State v. Favorite

[Cite as State v. Favorite, 2026-Ohio-1619.]




                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                UNION COUNTY




STATE OF OHIO,                                      CASE NO. 14-25-45

         PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

    v.

TERRENCE TERELL FAVORITE,                           OPINION AND
                                                    JUDGMENT ENTRY
         DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.




                   Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court
                            Trial Court No. 2024-CR-0216

                                       Judgment Affirmed

                               Date of Decision: May 4, 2026



APPEARANCES:

         Colin P. Cochran for Appellant

         Raymond Kelly Hamilton for Appellee
Case No. 14-25-45




WILLAMOWSKI, J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant Terrence T. Favorite (“Favorite”) appeals the

judgment of the Union County Court of Common Pleas, arguing (1) that his guilty

pleas were not entered knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently and (2) that he was

denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel. For the reasons set forth

below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                           Facts and Procedural History

       {¶2} On September 27, 2024, Favorite was indicted on two counts of

aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), third-degree

felonies; two counts of aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C.

2925.03(A)(2), third-degree felonies; one count of possession of a fentanyl-related

compound in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), a fourth-degree felony; one count of

trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), a

fourth-degree felony; and one count of carrying a concealed weapon in violation of

R.C. 2923.12(A)(2), a fourth-degree felony.

       {¶3} The first six counts in the indictment each carried a one-year firearm

specification under R.C. 2941.141(A); a forfeiture specification for money in a drug

case under R.C. 2941.1417(A); and a forfeiture specification for a gun in a drug case

under R.C. 2941.1417(A). At his arraignment, Favorite pled not guilty to each of

the seven charges in the indictment.

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       {¶4} On September 25, 2025, Favorite appeared at a change of plea hearing.

The trial court explained that two of the three offenses in the plea agreement carried

presumptions in favor of prison sentences but that Favorite was still eligible for

community control. During the Crim.R. 11 colloquy, the trial court also informed

Favorite of the prison terms that were available for each of the charges in the plea

agreement. In response, Favorite affirmatively indicated that he understood these

notifications.

       {¶5} Favorite pled guilty to one count of aggravated trafficking in drugs in

violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), a third-degree felony, that carried forfeiture

specifications for money and a gun in a drug case; one count of aggravated

trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), a third-degree felony; and

one count of trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound in violation of R.C.

2925.03(A)(2), a fourth-degree felony, that carried forfeiture specifications for

money and a gun in a drug case.

       {¶6} At the conclusion of the change of plea hearing, Favorite said, “I really

just took this, umm, this plea because I felt like I was going to get out on probation.”

(Tr. 36). In response, the trial court reiterated that no determination had been made

as to whether Favorite would receive a community control sanction or a term in

prison. After accepting Favorite’s pleas, the trial court dismissed the remaining

charges in the indictment on motion of the State.



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       {¶7} At a sentencing hearing on November 7, 2025, the trial court ordered

Favorite to serve an aggregate prison term of fifty-nine months. The trial court then

issued its judgment entry of sentencing on November 7, 2025.

       {¶8} Favorite filed his notice of appeal on December 3, 2025 and raises the

following two assignments of error:

                            First Assignment of Error

       Appellant’s guilty plea was not made knowingly, intelligently, and
       voluntarily.

                          Second Assignment of Error

       Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel where his trial
       counsel failed to ensure he understood the consequences of his
       guilty plea.

                             First Assignment of Error

       {¶9} Favorite asserts that his guilty pleas were not knowing, voluntary, or

intelligent because he believed that the trial court would impose a community

control sanction at sentencing.

                                  Legal Standard

       {¶10} “When a defendant enters a plea in a criminal case, the plea must be

made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d 525,

527 (1996). “Failure on any of those points renders enforcement of the plea

unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Ohio

Constitution.” Id. “Crim.R. 11(C)(2) directs trial courts to engage in a colloquy


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with a defendant before accepting a guilty or no contest plea in a felony case.” State

v. Wallace, 2023-Ohio-3014, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.). “This colloquy is designed to ensure

that a plea is knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made.” State v. Sessom,

2024-Ohio-130, ¶ 24 (3d Dist.).

       {¶11} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) sets forth what a trial court is to communicate to the

defendant and reads, in its relevant part, as follows:

       (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily,
       with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum
       penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible
       for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions at
       the sentencing hearing.

       (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant
       understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest, and that the
       court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and
       sentence.

       (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the defendant
       understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury
       trial, to confront witnesses against him or her, to have compulsory
       process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s favor, and to
       require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
       doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify
       against himself or herself.

Generally, “a defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he

demonstrates he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the

provisions of Crim.R. 11(C).” State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 16.




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       {¶12} “The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have otherwise been

made.’” Dangler at ¶ 16, quoting State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108 (1990).

However, there are two exceptions to this general rule. Dangler at ¶ 16.

       First, ‘a trial court’s complete failure to comply with a portion of
       Crim.R. 11(C) eliminates the defendant’s burden to show prejudice.’
       Dangler at ¶ 15. Second, ‘[w]hen a trial court fails to explain the
       constitutional rights that a defendant waives by pleading guilty or no
       contest’ as required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c), the defendant’s plea is
       presumed to have been ‘entered involuntarily and unknowingly, and
       no showing of prejudice is required.’ Id. at ¶ 14.

State v. Caudill, 2023-Ohio-3843, ¶ 7 (3d Dist.). As a result,

       the analysis of an appellate challenge based upon Crim.R. 11(C)(2) .
       . . involve[es] three main questions: ‘(1) has the trial court complied
       with the relevant provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not
       complied fully with the rule, is the purported failure of a type that
       excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and
       (3) if a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that
       burden?’

Sessom, 2024-Ohio-130, at ¶ 25 (3d Dist.), quoting Dangler at ¶ 17.

                                  Legal Analysis

       {¶13} Favorite asserts that his pleas were not knowing, voluntary, or

intelligent because he believed “that he would receive probation or community

control.” (Appellant’s Brief, 6). However, during the Crim.R. 11 colloquy, the trial

court repeatedly indicated that Favorite could receive a prison sentence and

informed him of the potential prison terms that could be imposed for each offense

in this case. He was also told that he could be incarcerated for a period of seven

years and six months if the longest prison terms available for each offense were

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Case No. 14-25-45


ordered and imposed consecutively.        In response, Favorite indicated that he

understood each of these notifications.

       {¶14} While Favorite was told that he was eligible for community control,

the trial court informed him on three separate occasions that two of the three

offenses in this case carried presumptions in favor of imposing a prison term. In

response, Favorite indicated that he did not fully understand what was meant by a

“presumption” in this context. The trial court then reviewed how a “presumption”

would operate in this situation. See State v. Gau, 2023-Ohio-4205, ¶ 9-10 (2d Dist.).

       {¶15} Favorite also signed a written plea agreement that stated the potential

prison terms that could be imposed for each of the offenses in this case. This

document stated that two of the three offenses that were subject to the plea

agreement carried presumptions in favor of the imposition of a prison term. Thus,

Favorite was informed on multiple occasions and in multiple ways that he could

receive a prison sentence if he entered pleas of guilty to the charges against him.

       {¶16} Importantly, Favorite does not argue on appeal that the trial court

failed to make a notification that was required by Crim.R. 11 prior to accepting his

guilty pleas. Rather, Favorite points to a statement that he made at the change of

plea hearing in which he indicated that he “felt” he was going to receive a

community control sanction at sentencing. (Tr. 36). However, this statement does

not establish that Favorite was unaware that he could receive a prison sentence but

merely expressed a feeling or hope about what might transpire at sentencing. State

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v. Milite, 2020-Ohio-5384, ¶ 19 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Reed, 2010-Ohio-

1096, ¶ 24 (7th Dist.) (“[A] defendant must know the possible ramifications of his

plea, not the future sentencing decision of the trial court.”).

       {¶17} Further, in response to Favorite’s statement, the trial court reiterated

the fact that no determination had been made as to whether he would be placed on

community control at sentencing. Since community control was an available

sanction at sentencing, Favorite’s statement at the change of plea hearing does not

ultimately establish that he was misinformed or did not understand that he could

receive a prison sentence in this case.

       {¶18} In summary, Favorite does not argue on appeal that any portion of the

Crim.R. 11 colloquy was deficient or erroneous. The record indicates that he was

repeatedly informed that he could be ordered to serve time in prison at sentencing.

In response, Favorite affirmatively indicated that he understood each of these

notifications. Thus, we conclude that he has failed to demonstrate that his guilty

pleas were not knowing, voluntary, or intelligent. Accordingly, the first assignment

of error is overruled.

                             Second Assignment of Error

       {¶19} Favorite argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to

ensure that he understood the consequences of entering these guilty pleas.




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                                    Legal Standard

       {¶20} “Ohio law presumes that a licensed attorney’s representation was

competent.” State v. Morgan, 2024-Ohio-625, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). “In order to prove

an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the appellant must carry the burden of

establishing (1) that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that this

deficient performance prejudiced the defendant.” State v. McWay, 2018-Ohio-3618,

¶ 24 (3d Dist.), quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

       {¶21} To establish deficient performance, the appellant must demonstrate

that defense “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” State v. Howton,

2017-Ohio-4349, ¶ 35 (3d Dist.), quoting Strickland at 687. In general, matters that

fall within the ambit of trial strategy or debatable tactics do not constitute ineffective

assistance of counsel. State v. Wears, 2023-Ohio-4363, ¶ 32 (3d Dist.).

       {¶22} To establish prejudice, “the defendant must show a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” State v. Bibbs, 2016-Ohio-8396, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). “If the appellant

does not establish one of these two prongs, the appellate court does not need to

consider the facts of the case under the other prong of the test.” State v. Gear, 2023-

Ohio-1246, ¶ 50 (3d Dist.).




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                                    Legal Analysis

         {¶23} As the basis of his argument, Favorite again points to the following

statement that he made at the change of plea hearing: “I really just took this, umm,

this plea because I felt like I was going to get out on probation.” (Tr. 36). On

appeal, he asserts that this statement indicates that defense counsel did not properly

advise him that he could be sentenced to prison if he pled guilty. However, as noted

previously, the trial court repeatedly indicated that Favorite could receive a prison

sentence before he entered his guilty pleas at the change of plea hearing. In

response, Favorite affirmatively stated that he understood these notifications. T

         {¶24} The statement identified by Favorite does not establish that he was

unaware of the fact that he could be ordered to serve a period of time in prison at

sentencing, especially when viewed in light of the Crim.R. 11 colloquy. At most,

this statement indicates that he believed or hoped that the trial court would opt to

impose a community control sanction at sentencing. Because community control

was an available sanction at sentencing, this statement does not establish that

Favorite did not understand the potential consequences of entering these guilty

pleas.

         {¶25} Finally, Favorite does not identify any portion of the record in which

he was misinformed or provided incorrect advice. See State v. Smith, 2026-Ohio-

378, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Cooperrider, 4 Ohio St.3d 226, 228 (1983) (“[I]t

is impossible to determine whether the attorney was ineffective in his representation

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of appellant where the allegations of ineffectiveness are based on facts not appearing

in the record.”). Thus, based on the materials contained in the record presently

before us, Favorite has not demonstrated that defense counsel’s performance was

deficient in this case.

       {¶26} On appeal, Favorite has not explained how he was prejudiced in this

case given that (1) he has not identified any portion of the record in which he was

misinformed about the potential consequences of entering his guilty pleas and (2)

he repeatedly stated at the change of plea hearing that he understood multiple

notifications that informed him that he could receive prison terms at sentencing. We

conclude Favorite has not carried the burden of establishing that he was denied his

right to the effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the second assignment of

error is overruled.

                                     Conclusion

       {¶27} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Union County Court of Common Pleas is

affirmed.

                                                                 Judgment Affirmed

ZIMMERMAN, P.J. and MILLER, J., concur.




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                            JUDGMENT ENTRY

       For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error

are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby

rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the

judgment for costs.

       It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.

27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the

proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.




                                            John R. Willamowski, Judge



                                            William R. Zimmerman, Judge



                                            Mark C. Miller, Judge

DATED:
/hls




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