisory opinion because it
would not settle the legal rights of the parties given the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction to
issue orders granting any financial relief. Thus, the trial court entered final judgment in
favor of the state. Toledo timely appeals.
II. Assignments of Error

       {¶ 12} Toledo raises the following seven assignments of error for our review:
              [I.] The Trial Court erred in concluding that R.C. 5703.38
              deprives Courts of Common Pleas of subject matter jurisdiction
              to hear the City of Toledo’s action seeking recovery of local
              government funds withheld by the State during the period
              when a valid injunction barred enforcement of the spending
              setoff provisions of House Bill 62.

              [II.] The Trial Court erred in misinterpreting R.C. 5703.38 by
              treating it as an absolute jurisdictional bar rather than as a
              limitation solely on injunctive relief against tax
              determinations.

              [III.] The Trial Court erred in failing to harmonize R.C. 5703.38
              with R.C. 2723.01 which expressly grants Courts of Common
              Pleas jurisdiction to enjoin illegal tax levies or collections and
              to entertain actions to recover illegally collected taxes.

              [IV.] The Trial Court erred in disregarding the statutory
              exception in R.C. 5703.38 preserving “any right or defense in
              any action to collect any tax or penalty,” which applies to the
              City’s claim for recovery of funds withheld during the
              injunction period.

              [V.] The Trial Court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction
              to issue a declaratory judgment regarding the City’s rights
              during the injunction period.

              [VI.] The Trial Court erred by failing to hold that the State’s use
              of R.C. 5703.38 was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

              [VII.] The Trial Court erred in failing to recognize that
              constitutional principles requiring respect for injunctions until
No. 25AP-872                                                                               6



                vacated override statutory limitations on jurisdiction, thereby
                requiring the Court to exercise jurisdiction to enforce the
                injunction’s legal effect.

III. Standard of Review

       {¶ 13} An appellate court reviews a trial court’s grant of summary judgment under
a de novo standard. Estate of Sample v. Xenos Christian Fellowship, Inc., 2021-Ohio-
3898, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.). “[D]e novo appellate review means that the court of appeals
independently reviews the record and affords no deference to the trial court’s decision.”
(Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Holt v. State, 2010-Ohio-6529, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.).
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party demonstrates: (1) no
genuine issue of material fact exists; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law; and (3) reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is
adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party
being entitled to have the evidence most strongly construed in its favor. Civ.R. 56(C); State
ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183 (1997).
       {¶ 14} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), the moving party bears the initial burden of
informing the trial court of the basis for the summary judgment motion and of identifying
those portions of the record demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-93 (1996). The moving party cannot discharge its
initial burden with a conclusory assertion that the nonmoving party has no evidence to
prove its case; the moving party must specifically point to evidence of the type listed in
Civ.R. 56(C) affirmatively demonstrating the nonmoving party has no evidence to support
the nonmoving party’s claims. Id.; Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421, 429 (1997). If the
moving party fails to satisfy its initial burden, the court must deny the motion for summary
judgment. Dresher at 293. Where the moving party satisfies the initial burden, summary
judgment is appropriate unless the nonmoving party responds, by affidavit or otherwise, as
provided under Civ.R. 56, with specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue exists for trial.
Id.; Hall v. Ohio State Univ. College of Humanities, 2012-Ohio-5036, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.);
Civ.R. 56(E).
No. 25AP-872                                                                               7



