State v. Crowder

[Cite as State v. Crowder, 2026-Ohio-1474.]


                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     MONTGOMERY COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                      :
                                                    :   C.A. No. 30560
       Appellee                                     :
                                                    :   Trial Court Case No. 2022 CR 03407/2
 v.                                                 :
                                                    :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
 ROBERT CROWDER JR.                                 :   Court)
                                                    :
       Appellant                                    :   FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &
                                                    :   OPINION

                                              ...........

        Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on April 24, 2026, the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed.

        Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

        Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.


                                       For the court,




                                       RONALD C. LEWIS, PRESIDING JUDGE

TUCKER, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.
                                      OPINION
                               MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30560


CHRISTOPHER BAZELEY, Attorney for Appellant
ANDREW T. FRENCH, Attorney for Appellee


LEWIS, P.J.

        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Robert Crowder, Jr., appeals from his convictions following

a jury trial in the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court. For the following reasons, we

affirm the judgment of the trial court.

   I.      Facts and Course of Proceedings

        {¶ 2} This appeal involves Crowder’s conviction for trespassing in a habitation owned

by J.C. on Indianola Avenue in Dayton, Ohio (“the Indianola Property”). On January 31,

2024, a Montgomery County grand jury indicted Crowder on one count of trespass in a

habitation, a fourth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2911.12(B); one count of breaking and

entering, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2911.13(A); and one count of forgery

(elderly person), a fourth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2913.31(A)(2). The indictment

stated that the trespass in a habitation and breaking and entering counts involved Crowder’s

actions on or about July 8, 2022. Crowder pleaded not guilty to all counts. 1

        {¶ 3} On April 2, 2025, a Montgomery County grand jury indicted Crowder on one

count of tampering with records, a third-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2913.42(A)(1); one

count of false representation as an attorney, a first-degree misdemeanor in violation of

R.C. 4705.07(A)(1); and one count of false representation as an attorney/unauthorized

practice of law, a first-degree misdemeanor in violation of R.C. 4705.07(A)(2).


1. The January 31, 2024 indictment also included charges against Dorrick Conner and The
Village DBA Irrevocable Trust, but those charges are not at issue in this appeal and are not
further discussed in this opinion.

                                              2
      {¶ 4} On July 6, 2025, the State filed its bill of particulars. Among other things, the

bill of particulars provided that (1) from June 15, 2022, to June 17, 2022, Crowder forged a

warranty deed relating to property owned by J.C.; (2) on or about June 17, 2022, Crowder

submitted a forged warranty deed for recording; and (3) on or about June 17, 2022, Crowder

submitted a real property conveyance form listing J.C. as a grantor.

      {¶ 5} A jury trial on the six counts in the two indictments was held in July 2025.

Dorrick Conner testified first for the State. Conner was a self-employed auto mechanic who

had known Crowder since they were children. Crowder told Conner that he was an attorney

and that they could acquire abandoned houses in Dayton through adverse possession.

Crowder explained to Conner that they did not need to acquire the properties through a

foreclosure proceeding because “we’re neighbors of the city.” Tr. 215-216.

      {¶ 6} As part of their plan to acquire abandoned houses, Conner paid the delinquent

property taxes owed on the Indianola Property.      Conner and Crowder moved into the

Indianola Property and began making repairs to the house. Conner testified that J.C. came

to the Indianola Property while Conner and Crowder were living there. J.C. called the

police, but the police asked J.C. to leave. Conner and Crowder subsequently were evicted

from the Indianola Property. Crowder told Conner that the eviction was illegal and they

were being “human trafficked.” Tr. 226.

      {¶ 7} Conner spent about $45,000 on back taxes and $6,000 on utilities for properties

that Crowder told them they could acquire through adverse possession.                Conner

considered Crowder his legal advisor throughout the process. Crowder prepared all the

paperwork and Conner signed it. Relating to the paperwork for the Indianola Property,

Crowder listed himself as the trustee of J.C., which was based on J.C.’s “implied consent.”

Tr. 214.


                                             3
      {¶ 8} Kimberly DeLong also testified for the State. She was a Detective Sergeant

with the Trotwood Police Department.       DeLong interviewed Crowder and Conner on

July 14, 2022, and a video recording of the interview was played for the jury. She did not

believe Crowder was an attorney, and once it was determined that Crowder was not the

owner of the Indianola Property, she referred the case to the county to consider bringing

criminal charges against him.

      {¶ 9} Jennifer Connelly, the supervisor of tax delinquency at the Montgomery County

Treasurer’s Office, testified that anyone can make a real estate property tax payment on the

County Treasurer’s website. However, she explained that the payment of property taxes

by someone who does not own a property does not change ownership of the property.

While an owner of a property makes payments toward a delinquent balance under a

payment plan, the owner is protected against a tax foreclosure proceeding or the sale of a

tax lien. On June 15, 2022, Conner paid off the remaining $7,113.91 that was owed in

delinquent property taxes on the Indianola Property. At the time Conner paid the taxes, the

owner of the Indianola Property (J.C.) was current on a payment plan that had started in

March 2020.

      {¶ 10} J.C. testified that he was 74 years old at the time of the hearing and was a

retired real estate appraiser who currently owned and maintained 27 rental properties. He

had owned the Indianola Property since 2010, when he bought it for approximately $18,000.

He had previously rented out the house on the Indianola Property, but it had been vacant

since his last tenants moved out sometime in 2020. Once his last tenants moved out, J.C.

could not afford the necessary repairs on the property, and he fell behind in paying his

property taxes.   He set up a payment plan to make payments toward the outstanding

property taxes.


                                             4
       {¶ 11} In 2022, J.C. planned to make repairs on the Indianola Property and sent an

electrician to the property to verify that the electricity was in working condition. J.C. needed

to do this as the first step toward applying for the necessary permits to make repairs on the

house. The electrician went to the Indianola Property on July 8, 2022, and discovered that

somebody was living there. When asked whether he went to the Indianola Property on

July 8 after receiving the call from his electrician, J.C. testified, “If not that day, in the next

couple days.” Tr. 317.

       {¶ 12} When J.C. arrived at the property, he found Crowder and Conner living there,

and they told him that it was their house.          J.C. testified that he never gave Crowder

permission to enter the Indianola Property or to act as his trustee, and he never gave

Crowder a power of attorney. While speaking with Crowder at the house, J.C. offered to

sell the house to Crowder. J.C. then called the police but was told that it was a civil matter.

J.C. subsequently regained possession of the Indianola Property through the civil eviction

process.   Crowder sued J.C. to recover money for repairs that had been done to the

property, but the court awarded J.C. $35,000, which Crowder had not paid.

       {¶ 13} Tyson Dillon, a criminal investigator for the Montgomery County Prosecutor’s

Office, testified for the State as well. Part of his job duties included investigating financial

crimes and fraud. He began his investigation into the Indianola Property when Connelly

notified him in 2022 of some unusual payments on delinquent taxes received by the

Montgomery County Treasurer. Dillon discovered that Conner had paid off back taxes on

three properties. Dillon researched the Indianola Property and located a deed transferring

the Indianola Property from J.C. to Crowder. Dillon met with Conner in December 2024, at

which time Conner provided Dillon with some documents, including a power of attorney and




                                                5
a declaration of tax representative. As part of his investigation, Dillon also searched for any

record of Crowder being a licensed attorney but was unable to find any such record.

       {¶ 14} Crowder waived his right against self-incrimination and testified at his trial.

He stated that he was a “federal attorney” and had successfully represented many

individuals at the Noble Correctional Institution. Crowder testified that he had attorney bar

numbers in Florida, Washington, and West Virginia. He stated that he did not have to go

to law school to become an attorney. Crowder represented that he had made over three

million dollars in North Carolina and Florida using the nuisance abatement process and was

not a con man.

       {¶ 15} Crowder explained what he fixed at the Indianola Property and why it was

obvious that the property was not occupied when he moved in:

       We noticed a property had -- it was a good prospect. It was a lot of code

       violations. It was a hole in the roof. The doors were -- and windows were

       either broken out or not secured. There were dead animals throughout inside

       and outside the property. Trash. Black mold from the basement almost all

       the way to the third floor. We had to completely renovate and -- and take out

       all of that just to make it habitable. There was no way possible anyone could

       have occupied that structure before we got there. The black mold would have

       killed them. That alone. So for anyone to lead you to believe that we thought

       we were taking someone else’s property, that’s not true. We knew it was

       previously owned by someone, but it was in a abandoned state in accordance

       with 2308.02 of the Ohio Revised Code.

              ...




                                              6
               There’s no possible way I could have been sitting there foreseeing that

       someone would interfere in a lawful abatement of a nuisance in the

       neighborhood.     It was obvious that these properties were not occupied.

       Obvious. And at the time that we received notice that anybody had a interest

       that they were trying to protect, before we got into the property, we backed off.

       No one let us know anything until after. When Tyson Dillon contacted me, we

       had already got rid of all of the mold. We had already fixed the roof. We had

       already fixed all the windows and doors.        We had already secured our

       investment.

