State v. Clark

[Cite as State v. Clark, 2026-Ohio-1286.]


                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                             No. 115520
                 v.                               :

TODD CLARK,                                       :

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :


                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 9, 2026


          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Case No. CR-24-696111-A


                                            Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Margaret Graham, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Edward M. Heindel, for appellant.


LISA B. FORBES, P.J.:

                   Todd Clark (“Clark”) appeals his sentence for sexual battery against

J.C. (“Victim”). After a thorough review of the facts and the law, we affirm.
I.   Procedural History

              On October 21, 2024, Clark was charged with Count 1, rape, a first-

degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b); Count 2, rape, a first-degree

felony, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b); Count 3, gross sexual imposition

(“GSI”), a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4); Count 4, GSI, a

third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4); and Count 5, GSI, a fourth-

degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1).

              On May 9, 2025, the court was informed of a plea agreement. Clark

would plead guilty to amended Count 1, sexual battery, a third-degree felony, in

violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(1) and to Counts 3 and 4 as charged. The State would

nolle Counts 2 and 5. That same day, the court held a plea hearing, at which it

advised Clark of constitutional rights he was waiving by entering a guilty plea, along

with nonconstitutional rights impacted by his plea, which Clark indicated that he

understood. The court accepted Clark’s pleas of guilt. The court granted Clark’s

request to withhold sentencing until after a presentence investigation had been

completed.

              On June 10, 2025, the court held a sentencing hearing. The court

stated that it had received and reviewed a presentence-investigation report (“PSI”)

concerning Clark. The court also heard from the State and counsel for Clark, who

asked the court to impose a community-control sanction. Victim’s grandmother

(“Grandmother”) also addressed the court, explaining the impact that Clark’s

actions had on Victim.
               The court recited the offenses to which Clark had previously pled

guilty before asserting, “There is a presumption in favor of prison associated with

each of the counts.” The court provided its rationale for its determination of Clark’s

sentence, addressing sentencing factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. The court

sentenced Clark to a three-year term of imprisonment on each of Counts 1, 3, and 4,

to run consecutively for an aggregate prison term of nine years.

               Clark appeals, raising the following assignment of error:

      The trial court committed reversible error by sentencing Mr. Clark
      under an incorrect presumption of imprisonment. Specifically,
      R.C. 2907.03(A)(1) — sexual battery — does not carry a statutory
      presumption in favor of a prison term. By applying such a
      presumption, the court failed to adhere to the governing sentencing
      framework. Mr. Clark is therefore entitled to resentencing under the
      correct legal standard, free from any improper presumption of
      incarceration.

II. Law and Analysis

               As an initial matter, we note that Clark, who was represented by

counsel, raised no objection at the sentencing hearing regarding the court’s

assertion that incarceration was presumed upon conviction for sexual battery.

Consequently, we review for plain error. See State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459,

¶ 22, quoting Crim.R. 52(B) (“Crim.R. 52(B) affords appellate courts discretion to

correct ‘[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights’ notwithstanding the

accused’s failure to meet his obligation to bring those errors to the attention of the

trial court.”). To prevail under a plain-error analysis, the appellant bears the burden

of demonstrating, but for the error, the outcome of the trial court proceeding would
have been different. Id. at ¶ 22-23. Even then, an appellate court corrects plain

error only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. Id. at ¶ 23.

               R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) addresses appellate review of sentencing,

providing that the court of appeals “shall review the record, including the findings

underlying the sentence . . . given by the trial court.” This court may “increase,

reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence . . . [or] vacate the sentence and remand

the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing” if it “clearly and convincingly

finds” that the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings or that the

sentence is otherwise contrary to law. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b).

               R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 establish criteria that a court must

consider in sentencing a felony offender. Pertinent to this appeal, R.C. 2929.12

requires that, in determining the “most effective way to comply with the purposes

and principles of sentencing,” the court “shall consider additional factors” that relate

to the seriousness of an offender’s conduct and the likelihood of recidivism.