IV. First, Second, Third, and Fourth Assignments of Error—R.C. 5703.38

       {¶ 15} Toledo’s first, second, third, and fourth assignments of error are interrelated,
and we address them jointly. In its first assignment of error, Toledo argues the trial court
erred in finding R.C. 5703.38 deprived it of jurisdiction to consider Toledo’s claims when
the claims relate to a period of time when a valid injunction was in place. In its second
assignment of error, Toledo argues the trial court erred in its interpretation of the scope of
R.C. 5703.38. In its third assignment of error, Toledo argues the trial court erred in failing
to reconcile R.C. 5703.38 with R.C. 2723.01. And in its fourth assignment of error, Toledo
argues the trial court erred in failing to apply the statutory exception in R.C. 5703.38 to its
claim for relief. Taken together, these four assignments of error assert the trial court
erroneously interpreted and applied R.C. 5703.38 to conclude it lacked jurisdiction to issue
the requested relief.
       {¶ 16} The construction of a statute presents a question of law that this court reviews
de novo. Madyda v. Ohio Dept. of Pub. Safety, 2024-Ohio-3201, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.), quoting
New York Frozen Foods, Inc. v. Bedford Hts. Income Tax Bd. of Rev., 2016-Ohio-7582,
¶ 8. A court’s duty is to give effect to the words used in a statute, not to delete or insert
words. See, e.g., Ayers v. Cleveland, 2020-Ohio-1047, ¶ 17; State v. Jordan, 89 Ohio St.3d
488, 491 (2000) (“[T]he cornerstone of statutory construction and interpretation is
legislative intention.”). “In order to determine legislative intent it is a cardinal rule of
statutory construction that a court must first look to the language of the statute itself.”
Jordan at 492. When the text of the statute in question is plain and unambiguous, we must
give effect to the legislature’s intent simply by applying the law as written. State v.
Kreischer, 2006-Ohio-2706, ¶ 12; State v. Hairston, 2004-Ohio-969, ¶ 13, citing Sears v.
Weimer, 143 Ohio St. 312 (1944), paragraph five of the syllabus. “Only when a definitive
meaning proves elusive should rules for construing ambiguous language be employed.
Otherwise, allegations of ambiguity become self-fulfilling.” State v. Porterfield, 2005-
Ohio-3095, ¶ 11. See also Hairston at ¶ 11.
       {¶ 17} R.C. 5703.38 provides:
              No injunction shall issue suspending or staying any order,
              determination, or direction of the department of taxation, or
              any action of the treasurer of state or attorney general required
No. 25AP-872                                                                             8



              by law to be taken in pursuance of any such order,
              determination, or direction. This section does not affect any
              right or defense in any action to collect any tax or penalty.

       {¶ 18} As we have previously explained, “R.C. 5703.38 prohibits common pleas
courts from issuing any order—injunction or otherwise—that would have the effect of
staying or suspending an order or action of the department of taxation.” Dept. of Taxation
v. Scalf, 2023-Ohio-3652, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.), citing Hakim v. Kosydar, 49 Ohio St.2d 161,
164-65 (1977) (“the unambiguous language” in the first sentence of R.C. 5703.38 “means
what it says”). “In other words, R.C. 5703.38 bars the common pleas court from granting
any relief that would suspend or stay any order, determination, or decision of the
commissioner of the department of taxation.” Id. at ¶ 13, citing Torbet v. Kilgore, 6 Ohio
St.2d 42, 44 (1966).
       {¶ 19} Toledo agrees with the general premise that R.C. 5703.38 prohibits a
common pleas court from issuing an injunction staying or suspending an order of the
Department of Taxation. Toledo argues, however, the trial court erroneously applied R.C.
5703.38 here because the statute does not relate to the unique relief Toledo sought.
Specifically, Toledo asserts it did not seek a new injunction against current determinations
of the Department of Taxation, a situation Toledo concedes would be barred by R.C.
5703.38. Instead, Toledo asserts it seeks enforcement of the previously issued injunction
in the Lucas County case in effect from July 2019 to August 2022. Thus, Toledo argues,
without citation to authority, the injunction it seeks in the instant case is fundamentally
distinct from the type of injunctive relief contemplated in R.C. 5703.38. We disagree.
       {¶ 20} Though Toledo attempts to draw a distinction between a new injunction
against current determinations of the tax commissioner and what it deems is mere
enforcement of a previously issued injunction, Toledo ignores both the plain language of
R.C. 5703.38 and the relief it requested in its complaint. The first sentence of R.C. 5703.38
unequivocally provides, “N0 injunction shall issue suspending or staying any order,
determination, or direction of the department of taxation.” (Emphasis added.) Toledo’s
complaint specifically requested preliminary and permanent injunctions “prohibiting the
[state] from enforcing the provisions [of] R.C. 5747.502 or reducing [Toledo’s] local
government funds.” (Compl. at 8.) Despite Toledo’s attempt on appeal to frame its request
No. 25AP-872                                                                                9



