State v. Burge

[Cite as State v. Burge, 2026-Ohio-1552.]


                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                           Nos. 115282 and 115563
                 v.                               :

KEVIN BURGE,                                      :

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :


                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 30, 2026


          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-24-694462-A


                                            Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Morgan Austin, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Eric M. Levy, for appellant.


KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:

                   In this delayed appeal, defendant-appellant Kevin Burge appeals

from his convictions, sentence, and the trial court’s denial of his pro se, post-

sentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. For the following reasons, we affirm.
              In August 2024, a grand jury charged Burge in a 63-count indictment

pertaining to several incidents occurring between December 2023 and March 2024.

The offenses included multiple counts of theft, felonious assault, robbery, receiving

stolen property, improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle, falsification,

obstructing official business, and having weapons while under a disability. Many of

the counts included one- and three-year firearm specifications.

              On February 24, 2025, the court held a pretrial at which the State

offered him a plea deal. Burge would plead guilty to 39 counts, including “several

amendments to the indictment, but . . . the agreed recommended range would be 14

to 18 years” prior to a Reagan Tokes Law tail. (Tr. 25-26.) After rejecting this plea,

Burge voiced his preference for a jury trial and asked for new counsel and a

continuance of the trial date. The court denied both oral motions, reasoning that

the “defendant and defense counsel have, in my estimation, worked very well

together throughout all of this time, and now that we’re nearing the trial and he

doesn’t like what he’s being told, he’s asking for a withdrawal of counsel.” (Tr. 32.)

              The court convened for trial on March 3, 2025. The State placed the

prior plea offer on the record, and Burge again voiced his preference to proceed to a

jury trial rather than plead to a deal with a 14-to-18-year sentence. When offered

time to confer with his counsel again, Burge asked for a psychiatric reevaluation,

referring to an earlier investigation into his competency under which it was

determined that Burge was malingering. The court eventually adjourned with the

expectation that trial would begin later that afternoon.
               Later that day, the trial court went on the record and indicated that

the parties had spent several hours discussing further plea negotiations. Under the

newly proposed plea agreement, Burge would plead guilty to 39 counts, two one-

year firearm specifications, and one three-year firearm specification. The State

explained that it modified several of the firearm specifications so that the new

agreement’s ten-year “floor” was possible but clarified that this minimum did not

include the indefinite sentence pursuant to the Reagan Tokes Law. The State

explained that “by agreement of the parties, the parties agree to a floor of a ten-year

prison sentence, with the understanding that the State will argue for a higher

sentence, and that the Court may impose any legal sentence. But there is an

agreement as to a floor of ten years on this plea offer.” (Tr. 60.) Before proceeding

with the Crim.R. 11 colloquy, the court confirmed with Burge that he understood

that he was required to serve the two failure-to-comply charges consecutively. Burge

responded in the affirmative.

               The trial court engaged Burge in a comprehensive Crim.R. 11

colloquy. The trial court discussed the maximum penalty associated with each of

the 39 charges within the plea. After nearly every count, the trial court asked Burge

whether he understood, and Burge answered affirmatively on all occasions. When

discussing the failure-to-comply charges, the court confirmed that Burge

understood the meaning of “mandatory” and “consecutively.” (Tr. 75.) During the

colloquy, the court asked Burge whether he understood that “this Court would still

have the authority to sentence you to prison for longer than that ten-year period. Do
you understand that?” and Burge agreed. (Tr. 103.) Burge ultimately pleaded guilty

pursuant to the plea agreement.

                  Following his plea hearing, Burge, pro se, filed a deluge of motions

including two “motion[s] to suppress,” two “motion[s] to dismiss,” two “motion[s]

for exclusion,” and a “motion to withdraw plea deal.” Relevant to this appeal, the

filings generally alleged that Burge felt “threatened” and “coerced” into taking his

plea, that he was promised a “minimum” sentence and was dissatisfied with his

counsel, and felt that the trial court should have granted his oral motion for new

counsel instead of proceeding to the change-of-plea hearing.

                  The next week, the parties convened again. The court addressed all

of Burge’s pro se motions, stating that “the [c]ourt did review those and will note

that the defendant is requesting to withdraw those pro se motions.” (Tr. 138.) The

State presented the contents of its sentencing memorandum and asked that the trial

court impose a sentence greater than the ten-year minimum. Two of Burge’s

relatives addressed the court as mitigation witnesses, and then Burge’s counsel

addressed the court and specifically addressed the tenuous relationship with his

client.

          Ultimately, Your Honor, despite everything we have been through, and
          our disagreements, and we expect disagreements at times because not
          everyone agrees with the facts that are presented, but when you have a
          matter like this with these number of counts, Your Honor, arguments
          are going to happen, there’s going to be disagreements about certain
          acts at certain times on certain days.

          But ultimately we got to a point on March 3rd, which was our, in fact,
          trial date, that we could possibly resolve this. And, of course, it started
      with an offer from the State, which I thought was reasonable, which
      was, you know, plead to these 39 counts with an agreed range of 14 to
      18 years. Obviously that offer was on the table approximately two
      weeks. I discussed that matter over those two weeks with Mr. Burge.
      Obviously, he wanted to ultimately make a counteroffer because he
      wanted to obviously minimize his exposure or try to minimize his
      exposure with another agreement. And he himself had posed could we
      have an agreement of ten years. That’s how we got to this point.

      Now, of course, I understand, we all understand that yes, the State
      would agree to that minimum bottom number of years but would not
      agree to a top end. I use this as a point of reference to the Court as to
      where we were in negotiations and where we are now.

(Tr. 190-192.) Burge briefly addressed the court and offered his apologies and also

remarked that he wished for less prison time so that he could see his grandparents.

The trial court once again asked if Burge was withdrawing all of the pro se motions

that had been filed after the change-of-plea hearing to which Burge and his attorney

both responded affirmatively. Burge was sentenced to 18 years with a Reagan Tokes

tail, resulting in a possible 22-year indefinite sentence.

               Burge appealed, assigning the following errors for our review:

      1. Appellant was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel as
      guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
      States Constitution and Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.

      2. The trial court failed to comply with the mandates of Criminal Rule
      11, rendering appellant’s guilty plea not knowingly, intelligently, and
      voluntarily made.

      3. The sentence imposed by the trial court is not supported by the
      record and is otherwise clearly and convincingly contrary to law
      requiring the sentence to be vacated and appellant resentenced
      pursuant to agreement, or, otherwise that appellant’s plea be vacated
      as not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

      4. The trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences, as the
      record does not support the findings required by R.C. § 2929.14(C)(4).
      5. The trial court erred and abused its discretion by denying appellant’s
      post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea without conducting a
      hearing.

               For ease of discussion, we elect to address Burge’s assignments of

error in the order that they occurred temporally.

               Burge’s second assignment of error challenges the trial court’s

Crim.R. 11 colloquy as deficient, thus rendering his pleas not knowingly,

intelligently, or voluntarily entered.

               Crim.R. 11 “‘ensures an adequate record on review by requiring the

trial court to personally inform the defendant of his rights and the consequences of

his plea and determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily made.’” State

v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168

(1975). In reviewing pleas, we determine “whether the dialogue between the court

and the defendant demonstrates that the defendant understood the consequences

of his plea.” Id. at ¶ 12, citing State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 15-16; State v.

Clark, 2008-Ohio-3748, ¶ 26; State v. Miller, 2020-Ohio-1420, ¶ 19. With some

exceptions, “a defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he

demonstrates he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the

provisions of Crim.R. 11(C).” Id. at ¶ 16, citing State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108

(1990). “The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have otherwise been

made.’” Id., quoting Nero at id. When reviewing a colloquy for compliance with

Crim.R. 11, we ask “(1) has the trial court complied with the relevant provisions of

the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure
of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and

(3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?” Id. at

¶ 17.

               “‘A trial court does not err by imposing a sentence greater than “that

forming the inducement for the defendant to plead guilty when the trial court

forewarns the defendant of the applicable penalties, including the possibility of

imposing a greater sentence than that recommended by the prosecutor.’’”’ State v.

Jordan, 2024-Ohio-2361, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Buchanan, 2003-Ohio-

4772, ¶ 13 (5th Dist.), citing State v. Darmour, 38 Ohio App.3d 160 (8th Dist. 1987);

State v. Tucci, 2002-Ohio-6903 (7th Dist.)

               Burge agrees that the trial court “perform[ed] a rote recitation of

these constitutional rights,” but argues that he could not have understood the

maximum penalty or the consequences of his plea, given the 39 separate convictions

and various discussions held with the trial court. He also argues that he would not

have taken this plea had he known that the trial court was going to impose a sentence

greater than the range he explicitly rejected in the trial court’s presence.

               On this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in

complying with Crim.R. 11 thus rendering Burge’s plea not knowingly, intelligently,

or voluntarily entered. Burge does not point us to any specific portion of the

colloquy, only a conversation where the trial court was discussing the different

calculated total numbers that were later corrected and clarified. Burge instead

argues generally that there is no possibility that he could have understood the
impact of his plea due to the number of charges involved with the plea, despite the

proper administered colloquy.       The record significantly contradicts Burge’s

contention that he would not have taken the plea had he known the trial court was

going to impose a sentence greater than the plea deal he rejected. As discussed in

the facts, the trial court was careful to make sure that Burge understood the

implications of taking this plea, including warning him numerous times that it could

impose a sentence over the ten-year minimum. The State also provided that it would

be seeking more than ten years because of the nature of the crimes. At the beginning

of the colloquy, the trial court asked Burge if it was correct that “the only promise

that’s been made is the plea arrangement as to these pleas, and the fact that there

must be an understanding by the parties that there will be at least a minimum

sentence of ten years; is that correct?” to which Burge agreed. (Tr. 66-67.) The trial

court explained each individual offense to which Burge was pleading and explained

the maximum possible exposure; this included ensuring that Burge understood the

Reagan Tokes Law tail as well as the terms “mandatory,” “consecutive,”

“concurrent,” and their respective implications. The trial court also engaged Burge

in detailed discussions about the implications of pleading guilty to his two failure-

to-comply charges, which require that the sentence is served “consecutively to any

other prison term or mandatory prison term imposed upon the offender.” R.C.

2921.331(D). The trial court frequently paused to ask Burge if he understood, and

Burge consistently answered affirmatively. Burge even asked a question about
mandatory time during the colloquy, suggesting that he was following the court’s

colloquy and wanted to make an informed decision before taking his plea.

               On this record, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s colloquy

resulted in Burge entering his plea unknowingly, unintelligently, or involuntarily.

The trial court fully complied with the mandates of Crim.R. 11, and Burge’s

contention that he would not have taken the plea had he known that he would

receive prison time above and beyond 18 years is unsupported by the record.

               We do note, however, that this case presents a close call. Throughout

the pendency of this case, Burge repeatedly expressed his (1) dissatisfaction with his

counsel, (2) desire for a jury trial, and (3) unwillingness to accept a plea deal with

the 14- to 18-year range because he was concerned about the length of his sentence

and felt that 14 years was too long of a minimum. Even after trial counsel and the

court warned Burge that trial could subject him to a significantly larger potential

prison sentence, and that his plea with a ten-year floor could expose him to any

maximum within the permitted sentences, Burge initially maintained a preference

for trial. The trial court was affirmatively aware of these preferences and intentions.

It is clear from this record that Burge’s overarching concern was his minimum

exposure, and it is not unreasonable to suggest that Burge may not have taken the

plea had he known he would receive even a year over 18 years. The trial court’s

colloquy and the extensive record where Burge indicated his understanding, which

Burge cannot contradict with anything more than his self-serving statements, is fatal

to this assigned error.
              Burge’s second assignment of error is overruled.

              In his fourth assignment of error, Burge argues that the trial court did

not make the proper findings under R.C. 2929.14 necessary to impose consecutive

sentences.

              We first address Burge’s argument regarding the failure-to-comply

charges in Counts 7 and 47. This court has previously held in State v. Stewart, 2025-

Ohio-2676, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), that where the trial court is required by law to impose

consecutive sentences, it need not make R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) findings. State v. Miller,

2025-Ohio-5350, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.).       Accordingly, because Counts 7 and 47’s

consecutive sentences were imposed pursuant to statute, the trial court was not

required to make any findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4).

              However, the trial court discretionarily imposed consecutive

sentences on Counts 28, 42, and 61. We thus review the trial court’s findings as

related to these three counts.

              Consecutive sentences may be imposed only if the trial court makes

the required findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). State v. Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-

3177, ¶ 20-22. Under the statute, consecutive sentences may be imposed if the trial

court finds that (1) consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from

future crime or to punish the offender, (2) consecutive sentences are not

disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and to the danger the

offender poses to the public, and (3) at least one of the following applies:
      (1) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while
      awaiting trial or sentencing, while under a sanction, or while under
      post-release control for a prior offense;

      (2) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one
      or more courses of the conduct, and the harm caused by two or more
      of the offenses was so great or unusual that no single prison term for
      any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct
      adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender’s conduct; or

      (3) The offender’s history of criminal conduct demonstrates that
      consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future
      crime by the offender.

               To impose consecutive terms of imprisonment, a trial court must

both make the statutory findings mandated for consecutive sentences under R.C.

2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate those findings into its

sentencing entry. Bonnell at syllabus.

               In State v. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, the Ohio Supreme Court held

that de novo review of the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentences is

contrary to the language of R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), which provides that an appellate

court may only increase, reduce, or otherwise modify consecutive sentences if the

record does not “clearly and convincingly” support the trial court’s R.C.

2929.14(C)(4) findings. Id. at ¶ 13, 16. The Court defined “clear and convincing

evidence” as “‘that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere

“preponderance of the evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty as is

required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in

the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be

established.’” Id. at ¶ 14, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954),
paragraph three of the syllabus. The Court instructed the appellate court that “it

must have a firm belief or conviction that the record does not support the trial

court’s findings before it may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify consecutive

sentences” and that it should employ a deferential standard regarding the trial

court’s consecutive-sentence findings. Id. at ¶ 15.

               In this case, we find that the trial court made the findings required

by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) both at the sentencing hearing and in its judgment entry,

and that the record clearly and convincingly supports these findings. The trial

court did not have to state its factual findings or reasoning for imposing

consecutive sentences. “[A]s long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial

court engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that the record contains

evidence to support the findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld.”

Bonnell, 2014-Ohio-3177, at ¶ 29; see also State v. Jones, 2024-Ohio-1083, ¶ 11,

citing Bonnell at ¶ 37.

               Here, Burge was charged in a 63-count indictment and pleaded

guilty to 39 counts for various crimes occurring over five months, “involv[ing]

numerous different police agencies on the east side of the county as well as some

into Lake County, and ultimately he was charged regarding 15 different incidents.”

(Tr. 139.) At sentencing, the prosecutor detailed several events forming the basis

of this indictment, including (1) a theft and break-in at a Marc’s parking lot where

he broke a car window, stole a cell phone, and sent a substantial sum of money to

his own CashApp account, (2) driving and flipping over a stolen Kia, fleeing on
foot, and leaving behind a stolen firearm, (3) having a different stolen vehicle with

broken out windows in his driveway, and when police approached, Burge drove the

stolen vehicle through several front yards, and (4) various other incidents relating

to vehicle break-ins, robberies, and thefts sometimes involving firearms.

              Based on the record before us, this is not a case where we do not have

a “firm belief or conviction” that the record does not clearly and convincingly

support the trial court’s findings. In fact, our review reveals that the record

supports the court’s findings, and Burge has not demonstrated otherwise.

Accordingly, Burge’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

              Similarly, Burge’s third assignment of error alleges that his sentence

was contrary to law and did not comply with the overriding purposes of felony

sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and did not consider the seriousness and recidivism

factors in R.C. 2929.12. Burge argues that “[w]hile [his] conduct was serious, the

sentence fails to adequately account for mitigating factors.”         He cites the

involuntariness of the plea based on Burge’s denial of the initial plea offer, Burge

pleading to 39 offenses, and Burge’s remorse at sentencing.            Burge again

incorporates an argument about the propriety of the plea, i.e., whether it was

entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

              A sentence is contrary to law if it is outside the statutory range for

the offense or if the sentencing court failed to consider the purposes and principles

of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.12.

State v. Levison, 2021-Ohio-3601, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). And, “if a sentence is within the
statutory range for the offense and the trial court considered both the purposes

and principles of felony sentencing in R.C. 2929.11 and the relevant sentencing

factors under R.C. 2929.12 when imposing the sentence, the sentence is not

contrary to law.” Id. citing State v. Phillips, 2021-Ohio-2772, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.).

Although the court is required to consider R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, these statutes

are not factfinding statutes. Id. at ¶ 16. The court is not required to make findings

on the record or use any particular language when contemplating the facts in R.C.

2929.11 and 2929.12. Id., citing State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 20. Stating that

the court considered the required sentencing factors alone is sufficient to fulfill the

obligations under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Id. at ¶ 17, citing Phillips at ¶ 8.

               During sentencing, the trial court expressly stated that it considered

the relevant statutes. “Prior to coming to the [b]ench I reviewed 2929.11 for the

principles and purposes of sentencing, 2929.12 for the seriousness and recidivism

factors . . . . The Court has formulated the following decision based upon those

overriding principles and purposes of felony sentencing . . . .” (Tr. 204.) It also

stated that it considered all of the mitigation presented. Moreover, the court’s

journal entry indicates that it considered all required factors of the law.

Accordingly, we are unable to find that Burge’s sentence was contrary to law.

