State v. Blevins

[Cite as State v. Blevins, 2026-Ohio-1181.]


                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     LAWRENCE COUNTY


STATE OF OHIO,                                   :

        Plaintiff-Appellee,                      :    Case No.   24CA22

        v.                                       :

JERRY RAY BLEVINS,                               :    DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

        Defendant-Appellant.                     :

________________________________________________________________

                                              APPEARANCES:

Karyn Justice, Portsmouth, Ohio, for appellant.1

Brigham M. Anderson, Lawrence County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Andrea M. Kratzenberg, Lawrence County Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, Ironton, Ohio, for appellee.
________________________________________________________________
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM COMMON PLEAS COURT
DATE JOURNALIZED:
ABELE, J.

        {¶1} This is an appeal from a Lawrence County Common Pleas

Court judgment of conviction and sentence.                       Jerry Ray Blevins,

defendant below and appellant herein, assigns the following

errors for review:

                 FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

                 “MR. BLEVINS’S CONVICTIONS ARE NOT SUPPORTED
                 BY THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF SUFFICIENT
                 EVIDENCE.”

                 SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR:

        Different counsel represented appellant during the trial court
        1

proceedings.
Lawrence 24CA22                                                      2


          “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
          ADVISE MR. BLEVINS REGARDING POST-RELEASE
          CONTROL AT SENTENCING.”

    {¶2} On June 21, 2024, a Lawrence County Grand Jury returned

an indictment that charged appellant with one count of fourth-

degree-felony aggravated trafficking in drugs and one count of

second-degree-felony aggravated trafficking in drugs, both in

violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1).

    {¶3} On December 9, 2024, the trial court held a jury trial.

At trial, a confidential informant testified about two

controlled purchases of methamphetamine from appellant.    During

the first buy, he purchased about one gram of methamphetamine.

During the second buy, the informant thought he purchased about

half an ounce of methamphetamine, but when he opened the bag he

discovered that it contained about 40 grams of methamphetamine.

    {¶4} During the informant’s testimony, the State played

video recordings of the controlled buys.   The informant

identified appellant as the person who gave him the drugs.     The

video showed that, after the informant obtained the drugs, he

immediately walked to a police car and gave the drugs to the

police.

    {¶5} The informant admitted that he had agreed to become an

informant to help reduce criminal charges that he faced after

officers discovered drugs in his possession.   The informant

stated that he currently was serving a prison sentence for a
Lawrence 24CA22                                                    3


tampering-with-evidence conviction and that he also had been

imprisoned in the past for other criminal offenses, including

“possession, tampering, vandalism and escape.”

    {¶6} Ironton Police Captain Brandon Blankenship testified

and explained the procedure that he followed before the

informant approached appellant’s residence.   He explained that,

before the informant approached appellant’s residence, officers

searched the informant to ensure that he did not have any drugs

on him.   Blankenship also stated that, after the informant

returned to the police vehicle after he visited appellant’s

residence, the informant had drugs in his possession.

    {¶7} Blankenship further explained that officers used a cell

phone to capture video and audio recordings of the two

transactions.    Blankenship stated that the first controlled

purchase occurred during the nighttime, so Blakenship could not

see appellant and the informant, except on the video recording.

He indicated that because the second controlled buy occurred

during the daytime, he viewed the transaction directly and via

the recording.

    {¶8} After Blankenship’s testimony, the State presented

evidence from two forensic scientists who tested the drugs.     The

forensic scientists confirmed that the substances they tested

contained approximately .67 grams and 45 grams of

methamphetamine.    After their testimony, the State rested.
Lawrence 24CA22                                                    4


    {¶9} At that juncture, appellant orally moved for a judgment

of acquittal, that the trial court denied.

    {¶10} After hearing the evidence the jury found appellant

guilty of fourth-degree-felony and second-degree-felony

aggravated trafficking in drugs.

    {¶11} On December 12, 2024, the trial court sentenced

appellant to serve 12 months in prison for the fourth-degree-

felony offense and to serve 8 to 12 years for the second-degree-

felony offense, with the sentences to be served consecutively to

one another for a total prison time of 9 to 13 years.     The court

also imposed a period of postrelease control of no less than 18

months and no more than three years.   This appeal followed.

                                I

    {¶12} In his first assignment of error, appellant asserts

that his convictions are against “the manifest weight of

sufficient evidence.”   He argues that the informant’s testimony

was not credible and, thus, did not support appellant’s

convictions.

                                A

    {¶13} We initially observe that appellant’s assignment of

error appears to blend the “quantitively and qualitatively

different” standards that apply to sufficiency and manifest-

weight challenges.   See State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380,

386 (1997) (“The legal concepts of sufficiency of the evidence
Lawrence 24CA22                                                       5


and weight of the evidence are both quantitatively and

qualitatively different.”).     A challenge to the manifest weight

of the evidence requires a court to evaluate whether the greater

amount of credible evidence offered at trial supports the

defendant’s conviction.     See id. at 387, quoting Black’s Law

Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990) (“Weight of the evidence concerns

‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence,

offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue rather than

the other.’”).    A court that considers a manifest weight

challenge must “‘review the entire record, weigh the evidence

and all reasonable inferences, and consider the credibility of

witnesses.’”     State v. Beasley, 2018-Ohio-493, ¶ 208, quoting

State v. McKelton, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 328.     Reviewing courts also

must bear in mind, however, that credibility generally is an

issue for the trier of fact to resolve.     See Eastley v. Volkman,

2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 21; State v. Issa, 93 Ohio St.3d 49, 67

(2001); State v. Murphy, 2008-Ohio-1744, ¶ 31 (4th Dist.).

“‘Because the trier of fact sees and hears the witnesses and is

particularly competent to decide “whether, and to what extent,

to credit the testimony of particular witnesses,” we must afford

substantial deference to its determinations of credibility.’”

Barberton v. Jenney, 2010-Ohio-2420, ¶ 20, quoting State v.

Konya, 2006-Ohio-6312, ¶ 6 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Lawson,

1997 WL 476684 (2d Dist. Aug. 22, 1997).     As the Eastley court
Lawrence 24CA22                                                   6


explained:

    “‘[I]n determining whether the judgment below is
    manifestly against the weight of the evidence, every
    reasonable intendment and every reasonable presumption
    must be made in favor of the judgment and the finding of
    facts. . . .
         If the evidence is susceptible of more than one
    construction, the reviewing court is bound to give it
    that interpretation which is consistent with the verdict
    and judgment, most favorable to sustaining the verdict
    and judgment.’”

2012-Ohio-2179, at ¶ 21, quoting Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v.

Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984), fn.3, quoting 5 Ohio

Jurisprudence 3d, Appellate Review, Section 60, at 191–192

(1978).   Thus, an appellate court will leave the issues of

evidence weight and witness credibility to the fact finder, as

long as a rational basis exists in the record for its decision.

State v. Picklesimer, 2012-Ohio-1282, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.); accord

State v. Howard, 2007-Ohio-6331, ¶ 6 (4th Dist.) (“We will not

intercede as long as the trier of fact has some factual and

rational basis for its determination of credibility and

weight”).

    {¶14} Accordingly, a judgment of conviction is not against

the manifest weight of the evidence when the record contains

substantial credible evidence upon which the trier of fact

reasonably could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the

essential elements of the offense had been established.   See

State v. Leonard, 2004-Ohio-6235, ¶ 81, quoting State v. Getsy,
Lawrence 24CA22                                                    7


84 Ohio St.3d 180, 193–194 (1998), citing State v. Eley, 56 Ohio

St.2d 169 (1978), syllabus (“‘The question to be answered when a

manifest-weight issue is raised is whether “there is substantial

evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that all

the elements have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt’”

[emphasis omitted.]).   A court may reverse a judgment of

conviction only if it appears that the fact finder, when it

resolved the conflicts in evidence, “‘clearly lost its way and

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’”

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20

Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983); accord

State v. Brown, 2025-Ohio-2804, ¶ 31.   A reviewing court should

find a conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence

only in the “‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs

heavily against the conviction.’”   Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at

387, quoting Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d at 175; accord State v.

Clinton, 2017-Ohio-9423, ¶ 166; State v. Lindsey, 87 Ohio St.3d

479, 483 (2000).

