State v. Abukar

[Cite as State v. Abukar, 2026-Ohio-1624.]


                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio,                                     :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,               :
                                                                     No. 25AP-354
v.                                                 :             (M.C. No. 2024 CRB 17131)

Abdikadir Abukar,                                  :           (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                 Defendant-Appellant.              :




                                             D E C I S I O N

                                       Rendered on May 5, 2026


                 On brief: Zachary M. Klein, City Attorney, Melanie R.
                 Tobias-Hunter, and Dave Pelletier, for appellee.
                 Argued: Ryan M. Pelfrey.

                 On brief: Elizabeth R. Miller, Ohio Public Defender, and
                 Melissa Seabolt, for appellant. Argued: Melissa Seabolt.

                       APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court

DORRIAN, J.
        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Abdikadir Abukar, appeals from a judgment of the
Franklin County Municipal Court. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal for
lack of jurisdiction.
I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 2} On March 20, 2025, a jury found appellant guilty of Violation of a Protection
Order in violation of R.C. 2919.27(A). The court filed an entry reflecting the same and
setting the case for a sentencing hearing on March 25, 2025.
        {¶ 3} On March 25, 2025, at the sentencing hearing, the court imposed a $200 fine
and court costs as well as 127 total days in jail. The court also credited appellant with 127
days in jail for time served.
No. 25AP-354                                                                               2


II. Assignments of Error
       {¶ 4} Appellant appealed on April 22, 2025.          Appellant asserts the following
assignments of error:
              [I.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
              APPOINT    A   QUALIFIED  FOREIGN  LANGUAGE
              INTERPRETER.

              [II.] MR. ABUKAR’S CONVICTION FOR VIOLATING A
              PROTECTION ORDER IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
              MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.

III. Discussion
       {¶ 5} We cannot address the merits of these assignments of error because we do
not have a final appealable order before us. An appellate court may only review final orders.
R.C. 2505.02(B).
              Under Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution, courts of
              appeals have jurisdiction only to “affirm, modify, or reverse
              judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the
              court of appeals within the district.”

              As a result, “[i]t is well-established that an order must be final
              before it can be reviewed by an appellate court. If an order is
              not final, then an appellate court has no jurisdiction.” Gen. Acc.
              Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 17, 20, 540
              N.E.2d 266.
Gehm v. Timberline Post & Frame, 2007-Ohio-607, ¶ 13-14.
       {¶ 6} In State v. Lester, 2011-Ohio-5204, ¶ 8, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that
for a judgment of conviction to be a final appealable order subject to appeal, it must comply
with the requirements of Crim.R. 32(C). To comply with the rule, all judgment entries
must contain 1) the fact of the conviction, 2) the sentence, 3) the judge’s signature, and
4) the entry on the journal by the clerk to be a final appealable order. Lester at ¶ 11.
“Without these substantive provisions, the judgment entry of conviction cannot be a final
order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02.” Id. “As a general matter, ‘[o]nly one
document can constitute a final appealable order,’ meaning that a single entry must satisfy
the requirements of Crim.R. 32(C).” State v. Thompson, 2014-Ohio-4751, ¶ 39.
       {¶ 7} Upon review of the sentencing entry in this case, this court notes that the
judgment entry does not state the fact of conviction. It does not indicate for what exactly
No. 25AP-354                                                                             3


appellant is being sentenced as it does not contain the name of the offense or the statute.
In relevant part, the form entry states:
                                           SENTENCE ENTRY
                                    Following Trial [handwritten]
                Defendant entered a plea of (GUILTY)/(NO CONTEST) to the
                (STATED)/(AMENDED) charge of _________________ in
                violation of Section ______________. At the request of the
                prosecutor         the       following      counts       are
                dismissed:___________. Based upon the (                    )
                DEFENDANT’S STIPULATION, ( ) COURT FINDING, ( )
                DEFENDANT[] WAIVES AN EXPLANATION OF THE
                CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE OFFENSE, there are sufficient
                facts to find defendant guilty and the Court finds defendant
                guilty.
(Emphasis in original.) This sentencing entry was filed March 25, 2025. A
different entry was filed four days earlier on March 21, 2025. That entry
states:
                The above-captioned case weas called for trial on the charges of
                Violation of a Protection Order. A jury was impaneled and
                sworn. Testimony was taken, and exhibits were admitted into
                evidence as reflected on the record.

                The jury found Defendant Abdikadir Abukar GUILTY of
                Violation of a Protection Order in violation of Ohio Revised
                Code 2919.27(A).

                This case is hereby set for sentencing on March 25, 2025 at
                9:00. Notice provided to parties.
(Emphasis in original.)
          {¶ 8} The earlier entry identifies the offense by name and statute. However, the
later sentencing entry does not identify the offense by name or statute. Therefore, the
sentencing entry does not constitute a single entry or one document that satisfies the
requirements of Crim.R. 32(C). Accordingly, as the March 25, 2025 sentencing entry is
missing one of the substantive requirements of Crim.R. 32(C)—the fact of the conviction—
No. 25AP-354                                                                                               4


it is not a final appealable order. This is true even if the entry of conviction is in the record.
See State v. Skaggs, 2021-Ohio-3639, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.)1
IV. Conclusion
        {¶ 9} Since the sentencing entry does not set forth the fact of conviction in this case,
there is no final appealable order and this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the
assignments of error. Thus, this court must dismiss the appeal as premature.
                                                                                      Appeal dismissed.

                               JAMISON and LELAND, JJ., concur.




1 We recently held as follows: “ ‘When a defendant in a criminal case claims that his judgment of conviction

does not comply with Crim.R. 32(C),’ the appropriate procedure to obtain a remedy is ‘ “a motion in the trial
court requesting a revised sentencing entry.” ’ ” State v. Morris, 2024-Ohio-262, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.), quoting
State ex rel. Bonner v. Serrott, 2020-Ohio-1450, ¶ 11, quoting McAllister v. Smith, 2008-Ohio-3881, ¶ 7. See
also State ex rel. DeWine v. Burge, 2011-Ohio-235, ¶ 20 (stating that “the appropriate remedy for a violation
of Crim.R. 32(C) is ‘resentencing,’ ” but the court’s previous holdings “did not suggest that this term
encompassed anything more than issuing a corrected sentencing entry that complies with Crim.R. 32(C)”).