               Burge’s second argument pertains to the knowing, intelligent, and

voluntary nature of his plea. We fully incorporate our analysis from the second

assignment of error and reject the presented arguments. Burge’s third assignment

of error is overruled.
              Burge’s first assignment of error alleges that he received ineffective

assistance of counsel. He supports this contention with the following argument:

      On March 14, 2025, a full thirteen days prior to sentencing, Appellant
      filed a pro se pre-sentence Motion to Withdraw his Plea, stating he felt
      “threatened and coerced into taking the plea.” He further indicated
      that his attorney had improperly promised him that he would receive
      the minimum sentence of a negotiated 10-year floor. These are serious
      allegations going to the heart of the plea’s validity. They must also be
      reviewed in the context of the history of Appellant’s relationship with
      his trial counsel. Appellant had previously moved the trial court to
      withdraw his trial counsel and continue trial for Appellant to receive
      new counsel which the trial court denied. This was done at the plea-
      bargaining phase which the trial court dismissed as simply the
      Appellant not liking what he was being told.

              “To substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must demonstrate that defense counsel’s performance was seriously

flawed and deficient, and that the result of the trial would have been different had

proper representation been afforded.” State v. Foster, 2010-Ohio-3186, ¶ 22 (8th

Dist.), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Where, as here, a

defendant pleads guilty, “a defendant must demonstrate there is a reasonable

probability that but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would

have insisted on going to trial.” State v. Dansby-East, 2019-Ohio-2218, ¶ 8 (8th

Dist.), citing State v. Szakacs, 2009-Ohio-5480, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.).

              As previously discussed, the record before us, particularly the

colloquy, contradicts Burge’s ineffectiveness claims. Contrary to Burge’s assertion

that he was promised that he would only receive a ten-year sentence, the record

indicates that on numerous occasions prior to and during the colloquy, he was
reminded and affirmatively acknowledged that ten years was merely a minimum

and that (1) the State was going to seek more time and (2) that the trial court could

be permitted to exceed the ten-year minimum, and Burge was advised as to these

potential maximums. Furthermore, Burge conceded that he was satisfied with his

attorney’s representation and was given multiple occasions to speak to his attorney

and ask the court questions. He cannot now make a statement to the contrary as the

basis for alleging that his counsel was ineffective. See, e.g., State v. Shipp, 2026-

Ohio-416, ¶ 26 (7th Dist.). On this record, we cannot find merit to Burge’s claim that

he would not have entered his plea but for counsel’s representations when the record

directly contradicts this statement.

              Burge’s first assignment of error is without merit and overruled.

              In his fifth and final assignment of error, Burge alleges that the trial

court should have held a hearing on his postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty

plea.

              Crim.R. 32.1 provides that a trial court may grant a defendant’s

postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea only “to correct manifest injustice.”

Accordingly, a defendant who seeks to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing bears

the burden of demonstrating “manifest injustice.” Manifest injustice has been

described as a “clear or openly unjust act,” State ex rel. Schneider v. Kreiner, 1998-

Ohio-271, ¶ 20, that is evidenced by “an extraordinary and fundamental flaw in the

plea proceeding,”     State v. Hamilton, 2008-Ohio-455, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.).            A
postsentence withdrawal of a guilty plea is permitted “only in extraordinary cases.”

State v. Rodriguez, 2016-Ohio-5239, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.).

               Regarding a hearing, the trial court is not required to hold a hearing

on a postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Chandler, 2013-Ohio-

4671, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). A hearing is required only if the facts alleged by the defendant,

accepted as true, would require that the defendant be allowed to withdraw the plea.

Id. An evidentiary hearing on a postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is

generally not required if “the record indicates that the movant is not entitled to relief

and the movant has failed to submit evidentiary documents sufficient to

demonstrate a manifest injustice.” State v. Russ, 2003-Ohio-1001, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).

The trial court’s decision whether to hold a hearing on a postsentence motion to

withdraw a guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. McElroy, 2017-

Ohio-1049, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.).

               As discussed in the prior assignments of error, the record and Burge’s

filing do not demonstrate that a “manifest injustice” occurred. Burge’s postsentence

motion to withdraw his guilty plea was premised on points that were already

addressed and resolved during prior hearings and his dissatisfaction with his trial

counsel, which is directly contradicted by the record. We find that the trial court

was not required to hold a hearing on Burge’s motion.

               We accordingly overrule Burge’s fifth and final assignment of error.

               Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.          The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.



KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE

MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR