State v. Hill

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
v. Hill, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1427.]




                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.




                          SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-1427
               THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. HILL, APPELLEE.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
        may be cited as State v. Hill, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1427.]
Criminal law—R.C. 2953.21 provides the exclusive mechanism by which a person
        may bring a collateral challenge to the validity of a conviction or sentence
        in a criminal case—A capital defendant may not collaterally challenge a
        prior judgment denying his petition for postconviction relief by filing a
        motion under Civ.R. 60(B)—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and cause
        remanded.
    (No. 2024-0352—Submitted October 29, 2025—Decided April 23, 2026.)
              APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County,
                           No. 2023-T-0039, 2023-Ohio-4486.
                                   __________________
        KENNEDY, C.J., authored the opinion of the court, which FISCHER, DEWINE,
HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ., joined. BRUNNER, J., concurred, with an opinion.
DETERS, J., concurred, with an opinion.
                             SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




         KENNEDY, C.J.
         {¶ 1} This discretionary appeal from a judgment of the Eleventh District
Court of Appeals presents the question whether a capital defendant may collaterally
challenge a prior judgment denying his petition for postconviction relief by filing a
motion under Civ.R. 60(B). The answer is no.
         {¶ 2} We hold that R.C. 2953.21 provides the exclusive mechanism “by
which a person may bring a collateral challenge to the validity of a conviction or
sentence in a criminal case,” R.C. 2953.21(K). The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure
do not apply to special statutory proceedings when the rules “by their nature [are]
clearly inapplicable.”    Civ.R. 1(C)(8).     Because the General Assembly has
prescribed a specific statutory mechanism by which a person may request
postconviction relief and designated it as the exclusive remedy available, a petition
for postconviction relief may not be reopened by filing a Civ.R. 60(B) motion.
         {¶ 3} We therefore reverse the judgment of the Eleventh District and
remand the matter to that court for consideration of Hill’s remaining assignment of
error.
                  I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
         {¶ 4} In 1986, appellee, Danny Hill, was convicted of aggravated arson,
kidnapping, rape, felonious sexual penetration, and aggravated murder with a
capital specification arising out of the torture and murder of 12-year-old Raymond
Fife. See State v. Hill, 1992-Ohio-43 (“Hill I”). Since then, Hill has repeatedly
challenged his convictions and death sentence.
         {¶ 5} This court decided his appeal as of right in 1992. Id. Hill presented
25 propositions of law, raising a range of alleged constitutional and procedural
violations, but the court found none meritorious. Id. We then reviewed the
aggravating and mitigating factors and noted that Hill’s intellectual disability was
“a possible mitigating factor,” id. at ¶ 129. We also noted that according to the




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testimony of two psychologists, Hill’s full-scale IQ score was either 64 or 68 and
his moral development was comparable to that of a two-year-old’s. Id. at ¶ 125-
126. However, we found only “a very tenuous relationship between the acts [Hill]
committed and his level of” intellectual disability because the evidence showed that
Hill “knew right from wrong.” Id. at ¶ 130. We affirmed Hill’s convictions and
sentences. Id. at ¶ 133-135.
       {¶ 6} In 1996, Hill filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, arguing, among other things,
that because of his intellectual disability, he had been prevented from receiving a
fair trial. The district court denied his petition in 1999, Hill v. Anderson, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23332 (N.D.Ohio Sept. 29, 1999), and Hill appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In his appeal, Hill added to his claim
that because of his intellectual disability, the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution bars his execution, see Hill v. Anderson, 300 F.3d 679, 680 (6th
Cir. 2002) (“Hill II”). While Hill’s appeal was pending in the Sixth Circuit, the
United States Supreme Court decided Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002),
holding that the Eighth Amendment’s clause prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment prohibits the execution of intellectually disabled people. Shortly after
Atkins was decided, this court held that to prove intellectual disability, a defendant
must demonstrate “(1) significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, (2)
significant limitations in two or more adaptive skills, such as communication, self-
care, and self-direction, and (3) onset before the age of 18.” State v. Lott, 2002-
Ohio-6625, ¶ 12. Because Hill had not yet presented his Atkins claim in the state
courts, the Sixth Circuit returned the case to the federal district court “with
instructions that it remand Hill’s Atkins claim to a state court and stay his remaining
claims pending resolution of” that issue. Hill II at 680.
       {¶ 7} Hill then filed a petition for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21
in the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas, arguing that his intellectual




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disability made him ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins and Lott. See State
v. Hill, 2008-Ohio-3509, ¶ 14 (11th Dist.). Both the expert for the State of Ohio
and the expert for the trial court determined that Hill was not intellectually disabled,
while Hill’s expert determined that Hill had “mild” intellectual disability. See id.
at ¶ 16, 18. Based on these determinations and others, in 2006, the trial court denied
Hill’s petition for postconviction relief, finding that Hill had proved the first prong
of the Lott test but had failed to prove the second and third prongs. See id. at ¶ 76,
99-100. The Eleventh District affirmed, id. at ¶ 108, and this court declined to
accept Hill’s jurisdictional appeal, 2009-Ohio-4233. Once the Atkins/Lott issue
was decided in the state court, the federal district court reopened the habeas
proceeding to address the claims that it had stayed, and it denied Hill’s petition.
Hill v. Anderson, 2014 WL 2890416 (N.D.Ohio June 25, 2014).
        {¶ 8} Around the same time, the United States Supreme Court decided Hall
v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014), and Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. 1 (2017), holding
that the Florida and Texas courts had applied incorrect tests for determining a
defendant’s intellectual disability in the context of state-court death-penalty
proceedings. In response to those decisions, this court held that the test articulated
in Lott was “the wrong standard” for determining a defendant’s intellectual
disability. State v. Ford, 2019-Ohio-4539, ¶ 95; see also id. at ¶ 94, 97, 100. The
new test requires courts to consider:


        (1) intellectual-functioning deficits (indicated by an IQ score
        approximately two standard deviations below the mean—i.e., a
        score of roughly 70 or lower when adjusted for the standard error of
        measurement), (2) significant adaptive deficits in any of the three
        adaptive-skill sets (conceptual, social, and practical), and (3) the
        onset of these deficits while the defendant was a minor.




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Id. at ¶ 100.
        {¶ 9} Hill appealed the federal district court’s judgment denying his habeas
petition to the Sixth Circuit, and that court reversed, holding that in affirming the
trial court’s denial of Hill’s petition for postconviction relief, the state court of
appeals had “unreasonabl[y] determin[ed]” that Hill was not intellectually disabled.
Hill v. Anderson, 881 F.3d 483, 487 (6th Cir. 2018). The State appealed the Sixth
Circuit’s judgment to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
vacated the Sixth Circuit’s judgment, finding that that court had erred in relying
extensively on Moore, because Moore “was not handed down until long after the
state-court decisions” in Hill’s case; it remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit with
instructions to evaluate Hill’s claim regarding his intellectual disability “based
solely on holdings of [the United States Supreme Court] that were clearly
established at the relevant time.” Shoop v. Hill, 586 U.S. 45, 46 (2019) (per
curiam).
        {¶ 10} On remand, a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit granted Hill
relief in habeas corpus on his Atkins claim with respect to his death sentence. Hill
v. Anderson, 960 F.3d 260, 265 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam). The warden filed a
request for rehearing en banc, which the Sixth Circuit granted. Hill v. Shoop, 11
F.4th 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2021). Under the Sixth Circuit’s local rules, granting the
warden’s request vacated the previous opinion and restored the case on the docket
as a pending appeal. See 6 Cir.R. 40(d). The Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, voted
nine to seven to affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief, holding that “the
Ohio Court of Appeals did not act unreasonably in relying on the opinions of . . .
trained medical professionals who had full access to the extensive record in this
case,” Hill v. Shoop at 394. The United States Supreme Court declined to review
that decision, with three justices dissenting. Hill v. Shoop, 597 U.S. __, 142 S.Ct.
2579 (2022) (Mem.).




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       {¶ 11} Hill subsequently filed a motion in the Trumbull County Court of
Common Pleas under Civ.R. 60(B)(4) and (5), seeking relief from the trial court’s
2006 judgment denying his petition for postconviction relief that was based on
Atkins. Civ.R. 60(B)(4) and (5) allow a court, on motion, to “relieve a party . . .
from a final judgment” if “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application” or for “any other reason justifying relief from the
judgment.” Hill argued that (1) the trial court’s judgment denying his petition for
postconviction relief was based on the incorrect standard for determining
intellectual disability set forth in Lott and (2) his petition should be reconsidered
under the standard set forth in Ford, 2019-Ohio-4539. He included a January 2022
affidavit from the psychologist who had served as the State’s expert during the
earlier proceedings on his Atkins claim. In the affidavit, the expert attested that he
had reviewed his previous reports and now “concluded [that Hill] is intellectually
disabled and has been his entire life.”
       {¶ 12} The trial court, citing State v. Schlee, 2008-Ohio-545, recast Hill’s
Civ.R. 60(B) motion as a petition for postconviction relief and then determined that
the petition was untimely and successive.        It held that Hill had not met the
requirements in R.C. 2953.23(A) for filing an untimely or successive petition for
postconviction relief, because he had “failed to demonstrate that he was
unavoidably prevented from the discovery of the historical facts of the case that
occurred up to and including the time of conviction.” The trial court stated that the
expert’s changed opinion regarding Hill’s intellectual disability “is not the type of
historical fact contemplated” by the statute.
       {¶ 13} Hill appealed to the Eleventh District, asserting two assignments of
error. In the first assignment of error, he argued that the trial court erred in holding
that Civ.R. 60(B) is an improper mechanism for seeking relief from a prior
postconviction judgment. See 2023-Ohio-4486, ¶ 31 (11th Dist.). And in the
second assignment of error, Hill argued that even if he is not entitled to relief under




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Civ.R. 60(B), the trial court erred in concluding that he failed to meet the
requirements for a second postconviction petition under R.C. 2953.23. See id. at
¶ 55.
        {¶ 14} The Eleventh District reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding
that Hill’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion was not an “irregular” motion but instead was “the
appropriate motion to file to seek relief from the civil judgment that was entered on
his petition for postconviction relief.” Id. at ¶ 52. It remanded the case to the trial
court for a determination on Hill’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion. Id. It declined to reach
Hill’s second assignment of error. Id. at ¶ 56.
        {¶ 15} The State appealed to this court, and we agreed to consider the
following proposition of law:


               A successive post-conviction petition that points to new
        evidence or a change in law must be brought according to R.C.
        2953.23(A), and may not be filed as a Civil Rule 60 motion for relief
        from an adverse judgment on a prior post-conviction petition.


See 2024-Ohio-5529.
                            II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
        {¶ 16} Civ.R. 60(B)(5) allows a court to “relieve a party . . . from a final
judgment” in the case of “any . . . reason justifying relief from the judgment.”
However, the Rules of Civil Procedure are not universally applicable.
        {¶ 17} The applicability of the Civil Rules is limited by Civ.R. 1(C):


               These rules, to the extent that they would by their nature be
        clearly inapplicable, shall not apply to procedure (1) upon appeal to
        review any judgment, order or ruling, (2) in the appropriation of
        property, (3) in forcible entry and detainer, (4) in small claims




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       matters under Chapter 1925 of the Revised Code, (5) in uniform
       reciprocal support actions, (6) in the commitment of the mentally ill,
       (7) in adoption proceedings under Chapter 3107 of the Revised
       Code, (8) in all other special statutory proceedings; provided, that
       where any statute provides for procedure by a general or specific
       reference to all the statutes governing procedure in civil actions such
       procedure shall be in accordance with these rules.


       {¶ 18} Therefore, “[t]here are two considerations in determining whether
the Civil Rules do not apply: whether the procedural statute governs a special
statutory proceeding and whether that statute renders the civil rule at issue ‘clearly
inapplicable.’” Ferguson v. State, 2017-Ohio-7844, ¶ 21.
                        A. Special Statutory Proceedings
       {¶ 19} A special statutory proceeding is one that did not exist at common
law or in equity but was established by special legislation. See Ferguson at ¶ 23,
citing Myers v. Toledo, 2006-Ohio-4353, ¶ 15. Postconviction-relief proceedings
clearly meet this definition. The right to file petitions for postconviction relief was
created by statute in 1965. R.C. 2953.21, Am.S.B. No. 383, 131 Ohio Laws 684,
1610 (effective July 21, 1965). “[A] postconviction proceeding is a collateral civil
attack on the judgment . . . [and] the ‘right to file a postconviction petition is a
statutory right, not a constitutional right.’” State v. Apanovitch, 2018-Ohio-4744,
¶ 35, quoting State v. Broom, 2016-Ohio-1028, ¶ 28. Because postconviction-relief
proceedings are special statutory proceedings, the only remaining question is
whether Civ.R. 60(B) is clearly inapplicable to those proceedings.
B. Civ.R. 60(B) Is Clearly Inapplicable to Postconviction-Relief Proceedings
       {¶ 20} “A civil rule is clearly inapplicable ‘“only when [its] use will alter
the basic statutory purpose for which the specific procedure was originally
provided.”’” (Bracketed text added in Ferguson.) Ferguson at ¶ 24, quoting Price




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v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 70 Ohio St.2d 131, 133 (1982), quoting State ex rel.
Millington v. Weir, 60 Ohio App.2d 348, 349 (10th Dist. 1978).
          {¶ 21} Ohio’s statute authorizing petitions for postconviction relief, R.C.
2953.21, “was enacted in 1965 in response to the United States Supreme Court
order that states must provide their prisoners with some ‘clearly defined method by
which they may raise claims of denial of federal rights.’” State v. Calhoun, 1999-
Ohio-102, ¶ 9, quoting Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 239 (1949).
          {¶ 22} R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a) provides, in relevant part:


                   A person in any of the following categories may file a
          petition in the court that imposed sentence, stating the grounds for
          relief relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set aside the
          judgment or sentence or to grant other appropriate relief:
                   (i) Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense
          . . . and who claims that there was such a denial or infringement of
          the person’s rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under
          the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States;
                   (ii) Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense
          and sentenced to death and who claims that there was a denial or
          infringement of the person’s rights under either of those
          Constitutions that creates a reasonable probability of an altered
          verdict . . . .


          {¶ 23} And R.C. 2953.23(A) sets out two circumstances under which a
court may “entertain” a second or successive petition for postconviction relief. The
first of those, which is applicable here, requires that both of the following criteria
be met:




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               (a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was
       unavoidably prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the
       petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or, subsequent to
       the period described in division (A)(2) of section 2953.21 of the
       Revised Code or to the filing of an earlier petition, the United States
       Supreme Court recognized a new federal or state right that applies
       retroactively to persons in the petitioner’s situation, and the petition
       asserts a claim based on that right.
               (b) The petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence
       that, but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder
       would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense of which the
       petitioner was convicted or, if the claim challenges a sentence of
       death that, but for constitutional error at the sentencing hearing, no
       reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner eligible for the
       death sentence.


       {¶ 24} From the text of these statutes and the context surrounding R.C.
2953.21’s enactment, it is clear that the purpose of the statutes is to define the
method by which people convicted of crimes “may raise claims of denial of federal
rights,” Young, 337 U.S. at 239. The prescribed method describes not only how a
person might bring his first petition but also the circumstances under which a court
may entertain successive or delayed collateral attacks on a conviction or sentence.
And R.C. 2953.21 states, without reservation, that it provides “the exclusive
remedy by which a person may bring a collateral challenge to the validity of a
conviction or sentence in a criminal case . . . or the validity of a related order of
disposition.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2953.21(K). Allowing what amounts to a
successive request for postconviction relief to be brought by filing a Civ.R. 60(B)
motion would contravene the statutory purpose of having one remedy for such




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cases. Therefore, the Civil Rules are manifestly inapplicable to postconviction-
relief proceedings.
                                  III. CONCLUSION
          {¶ 25} Postconviction-relief proceedings are special statutory proceedings
to which the Civil Rules are inapplicable, so Hill may not challenge the judgment
denying his petition for postconviction relief by filing a motion under Civ.R. 60(B).
Instead, successive petitions for postconviction relief must conform to the
requirements of R.C. 2953.21 and 2953.23.
          {¶ 26} Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Eleventh District Court
of Appeals and remand the case to that court for consideration of Hill’s remaining
assignment of error.
                                                                     Judgment reversed
                                                                   and cause remanded.
                                 __________________
          BRUNNER, J., concurring.
          {¶ 27} I agree with the majority opinion, which closes any loophole that
may exist in the methods prescribed in R.C. 2953.21 for raising postconviction
claims and the procedure under Civ.R. 60(B) that permits a party to move for relief
from a final judgment under certain circumstances. A request to vacate a criminal
conviction or sentence is governed by R.C. 2953.21. See R.C. 2953.21(K) (“the
remedy set forth in this section is the exclusive remedy by which a person may
bring a collateral challenge to the validity of a conviction or sentence in a criminal
case”).
          {¶ 28} Technically, in filing his motion under Civ.R. 60(B) in the trial court,
appellee, Danny Hill, did not seek to directly challenge the validity of his sentence.
However, the relief Hill sought—to vacate the prior judgment entry denying his
initial motion for postconviction relief—if granted, would have returned him to the
position he was in when he initially requested that his death sentence be vacated by




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using the postconviction procedure to challenge the validity of his sentence.
Because Hill was seeking to have the trial court reconsider the validity of his death
sentence based on new evidence and a newly recognized legal standard, his Civ.R.
60(B) motion was properly characterized by the trial court as a successive
postconviction petition, which is governed by R.C. 2953.23.
             {¶ 29} I write separately to highlight the context of Hill’s claim and to
emphasize the responsibility this court has in ensuring integrity in applying Ohio’s
capital-punishment laws, see State v. Wogenstahl, 2024-Ohio-4714, ¶ 45 (Brunner,
J., dissenting), quoting State v. Lawson, 2021-Ohio-3566, ¶ 198 (Brunner, J.,
dissenting) (“It is this court’s duty to ensure that any death sentence imposed in this
State is ‘subjected to a reliable, deliberate, and rigorous constitutional review’
. . . .”).
             {¶ 30} The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
states from executing persons who are intellectually disabled. Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002). To stay within constitutional bounds in implementing the
death penalty, states must employ standards based on “established medical
practice” to determine whether a person is intellectually disabled. Hall v. Florida,
572 U.S. 701, 711-712 (2014). The United States Supreme Court has cautioned
that even “[m]ild levels of intellectual disability . . . remain intellectual disabilities,”
Moore v. Texas, 581 U.S. 1, 18 (2017), and that states may not execute anyone who
falls into “‘the entire category of [intellectually disabled] offenders’” (emphasis
and bracketed text added in Moore), id., quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
563 (2005).
             {¶ 31} Therefore, the process of determining whether a capital defendant is
intellectually disabled must be constitutionally rigorous and thorough, and the
procedural pathway for a capital defendant to seek such a determination must be
clear and accessible. In State v. Lott, this court determined that the postconviction
procedures set forth in R.C. 2953.21 et seq. “provide a suitable statutory framework




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for reviewing [a defendant’s] Atkins claim.” Lott, 2002-Ohio-6625, ¶ 13. But here,
appellant, the State of Ohio, asks for application of this statutory framework in a
manner that would prevent Hill from having his Atkins claim properly adjudicated.
In its merit brief, the State argues that R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(k) prohibits Hill from
raising “the exact same [Atkins] claim” that he unsuccessfully raised in 2003.
         {¶ 32} That the State seeks to foreclose Hill’s ability to have his claim that
he is intellectually disabled reviewed under the current legal standard is extremely
concerning, especially given the substantial evidence that supports Hill’s claim, see
Hill v. Shoop, 597 U.S. __, 142 S.Ct. 2579 (2022) (Mem.) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
         {¶ 33} On habeas corpus review, a three-judge panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that Hill had been sentenced to death
“despite his mental retardation.” Hill v. Anderson, 300 F.3d 679, 681 (6th Cir.
2002). Many years later, again on habeas review, the same three-judge panel said
that the evidence that Hill is intellectually disabled is “overwhelming.” Hill v.
Anderson, 960 F.3d 260, 281 (6th Cir. 2020), vacated by Hill v. Shoop, 11 F.4th
373 (6th Cir. 2021). On en banc review, seven dissenting judges of the Sixth Circuit
observed that “[n]o person looking at [the] record could reasonably deny that Hill
is intellectually disabled under Atkins.”              Shoop, 11 F.4th at 400 (Moore, J.,
dissenting). And in her opinion dissenting from the United States Supreme Court’s
denial of certiorari,1 Justice Sotomayor, joined by two other justices, explained the
evidence of Hill’s intellectual disability as follows:


1. In denying certiorari, Shoop, 597 U.S. __, 142 S.Ct. 2579, the United States Supreme Court
declined to review Hill’s initial Atkins claim, see Shoop, 11 F.4th 373. Hill was seeking the Court’s
review of the nine-to-seven decision of the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc that determined that based
on “Ohio law at the time of Hill’s Atkins hearing,” id. at 386, the state appellate court properly
denied Hill’s Atkins claim, id. at 395. The initial three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit had held that
Hill is intellectually disabled, and it had ordered the district court to issue a writ of habeas corpus
with respect to Hill’s death sentence, noting that “the Ohio courts [had] avoided giving serious
consideration to past evidence of Hill’s intellectual disability.” Anderson, 960 F.3d at 265, vacated
by Shoop, 11 F.4th 373.




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        Before Hill filed his state petition for postconviction relief, he had
        been diagnosed with intellectual disabilities approximately 10
        times, beginning at age six. He scored 70 or below on every IQ test
        he took during his school years. The record before the state courts
        also revealed significant limitations in Hill’s functional academics,
        self-care, social skills, and self-direction. He could not sign his own
        name, never lived independently, was “functionally illiterate” at
        school and in prison, could not read or write above a third-grade
        level, and could not perform a job without substantial guidance from
        supervisors. [Shoop, 11 F.4th] at 407 [Moore, J., dissenting]. He
        has never been able to take care of his own hygiene independently;
        even in the rigidly organized environment of prison, he will not
        shower without reminders. All three medical professionals who
        testified at the mitigation phase of Hill’s trial concluded that he was
        within the range of intellectual disability, see State v. Hill, 177 Ohio
        App.3d 171, 177, 2008-Ohio-3509, ¶¶ 8-11, 894 N.E.2d 108, 112,
        and the trial court found the record indicated that Hill was “‘mildly
        to moderately retarded.’”       [Shoop,] 11 F.4th at 381 (majority
        opinion).


Shoop, 597 U.S. at __, 142 S.Ct. at 2579-2580 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
        {¶ 34} Hill submitted with his Civ.R. 60(B) motion in the trial court an
affidavit from the psychologist who had served as the State’s expert when Hill first
raised his Atkins claim. In the expert’s opinion, under Ohio’s current standard for
intellectual disability, Hill has been intellectually disabled his entire life. Yet Hill’s
Atkins claim remains unresolved.




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        {¶ 35} I share the sentiment expressed in the second concurring opinion that
courts should be cognizant of the consequences of delaying finality in a case like
this. Concurring opinion of Deters, J., at ¶ 39. However, I would add that the State
must ensure that it does not unnecessarily contribute to the delay. And the State
must recognize its responsibility in guaranteeing the integrity of capital punishment
in Ohio. It is at the very least questionable whether Hill’s death sentence is
constitutional. Accordingly, I concur in the court’s judgment and suggest that, for
the benefit of the family of Hill’s victim, the judicial system, and the penological
agencies and institutions responsible for carrying out Hill’s sentence, Hill’s claim
that his death sentence is constitutionally infirm be resolved at the earliest possible
instance following our remand.
                               __________________
        DETERS, J., concurring.
        {¶ 36} I fully join the majority opinion. I write separately to underscore the
injustice to the victim’s family caused by the delay in bringing finality to this case.
        {¶ 37} The majority opinion recounts the procedural path that appellee
Danny Hill’s appeals have taken since he was convicted and sentenced in March
1986.    But the nightmare for 12-year-old Raymond Fife’s family began on
September 10, 1985, when Raymond was found by his father after he had been
tortured by Hill. State v. Hill, 1992-Ohio-43, ¶ 1-6. Raymond died two days later.
Id. at ¶ 7.
        {¶ 38} To be sure, “no matter how heinous the crime, any conviction must
be secured respecting all constitutional protections,” Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S.
366, 393 (2022) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). But “[s]erial relitigation of final
convictions undermines the finality that ‘is essential to both the retributive and
deterrent functions of criminal law.’” Id. at 391, quoting Calderon v. Thompson,
523 U.S. 538, 555 (1998). Raymond’s family and the State of Ohio have been
deprived of finality for over 40 years.




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       {¶ 39} It is true that some of the delay in achieving that finality may be
attributed to the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002), that an intellectually disabled person may not be executed and its
decision to leave application of that holding to the state courts. See majority
opinion, ¶ 6. But other delays have occurred within the state court system. For
example, when Hill’s case returned to the trial court so that he could pursue his
Atkins claim, he filed a petition to vacate his sentence in January 2003. Over three
years later, the trial court denied his petition. And the motion being considered in
this case—Hill’s motion under Civ.R. 60(B) challenging the trial court’s judgment
denying his petition for postconviction relief—was pending in the trial court for
nearly a year before the trial court dismissed it. While we of course want trial courts
(and appellate courts) to give meritorious arguments proper consideration, we also
want them to remain cognizant of the suffering of the victims and their families that
results when courts unduly delay resolving matters before them.
       {¶ 40} Today, this court takes a step toward preventing further delay in
achieving finality in criminal matters by recognizing the inapplicability of Civ.R.
60(B) motions to judgments denying a criminal defendant’s petition for
postconviction relief. I agree in full with the majority opinion, and I concur in the
court’s judgment.

                               __________________
       Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles L.
Morrow, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney; and Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General,
Mathura J. Sridharan, Solicitor General, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy
Solicitor General, and Stephen Maher, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.
       Stephen C. Newman, Federal Public Defender, and Calland M. Ferraro and
Matthew Gay, Assistant Federal Public Defenders, for appellee.




                                          16
                            January Term, 2026




       Steven L. Taylor, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Prosecuting
Attorneys Association.
                           __________________




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