State v. Alqahtani

[Cite as State v. Alqahtani, 2026-Ohio-1335.]




                           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                               THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                   AUGLAIZE COUNTY




STATE OF OHIO,
                                                      CASE NO. 2-25-11
         PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

    v.

ABDULLAH M. ALQAHTANI,                                OPINION AND
                                                      JUDGMENT ENTRY
         DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.




                        Appeal from Auglaize County Municipal Court
                              Trial Court No. 2025 TRD 05151

                                          Judgment Affirmed

                                   Date of Decision: April 13, 2026




APPEARANCES:

         Abdullah M. Alqahtani, Appellant

         Joshua A. Muhlenkamp for Appellee
Case No. 2-25-11



MILLER, J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Abdullah Alqahtani (“Alqahtani”), brings this appeal

from the September 11, 2025 judgment of the Auglaize County Municipal Court finding

him guilty of speeding. On appeal, Alqahtani asserts the court erred by admitting radar

evidence without sufficient proof of proper calibration and operation of the radar device.

He also argues that the trial court’s finding of guilt was against the manifest weight of the

evidence and the court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a continuance. For

the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                              Facts and Procedural History

       {¶2} On July 13, 2025, at approximately 1:37 a.m., while traveling northbound on

State Route 66 in Auglaize County, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Colin Costin

(“Trooper Costin”) observed Alqahtani’s vehicle traveling southbound toward his cruiser.

Trooper Costin visually estimated that Alqahtani’s vehicle was traveling at a rate of speed

that exceeded the speed limit of 55 miles per hour. He confirmed this suspicion by utilizing

his standard issue BEE III radar device which indicated Alqahtani was travelling at 72

miles per hour. Trooper Costin issued Alqahtani a traffic citation, charging him with

speeding in violation of R.C. 4511.21(D)(1). The citation was filed in the Auglaize County

Municipal Court on July 14, 2025.

       {¶3} On July 15, 2025, Alqahtani filed a written plea of not guilty. The court

accepted his plea and set the case for trial on August 14, 2025. On August 11, 2025,

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Alqahtani filed a motion to continue the trial. This motion was granted, and the trial was

set for August 28, 2025. On August 13, 2025, Alqahtani requested another continuance to

obtain additional discovery. The trial court denied the request.

       {¶4} At the August 28, 2025 bench trial, Trooper Costin testified that he performs

a calibration check on the device at the beginning and end of each shift, including the shift

during which he pulled over Alqahtani. Trooper Costin further stated that on the day in

question the device was in good working order and that, as an Ohio State Highway Patrol

officer, he was qualified to use the radar device. Additionally, the State entered the radar

certification document into evidence which showed the device was calibrated on June 4,

2025, with the calibration certification expiring on December 1, 2025. At the conclusion

of the trial, the court took the matter under advisement.

       {¶5} The trial court filed a judgment entry on September 11, 2025 finding Alqahtani

guilty of speeding in violation of R.C. 4511.21(D)(1). The court imposed a $100 fine.

Alqahtani timely appealed, setting forth three assignments of error.

                                First Assignment of Error

       The trial court abused its discretion by admitting the radar evidence
       without sufficient proof of proper calibration and operation, in violation
       of R.C. 4511.091 and relevant case law.

                              Second Assignment of Error

       The trial court’s finding of guilt was against the manifest weight and
       sufficiency of the evidence, as the prosecution failed to prove the
       elements of speeding beyond a reasonable doubt.



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         {¶6} At the outset, we address the glaring misapplication of case law presented in

the brief Alqahtani submitted to this court. We find the citations provided at best vaguely

support appellant’s claims and at worst are either completely irrelevant to the matter at

hand or, in at least one example of a case cited, do not seem to exist. Nevertheless, given

this brief was submitted by a self-represented party, with the claimed errors presenting non-

complex issues, we decline to sua sponte strike the brief and dismiss the appeal, choosing

instead to afford a measure of grace and consider the merits of the assignments of error.1


                                  First and Second Assignments of Error


         {¶7} In his first and second assignments of error, which we address together,

Alqahtani contends that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of the radar device

used by Trooper Costin, and his guilty conviction was founded on insufficient evidence

and is against the manifest weight of the evidence.


                                              Standards of Review


         {¶8} Although Alqahtani cross-examined Trooper Costin about the radar device, he

did not object to the admission of the radar device evidence at trial. Therefore, the


1
  “Pro se litigants are held to the same rules and procedures as those litigants who retain counsel.” Jones v. Booker,
114 Ohio App.3d 67, 70 (10th Dist. 1996), quoting Meyers v. First Nat’l Bank, 3 Ohio App.3d 209, 210 (1st Dist.
1981). Accordingly, a pro se litigant may not knowingly “make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal.”
Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1). Furthermore a pro se litigant must not “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation” or “engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c)-
(d). “It is well established that courts possess inherent authority to manage proceedings essential to their function, to
control the conduct of those who appear before them, and to sanction conduct that abuses the judicial process.” State
v. Coleman, 2026-Ohio-965, ¶ 39 (11th Dist.). Striking a filing containing fabricated and misplaced authority is an
appropriate remedy a court could employ. See, id. at ¶103-104.

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Case No. 2-25-11


admission of this evidence is reviewed for plain error, and not abuse of discretion as

Alqahtani contends. State v. Mitchell, 2019-Ohio-5168, ¶ 35 (3d Dist.). “For this Court to

notice plain error, the error must be an obvious defect in a trial’s proceedings, it must have

affected substantial rights, and it must have affected the outcome of the trial.” Id. “[E]ven

when the minimum requirements have been met, a reviewing court should still be

conservative in its application of plain-error review, reserving notice of plain error for

situations involving more than merely theoretical prejudice to substantial rights.” State v.

Steele, 2013-Ohio-2470, ¶ 30, citing State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 94 (1978). “Notice

of plain error . . . is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances

and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Long at paragraph three of the

syllabus.

       {¶9} As to Alqahtani’s second assignment of error, the concepts of sufficiency of

the evidence and manifest weight of the evidence are legally distinct. “An appellate court’s

function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction

is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed,

would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”

State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by

state constitutional amendment on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio.St.3d 89 (1997).

Consequently, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “In deciding if the evidence

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was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the credibility of

witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of fact.” State v. Jones, 2013-Ohio-

4775, ¶ 33 (1st Dist.).

       {¶10} Finally, when reviewing whether a conviction is against the manifest weight

of the evidence, “an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and

all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in

resolving conflicts in the evidence, the factfinder ‘clearly lost its way and created such a

manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial

ordered.’” State v. Williams, 2024-Ohio-2307, ¶ 22 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Thompkins,

78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). “A reviewing court must, however, allow the trier of fact

appropriate discretion on matters relating to the weight of the evidence and the credibility

of the witnesses.” State v. Sewell, 2016-Ohio-7175, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.), citing State v. DeHass,

10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. “Only in exceptional cases, where

the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn

the trial court’s judgment.” State v. Haller, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.), quoting State

v. Hunter, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.


                                         Analysis


       {¶11} “To prove a case of speeding based on the reading of a radar gun, [the State]

is required to show the accuracy and reliability of the device; that the unit was in good

condition for accurate work; and the operator’s qualifications by training and experience


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Case No. 2-25-11


to use the device.” State v. Helke, 2007-Ohio-5483, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.).2 “[T]he results of a

speed-measuring device using either radar or laser technology are admissible in court

without expert testimony establishing, or the court taking judicial notice of, the reliability

of the scientific principles underlying that technology. However, the fact-finder is required

to determine whether the evidence presented concerning the accuracy of the particular

speed-measuring device and the qualifications of the person who used it is sufficient to

support a conviction based on the device’s results.” City of Brook Park v. Rodojev, 2020-

Ohio-3253, ¶ 19. The trial court relied on Rodojev in its judgment entry for a finding that,

based on the evidence presented at trial, the radar device in question was accurate, in proper

working condition, and its operator was sufficiently qualified.

         {¶12} Alqahtani claims that the trial court’s reliance on Rodojev was misplaced,

because Rodojev still requires case-specific proof of the radar unit’s accuracy and

operation. Indeed, in Rodojev the Supreme Court of Ohio indicated that although the

results of a speed-measuring device are admissible without expert testimony,

“determinations involving the sufficiency and weight of the evidence [are still] to be made

on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at ¶18. The record shows that such case-specific proof of

accuracy and operation of the radar device were provided as part of the State’s case against

Alqahtani.




2
  Appellant incorrectly cites R.C. 4511.091 as the source for this rule. While R.C. 4511.091 addresses the arrest of an
individual based on radar and other devices, it does not place such a burden on the prosecution as Alqahtani claims.

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Case No. 2-25-11


       {¶13} “The trial court is the finder of fact in a bench trial.” Harrold v. Homsher,

2002-Ohio-4688, ¶ 20 (3d Dist.). It is the job of the fact finder to weigh the evidence and

determine the credibility of the witnesses and, as such, may choose to believe a witness in

all of their testimony, some of their testimony, or to discredit them entirely. In re K.S.,

2026-Ohio-79, ¶ 16 (3d Dist.). In the present case, Trooper Costin testified that he had

properly completed the necessary calibration checks, that the radar device was in good

working condition, and that he was qualified as a graduate of the Ohio State Highway

Patrol Academy to use the device. As fact-finder, the court found this testimony sufficient

to admit the radar evidence in order for the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that

Alqahtani was speeding. We find that Trooper Costin’s testimony along with the radar

certification document submitted into evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, was sufficient proof from which any rational fact finder could determine the

accuracy of the speed-measuring device and the qualifications of its operator to support a

conviction based on the device’s results.

       {¶14} Similarly, we find the trial court’s guilty verdict was not against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Alqahtani claims that Trooper Costin displayed an argumentative

demeanor during the traffic stop and would not advise him of the reason for the stop until

Alqahtani first provided identification. At trial and in his appellate brief he attempted to

claim the trooper’s alleged confrontational behavior evidenced a “preconceived notion

[that] could have colored his testimony on the radar reading and visual estimate, further

tipping the manifest weight against conviction.” In contrast, Trooper Costin testified that

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he followed proper protocol, the order of questions during a traffic stop holds no

significance, and there is no script given to state highway patrol troopers to follow when

conducting a traffic stop.3 Alqahtani’s accusation of prejudice does not refute the evidence

that he was travelling over the speed limit.

         {¶15} Giving the fact-finder its appropriate discretion in weighing the evidence and

assessing the credibility of the witness, we do not find this to be an exceptional case

manifesting a miscarriage of justice such that a new trial must be ordered. The State

established Trooper Costin’s qualifications and the functionality of the speed-measuring

device at trial. Alqahtani did not present adequate evidence to refute these established

claims.

         {¶16} Alqahtani’s argument in his first assignment of error that the trial court erred

by admitting the radar evidence was based on the trier of fact’s assessment of the credibility

of Trooper Costin’s testimony. Consequently, because we find the admittance of the radar

device testimony sufficient, we do not make a finding of plain error as to the admission of

the radar evidence showing Alqahtani was traveling at 72 miles per hour.

         {¶17} In addition, on appeal Alqahtani argues for the first time that Trooper Costin’s

actions were contrary to the steps required in the manual for the BEE III radar device, the

specific device used by the trooper to record Alqahtani’s speeding violation. Although

Alqahtani attached to his brief what appears to be various excerpts from the manual, the



3
 Moreover, Alqahtani fails to offer any support for the notion that an officer must state the reason for a traffic stop
before requesting identification from a driver, nor can we find any such requirement in the law to that effect.

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Case No. 2-25-11


actual manual was not presented as part of his cross-examination of Trooper Costin, so it

cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. See, Grove v. Grove, 2001-Ohio-2109,

¶ 5 (3d Dist.) (“Evidence not part of the record that is attached to an appellate brief cannot

be considered by a reviewing court.”) Alqahtani purports to cite multiple cases for the

proposition that there is a burden on the prosecution to show that strict calibration

requirements were met in accordance with the BEE III radar manual. We find the cases

cited are misapplied and irrelevant as to the arguments presented by Alqahtani such that

they do not warrant further discussion.

       {¶18} Finding no plain error in the admission of the radar device evidence, we

overrule the first assignment of error. Further, we conclude the record provides sufficient

evidence to support the finding of guilt and the trial court’s verdict was not against the

manifest weight of the evidence or a miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, we overrule the

second assignment of error.

                               Third Assignment of Error

       The trial court abused its discretion by denying Appellant’s motion for
       continuance to obtain discovery, prejudicing the defense in violation of
       Crim.R. 16.


       {¶19} In his third assignment of error, Alqahtani contends that he was prejudiced

when the trial court denied his motion to continue the trial in order for him to obtain

additional discovery.




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                                     Standard of Review


       {¶20} “The grant or denial of a continuance is within the sound discretion of the

trial judge and we will not reverse a determination regarding a continuance absent an abuse

of discretion.” City of Fostoria v. Flinders, 2020-Ohio-4263, ¶ 23 (3d Dist.). “The term

‘abuse of discretion’ connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the

court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” State ex rel. Edwards v.

Toledo City School Dist. Bd. Of Edn., 72 Ohio St.3d 106, 107 (1995).


                                           Analysis


       {¶21} “The Supreme Court of Ohio has created a list of factors to be considered in

evaluating a motion for continuance, which includes: the length of delay requested,

whether other continuances have been requested and received; inconvenience to litigants,

witnesses, and the trial court; whether the delay is for legitimate reasons or dilatory,

purposeful, or contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the circumstances giving

rise to the request, and any other relevant factors.” Flinders, at ¶ 24, citing State v. Unger,

67 Ohio St.2d, 65, 68 (1981).

       {¶22} Upon examining the record in this case, we find the trial court was properly

within its discretion in refusing to grant the continuance. Specifically, in his letter to the

court in response to the denial of his motion to continue and at trial, Alqahtani requested

additional time to obtain “full officer notes”, a “radar log”, and body camera footage. In

the same letter, Alqahtani confirmed that the prosecution “provided all available material.”

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       {¶23} At trial, Trooper Costin testified he is not required to keep a log of the radar

calibration checks he performs at the beginning and end of each of his shifts, and the State

reiterated that all available notes and materials had been delivered to Alqahtani pursuant to

his discovery request. Alqahtani has not directed our attention to any legal authority that

states a radar log is required to be kept by an officer operating such a device. Nonetheless,

Alqahtani persisted in his request for a document that does not exist.             Alqahtani

acknowledged on the record that he was in possession of officer notes included with the

citation that contain a “brief narrative” of the events surrounding his traffic stop but

contends that the “full officer notes . . . are missing.” Beyond Alqahtani’s assertion, he

points to no proof or facts that would create a reasonable inference that a radar log or more

detailed notes exist and were withheld from him. As to his request for the body camera

footage, we find Alqahtani’s contention bizarre, because in his pretrial correspondences

with the trial court not only does he admit the prosecution provided him with the body

camera footage, he describes in some detail what is found on the recording.

       {¶24} Given that the record demonstrates the prosecution complied fully with

Alqahtani’s discovery request, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion in denying

Alqahtani’s motion for a continuance.          Appellant’s third assignment of error is,

accordingly, overruled.




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                                     Conclusion


      {¶25} Having found no error prejudicial to the Appellant herein in the particulars

assigned and argued in the assignments of error, we affirm the judgment of the Auglaize

County Municipal Court.


                                                                   Judgement Affirmed

WILLAMOWSKI, and WALDICK, J. J., concur.




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Case No. 2-25-11



                               JUDGMENT ENTRY

       For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error are

overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial court

is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby rendered. The

cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the judgment for costs.

       It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R. 27; and

serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the proceedings

and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.




                                           Mark C. Miller, Judge



                                           John R. Willamowski, Judge



                                           Juergen A. Waldick, Judge

DATED:
/jlm




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