    {¶15} On the other hand, a challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence does not permit a reviewing court to assess the

credibility of the evidence.   See State v. Brown, 2025-Ohio-

2804, ¶ 17, quoting State v. Pountney, 2018-Ohio-22, ¶ 19,

quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two
Lawrence 24CA22                                                    8


of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional amendment on

other grounds as stated in State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89,

102, fn. 4 (1997) (sufficiency review does not allow a reviewing

court to “ask whether the evidence should be believed but,

rather, whether the evidence, ‘“if believed, would convince the

average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt”’”); see generally State v. Balmert, 2025-Ohio-5588, ¶ 10,

quoting State v. Groce, 2020-Ohio-6671, ¶ 7 (a sufficiency

challenge requires a reviewing court to determine “‘whether the

evidence presented, when viewed in a light most favorable to the

prosecution, would allow any rational trier of fact to find the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt’”).

Instead, the question is whether the State’s evidence, if

believed, is legally sufficient to support a defendant’s

conviction.   See Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 386 (“sufficiency

is a test of adequacy”).

    {¶16} In the case sub judice, appellant’s assignment of

error challenges the credibility of the informant’s testimony,

not the sufficiency of the State’s evidence.   Thus, because

appellant’s brief does not contain a sufficiency argument, we do

not address this issue.    See, e.g., State v. Quarterman, 2014-

Ohio-4034, ¶ 19 (“[a]ppellate courts are not obligated to

create, nor should they sua sponte provide, arguments on behalf

of parties”).
Lawrence 24CA22                                                      9


    {¶17} In the case sub judice, as we explain below, we do not

believe that appellant’s case is an exceptional case in which

the evidence weighs heavily against his conviction.     Instead, we

believe that the record contains substantial, credible evidence

upon which the trier of fact reasonably could have concluded,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that the essential elements of the

offense had been established.    Thus, appellant’s conviction is

not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

                                  B

    {¶18} A conviction for aggravated trafficking in

methamphetamine requires the State to establish, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that a defendant knowingly sold, or offered to

sell, methamphetamine.    See R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and (C)(1).    In

the case sub judice, appellant disputes whether the informant’s

testimony was sufficiently credible so as to establish, beyond a

reasonable doubt, the elements of the offense.

    {¶19} As this court recently recognized, “a confidential

informant’s testimony and credibility are generally matters for

the trier of fact to weigh and determine, and the trier of fact

is free to accept or reject any and all of the evidence.”

(Citations omitted.)     State v. Burns, 2025-Ohio-5442, ¶ 20 (4th

Dist.).   Because Burns is particularly relevant to the issue

appellant raises in his first assignment of error,     we quote it

at length:
Lawrence 24CA22                                                10


         In State v. Anderson, 2018-Ohio-2013 (4th Dist.),
    this court considered whether Anderson’s charges were
    against the manifest weight of the evidence when
    Anderson asserted that a confidential informant with a
    criminal history, financial incentive, and incentive to
    mitigate punishment for his own drug offense, lacked
    credibility. We observed:

              [T]his court and others generally have
         rejected manifest-weight challenges based upon a
         confidential    informant’s    alleged    lack   of
         credibility. State v. Stevens, 4th Dist. Highland
         No. 09CA3, 2009-Ohio-6143, 2009 WL 4021149, ¶ 25;
         accord State v. Bachman, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-
         17-006, 2018-Ohio-1242, 2018 WL 1567641; State v.
         Bradley, 2015-Ohio-5421, 55 N.E.3d 580 (8th Dist.),
         ¶¶ 26–28; State v. Fisher, 3rd Dist. Hardin No. 6-
         13-03, 2014-Ohio-436, 2014 WL 538642, ¶¶ 10–11;
         State v. Altman, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 12 CO 42,
         2013-Ohio-5883, 2013 WL 6921497, ¶¶ 33–37; State v.
         Price, 3rd Dist. Logan No. 8-13-03, 2013-Ohio-3984,
         2013 WL 5230326, ¶ 24; State v. Smith, 193 Ohio
         App.3d 201, 2011-Ohio-997, 951 N.E.2d 469 (3rd
         Dist.), ¶ 20; State v. Moore, 5th Dist. Stark No.
         2008-CA-00228, 2009-Ohio-4958, 2009 WL 3003996, ¶
         23. In Bachman, for instance, the court concluded
         that the defendant’s trafficking charge was not
         against manifest weight of the evidence, even
         though the defendant asserted that the confidential
         informant's testimony lacked credibility due to the
         informant's “drug addiction and previous bad acts.”
         Id. at ¶ 18.      The court pointed out that the
         defendant's “trial counsel thoroughly explored the
         various credibility issues relating to” the
         confidential informant. The court noted that the
         jury was aware of the informant's credibility
         issues and was entitled to weigh it accordingly.
         The court did not believe “that the jury’s
         credibility determination was against the manifest
         weight of the evidence.” Id., citing State v. Neal,
         5th Dist. Stark No. 1998CA00288, 1999 WL 744148,
         *2–3, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 2863, *5–6 (June 21,
         1999) (rejecting defendant’s manifest weight
         argument    challenging    the    credibility    of
         identification testimony based upon the witness's
         credibility upon a determination that defense
         counsel thoroughly cross-examined the witness and
Lawrence 24CA22                                                 11


         explored the credibility issue at trial).

    Id. at ¶ 41.
         In Anderson, we observed that, in Bachman, supra,
    the court also observed that the officers who monitored
    the informant’s controlled buy with the defendant
    substantiated the informant’s testimony. “The officers
    testified at length as to the procedures they employ to
    ensure that [the informant] was not in possession of any
    drugs prior to the transaction, which included searching
    [the informant] and his vehicle.” Id. at ¶ 19. Further,
    in Bachman and in the case sub judice, after the
    informant’s contact with the defendant, the officers
    rendezvoused with the informant who advised the officers
    that the defendant sold him narcotics and gave the
    officers the narcotics. Anderson at ¶ 42.
         Moreover, other Ohio courts have rejected similar
    manifest-weight challenges based upon a confidential
    informant's alleged lack of credibility.    In State v.
    Jefferson, 2021-Ohio-281, (3d Dist.), the defendant
    argued that the confidential informant not a credible
    witness because he testified in exchange for case
    consideration and had a motive to ensure defendant's
    conviction. The court, however, held:

              “[T]he jury is not precluded from relying on
         a witness’s testimony simply because the witness
         has a criminal history or a motivation to provide
         testimony favorable to the prosecution.” State v.
         Smith, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-19-26, 2020-Ohio-427,
         ¶ 44, citing State v. Nitsche, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
         No. 103174, 2016-Ohio-3170, ¶ 44.       “Instead, a
         witness’s criminal history, prior drug use, or
         potential bias are factors that the jury may
         consider in determining whether to credit the
         witness's testimony and in assigning weight to the
         witness’s testimony.” Id., citing State v. Price,
         3d Dist. Logan No. 8-13-03, 2013-Ohio-3984, ¶ 23-
         24. Here, the jury was informed of the agreement
         between   the   confidential   informant   and   law
         enforcement officers, specifically that he assisted
         law enforcement in his capacity as a confidential
         informant in exchange for case consideration for
         his pending drug-related charges.      See State v.
         Kammeyer, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-19-48, 2020-Ohio-
         3842, ¶ 51. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that
         the jury clearly lost its way and created a manifest
Lawrence 24CA22                                                12


         injustice by finding the confidential informant’s
         testimony credible.    See State v. Cartlidge, 3d
         Dist. Seneca No. 13-19-44, 2020-Ohio-3615, ¶ 26
         (“In the end, a ‘[m]ere disagreement over the
         credibility of witnesses is not a sufficient reason
         to   reverse   a  judgment   on   manifest   weight
         grounds.’”), quoting State v. Cervantes, 10th Dist.
         Franklin No. 18AP-505, 2019-Ohio-1373, ¶ 28.

    Jefferson at ¶ 36.
         In the case sub judice, appellant’s trial counsel
    thoroughly cross-examined co-defendant Fender and
    confidential informant Gibson about their criminal
    records and incentives to testify.       The jury heard
    testimony that Fender awaited sentencing in her case and
    that Gibson received compensation and an opportunity to
    avoid criminal charges. See Anderson at ¶ 43 (jury heard
    ample testimony about the confidential informant’s
    criminal history and did not lose its way when it
    credited the informant’s testimony and rejected the
    defendant’s testimony). Here, the jury sitting as the
    trier of fact was “free to believe or disbelieve any or
    all of the testimony the confidential informant
    “presented” at trial. State v. Crump, 2010-Ohio-5263,
    ¶ 26 (10th Dist.).
    . . . .
         Importantly, in the case at bar appellee played a
    video recording of the transaction for the jury that
    showed during the controlled buy appellant retrieve the
    scales and handle the methamphetamine in coordination
    with codefendant Fender.    Although appellant contends
    that the video does not show what exactly appellant
    handed to Fender, in Anderson, supra, 2018-Ohio-2013, we
    noted that while we recognized that none of the video or
    audio evidence crystallized the moment the defendant
    handed drugs to the confidential informant in exchange
    for money, the evidence did record the informant and the
    defendant engaged in conversations that trained law
    enforcement   officers    testified   constituted   drug
    transactions.   Id. at ¶ 45.    Moreover, we noted that
    direct evidence of a hand-to-hand drug transaction is
    not necessarily required to sustain a drug-trafficking
    conviction.   Id., citing State v. Chafin, 2017-Ohio-
    7622, ¶ 36-38 (4th Dist.) (rejecting similar argument
    that drug-trafficking conviction against manifest weight
    of the evidence when video failed to document hand-to-
    hand drug transaction); State v. McLemore, 2000 WL
Lawrence 24CA22                                                   13


    422368, *2 (9th Dist.) (defendant’s conviction not
    against the manifest weight of the evidence even though
    officers who observed controlled buy did not see what
    transpired between appellant and informant, and even
    though   defendant  asserted   that   informant   lacked
    credibility because she cooperated with police in
    exchange for the dismissal of criminal charges against
    her).
         As noted above, in the case sub judice, the co-
    defendant and confidential informant’s testimony are
    substantially consistent and two officers corroborated
    their testimony and provided photos and the video
    surveillance. Therefore, like Anderson, even if none of
    the video or documentary evidence clearly shows that
    appellant exchanged drugs for money, Gibson and Fender’s
    testimony, along with the officer’s corroborating
    observations, provides ample competent credible evidence
    to establish beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant
    committed the offense aggravated drug trafficking.
    Anderson at ¶ 45.

Burns, 2025-Ohio-5442, at ¶ 21-24 and 27-28 (4th Dist.).

    {¶20} We believe that our reasoning set forth in Burns

applies here to appellant’s argument.   Appellant’s argument is

based upon his assertion that the informant was not a credible

witness due to his previous criminal history and his incentive

to assist the State to secure a conviction so that he would

obtain leniency with respect to his own criminal charges.     As we

explained in Burns, however, the credibility of an informant’s

testimony is a matter reserved to the fact finder.

    {¶21} Furthermore, even if the video recording did not fully

“crystallize[] the moment [appellant] handed drugs to the

confidential informant in exchange for money,” Burns at ¶ 27,

the record contains competent and credible evidence to support
Lawrence 24CA22                                                     14


appellant’s conviction for trafficking in drugs.    The officer

testified that, before the informant approached appellant’s

residence, officers had searched the informant to ensure that he

did not have any drugs in his possession before the controlled

buy.    The recording shows that, after the controlled buy, the

informant returned directly to the law enforcement officer and

gave the drugs to the officer.    Nothing on the video or audio

portion of the recording suggests that the informant had the

opportunity to surreptitiously obtain drugs from any person

other than appellant.    Thus, a logical inference is that the

informant obtained the drugs from appellant.

       {¶22} We also observe that appellant’s trial counsel fully

cross-examined the informant regarding his previous involvement

with the justice system and questioned his motives.

Additionally, during closing argument, trial counsel suggested

that the jury should not believe the informant’s testimony.