Tr. 389-390.

       {¶ 16} Crowder conceded that he had never received explicit consent from J.C. to

sign anything on his behalf, but Crowder believed that he had implied consent to do so.

Crowder did not pay J.C. any money after Crowder lost his civil suit against J.C.

       {¶ 17} The jury found Crowder guilty as charged on all six counts contained in the

two indictments.     At the sentencing hearing, the trial court merged for purposes of

sentencing the trespass in a habitation and the breaking and entering convictions, and the

State elected sentencing on the trespass in a habitation conviction. The trial court did not

merge any other convictions. Crowder neither asked that any other convictions be merged

nor objected to the trial court’s decision to not merge any other convictions.

       {¶ 18} The trial court sentenced Crowder to 18 months in prison for trespass in a

habitation, 12 months in prison for forgery (elderly/disabled), 36 months in prison for

tampering with records (government), 180 days in jail for false representation as an attorney,

and 180 days in jail for false representation as an attorney/unauthorized practice of law.

The court ordered the prison sentences to be served consecutively to each other and the


                                              7
jail sentences to be served concurrent with both each other and the felony sentences.

Crowder’s total prison sentence was 66 months. Crowder filed a timely notice of appeal

from the trial court’s judgment.

   II.      Crowder’s Trespass in a Habitation Conviction Is Supported by Sufficient

            Evidence and Is Not Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence

         {¶ 19} Crowder’s first assignment of error states:

         CROWDER’S CONVICTION FOR TRESPASS IN A HABITATION IS

         AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND BASED UPON LEGALLY

         INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

         {¶ 20} Whether the evidence presented at trial is legally sufficient to sustain a

conviction is a question of law that an appellate court reviews de novo. State v. Groce,

2020-Ohio-6671, ¶ 7, citing In re J.V., 2012-Ohio-4961, ¶ 3. “To resolve a sufficiency

challenge, we must determine ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable

to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. McKelton, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 325,

quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. An

appellate court does not engage in a determination of witnesses’ credibility when reviewing

the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Goff, 82 Ohio St.3d 123, 139 (1998), citing State

v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. Nor does an appellate

court assess whether the evidence admitted at trial should be believed but, rather, if

believed, whether the evidence “would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus. “We will not disturb

the verdict unless we find that reasonable minds could not reach the conclusion reached by

the trier of fact.” State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 484 (2001), citing Jenks at 273.


                                                8
      {¶ 21} Crowder was convicted of trespass in a habitation in violation of

R.C. 2911.12(B), which provides, “No person, by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass

in a permanent or temporary habitation of any person when any person other than an

accomplice of the offender is present or likely to be present.” Criminal trespass is defined

in R.C. 2911.21(A)(1) as to “[k]nowingly enter or remain on the land or premises of another”

without privilege to do so. On appeal, Crowder challenges only whether the State proved

beyond a reasonable doubt that any person was present or likely to be present at the

Indianola Property when he trespassed there. Crowder argues that “[t]he evidence was

overwhelming that the Indianola property was abandoned and that there was no objective

reason to believe anyone was likely to be present.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 4. Crowder further

argues that the property was unoccupied when Crowder and Conner found it and that the

State failed to prove that anyone was present at the time Crowder and Conner moved into

the property.

      {¶ 22} The State responds that it does not matter whether anyone was present when

Crowder first began living at the Indianola Property because the trespass in a habitation

charge was not based on his initial trespass. “The likely to be present element was not the

theory under which Crowder was convicted, it was the present element.” Appellee’s Brief,

p. 11. According to the State, “Crowder was trespassing in this habitation while people

were present. On or about July 8, 2022, an electrician sent by J.C. was present at the

property while Crowder was trespassing and a few days later Crowder was still trespassing

while J.C. was present.” Id. at 12.

      {¶ 23} Several appellate districts have considered and rejected Crowder’s argument

that a defendant can only be convicted under the burglary statute if a person was present or

likely to be present when the defendant first entered the property of another. As the Eighth


                                             9
District has held, “the ‘trespass’ element of burglary can constitute more than the initial entry

and the trespass continues throughout the duration of the offense.” State v. Davis, 2004-

Ohio-1908, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Fontes, 87 Ohio St.3d 527, 530 (2000), and State

v. Powell, 59 Ohio St.3d 62, 63 (1991). Therefore, when a person arrives at a property

while a defendant is trespassing there, the trespassing offense may be converted into a

burglary offense. State v. Scurry, 2011-Ohio-2243, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.); State v. Fairrow, 2004-

Ohio-3145, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.) (“[A] burglary conviction may stand if, during anytime that the

defendant is trespassing, a person enters the premises.”); State v. Rosas, 2024-Ohio-2522,

¶ 27-28 (3d Dist.); Davis at ¶ 16.

       {¶ 24} Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the State provided

sufficient evidence to prove that a person other than Crowder and Conner was present at

the Indianola Property on or about July 8, 2022, while Crowder was trespassing. J.C.

testified that he planned to make repairs on the house at the Indianola Property and sent an

electrician there to verify that the electricity was in working condition. J.C. needed to do

this as the first step toward applying for the necessary permit to make repairs on the house.

The electrician went to the Indianola Property on July 8, 2022, and discovered that Crowder

was living there. When asked whether he went to the Indianola Property on July 8 after

receiving the call from his electrician, J.C. testified, “If not that day, in the next couple days.”

Tr. 317. Conner confirmed that J.C. came to the Indianola Property while Crowder was

living there. Based on the testimony of Conner and J.C., any rational trier of fact could have

found that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a person other than

Crowder and Conner was present at the Indianola Property on or about July 8, 2022, when

Crowder was trespassing. While no person other than Crowder and his accomplice were

present when Crowder first entered the Indianola Property, Crowder remained on the


                                                10
Indianola Property after the electrician and J.C. arrived at the property. The evidence was

sufficient to support the conviction of trespass in a habitation in violation of R.C. 2911.12(B).

       {¶ 25} We also conclude that Crowder’s conviction for trespass in a habitation is not

against the manifest weight of the evidence. In contrast to a sufficiency challenge, the

weight of the evidence concerns the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence

offered to support one side of the issue rather than the other. State v. Thompkins, 1997-

Ohio-52, ¶ 24, citing Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). “A reviewing court considering

a manifest-weight claim ‘review[s] the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable

inferences, [and] considers the credibility of witnesses.’” State v. Group, 2002-Ohio-7247,

¶ 77, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). A case should be

reversed as being against the manifest weight of the evidence “‘only in the exceptional case

in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins at ¶ 25, quoting

Martin at 175.

       {¶ 26} The jury heard testimony relating to Crowder’s scheme to obtain ownership of

properties in Dayton by first having Conner pay delinquent taxes owed on the properties.

Crowder then recorded deeds with the Montgomery County Recorder’s Office that purported

to show a transfer of those properties from the owners to Crowder. As part of the scheme,

Crowder and Conner moved into the Indianola Property. Neither of them had received

permission from J.C. to move into his property or to transfer the property to them. J.C.

testified that he had rented the Indianola Property to tenants as recently as 2020 and

planned to do it again in 2022 after he made the required repairs to the property. On July 8,

2022, as part of his plan to rent the property again, J.C. sent an electrician to the Indianola

Property. When the electrician arrived at the property, he discovered that Crowder was

trespassing. Despite the presence of the electrician, Crowder remained at the property.


                                               11
After speaking with the electrician, J.C. went to the Indianola Property on either July 8 or a

couple of days later. Once again, after J.C. arrived at the Indianola Property, Crowder

remained there.       This evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Crowder

criminally trespassed in the Indianola Property when someone other than Crowder and his

accomplice were present at the property. We cannot conclude that this is the exceptional

case where the evidence weighs heavily against a conviction.

          {¶ 27} The first assignment of error is overruled.

   III.      The Trial Court Did Not Commit Plain Error by Failing to Merge the Forgery

             and Tampering with Records Convictions at Sentencing

          {¶ 28} Crowder’s second assignment of error states:

          THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO MERGE CROWDER’S

          CONVICTIONS FOR FORGERY AND TAMPERING WITH RECORDS.

          {¶ 29} Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution prohibits multiple punishments for

the same offense. This prohibition is codified at R.C. 2941.25, which states:

                 (A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to

          constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or

          information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may

          be convicted of only one.

                 (B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of

          dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the

          same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to

          each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such offenses,

          and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.




                                                 12
       {¶ 30} “‘[W]hen determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import

within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must ask three questions when defendant’s

conduct supports multiple offenses: (1) Were the offenses dissimilar in import or

significance? (2) Were they committed separately? and (3) Were they committed with

separate animus or motivation?’” State v. Earley, 2015-Ohio-4615, ¶ 12, quoting State v.

Ruff, 2015-Ohio-995, ¶ 31. “‘An affirmative answer to any of the above will permit separate

convictions. The conduct, the animus, and the import must all be considered.’” Id., quoting

Ruff at ¶ 31. As to the question of import and significance, “two or more offenses of

dissimilar import exist within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25(B) when the defendant’s conduct

constitutes offenses involving separate victims or if the harm that results from each offense

is separate and identifiable.” Ruff at ¶ 23.

       {¶ 31} Crowder contends that the merger issue raised in this assignment of error was

preserved when the trial court sua sponte merged Crowder’s convictions for breaking and

entering and trespass in a habitation but failed to consider merging any of the other counts.

As the State points out, however, “there is nothing in the record showing that Crowder

objected to the trial court’s pronouncement that it was only going to merge his convictions

for breaking and entering and trespass in a habitation.” Appellee’s Brief, p. 12, citing

Tr. 511-519.

       {¶ 32} “An accused’s failure to raise the issue of allied offenses of similar import in

the trial court forfeits all but plain error, and a forfeited error is not reversible error unless it

affected the outcome of the proceeding and reversal is necessary to correct a manifest

miscarriage of justice.” State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 3. “Accordingly, an accused

has the burden to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the convictions are for allied

offenses of similar import committed with the same conduct and without a separate animus;


                                                 13
absent that showing, the accused cannot demonstrate that the trial court’s failure to inquire

whether the convictions merge for purposes of sentencing was plain error.” Id.

          {¶ 33} The record-tampering statute provides, “No person, knowing the person has

no privilege to do so, and with purpose to defraud or knowing that the person is facilitating

a fraud, shall do any of the following: (1) Falsify, destroy, remove, conceal, alter, deface,

or mutilate any writing, computer software, data, or record.” R.C. 2913.42(A)(1).              The

forgery statute provides, “No person, with purpose to defraud, or knowing that the person is

facilitating a fraud, shall do any of the following: (2) Forge any writing so that it purports to

be genuine when it actually is spurious, or to be the act of another who did not authorize that

act, or to have been executed at a time or place or with terms different from what in fact was

the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed.” R.C. 2913.31(A)(2).

          {¶ 34} Crowder contends that the forgery and tampering with government records

convictions should have been merged because “[o]ne offense cannot be committed without

the other.” Appellant’s Brief, p. 7. According to Crowder, (1) both convictions were based

on the deed to the property that Crowder drafted; (2) drafting the deed and filing it were of

similar import and committed simultaneously because the indictment alleges that Crowder

both forged the deed and filed it with the recorder on June 17, 2022; (3) Crowder’s ultimate

motivation was to attempt to have the property placed in his name, which can only be done

by forging a deed and filing it; and (4) “the forging of the deed and filing it with the recorder

must be done with the same animus: obtaining possession of the Indianola property.” Id.

at 7-8.

          {¶ 35} The State responds that the trial court did not err in failing to merge the forgery

and tampering with records convictions because the victims were different. J.C. was the

victim of the forgery count, and the government was the victim of the tampering with records


                                                  14
count. The State further argues that the two convictions should not have been merged

because the forgery offense was completed before the tampering with records offense

occurred. According to the State, “the forgery was completed when the documents were

drafted.    Crowder was not charged with uttering the forgery but instead forging the

document itself. After the forgery was complete, the document was taken to the Auditor’s

Office and filed, thereby committing tampering with records.” Appellee’s Brief, p. 17-18.

         {¶ 36} We cannot conclude that the trial court committed plain error in failing to merge

the tampering with records and forgery convictions at sentencing because the offenses

involved separate victims. The victim in the forgery offense was J.C., an elderly person.

However, when Crowder recorded the deed and the property transfer form, he committed

fraud as to the government office that oversaw recording property transfer documents.

Therefore, the county government was a victim of the tampering with records offense. See

State v. Delaney, 2025-Ohio-16, ¶ 17 (5th Dist.) (holding that forgery (identity fraud) and

attempted tampering with government records offenses should not merge because there

were two victims in the case, the person who lost her benefits and the Department of Family

and Job Services); State v. Jarrell, 2019-Ohio-1356, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.) (holding that the trial

court did not commit plain error by failing to merge the attempted tampering with records

and identity fraud counts where appellant had caused harm to the police department and

his brother). The forgery and tampering with records offenses are not allied offenses of

similar import, and the trial court did not commit plain error by failing to merge the two

convictions for purposes of sentencing.

         {¶ 37} The second assignment of error is overruled.

   IV.      Conclusion

         {¶ 38} Having overruled the assignments of error, the judgment of the trial court is


                                                15
affirmed.

                                .............

TUCKER, J., and HANSEMAN, J., concur.




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