for relief as requesting enforcement of a prior injunction, Toledo’s complaint requested the
issuance of a new injunction in order to accomplish this stated goal. Given the breadth of
R.C. 5703.38 prohibiting the common pleas court from issuing an injunction against any
order of the tax commissioner, Toledo’s requested relief of an injunction prohibiting the
enforcement of R.C. 5747.502 is plainly outside the authority of the common pleas court.
Toledo also requests an order that the state restore to Toledo “all local government fund
distributions that have been illegally withheld in violation of Court orders.” (Compl. at 8.)
However, such an order would have the effect of staying or suspending an order of the
Department of Taxation and, therefore, is barred by R.C. 5703.38. Scalf at ¶ 12. Simply
stated, R.C. 5703.38 bars the common pleas court from issuing any order that would have
the effect of staying or suspending an order of the tax commissioner and does not create an
exception for cases that relate to prior orders of the tax commissioner.
       {¶ 21} In an effort to circumvent the trial court’s disposition of the case on the basis
of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, Toledo argues R.C. 5703.38 is not a categorical bar
on the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction but is a mere limitation on the type of relief
the court may grant. Reiterating that it seeks relief related to the time period the injunction
from the Lucas County case was in effect, Toledo asserts the trial court retained jurisdiction
to consider its claim for relief because it dates back to a specific, finite time period. Again,
we emphasize the plain language of the statute does not provide for disparate application
depending on the timeframe for which a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief. Moreover, Toledo’s
argument ignores the general principle that “[w]hen a court has been granted general
subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a class of case, that court may still lack jurisdiction over
a particular case if that jurisdiction is explicitly removed by, for example, another statute.”
State ex rel. T.B. v. Brown, 2025-Ohio-4484, ¶ 24. The Supreme Court has determined the
limitation on the general authority of common pleas courts contained in R.C. 5703.38 is a
limitation on trial court jurisdiction. Hakim, 49 Ohio St.2d at 165, fn. 2; State ex rel. Tax
Comm. v. Faust, 113 Ohio St. 365, 368 (1925). We are not persuaded by Toledo’s argument
that the unique facts of this case somehow operate to restore subject-matter jurisdiction to
the common pleas court where the General Assembly has expressly acted to remove it.
       {¶ 22} Still, Toledo asserts the trial court erred in concluding it lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction because it failed to harmonize R.C. 5703.38 with R.C. 2723.01. We
No. 25AP-872                                                                             10



reject this argument. R.C. 2723.01 is the general grant of jurisdiction to common pleas
courts to “enjoin the illegal levy or collection of taxes and assessments.” In Torbet, the
Supreme Court specifically held “[t]he specific provisions against an injunction in [R.C.
5703.38] limit the general authority of the Common Pleas Court, that is provided for in
[R.C. 2723.01], to render an injunction against an illegal levy or collection of taxes and
assessments.” Torbet, 6 Ohio St.2d 42 at paragraph three of the syllabus. The trial court
cited and relied on Torbet in concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Thus, we do
not agree with Toledo that the trial court failed to harmonize the specific statute with the
more general statute. See also State ex rel. Dublin Secs. v. Ohio Div. of Secs., 68 Ohio St.3d
426, 429 (1994) (“It is a well-settled principle of statutory construction that when two
statutes, one general and the other special, cover the same subject matter, the special
provision is to be construed as an exception to the general statute which might otherwise
apply.”).
       {¶ 23} Toledo acknowledges Torbet but argues it does not apply because the
injunction from the Lucas County case was based on “the declared unconstitutionality” of
the spending setoff provision of R.C. 5747.502. (Appellant’s Brief at 19.) Because of that
“declared unconstitutionality,” Toledo asserts the application of the spending setoff to the
timeframe the injunction from the Lucas County case was in effect amounts to “the
collection of an illegal tax” under R.C. 2723.01. (Emphasis omitted.) (Appellant’s Brief at
19.) Toledo’s argument is based on a flawed premise: the spending setoff provision is
neither “illegal” nor is it a “tax.”
       {¶ 24} Though the constitutionality of the spending setoff in R.C. 5747.502 was the
question underlying the initial injunction in the Lucas County case, the Supreme Court
unequivocally found the spending setoff to be constitutional in Newburgh Heights, 2022-
Ohio-1642, at ¶ 35, leading to the trial court vacating the injunction in the Lucas County
case. The Supreme Court concluded the spending setoff in R.C. 5747.502 is a proper
exercise of the General Assembly’s discretionary spending power.             Id. (“The Ohio
Constitution grants the General Assembly the spending power, and the spending setoff
enacted by R.C. 5747.502 falls squarely within the authority to establish priorities in
deciding the amount of funding to provide for municipalities.”). Therefore, there is no
longer any dispute that the spending setoff—which is not a tax, but a discretionary function
No. 25AP-872                                                                                   11



