State v. Boggs

[Cite as State v. Boggs, 2026-Ohio-1472.]


                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      CHAMPAIGN COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                       :
                                                     :   C.A. No. 2025-CA-22
       Appellee                                      :
                                                     :   Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 023
 v.                                                  :
                                                     :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
 CHELSEY LYNN BOGGS                                  :   Court)
                                                     :
       Appellant                                     :   FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &
                                                     :   OPINION

                                               ...........

        Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on April 24, 2026, the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed.

        Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

        Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.


                                        For the court,




                                        MICHAEL L. TUCKER, JUDGE

LEWIS, P.J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.
                                      OPINION
                             CHAMPAIGN C.A. No. 2025-CA-22


JENNIFER E. MARIETTA, Attorney for Appellant
KARA N. RICHTER, Attorney for Appellee


TUCKER, J.

       {¶ 1} Chelsey Lynn Boggs appeals from her conviction on two counts of fentanyl

possession.

       {¶ 2} Boggs contends the trial court erred in ordering her to complete a residential

program at the West Central community-based correctional facility as part of her sentence

to community control sanctions. She argues that participation in the West Central program

was unnecessary for her rehabilitation and that the trial court failed to obtain a necessary

professional assessment before ordering her participation.

       {¶ 3} For the reasons set forth below, we see no error in the trial court’s order for

Boggs to complete the West Central program. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                                        I. Background

       {¶ 4} A grand jury indicted Boggs on two counts of fentanyl possession and one count

of evidence tampering. The State subsequently dismissed the tampering charge. Boggs

pleaded guilty to the fentanyl charges but sought intervention in lieu of conviction (“ILC”).

The trial court granted her ILC with conditions. Boggs later admitted to violating those

conditions. As a result, the trial court terminated ILC, entered findings of guilty based on her

prior guilty pleas, and sentenced her to three years of community control sanctions. The

conditions of community control included completion of a residential program at the West

Central community-based correctional facility.


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                                         II. Analysis

       {¶ 5} Boggs’ sole assignment of error states:

       The Court’s sentence of Defendant to the West Central Community

       Based Correction Facility (CBCF) was contrary to law.

       {¶ 6} Boggs recognizes that a trial court may impose a term in a community-based

correctional facility as part of community control sanctions following revocation of ILC. Here,

however, she argues that the trial court should have ordered basic supervision without

including the West Central program. In support, she cites the purposes of felony sentencing

in R.C. 2929.11(A), which include promoting effective rehabilitation using the minimum

sanctions necessary. Boggs also asserts that R.C. 2929.17(D) obligated the trial court to

order and consider an assessment by a treatment professional before ordering her

participation in the West Central program. She contends the West Central component of her

sentence was contrary to law because it was unnecessary and the trial court failed to obtain

an assessment.

       {¶ 7} Upon review, we find Boggs’ assignment of error to be without merit. As an initial

matter, whether the trial court erred in requiring her to participate in the West Central

program is likely to be moot. The trial court imposed the requirement when it sentenced her

on July 30, 2025. The maximum time she could have been required to spend at West Central

was six months. See R.C. 2929.16(A)(1). On appeal, the State claims she completed the

program and was discharged on December 23, 2025. If that is true, her argument about

being required to participate is moot. Although Boggs remains under community control

supervision, she challenges only the West Central component of her sentence. There is no

remedy we can provide for the time she spent completing that program.




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       {¶ 8} We note, however, that the record does not indicate when Boggs entered the

West Central program. Nor does the State cite any evidence that she was discharged on

December 23, 2025. Instead, the State directs us to West Central’s online database of

“residents currently incarcerated at West Central,” pointing out that her name does not

appear. Considering that Boggs is not listed as a current resident of the program, the West

Central issue does appear to be moot.

       {¶ 9} Even if we set aside potential mootness, we find her assignment of error to be

unpersuasive. When reviewing a felony sentence, we apply the standards found in

R.C. 2953.08(G). This statute does not permit an appellate court to vacate or modify a

sentence based on its belief that the sentence is unsupported by the record under

R.C. 2929.11, which addresses the purposes of felony sentencing, or R.C. 2929.12, which

lists factors to consider in felony sentencing. State v. Rivers, 2026-Ohio-858, ¶ 4 (2d Dist.).

Therefore, Boggs’ belief that her effective rehabilitation did not require completion of the

West Central program is not a permissible basis for finding her sentence contrary to law.

       {¶ 10} “A sentence is contrary to law when it falls outside the statutory range for the

offense or if the sentencing court does not consider R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Id. Here

the trial court’s order for Boggs to complete the West Central program was an authorized

community control sanction. Moreover, the disposition transcript and her judgment entry

reflect that the trial court considered R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. During the sentencing

hearing, the trial court found that her successful rehabilitation required “strict monitoring that

can only be provided at attendance such as a CBCF program.” The trial court noted that she

“exhibits a level of behavior and criminogenic thinking that necessitates the need for the

public to be protected.” In its judgment entry, the trial court stated that its sentencing decision

was guided by the purposes of felony sentencing, including promoting Boggs’ effective


                                                4
rehabilitation using the minimum sanctions necessary. Her disagreement with these findings

does not make the West Central aspect of her sentence contrary to law.

       {¶ 11} We also see no grounds for reversal based on the trial court’s failure to obtain

a professional assessment before ordering Boggs’ participation in the West Central

program. On appeal, she cites R.C. 2929.17, which provides that a trial court “shall not

impose a term in a drug treatment program as described in division (D) of this section until

after considering an assessment by a properly credentialed treatment professional, if

available.” But this provision applies to “nonresidential sanctions.” Another statute,

R.C. 2929.16, applies to “community residential sanctions.” Notably, R.C. 2929.16(A)(1)

defines “community residential sanctions” to include “a term of up to six months at a

community-based correctional facility.” Nothing in R.C. 2929.16 obligates a trial court to

obtain an assessment before ordering an offender to complete a term in a community-based

correctional facility like West Central, which we consistently have recognized is a residential

program. See, e.g., State v. Tolle, 2024-Ohio-4709, ¶ 2 (2d Dist.); State v. Ramey, 2024-

Ohio-2650, ¶ 5 (2d Dist.); State v. Tackett, 2024-Ohio-1498, ¶ 2 (2d Dist.).

       {¶ 12} Finally, a third statute, R.C. 2929.15(A)(3), which specifically addresses

community control sanctions, provides:

       If an offender who is eligible for community control sanctions under this section

       admits to having a drug addiction or the court has reason to believe that the

       offender has a drug addiction, and if the offense for which the offender is being

       sentenced was related to the addiction, the court may require that the offender

       be assessed by a properly credentialed professional within a specified period

       of time and shall require the professional to file a written assessment of the

       offender with the court. If a court imposes treatment and recovery support


                                              5
       services as a community control sanction, the court shall direct the level and

       type of treatment and recovery support services after consideration of the

       written   assessment,    if   available   at   the   time   of   sentencing,   and

       recommendations of the professional and other treatment and recovery

       support services providers.

(Emphasis added.)

       {¶ 13} Boggs does not rely on R.C. 2929.15(A)(3). In any event, to the extent that it

has potential applicability, it does not obligate a trial court to obtain an assessment before

ordering drug treatment as a community control sanction. Rather, it provides that a trial court

“may require” an offender to be assessed and that a trial court shall consider a written

assessment if it orders one. See State v. Newsome, 2013-Ohio-4587, ¶ 15 (5th Dist.) (“We

note the use of the discretionary term ‘may’ require a professional assessment, it is not

statutorily mandated for a trial court to order an assessment before imposing a community

control sanction.”). Having found no error in the trial court’s order for Boggs to complete the

West Central program, we overrule her assignment of error.

                                        III. Conclusion

       {¶ 14} We affirm the judgment of the Champaign County Common Pleas Court.

                                        .............

LEWIS, P.J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.




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