Thus, the jury had ample opportunity to weigh the competing

evidence and apparently decided that the State’s evidence was

more convincing.    See State v. Smith, 2020-Ohio-5316, ¶ 45 (4th

Dist.) (conviction was not against the manifest weight of the

evidence when the officer’s testimony about the controlled buy,

the existence of audio/video recordings, and the recovery of

heroin and methamphetamine after the controlled buys

corroborated the informant’s testimony); State v. McIntosh,
Lawrence 24CA22                                                     15


2018-Ohio-5343, ¶ 53 (4th Dist.) (“Obviously, the jury was in

the best position to weigh the informant’s circumstances when it

evaluated the informant’s credibility, and we should not second-

guess its decision.    Even though appellant may believe that the

informant is not a credible witness, the jury was free to

believe otherwise.”).   Consequently, based upon our review of

the record we do not believe that the jury verdict constitutes a

manifest miscarriage of justice.

    {¶23} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we

overrule appellant’s first assignment of error.

                                 II

    {¶24} In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts

that his sentence is contrary to law because, during the

sentencing hearing, the trial court failed to advise him that

postrelease control “was discretionary and that a violation of

[postrelease control] would subject him to the consequences set

forth in R.C. 2967.28.”   Appellant asserts that although the

trial court included appropriate language in its sentencing

entry, the statute however required the court to provide these

notices on the record during the sentencing hearing.

    {¶25} The State agrees that, at the sentencing hearing, the

trial court did not advise appellant of the sanctions that the

parole board could impose if he violates any terms of his

postrelease control.    The State thus agrees that this court
Lawrence 24CA22                                                    16


should remand the matter to the trial court for the sole purpose

of giving appellant the proper postrelease-control

notifications.

    {¶26} When reviewing felony sentences, appellate courts

apply the standard set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).     E.g., State

v. Jones, 2024-Ohio-1083, ¶ 13; State v. Grashel, 2025-Ohio-580,

¶ 19 (4th Dist.).     The statute authorizes appellate courts to

“increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence” “if it

clearly and convincingly finds either of the following”:

         (a) That the record does not support the sentencing
    court’s findings under division (B) or (D) of section
    2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section
    2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the
    Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;
         (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).

    {¶27} As relevant here, a trial court that imposes a period

of postrelease control must give the defendant specific

advisements before it imposes sentence.     To validly impose

postrelease control, a trial court must orally inform the

defendant of “[1] the term of supervision, [2] whether

postrelease control is discretionary or mandatory, and [3] the

consequences of violating postrelease control.”     State v. Bates,

2022-Ohio-475, ¶ 11, citing State v. Grimes, 2017-Ohio-2927, ¶

11, overruled on other grounds by State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-

2913, see State v. Jordan, 2004-Ohio-6085, ¶ 22-23, overruled on
Lawrence 24CA22                                                   17


other grounds by Harper.

    {¶28} R.C. 2967.28(B) and (C) specify the terms of

supervision and state that

    a period of post-release control required by this
    division for an offender shall be of one of the following
    periods:
         (1) For a felony sex offense, five years;
         (2) For a felony of the first degree that is not a
    felony sex offense, up to five years, but not less than
    two years;
         (3) For a felony of the second degree that is not
    a felony sex offense, up to three years, but not less
    than eighteen months;
         (4) For a felony of the third degree that is an
    offense of violence and is not a felony sex offense, up
    to three years, but not less than one year.
         (C) Any sentence to a prison term for a felony of
    the third, fourth, or fifth degree that is not subject
    to division (B)(1) or (4) of this section shall include
    a requirement that the offender be subject to a period
    of post-release control of up to two years after the
    offender’s release from imprisonment, if the parole
    board, in accordance with division (D) of this section,
    determines that a period of post-release control is
    necessary for that offender.

    {¶29} R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d) and (e) require a trial court to

notify a defendant whether postrelease control is mandatory or

discretionary.    See Grimes at ¶ 11.   Postrelease control is

mandatory “if the offender is being sentenced, other than to a

sentence of life imprisonment, for a felony of the first degree

or second degree, for a felony sex offense, or for a felony of

the third degree that is an offense of violence and is not a

felony sex offense.”    R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d).   Postrelease

control is discretionary if the court is sentencing the offender
Lawrence 24CA22                                                   18


“for a felony of the third, fourth, or fifth degree that is not

subject to [R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d)].”     R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(e).

    {¶30} Additionally, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(f) requires a trial

court to notify a defendant of the consequence of violating

postrelease control.   This provision requires the trial court to

notify a defendant that, if the defendant violates a condition

of postrelease control,

    the parole board may impose a prison term, as part of
    the sentence, of up to one-half of the definite prison
    term originally imposed upon the offender as the
    offender’s stated prison term or up to one-half of the
    minimum prison term originally imposed upon the offender
    as part of the offender’s stated non-life felony
    indefinite prison term.

    {¶31} A sentence that imposes postrelease control without

providing the defendant with these statutory notifications at

the sentencing hearing renders the postrelease-control portion

of the sentence contrary to law.    See Jordan, 2004-Ohio-6085, at

¶ 23.

    {¶32} In addition to orally informing a defendant of (1) the

term of postrelease control, (2) the discretionary or mandatory

nature of postrelease control, and (3) the consequences of

violating postrelease control, the trial court also must

incorporate these notifications into its sentencing entry.

Bates, 2022-Ohio-475, at ¶ 12.     A sentence that imposes

postrelease control is contrary to law if the trial court fails

to provide these notices at the sentencing hearing or in the
Lawrence 24CA22                                                           19


sentencing entry.     Id.

     {¶33} In the case sub judice, at the sentencing hearing the

trial court informed appellant of the term of postrelease

control.    The court stated that it sentenced appellant to a

period of postrelease control of “up to three years, but not

less than 18 months.”       The trial court did not, however, orally

notify appellant (1) whether this period of postrelease control

was discretionary or mandatory, or (2) the consequences of

violating postrelease control.       Although the trial court

incorporated these two notifications into its sentencing entry,2

the trial court also was required to advise appellant these

notifications at the sentencing hearing.         See Bates, 2022-Ohio-

475, at ¶ 12.     The court’s failure to do so means that the trial

court did not properly impose postrelease control, and the

postrelease control portion of appellant’s sentence is contrary

to law.    See Jordan, 2004-Ohio-6085, at ¶ 23; State v. Griffin,

2024-Ohio-4806, ¶ 31 (1st Dist.); State v. Bolan, 2024-Ohio-

2640, ¶ 11-12 (8th Dist.).

     {¶34} Accordingly, based upon the foregoing reasons, we



     2  The State claims that the trial court’s sentencing entry informs
appellant that his period of postrelease control is mandatory. Our review of
the trial court’s sentencing entry indicates that the court used the word
“discretionary” to describe appellant’s period of postrelease control. See
December 30, 2024 Nunc Pro Tunc entry (“the defendant is advised that upon
the completion of the prison term, the defendant could be subject to a
discretionary period of supervision . . . .”). Because we are reversing and
remanding the postrelease-control portion of the trial court’s sentence, the
trial court may clarify any discrepancy on remand.
Lawrence 24CA22                                                   20


sustain appellant’s second assignment of error, reverse the

postrelease-control portion of appellant’s sentence and remand

this matter to the trial court for resentencing on postrelease

control only.   We otherwise affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                               JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART,
                               REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED FOR
                               FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT
                               WITH THIS OPINION.
Lawrence 24CA22                                                   21


                         JUDGMENT ENTRY

     It is ordered that the judgment be affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion. Appellee and appellant shall equally share
the costs herein taxed.

     The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this
appeal.

     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this
Court directing the Lawrence County Court of Common Pleas to
carry this judgment into execution.

     If a stay of execution of sentence and release upon bail
has been previously granted by the trial court or this court, it
is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon
the bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is
to allow appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an
application for a stay during the pendency of the proceedings in
that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will
terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period,
or the failure of the appellant to file a notice of appeal with
the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal period pursuant
to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court
of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses
the appeal prior to expiration of 60 days, the stay will
terminate as of the date of such dismissal.

     A certified copy of this entry shall constitute that
mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

    Smith, P.J. & Wilkin, J.: Concur in Judgment & Opinion

                                   For the Court




                                   BY:__________________________
                                      Peter B. Abele, Judge


                        NOTICE TO COUNSEL
     Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a
final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal
commences from the date of filing with the clerk