of the legislature to direct spending—is constitutional and, thus, it is not “illegal.” And R.C.
5703.38 clearly prohibits Toledo from seeking a new order enjoining an action of the tax
commissioner even if Toledo’s purported purpose of that new order is to relate back to the
time period of the prior injunction.
       {¶ 25} For similar reasons, we reject Toledo’s argument that the second sentence of
R.C. 5703.38 “directly applies” to these facts to confer subject-matter jurisdiction to the
trial court. That sentence provides, “This section does not affect any right or defense in any
action to collect any tax or penalty.” As we explained above, the state’s enforcement of the
spending setoff provision is not a tax but is a proper exercise of the legislature’s
discretionary spending power. See Newburgh Hts. at ¶ 35. Additionally, Toledo’s reading
of the spending setoff as punitive in nature does not render the spending setoff provision a
“penalty” within the meaning of R.C. 5703.38. We are mindful that, beyond a few specific
provisions requiring redistribution of certain taxes to municipalities, none of which are
relevant here, “the Ohio Constitution does not create a general duty for the legislature to
fund the operations of municipal corporations.” Newburgh Hts. at ¶ 22. Though Toledo
disagrees with the manner in which the legislature has chosen to exercise its discretionary
spending authority, that disagreement is not enough to qualify its action for injunctive relief
as a “defense in any action to collect any tax or penalty.” R.C. 5703.38. Toledo’s action is
not a defense to the state’s collection of a tax or penalty and, therefore, does not fall within
the second sentence of R.C. 5703.38.
       {¶ 26} Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that R.C. 5703.38 removed its
subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Toledo’s claims. We overrule Toledo’s first, second,
third, and fourth assignments of error.
V. Fifth Assignment of Error—Declaratory Judgment

       {¶ 27} In its fifth assignment of error, Toledo argues the trial court erred in
concluding it lacked jurisdiction to consider Toledo’s claim for declaratory judgment.
Toledo asserts that even if the jurisdictional limitation in R.C. 5703.38 applies to this case,
it applies only to its claims for injunctive relief, not its claim for declaratory judgment.
       {¶ 28} We agree with Toledo that R.C. 5703.38 applies to injunctive relief and does
not expressly mention declaratory judgment. However, as we explained in our resolution
No. 25AP-872                                                                                12



of Toledo’s first four assignments of error, the Supreme Court has broadly construed R.C.
5703.38 to prohibit the common pleas courts from issuing any order that has the
effect of staying or suspending an action or order of the Department of Taxation. Scalf,
2023-Ohio-3652, at ¶ 12 (10th Dist.), citing Hakim, 49 Ohio St.2d at 164-65. And, as we
have previously held, under R.C. 5703.38, a declaratory judgment cannot be used “to
achieve indirectly what [the plaintiff] could not achieve directly.” Kinninger v. Tracy, 1992
Ohio App. LEXIS 6793, *7 (10th Dist. Dec. 31, 1992) (finding R.C. 5703.38 barred the
plaintiffs’ claims for both injunctive relief against the collection of a specific tax and a
declaratory judgment that the tax was illegal).
         {¶ 29} Here, Toledo sought a declaratory judgment declaring (1) “the enforcement
of R.C. 5747.502 during the period its enforcement by the State of Ohio was enjoined was
unconstitutional, or otherwise invalid,” and (2) “the reduction of [Toledo’s] local
government fund distribution by the State of Ohio to be unlawful.” (Compl. at 7-8.) Despite
captioning its claim for relief as one for declaratory judgment, the underlying purpose of
Toledo’s requested declaration is to stay or suspend the tax commissioner’s enforcement of
the spending setoff provision of R.C. 5747.502. As in Kinninger, Toledo’s request for
declaratory judgment is an attempt to indirectly achieve the same outcome it requested
through its claim for injunctive relief. Because R.C. 5703.38 deprives the common pleas
court of subject-matter jurisdiction to issue any order—injunction or otherwise—that has
the effect of staying or suspending an order of the Department of Taxation, the trial court
did not err in concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Toledo’s claim for
declaratory judgment. Scalf at ¶ 12. We therefore overrule Toledo’s fifth assignment of
error.
VI. Sixth Assignment of Error—Res Judicata

         {¶ 30} In its sixth assignment of error, Toledo argues the trial court erred in granting
the state’s motion for summary judgment because res judicata bars the state’s reliance on
R.C. 5703.38. Toledo asserts the state failed to raise R.C. 5703.38 in the Lucas County case
and, therefore, is not permitted to rely on R.C. 5703.38 in the instant litigation.
         {¶ 31} “ ‘Res judicata bars the litigation of all claims that either were or might have
been litigated in a first lawsuit.’ ” State ex rel. Woods v. Jenkins, 2024-Ohio-1753, ¶ 7,
No. 25AP-872                                                                              13



quoting Hughes v. Calabrese, 2002-Ohio-2217, ¶ 12. Though the state did not raise R.C.
5703.38 in the Lucas County case, res judicata does not operate to bar the state from doing
so in this case because R.C. 5703.38 concerns the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.
       {¶ 32} Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to entertain and
adjudicate a particular class of cases on the merits. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta, 2014-
Ohio-4275, ¶ 19, citing Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87 (1972). “Subject-matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at any time.” Hulbert v. Buehrer, 2017-
Ohio-844, ¶ 11 (10th Dist.), citing Rosen v. Celebrezze, 2008-Ohio-853, ¶ 45, quoting Pratts
v. Hurley, 2004-Ohi0-1980, ¶ 11 (“ ‘Because subject-matter jurisdiction goes to the power
of the court to adjudicate the merits of a case, it can never be waived and may be challenged
at any time.’ ”). Res judicata does not preclude a court from considering a lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction unless the question of subject-matter jurisdiction has previously been
fully litigated. Dunlop v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2019-Ohio-3632, ¶ 11-12 (10th
Dist.), citing Bakhtiar v. Saghafi, 2018-Ohio-3796, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.) (“[t]he bar of res
judicata does not apply where the prior action was void for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction”), discretionary appeal not allowed by 2019-Ohio-173; In re A.R., 2017-Ohio-
1575, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.) (“[r]es judicata applies to bar relitigation of the issue of subject-
matter jurisdiction”). The question of the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction was not
raised, and thus not fully litigated, in the Lucas County case. Therefore, res judicata does
not bar the state from raising the jurisdictional limitation of R.C. 5703.38 in the instant
case. We overrule Toledo’s sixth assignment of error.
VII. Seventh Assignment of Error—Constitutional Preemption of Statutory
Jurisdictional Limitations

       {¶ 33} In its seventh and final assignment of error, Toledo argues the trial court
erred in deferring to statutory limits on its subject-matter jurisdiction rather than
recognizing “constitutional principles requiring respect for injunctions until vacated.”
(Appellant’s Brief at 1.) As the state notes, though Toledo assigned the trial court’s
adherence to the statutory limits of its subject-matter jurisdiction as error, Toledo failed to
separately argue this assignment of error in its brief.        App.R. 16(A)(7) requires an
appellant’s brief to include “[a]n argument containing the contentions of the appellant with
respect to each assignment of error presented for review and the reasons in support of the
No. 25AP-872                                                                                  14



contentions, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which
appellant relies.” This court “may disregard an assignment of error presented for review if
the party raising it . . . fails to argue the assignment separately in the brief, as required under
App.R. 16(A).” App.R. 12(A)(2). See also Lundeen v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 2013-Ohio-
112, ¶ 16, 18 (10th Dist.). Because Toledo failed to argue this assignment of error separately
in its brief, we overrule its seventh and final assignment of error.
VIII. Trial Court’s Erroneous Judgment on the Merits

       {¶ 34} We agree with the state that the trial court did not err in concluding it lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction over Toledo’s claims. As Toledo notes, however, after granting
the state’s motion for summary judgment based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the
trial court purported to enter final judgment for the state “on the merits.” (Decision and
Jgmt. Entry at 5.) “Where a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it must announce its
lack of jurisdiction and dismiss the matter; any other proclamation by a court lacking
subject-matter jurisdiction is void.” Hulbert, 2017-Ohio-844, at ¶ 12 (10th Dist.), citing
Pratts, 2004-Ohi0-1980, at ¶ 11, quoting State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 75
(1998), citing Scudere v. France, 2009-Ohio-6989, ¶ 6 (10th Dist.). Accordingly, we modify
the decision and judgment entry of the trial court to reflect the matter is dismissed rather
than resolved on its merits. Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2) (courts of appeals
are granted jurisdiction to “review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders
of the courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district”); R.C. 2501.02(C)
(appellate courts may “review, affirm, modify, set aside, or reverse judgments or final
orders of courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district”).
IX. Disposition

       {¶ 35} Based on the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court did not err in
determining R.C. 5703.38 removed its subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Toledo’s
claims. However, though the trial court correctly determined it lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction over the matter, the trial court erroneously entered judgment “on the merits”
rather than dismissing the action. Thus, we modify the trial court’s decision and judgment
entry to reflect the matter is dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Having
No. 25AP-872                                                                        15



overruled Toledo’s seven assignments of error, we affirm the decision and judgment entry
of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas as modified.
                                                        Judgment affirmed as modified.

                      BEATTY BLUNT and DINGUS, JJ., concur.
                                   __________