R.C. 2929.12(B) and (C), respectively, establish factors that indicate an offender’s

conduct is “more serious” or “less serious” than conduct normally constituting the

offense. Relevant here, a court shall consider whether the injury suffered by the

victim was exacerbated because of the victim’s age, whether the offense resulted in

serious psychological harm to the victim, and whether the offender’s relationship

with the victim facilitated the offense. R.C. 2929.12(B)(1), (2), (7). R.C. 2929.12(D)

and (E), respectively, establish factors that indicate an offender is “likely” or “not
likely” to commit future crimes. Notable in this case, a court may consider whether

“the offender has a history of criminal convictions.” R.C. 2929.12(D)(2).

              Upon review of the record, we note that the trial court inaccurately

stated that there was “a presumption in favor of prison associated with each of the

counts” to which Clark pled guilty. While R.C. 2907.05, concerning GSI, establishes

that “there is a presumption that a prison term shall be imposed for the offense,”

R.C. 2907.03 imposes no similar presumption of incarceration regarding sexual

battery. The State does not argue otherwise.

              However, we do not find that the court’s misstatement of

R.C. 2907.03 impacted the outcome of the proceeding or constituted a manifest

miscarriage of justice. The only nonprison sanction that Clark’s attorney requested

at the sentencing hearing was a community-control sanction.             The record

demonstrates that the trial court rejected community-control sanctions as a

sentencing option. The court specifically found that “a community control sanction

would not adequately protect the public and would demean the seriousness of the

offenses in this case.”   The court explained that it based this conclusion on

consideration of the sentencing principles in R.C. 2929.11 and its “review[] of the

seriousness and recidivism factors” set forth in R.C. 2929.12.

              The court’s discussion of the seriousness and recidivism factors

particularly demonstrates that, in sentencing Clark to incarceration, the court was

not merely adhering to a nonexistent statutory presumption.        Concerning the

aggravating factors in R.C. 2929.12(B), the court noted that the “offender’s
relationship with the victim facilitated the offense.” The court also found that “the

victim suffered serious psychological harm” and that the “injury [was] exacerbated

by the victim’s age in this particular case, a seven to twelve year old . . . girl,” at the

time of these offenses. Regarding the recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12(D), the

court found that Clark “has a substantial history of criminal convictions dating all of

the way back to 1984.”

               The record supports the court’s R.C. 2929.12 findings. The PSI

summarizes interviews with Victim and Grandmother, indicating that Victim was

less than 12 years old at the time of these offenses and that Clark was Victim’s

grandfather. At the sentencing hearing, Grandmother informed the court that the

young Victim “has suffered mentally and been in counseling.” Our review of Clark’s

PSI confirms that Clark had been convicted of numerous crimes over a two-decade

span. Clark’s prior offenses include felonious assault and aggravated burglary, both

of which are defined as offenses of violence under R.C. 2901.01. Based on the court’s

consideration of R.C. 2929.11, findings under R.C. 2929.12, and the record support

thereof, we do not find that the court sentenced Clark to imprisonment as a result of

its misstatement that a presumption of incarceration applied to sexual battery.

               Also noteworthy to Clark’s assignment of error is the length of the

prison term that the court imposed upon him. Under R.C. 2929.14(A)(3)(a), for

certain third-degree felonies, including sexual battery, a court may impose a prison

term that “shall be a definite term of twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, thirty, thirty-six,

forty-two, forty-eight, fifty-four, or sixty months.” The sentence that the court
imposed on Clark is the middle duration of these potential definite sentences.

Without more, Clark’s medium-length sentence gives us no reason to believe that

the court would have ordered a nonprison sanction if not for its misstatement that

sexual battery carried a presumption of incarceration.

              Given the foregoing, we do not find that the court’s misstatement that

all of Clark’s offenses carried a presumption of incarceration affected the outcome

of the sentencing hearing or created a manifest miscarriage of justice. We also do

not clearly and convincingly find that Clark’s sentence was unsupported by the

record or otherwise contrary to law. Accordingly, Clark’s assignment of error is

overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.          The defendant’s

convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.



LISA B. FORBES, PRESIDING JUDGE

DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR