State v. Etheridge

[Cite as State v. Etheridge, 2026-Ohio-1197.]


                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                        :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                  :
                                                               No. 115415
                 v.                                   :

CHRISTOPHER ETHERIDGE,                                :

                 Defendant-Appellant.                 :


                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 2, 2026


             Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                Case No. CR-07-492933-A


                                                Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Anthony T. Miranda, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Clarissa A. Smith, for appellant.


EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:

                Defendant-appellant Christopher Etheridge (“Etheridge”) appeals the

denial of his petition for postconviction relief. He claims the following errors:

        1. The court erred in denying appellant’s petition for postconviction
        relief under the guise of R.C. 2953.21 et seq. and Crim.R. 35.
      2. The court erred in denying appellant’s petition for postconviction
      relief under the guise of R.C. 2943.21 et seq. and Crim.R. 35 without
      making findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by
      R.C. 2953.21(H).

             We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                        I. Facts and Procedural History

             In 2007, when Etheridge was 16 years old, he was charged with multiple

violent offenses including aggravated murder and felonious assault. He was

originally charged in the Juvenile Division of the Cuyahoga County Court of

Common Pleas but he was subsequently bound over to the General Division where

he pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated murder with a three-year firearm

specification and one count of felonious assault. After accepting Etheridge’s guilty

pleas, the trial court sentenced him to life in prison with eligibility for parole after

28 years. Because the court found Ethridge guilty and sentenced him the same day,

no presentence investigation was prepared. His convictions and sentence were

affirmed on appeal. State v. Hawkins, 2009-Ohio-4368 (8th Dist.).1

             On July 11, 2025, Etheridge filed a petition for postconviction relief,

arguing that the trial court erred in failing to consider his youth when it sentenced

him. The State opposed the motion as untimely. The trial court denied the petition

without opinion. This appeal followed.




      1 Ethridge explained at the plea hearing that his name was Etheridge on his birth

certificate and that his father changed his name to Hawkins. However, because he used
the name Etheridge in filing this appeal, we refer to him as Etheridge.
                                II. Law and Analysis

                      A. Petition for Postconviction Relief

             In the first assignment of error, Etheridge argues the trial court erred

in denying his petition for postconviction relief. The State argues, among other

things, that Etheridge’s petition was properly denied as untimely.

             Ordinarily, we review a trial court’s ruling on a postconviction-relief

petition for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gondor, 2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 49. An

abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an unwarranted

way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority. Johnson v.

Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35. However, whether the trial court had subject-

matter jurisdiction to entertain an untimely petition for postconviction relief is a

question of law subject to de novo review. State v. Apanovitch, 2018-Ohio-4744,

¶ 24.

             R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a) governs petitions for postconviction relief and

states that a petition for postconviction relief “shall be filed no later than three

hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court

of appeals in a direct appeal of the judgment of conviction.” The transcripts in

Etheridge’s direct appeal were filed on September 30, 2008, and the deadline for

filing a timely petition for postconviction relief was September 30, 2009. Therefore,

because Etheridge did not file his petition until July 2025, his petition was untimely.

             A trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to consider an untimely

petition for postconviction relief if the petitioner demonstrates that (1) he was
“unavoidably prevented” from discovering the facts he relies on, or (2) subsequent

to the statutory, 365-day deadline for filing postconviction-relief petitions, “the

United States Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies

retroactively to persons in [his] situation, and the petition asserts a claim based on

that right.” R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(a). R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b) further provides that the

petitioner must also show, by clear and convincing evidence, that

      but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder would have
      found the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the petitioner was
      convicted or, if the claim challenges a sentence of death that, but for
      constitutional error at the sentencing hearing, no reasonable factfinder
      would have found the petitioner eligible for the death sentence.

             Etheridge argues the trial court violated the Eighth Amendment to the

United States Constitution because it failed to consider his youthfulness at the time

of sentencing. He contends the right to have the court consider an offender’s age

before sentencing a juvenile to a life sentence is a new constitutional right that was

not recognized until after his conviction and sentence. He contends this new

constitutional right was recognized in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and

State v. Patrick, 2020-Ohio-6803.

              The Court in Miller held that an offender’s youthfulness must be

considered when a court sentences a juvenile offender to life without the possibility

of parole. But Etheridge was sentenced to a life sentence with parole eligibility after

28 years. Therefore, the new right recognized in Miller is inapplicable here. See

State v. Jones, 2024-Ohio-6032, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.).
              Etheridge argues that in Patrick, the Ohio Supreme Court expanded

the right to include juvenile offenders who were sentenced to life with the possibility

of parole and that this right applies retroactively. In Patrick, the Court held that “a

trial court must separately consider the youth of a juvenile offender as a mitigating

factor before imposing a life sentence under R.C. 2929.03, even if that sentence

includes parole eligibility.” Patrick at ¶ 2. Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court recognized

a new right for juvenile offenders after Etheridge was sentenced.

              However, the Ohio Supreme Court has also held that although the

General Assembly allows a common pleas court to entertain an untimely or

successive petition for postconviction relief based on a new state or federal right

recognized by the United States Supreme Court, it did not provide any exception

that would allow an untimely or successive petition to be granted based on a new

Ohio Supreme Court decision. State v. Parker, 2019-Ohio-3848, ¶ 2; see also Jones

at ¶ 13 (holding that postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.23 only applies to rights

recognized by the United States Supreme Court and not to rights only recognized by

the Ohio Supreme Court). Therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider

Etheridge’s petition for postconviction relief, and the first assignment of error is

overruled.

                 B. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

              In the second assignment of error, Etheridge argues the trial court

erred by denying his petition for postconviction relief without issuing findings of fact

and conclusions of law. However, it is well-established that a trial court “has no duty
to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law on successive or untimely petitions

for postconviction relief.” State ex rel. George v. Burnside, 2008-Ohio-2702, ¶ 6,

citing State ex rel. Bunting v. Haas, 2004-Ohio-2055, ¶ 11; State ex rel. Ashipa v.

Kubicki, 2007-Ohio-4563, ¶ 4. And, as previously stated, the trial court lacked

jurisdiction to consider Etheridge’s untimely petition. Therefore, the trial court

properly denied Etheridge’s untimely petition for postconviction relief without

issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law. The second assignment of error is

overruled.

             Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.



EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR