State v. Greene

[Cite as State v. Greene, 2026-Ohio-1551.]


                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                     :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,               :
                                                            No. 115111
                 v.                                :

WILLIAM GREENE,                                    :

                 Defendant-Appellant.              :


                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 30, 2026


          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-24-694082-A


                                             Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Mason McCarthy and Caroline Maver,
                 Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.

                 Wegman Hessler Valore and Matthew O. Williams, for
                 appellant.


ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:

                   Defendant-appellant William Greene (“Greene”) appeals his

convictions and asks this court to reverse and remand to the trial court for a new

trial. We affirm the appellant’s convictions.
              After a jury trial, Greene was found guilty of two counts of gross

sexual imposition, third-degree felonies, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4); and two

counts of disseminating matter harmful to juveniles, a first-degree misdemeanor, in

violation of R.C. 2907.31(A)(3), and a fourth-degree felony, in violation of R.C.

2907.31(A)(3). Greene was sentenced to 36 months in prison.

     I. Facts and Procedural History

              Greene was accused of victimizing the two daughters of his girlfriend.

The victims, M.S. and K.S., were born November 17, 2010, and August 30, 2009,

respectively. The victims met Greene in 2018. Greene moved into the mother’s

home with her daughters in 2020. At trial, M.S. testified that Greene touched her

inappropriately two weeks after he moved in with them. Tr. 527. She stated that

she was sleeping and woke up to find Greene in front of her, wearing her mother’s

robe, touching his penis. The second incident, M.S. testified that Greene put his

penis in her hand. Tr. 530. M.S. stated that she awoke to Greene rubbing his penis

back and forth in her hand. Thereafter, M.S. texted her father. M.S. read the text

messages at trial, stating: “My mom boyfriend just put his penis — private part on

my hand. I woke up. And he tried to lie and say it was bedbugs in my bed.” Tr. 535.

The date of the text message was April 20, 2022. M.S.’s father told her to tell her

mother, and her father came to pick her up from the home. She stayed with him for

two weeks and then went back to live with her mother. Tr. 547. After returning

home, M.S. told her mother about the incidents. Despite informing her mother,

Greene continued to live in the home, making M.S. uncomfortable. M.S. testified
that she was frustrated that Greene was not held accountable. As a result of her

stress, M.S. lied to the director of the recreational center she attended, stating that

her mother killed M.S.’s three-year old sister. M.S. stated that her intention was to

get people to listen to her so she would not have to live with Greene any longer.

               After M.S.’s testimony, K.S. testified that from time to time, Greene

would come into her room naked. Tr. 631. One night, while K.S. was sleeping,

Greene put his penis in her hand. She also testified that after that night she

witnessed Greene masturbating and watching pornography on his phone while they

were both in the living room. After that incident, on another day, K.S. was in the

living room watching TV when she observed Greene sitting in the dining room on a

stool masturbating again. Tr. 644. When asked how old she was when the incidents

occurred, K.S. responded, “[p]robably, like, ten. I was in my double digits, ten or

eleven.” Tr. 636.

               K.S. further testified that she reported the incidents to her

grandmother and her father. M.S.’s and K.S.’s grandmother and their respective

fathers took them to the police station to report Greene in 2022. Tr. 630. K.S.

stated, “We went to the police to talk about what happened between me, my sister,

and the boyfriend William Greene.” Id. Both K.S. and M.S. would have been under

13 years old. Their grandmother also took them to the hospital where a SANE

examination was conducted on the girls. The girls were also interviewed by

Stephanie Moore (“Moore”), an investigator in the sex-abuse department for the

Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS”).
              Moore testified that she received a referral regarding inappropriate

touching of M.S. and K.S. Tr. 816. Moore initiated contact and interviewed the girls

on October 17, 2022. Tr. 727, 816, and 840. At trial, the State played video

interviews between Moore and each girl. Moore testified that M.S. disclosed that

Greene put his penis in her hand while she was in bed. Moore also testified that

during her interview with K.S., K.S. disclosed that Greene also put his penis her in

hand while she was sleep in her bed. K.S. also disclosed to Moore that Greene

masturbated twice in front of her. Moore conducted further investigations into the

allegations, she gave a disposition of substantiated in the case, and explained that

her disposition was based on the credible, consistent disclosures of the girls, the

consistency of the evidence from the FBI regarding the text messages from a phone

dump, and the information that was collected at the time of the investigation.

Tr. 836.

              At the end of the trial, the jury found Greene guilty of two counts of

gross sexual imposition and two counts of disseminating matter harmful to

juveniles.

              Greene filed this appeal, assigning three errors for our review:

      1.     The trial court erred prejudicing Appellant by admitting hearsay
             statements from forensic interviews of M.S. and K.S. which
             served no medical purpose and were clearly testimonial;

      2.     Appellant’s convictions for the Gross Sexual Imposition on K.S.
             and for Disseminating Matter Harmful to both M.S. and K.S. are
             not supported by sufficient evidence; and

      3.     Appellant’s Convictions are Against the Manifest Weight of the
             Evidence.
      II. Hearsay Statements

             A. Standard of Review

               ‘“The admission of evidence lies within the broad discretion of a trial

court, and a reviewing court [will] not disturb evidentiary decisions in the absence

of an abuse of discretion that has created material prejudice.’” State v. Hutchinson,

2025-Ohio-4674, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Noling, 2002-Ohio-7044, ¶ 43.

“An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court exercises ‘its judgment, in an

unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it has discretionary authority.’”

Id., quoting Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.

             B. Law and Analysis

               In Greene’s first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court

erred when it admitted portions of the forensic interview of K.S. and M.S. because

these interviews were conducted for the purposes of investigation and produced

testimonial and inadmissible statements. More specifically, Greene asserts that the

interviews that were produced served no medical purpose and were clearly

testimonial. Evid.R. 801(C) defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made

by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered into evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Under Evid.R. 802, hearsay is

inadmissible unless the out-of-court statement falls within a recognized exception

to the hearsay rule.       Evid.R. 803 sets forth several exceptions including

Evid.R. 803(4), which provides an exception for statements made for purposes of

medical diagnosis and treatment. Evid.R. 803(4) provides:
      Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and
      describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or
      sensations, or the inception or general character or the cause or
      external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis and
      treatment.

Hutchinson at ¶ 22.

               Greene cites State v. Arnold, 2010-Ohio-2742, in support of his claim

that Moore’s forensic interviews of M.S. and K.S. contain nothing but inadmissible

hearsay. In Arnold, the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether a child’s hearsay

statements contained in a forensic interview violated the Confrontation Clause of

the Ohio and United States Constitutions.

               The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section

10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions,

the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”

In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004), the United States Supreme

Court explained that the key question for determining whether a Confrontation

Clause violation has occurred is whether an out-of-court statement is “testimonial.”

If a statement is testimonial, its admission into evidence will violate the defendant’s

right to confrontation if the defendant does not have an opportunity to cross-

examine the declarant. Id. at 53-56.

               Because M.S. and K.S. testified at trial, the Confrontation Clause was

not implicated, and the Arnold decision has limited application in this case. State

v. Griffin, 2025-Ohio-1459, ¶ 34-35, and 38 (8th Dist.), citing Crawford at 59, fn. 9
(“[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation

Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.”).

               Nevertheless, Arnold, 2010-Ohio-2742, is relevant for determining

whether the statements M.S. and K.S. expressed during the forensic interview were

made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.           In Arnold, the Court

explained that child-advocacy centers are unique because they involve

interdisciplinary teams of people who cooperate “‘so that the child is interviewed

only once and will not have to retell the story multiple times.’” Hutchinson, 2025-

Ohio-4674, at ¶ 24 (8th Dist.), quoting Arnold at ¶ 33. “‘Most members of the team

retain their autonomy’” such that “‘[n]either police officers nor medical personnel

become agents of the other.’” Id., quoting id. “However, to avoid the need for

multiple interviews, ‘the interviewer must elicit as much information from the child

as possible in a single interview and must gather the information needed by each

team member.’” Id., quoting id.

      Thus, the interview serves dual purposes: (1) to gather forensic
      information to investigate and potentially prosecute a defendant for the
      offense and (2) to elicit information necessary for medical diagnosis
      and treatment of the victim. The interviewer acts as an agent of each
      member of the multidisciplinary team.

Id., quoting id.

               As a result, some of M.S.’s and K.S.’s statements could have served an

investigative purpose while other statements could have been elicited for purposes

of medical diagnosis or treatment. Arnold at ¶ 34. In State v. Fears, 2017-Ohio-

6978, ¶ 38 (8th Dist.), this court held that “[t]o the extent a victim’s statement to a
social worker is for investigative or prosecutorial purposes, the statement will not

fall within the hearsay exception under Evid.R. 803(4).” Id. at ¶ 38, citing State v.

Rose, 2012-Ohio-5607, ¶ 42 (12th Dist.).

              Greene argues that the nature of the questioning and the information

elicited demonstrates an investigative purpose. He further contends that Moore

made no referrals, treatment decisions, or diagnosis for either girl.

      However, courts have held that descriptions of sexual abuse itself and
      the identification of the perpetrator are within the scope of statements
      made for medical and treatment purposes when the interviewer is
      seeking to determine if the sexual abuse was indicated, whether the
      child victim remained at risk, and whether the child victim requires
      treatment. . . . (“[C]ourts have consistently found that a description of
      the encounter and identification of the perpetrator are within [the]
      scope of statements [made] for medical treatment and diagnosis.”).

Hutchinson at ¶ 25.

              Greene contends that the interviews are testimonial statements of a

highly prejudicial nature and should not have been put into evidence. Although

some of the questions and answers regarding specific acts of abuse and the identity

of the perpetrator could be used for criminal prosecution, there is no evidence that

Moore conducted the interview solely for that purpose. And, as previously stated,

statements describing the abuse and identifying the perpetrator are considered

within the scope of treatment when the interviewer is seeking to determine if the

abuse is indicated or if the child remained at risk. Griffin, 2025-Ohio-1459, at ¶ 42,

citing Fears, 2017-Ohio-6978, at ¶ 45; In re D.L., 2005-Ohio-2320, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.).
                 We conclude that the trial court did not err when it allowed

statements from the forensic interviews of M.S. and K.S. to be admitted at trial.

                 Therefore, Greene’s first assignment of error is overruled.

      III.   Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence

             A. Standard of Review

                 An appellate court’s purpose when reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at

trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average

mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Sanders, 2023-

Ohio-1565, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph

two of the syllabus. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in

a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id., citing

id.

                 “In contrast to a sufficiency argument, a manifest weight challenge

questions whether the state met its burden of persuasion.” Id. at ¶ 17, citing State v.

Armstrong, 2021-Ohio-1087, ¶ 24 (8th Dist.). An appellate court examines the

entire record, “‘weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the

credibility of witnesses, and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the

evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest

miscarriage of justice that the convictions must be reversed and a new trial

ordered.’” Id., quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 388 (1997). “A
conviction should be reversed as against the manifest weight of the evidence only in

the most ‘exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the

conviction.’” Id., quoting id.

          B. Law and Analysis

               In Greene’s second and third assignments of error, he argues that his

convictions are not supported by sufficient evidence and are also against the

manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, as it relates to the sufficiency of the

evidence, Greene contends that his conviction for gross sexual imposition on K.S.

was not supported by sufficient evidence without any specific offense dates in

evidence. Greene questions how the jury could reasonably find that the age element

had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.            He further contends that his

convictions for disseminating matter harmful to K.S. and M.S. through performative

masturbation and disseminating harmful matter to K.S. by sharing pornography

were not supported by sufficient evidence. As to manifest weight, Greene argues

that the weight of the evidence does not support his conviction for gross sexual

imposition or for disseminating matter harmful to juveniles.

               Greene was convicted of gross sexual imposition, in violation of

R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), which states: “No person shall have sexual contact with another

. . . when . . . [t]he other person, or one of the other persons, is less than thirteen

years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of that person.” In Greene’s

first issue, he argues that because there were no specific dates for the gross sexual

imposition, it cannot be demonstrated that K.S. was less than 13 years old. K.S.’s
birthday is August 30, 2009. The girls testified that Greene moved into the home

with them in 2020, when M.S. was 10 and K.S. was 11. Although a specific date of

abuse was not given, K.S. testified that she recalled the abuse of Greene placing his

penis in her hand and moving back and forth occurring when she was around 10, 11,

or maybe 12. Tr. 365-636. K.S. went on to testify that she was “almost a mute” after

the incident. Tr. 637. K.S. did not tell anyone but stated that she eventually told her

grandmother who then called 696-KIDS. Tr. 652-654. K.S. testified that she and

M.S. went to the police in 2022 to report the incidents between the sisters and

Greene. Additional testimony indicates that Moore first interviewed the girls in

October 2022. Given this evidence it is clear from the record that K.S. was under 13

when Greene abused her. “‘Where such crimes constitute sexual offenses against

children, indictments need not state with specificity the dates of alleged abuse, so

long as the prosecution establishes that the offense was committed within the time

frame alleged.’” State v. Yaacov, 2006-Ohio-5321, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), quoting State v.

Barnecut, 44 Ohio App.3d 149, 152 (5th Dist. 1988); see also State v. Gus, 2005-

Ohio-6717 (8th Dist.). “This is partly due to the fact that the specific date and time

of the offense are not elements of the crimes charged.” Yaacov, citing Gus at ¶ 6.

“Moreover, many child victims are unable to remember exact dates and times,

particularly where the crimes involved a repeated course of conduct over an

extended period of time.” Id., citing State v. Mundy, 99 Ohio App.3d 275, 296,

(2d Dist. 1994). “The problem is compounded where the accused and the victim are

related or reside in the same household, situations which often facilitate an extended
period of abuse.” Id. “Thus, an allowance for reasonableness and inexactitude must

be made for such cases considering the circumstances.” Id. We find that there was

sufficient evidence presented that K.S. was under the age of 13.

                 Next, Greene argues that his convictions for dissemination matter

harmful to K.S. and M.S., through performative masturbation, were not supported

by sufficient evidence because he was masturbating in the hallway of a home and

not in public.

                 Greene was convicted of two counts of disseminating matter harmful

to juveniles, in violation of R.C. 2907.31(A)(3), one count a misdemeanor of the first

degree and one count a felony of the fourth degree with a furthermore clause, which

states: “No person, with knowledge of its character or content, shall recklessly . . .

[w]hile in the physical proximity of the juvenile . . . allow any juvenile . . . to review

or peruse any material or view any live performance that is harmful to juveniles.”

      ‘“Harmful to juveniles” means that quality of any material or
      performance describing or representing nudity, sexual conduct, sexual
      excitement, or sado-masochistic abuse in any form to which: (1) The
      material or performance, when considered as a whole, appeals to the
      prurient interest of juveniles in sex; (2) the material or performance is
      patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a
      whole with respect to what is suitable for juveniles; (3) the material or
      performance, when considered as a whole, lacks serious literary,
      artistic, political, and scientific value for juveniles.

State v. Anderson, 2024-Ohio-1006, ¶ 35 (11th Dist.), quoting R.C. 2907.01(E).

                 M.S. testified that she woke up one night and observed Greene

touching his penis in front of her while he was wearing M.S.’s mother’s bathrobe.

Tr. 544-545. K.S. testified that she witnessed Greene masturbating and watching
pornography on his phone while they were both in the living room. After that

incident, on another day, K.S. was in the living room watching TV when she

observed Greene sitting in the dining room on a stool masturbating again. Tr. 644.

Greene was not in the privacy of his room, but rather in rooms shared by the entire

family while he was masturbating. He was aware that K.S. was in the living room

both times and that M.S. was in her own room while he masturbated. Thus, we

determine that Greene’s acts of masturbating in front of both girls were harmful to

them. However Greene contends that his performance did not appeal to the

prurient interests of juveniles in sex and it fails to qualify as obscene.

               “A ‘prurient interest’ is a ‘shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex,

or excretion . . . [which] goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in

description or representation of such matters . . . .’” Id. at ¶ 36, quoting State v.

Casto, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4124, *5 (9th Dist. Sept. 13, 2000). “‘Whether a work

appeals to the prurient interest or depicts sexual conduct in a patently offensive way

is governed by contemporary community standards.’” Id., quoting id.

               Both girls testified that they witnessed Greene masturbating in their

presence. M.S. woke up to Greene masturbating in front of her in her bedroom, and

K.S. witnessed Greene masturbating in the dining and living rooms of their home

while she was in the living room on both occasions. Therefore, Greene’s convictions

for disseminating matter harmful to K.S. and M.S. through performative

masturbation, in violation of R.C. 2907.31(A)(3), are supported by sufficient

evidence.
               Next, Greene argues that his conviction for disseminating matter

harmful to juveniles, as it relates to showing K.S. pornography, is not supported by

sufficient evidence because K.S. gave no description of the video Greene was playing

on his phone aside from the words “pornography” and “inappropriate.”

                 The record reveals that K.S. testified that while she was on the small

couch Greene came into the living room, sat on the long couch, started masturbating

while watching an inappropriate video. Tr. 639. When asked what she meant by

inappropriate, K.S. stated that it was a “pornography video.”                    Tr. 642.

R.C. 2907.31 (A)(3) states in part that “no person, with knowledge of its character or

content shall recklessly do . . . [w]hile in the physical proximity of the juvenile . . . .”

It is uncontested that Greene, with knowledge of its content, was viewing a video

while masturbating and that K.S. was in close proximity. It is also uncontested that

K.S. saw the video out of the corner of her eye. Id. Finally, K.S. is a juvenile. There

is evidence that Greene allowed K.S. to view him masturbating while watching a

video, and it is reasonable for a trier of fact to have determined, under the

circumstances herein, that such a performance was obscene and/or harmful to

juveniles. See In re Z.C., 2006-Ohio-5378, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.). We determine from these

facts that Greene’s watching pornography in K.S’s presence was harmful.

               K.S.’s testimony could reasonably be construed as indicating that

Greene’s overt act of masturbation was not only a display, but that it tended to

represent masturbation as a mere object of Greene’s own sexual appetite. The self-

gratification component of masturbation is obvious, but defendant appeared to
engage in masturbation for more than just physical self-gratification. Clearly, his

intent was to arouse his own lust by performing masturbation while watching

pornography, in front of a young child, rather than in private and was a patently

offensive act. “On these facts, we find the act of masturbation was obscene.” State

v. Zimmer, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 1833 (8th Dist. Apr. 22, 1999). Furthermore,

there was no evidence that the material or performance, when considered as a

whole, had any artistic, literary, scientific, or political value for juveniles.

               Therefore, we find that Greene’s convictions for disseminating

material harmful to juveniles as it relates to showing K.S. pornography was

supported by sufficient evidence.

               Greene further argues that his convictions were against the manifest

weight of the evidence because he took numerous steps to make sure he was unseen

while masturbating. As previously stated, Greene masturbated in the common areas

of the home, the living room and dining room. He also masturbated in M.S.’s

bedroom in front of her. He was not in his bedroom or the bathroom. Again, Greene

was convicted of two counts disseminating matter harmful to juveniles, in violation

of R.C. 2907.31(A)(3), which states: “No person, with knowledge of its character or

content, shall recklessly do . . . [w]hile in the physical proximity of the juvenile, allow

any juvenile to review or peruse any material or view any live performance that is

harmful to juveniles.”

               “‘A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the

consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
person’s conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature.

A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference

to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that

such circumstances are likely to exist.’” Anderson, 2024-Ohio-1006, at ¶ 34 (11th

Dist.), quoting R.C. 2901.22(C).

               K.S. testified that while she and Greene were sitting in the living

room, Greene was viewing a pornographic video. K.S. could clearly see the contents

of the video. Tr. 644. Greene then asked K.S. if she would help him with a favor, to

which she refused. Then Greene started masturbating in front of her. Thus,

Greene’s convictions for disseminating matter harmful to juveniles were not against

the manifest weight of the evidence.

               Although we review credibility when considering the manifest weight

of the evidence, “we are conscious of the fact that determinations regarding the

credibility of witnesses and the weight of the testimony are primarily for the trier of

fact.” State v. Robinson, 2018-Ohio-2058, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Bradley,

2012-Ohio-2765, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), citing State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230 (1967).

“Undeniably, the trier of fact is best able ‘to view the witnesses and observe their

demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing

the credibility of the proffered testimony.’” Id., quoting State v. Wilson, 2007-Ohio-

2202, ¶ 24. “Here, the jury may take note of any inconsistencies and resolve them

accordingly, ‘believ[ing] all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony.’” Id., quoting
State v. Raver, 2003-Ohio-958, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.), citing State v. Antill, 176 Ohio St.

61, 67 (1964).

                 Next, Greene argues that his convictions for gross sexual imposition

are against the manifest weight of the evidence because K.S.’s testimony was

borrowed from M.S., and M.S. lied about other things like her mother killing her

sister. “Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of

credible evidence, offered at trial, to support one side of the issue rather than the

other.’” (Emphasis deleted.) Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting Black’s Law

Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed. 1990). “A manifest weight challenge attacks the credibility

of the evidence presented and questions whether the prosecution met its burden of

persuasion at trial.” State v. Rodriguez, 2021-Ohio-2580, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.), citing

Whitsett, 2014-Ohio-4933, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.). “It ‘addresses the evidence’s effect of

inducing belief,’ i.e., whether the state’s or the defendant’s evidence is more

persuasive.” Whitsett at id., quoting Wilson at ¶ 25.

                 Regardless of whether there is some conflict between M.S.’s

testimony and K.S.’s testimony, there is no material inconsistency as to the evidence

that Greene committed the actual crimes of conviction. See State v. Hill, 2014-Ohio-

387, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.) (“A conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence

solely because the jury heard inconsistent testimony.”). Here, the jury heard the

testimony, including M.S.’s and K.S.’s accounts, and it chose to believe some or all

of their testimony with the alleged inconsistencies regarding the counts of gross

sexual imposition and dissemination matter harmful to juveniles. Based on the
record before us we cannot say that the trier of fact clearly lost its way. Thus,

Greene’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

               Therefore, Greene’s second and third assignments of error are

overruled.

               Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.          The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated. Case remanded to

the trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.


ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR