State v. Houser

[Cite as State v. Houser, 2026-Ohio-1339.]




                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                          THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                              VAN WERT COUNTY




STATE OF OHIO,
                                                   CASE NO. 15-25-06
         PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

    v.

RYAN E. HOUSER,                                    OPINION AND
                                                   JUDGMENT ENTRY
         DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.




                Appeal from Van Wert County Common Pleas Court
                          Trial Court No. CR-23-11-127

                                      Judgment Affirmed

                              Date of Decision: April 13, 2026



APPEARANCES:

         Rafael A. Villegas for Appellant

         Eva J. Yarger and Morgan A. Jackson for Appellee
Case No. 15-25-06




ZIMMERMAN, P.J.

       {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Ryan E. Houser (“Houser”), appeals the June 24,

2025 judgment entry of sentence of the Van Wert County Court of Common Pleas.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

       {¶2} This case arises from the September 4, 2023 shooting death of the

victim. Following the discovery of her body, law enforcement identified Houser—

her on-again, off-again boyfriend—as a suspect based on his history of threatening

her life and video surveillance placing him near the scene around her estimated time

of death. During initial questioning with law enforcement, Houser implicated

himself by demonstrating knowledge that the victim had been shot before police

disclosed her cause of death. Although Houser consented to a search of his cell

phone during interviews with law enforcement, investigators nonetheless sought a

warrant to search his cloud data. Subsequent forensic analysis ultimately revealed

that Houser had deleted information from his phone.

       {¶3} On November 2, 2023, Houser was indicted by the Van Wert County

Grand Jury on Count One of aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A),

2929.02(A), an unclassified felony; Count Two of murder in violation of R.C.

2903.02(A), (D), 2929.02(B), an unclassified felony; Count Three of tampering with

evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12(A)(1), (B), a third-degree felony; and Count

Four of having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3),

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(B), a third-degree felony. Houser appeared for arraignment on November 7, 2023

and pleaded not guilty to the indictment. On September 10, 2024, Houser filed a

notice of alibi defense.

       {¶4} As relevant to this appeal, Houser filed multiple motions to suppress

evidence in 2024 in which he sought suppression of statements that he made to law

enforcement as well as arguing that the search warrant for his cell phone lacked a

sufficient nexus to establish probable cause, was unconstitutionally vague, and

exceeded its lawful scope by authorizing access to cloud-based data. The State

opposed Houser’s motions. After a hearing on May 6, 2024, the trial court on

August 6, 2024 denied Houser’s motion to suppress statements made during

September 2023 interviews but suppressed statements made during the October 19,

2023 interview. Then, after a hearing on September 3, 2024, the trial court on

September 11, 2024 denied Houser’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from

the search of the cloud storage from his cell phone, concluding that the warrant

affidavit established a sufficient nexus between the crime and the data, and

alternatively, that the good faith exception applied.

       {¶5} On July 8, 2024, Houser filed a motion to dismiss Count Four of the

indictment. The State filed a memorandum in opposition to Houser’s motion to

dismiss on July 16, 2024, and Houser filed his reply that same day. On July 18,

2024, Houser filed motions to exclude evidence related to gunshot residue (“GSR”)

testing and to declare R.C. 2929.03(A)(1)—aggravated murder sentencing—

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unconstitutional. The State filed a memorandum in opposition to Houser’s motion

to exclude the GSR evidence on July 26, 2024. On August 20, 2024, the trial court

denied Houser’s motion to dismiss Count Four. That same day, the trial court denied

Houser’s motion requesting that the trial court declare R.C. 2929.03(A)(1)

unconstitutional as not yet ripe.

       {¶6} On October 1, 2024, Houser withdrew his motion regarding the GSR

evidence after the laboratory technician filed a report. Additionally, the parties

stipulated to Houser’s prior drug-related conviction, and Houser maintained his

constitutional challenge. Nevertheless, on October 5, 2024, Houser filed a motion

to exclude the laboratory technician’s report regarding the GSR evidence, which the

State opposed on October 17, 2024. Following these filings, the trial court held a

Daubert hearing on January 21, 2025 to address the admissibility of the GSR report.

On February 3, 2025, the trial court denied Houser’s motion to exclude the GSR

evidence after concluding that the expert’s testing and testimony satisfied the

Daubert standard for relevance and reliability.

       {¶7} On August 14, 2024, Houser filed a motion requesting the trial court to

accept jurisdiction over a related Mercer County case involving a charge of having

weapons while under disability. The State opposed Houser’s request, and the trial

court denied the motion on September 16, 2024.

       {¶8} On March 6, 2025, Houser withdrew his not guilty pleas and entered a

plea of no contest, under a written plea agreement, to Count Two of the indictment.

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In exchange for his change of plea, the State agreed to dismiss Counts One, Three,

and Four and to recommend that his sentence be served concurrently to the Mercer

County case. The trial court accepted Houser’s no contest plea, found him guilty of

Count Two, and ordered a presentence investigation.1

           {¶9} On May 12, 2025, Houser filed a motion requesting to withdraw his no

contest plea based on a claim of actual innocence, which the State opposed. On

May 29, 2025, the trial court denied Houser’s presentence motion to withdraw his

no contest plea.

           {¶10} On June 24, 2025, the trial court sentenced Houser to a mandatory

minimum term of 15 years in prison to a maximum term of life in prison.

           {¶11} On June 30, 2025, Houser filed his notice of appeal. He raises two

assignment of error for our review.

                                      First Assignment of Error

           The Trial Court’s denial of appellant’s motion to withdraw his no
           contest plea is an abuse of discretion and should have liberally
           been granted as the withdrawal occurred prior to sentencing.

           {¶12} In his first assignment of error, Houser argues that the trial court

abused its discretion by denying his presentence motion to withdraw his no contest

plea despite his claim of actual innocence. Specifically, he contends that the trial

court failed to apply the liberal standard to his request and incorrectly weighed the




1
    At sentencing, the trial court dismissed Counts One, Three, and Four of the indictment.

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nine-factor analysis, specifically regarding the lack of prejudice to the State and his

claim of actual innocence.

                                 Standard of Review

       {¶13} “Appellate review of the trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a

[no contest] plea is limited to whether the trial court abused its discretion.” State v.

Streeter, 2009-Ohio-189, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.). An abuse of discretion suggests the trial

court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. State v. Adams, 62

Ohio St.2d 151, 157-158 (1980).

                                       Analysis

       {¶14} “Criminal Rule 32.1 provides that a defendant is permitted to file a

presentence motion to withdraw a no contest plea.” State v. Driscol, 2022-Ohio-

1810, ¶ 15 (3d Dist.). “Generally, ‘presentence motion[s] to withdraw . . . [no

contest] plea[s] should be freely and liberally granted.’” Id., quoting State v. Xie,

62 Ohio St.3d 521, 527 (1992). “However, ‘[a] defendant does not have an absolute

right to withdraw a [no contest] plea prior to sentencing.’” Id., quoting Xie at

paragraph one of the syllabus. “As a result, a ‘trial court must conduct a hearing to

determine whether there is a reasonable and legitimate basis for withdrawal of the

plea.’” Id., quoting Xie at paragraph one of the syllabus.

       {¶15} When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a presentence motion to

withdraw a no contest plea, this court balances nine non-exhaustive factors: (1)

whether the withdrawal will prejudice the prosecution; (2) the quality of defense

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counsel's representation; (3) the adequacy of the Crim.R. 11 hearing; (4) the scope

of the hearing on the motion to withdraw; (5) whether the trial court afforded the

motion full and fair consideration; (6) the reasonableness of the motion’s timing;

(7) the reasons asserted for the withdrawal; (8) the defendant’s understanding of the

charges and potential penalties; and (9) whether the defendant maintains a claim of

innocence or a complete defense. Id. at ¶ 16. See State v. Edwards, 2023-Ohio-

3213, ¶ 8-9 (3d Dist.) (clarifying that the nine-factor analysis remains the applicable

standard of review for presentence motions to withdraw a plea unless the defendant

alleges that he or she became aware of new evidence that would have affected their

decision to enter the plea). “None of the factors is determinate on its own and there

may be numerous additional aspects weighed in each case.” Driscol at ¶ 16

       {¶16} In this case, the trial court denied Houser’s presentence motion to

withdraw his no contest plea after applying the reasonable-and-legitimate-basis

factors and determining that the factors weighed in favor of the State. In particular,

the trial court emphasized that withdrawing the plea would prejudice the State

because its GSR expert had retired and a separate plea negotiation in Mercer County

had been finalized based on this case’s anticipated outcome. Moreover, as to

Houser’s claim of actual innocence, the trial court determined that the record was

consistent with guilt, specifically noting Houser’s “outburst” to his mother revealing

knowledge that the victim was shot before law enforcement had released that

information, as well as video evidence contradicting his timeline. (Doc. No. 151).

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Furthermore, the trial court determined that the timing of Houser’s motion was

unreasonable because it was made orally at his sentencing hearing. Ultimately, the

trial court concluded that Houser was represented by competent counsel, fully

understood the mandatory sentence, and failed to provide a reasonable and

legitimate basis for withdrawal.

       {¶17} On appeal, Houser contends that the trial court abused its discretion

by denying his presentence motion to withdraw his no-contest plea based on factors

one, seven, and nine. Specifically, he argues that the trial court erroneously found

prejudice regarding his plea in the Mercer County case and the State’s GSR expert’s

retirement, which he characterizes as a foreseeable scheduling issue rather than

undue prejudice to the prosecution. Regarding his claim of actual innocence,

Houser asserts that he presented compelling expert testimony contesting the State’s

time-of-death calculation and video timeline, which established a plausible defense

sufficient to warrant withdrawal. In sum, he argues that the trial court failed to apply

the free and liberal standard, treating his motion as a mere change of heart rather

than a legitimate assertion of a defense.

       {¶18} Based on our review of the record in this case, we conclude that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Houser’s presentence motion to

withdraw his no contest plea. Indeed, the factors Houser leaves unchallenged on

appeal—specifically factors two, three, four, five, and six—weigh against

withdrawal. As to the second factor, the record is replete with evidence supporting

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that Houser received competent representation throughout the proceedings. He was

represented by multiple attorneys, including experienced retained counsel who

vigorously pursued pretrial motions and successfully negotiated a plea agreement

that resulted in the dismissal of three out of four charges, including the most serious

charge of aggravated murder.

       {¶19} As to the third factor, it is undisputed that the trial court conducted a

thorough Crim.R. 11 colloquy, ensuring that Houser’s plea was knowing,

intelligent, and voluntary. The fourth and fifth factors—regarding the extent of the

withdrawal hearing and whether the court gave full and fair consideration to the

motion—also weigh heavily against withdrawal. Importantly, following Houser’s

oral request to withdraw (at his sentencing hearing), the trial court afforded him a

full opportunity to be heard, permitting the parties to file written pleadings and

subsequently present evidence and arguments at a formal hearing. After receiving

this evidence, including the report from Houser’s expert witness, the trial court

issued a detailed judgment entry analyzing each of the nine factors.

       {¶20} Further, regarding the sixth factor, Houser conceded that the timing of

his motion to withdraw his plea—made orally at the very moment of the sentencing

hearing—was unreasonable. Indeed, “a motion to withdraw a guilty plea made on

the day of the sentencing hearing is not made at a reasonable time.” State v. Estep,

2024-Ohio-58, ¶ 30 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Harris, 2010-Ohio-4127, ¶ 31 (10th



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Dist.), State v. Hassink, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 5509, *13 (7th Dist. Nov. 20, 2000),

and State v. Caballero, 2016-Ohio-5496, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.).

       {¶21} Turning to the remaining factors challenged by Houser—factors one,

seven, and nine—we likewise conclude that these factors do not weigh in Houser’s

favor. As to the first factor, we agree that the State would have been prejudiced by

the withdrawal. Ohio courts classify the prejudice to the State “as the most

important factor in the balancing test.” State v. Zimmerman, 2010-Ohio-4087, ¶ 23

(10th Dist.). “Prejudice to the State ‘[g]enerally . . . involves one or more witnesses

becoming unavailable due to the delay in the trial resulting from the plea

withdrawal.’” State v. Preston, 2013-Ohio-4404, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.), quoting State v.

Boyd, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 4914, *15 (10th Dist. Oct. 22, 1998).

       {¶22} In this case, the State established precisely this type of prejudice.

Specifically, at the hearing on Houser’s motion, the State represented that the GSR

expert witness would “be retiring prior to any rescheduled trial date and that would

require another witness to re-test and re-examine the evidence and potentially have

another suppression hearing [Daubert] on that witness.” (Tr. at 215). See State v.

Isaacs, 2005-Ohio-2682, ¶ 14 (6th Dist.) (asserting that a prosecutor’s statement

regarding the potential unavailability of a material witness constituted sufficient

evidence that granting the motion to withdraw would prejudice the prosecution).

       {¶23} Furthermore, the GSR expert’s testimony was vital to the State’s case.

Indeed, his testimony would have provided critical forensic evidence physically

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linking Houser to the discharge of a firearm—evidence that would corroborate the

State’s timeline and contradict Houser’s claim of innocence. Thus, since the record

reflects not only the witness at issue but the nature of his testimony, we conclude

that the State would be prejudiced by the plea withdrawal. See Preston at ¶ 32

(noting that, to demonstrate prejudice based on witness unavailability, the State

should identify the specific witness, describe the substance of their anticipated

testimony, and explain how that testimony is essential to the State’s case).

       {¶24} Moreover, the State would suffer additional prejudice due to the global

resolution encompassing both Houser’s plea in this case and the plea agreement in

his related Mercer County criminal case. See State v. Leasure, 2024-Ohio-47, ¶ 9

(Donnelly, J., dissenting) (recognizing that plea agreements are contracts and that

the parties are entitled to the “benefit of their bargain,” noting that “[e]ach side

agrees to withstand a detriment in exchange for a desired benefit” and that the State

relies on securing a conviction and sentence in exchange for its concessions).

Critically, the record reflects that Houser’s plea in this case was inextricably linked

to the Mercer County proceedings, where Houser received a favorable concurrent

sentence specifically in reliance on the finality of his conviction in this case.

Because the State already performed its obligations under the related plea

agreement, permitting Houser to withdraw his plea in this case would prejudice the

State by unraveling the consideration given for the global resolution.



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          {¶25} Finally, as to factor seven—the stated reasons for the motion—which

touches upon factor nine—whether the accused had a complete defense—Houser

contends that withdrawal was justified by a claim of actual innocence, relying

primarily on a report from his defense expert that estimated a time of death that

purportedly contradicted the State’s timeline. “‘In weighing the ninth factor, “the

trial judge must determine whether the claim of innocence is anything more than the

defendant’s change of heart about the plea agreement.”’” State v. Ferdinandsen,

2016-Ohio-7172, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Davis, 2015-Ohio-5196, ¶ 19 (5th

Dist.), quoting State v. Davison, 2008-Ohio-7037, ¶ 45 (5th Dist.). “‘“A change of

heart or mistaken belief about pleading guilty is not a reasonable basis for

withdrawal of a guilty plea.”’” Id., quoting State v. Jones, 2011-Ohio-2903, ¶ 20

(7th Dist.), quoting State v. Smith, 2010-Ohio-5784, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.). “Claims of

innocence must be substantiated.” Id. While not a strict bar to withdrawal, a

defendant’s awareness of a possible defense at the time the plea was entered permits

a trial court to reasonably conclude that a legitimate basis for withdrawal does not

exist. State v. North, 2015-Ohio-720, ¶ 27 (3d Dist.). See also State v. DeJesus,

2015-Ohio-4111, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.) (confirming that “[d]enial of a pre-sentence motion

to withdraw a guilty plea [is] not . . . an abuse of discretion where the motion [is]

based upon a complete defense that the defendant was aware of when he entered the

plea”).



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       {¶26} Here, under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, we

conclude that factors seven and nine do not weigh in Houser’s favor. Importantly,

the specific facts and circumstances of this case reflect that Houser’s request to

withdraw his plea was motivated by a change of heart rather than a newly realized

defense. See State v. Edds, 2019-Ohio-4898, ¶ 24-25 (6th Dist.). Indeed, the record

in this case reflects that Houser was fully aware of this possible defense well before

entering his plea. See North at ¶ 25. Critically, the expert report outlining Houser’s

potential defense is dated January 23, 2025. Thus, Houser had over a month to

weigh this evidence with his trial counsel before proceeding to enter his no-contest

plea on March 6, 2025. The record demonstrates that Houser knowingly bypassed

this specific defense to secure a favorable plea agreement, which resulted in the

dismissal of three of his four charges, including the most serious offense. Therefore,

because he offered no additional circumstances to explain his subsequent reversal,

the trial court could reasonably conclude that relying on that exact same evidence

did not constitute a legitimate basis for withdrawal. See State v. Littlefield, 2004-

Ohio-5996, ¶ 12 (4th Dist.).

       {¶27} In sum, an evaluation of the nine plea-withdrawal factors demonstrates

that none weigh in Houser’s favor. Because none of the factors weigh in his favor,

Houser failed to establish a reasonable and legitimate basis to withdraw his plea.

See State v. Haskell, 2015-Ohio-1885, ¶ 28 (3d Dist.). Therefore, the trial court did



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not abuse its discretion by denying Houser’s presentence motion to withdraw his no

contest plea.

       {¶28} Houser’s first assignment of error is overruled.

                           Second Assignment of Error

       The trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress
       because the search warrant for Appellant’s cell phone was
       unconstitutionally vague and exceeded its lawful scope by
       authorizing access to cloud based data.

       {¶29} In his second assignment of error, Houser argues that the trial court

erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence derived from the search of his cell

phone’s cloud-based data. Specifically, he contends that his initial consent to search

the physical device did not extend to the cloud-based data; the warrant itself was

unconstitutionally vague; and the search warrant affidavit lacked the necessary

probable cause to justify the search. He further asserts that, even in the alternative,

the good-faith exception cannot prevent suppression because the warrant and

affidavit were too deficient to be reasonably relied on.

                                 Standard of Review

       {¶30} A review of the denial of a motion to suppress involves mixed

questions of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a suppression

hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best

position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. See also State

v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a ruling on a motion to


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suppress, “an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are

supported by competent, credible evidence.” Burnside at ¶ 8. With respect to the

trial court’s conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we

must independently determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal

standard. Id..

                                       Analysis

       {¶31} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article

I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution generally prohibit warrantless searches and

seizures, and any evidence that is obtained during an unlawful search or seizure will

be excluded from being used against the defendant.” State v. Tyson, 2015-Ohio-

3530, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.). “Generally, any evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth

Amendment, as well as any evidence seized subsequent to such violation, must be

suppressed as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’” State v. Fielding, 2014-Ohio-3105, ¶

15 (10th Dist.), quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). See

also State v. Jenkins, 2010-Ohio-5943, ¶ 9 (3d Dist.) (The Fourth Amendment does

not explicitly provide “that violations of its provisions against unlawful searches

and seizures will result in the suppression of evidence obtained as a result of such

violation, but the United States Supreme Court has held that the exclusion of

evidence is an essential part of the Fourth Amendment.”).

       {¶32} To prevent such unlawful intrusions, the Fourth Amendment mandates

that search warrants be issued “only ‘upon probable cause.’” State v. Gonzales,

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2014-Ohio-557, ¶ 18 (3d Dist.), quoting U.S. Const., amend. IV. “‘A neutral and

detached judge or magistrate may issue a search warrant only upon the finding of

probable cause.’” State v. Craw, 2018-Ohio-1769, ¶ 15 (3d Dist.), quoting State v.

Young, 146 Ohio App.3d 245, 253-254 (11th Dist. 2001), citing United States v.

Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916 (1984). “‘Probable cause “means less than evidence which

would justify condemnation,” so that only the “probability, and not a prima facie

showing of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause.”’” Id., quoting

Gonzales at ¶ 18, quoting State v. George, 45 Ohio St.3d 325, 329 (1989). To justify

a search for evidence of a crime, there must be a nexus connecting the item to be

seized with the criminal behavior, along with sufficient cause to believe that the

evidence sought will assist in a particular apprehension or conviction. Gonzales at

¶ 18.

        {¶33} In determining the sufficiency of probable cause, the issuing authority

must make a practical, common-sense decision based on the totality of the

circumstances presented in the affidavit. George at paragraph one of the syllabus.

This evaluation includes assessing the “‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’” of any

individuals providing information to determine if there is a “fair probability” that

evidence of a crime will be found in the specific location to be searched. Id., quoting

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-239 (1983). See also State v. Swing, 2017-Ohio-

8039, ¶ 40 (12th Dist.) (“Simply stated, a search warrant will be held sufficiently

particular when it enables a searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things

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that are authorized to be seized.”). “In other words, the issuing authority must

examine the ‘totality-of-the-circumstances’ in determining whether probable cause

exists to issue a search warrant.” Craw at ¶ 15, quoting George at 329.

       {¶34} “‘When reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit in support of a search

warrant, both the trial court and the appellate court are limited to the information

that was “brought to the attention of the [issuing authority].”’” Id. at ¶ 16, quoting

State v. Garza, 2013-Ohio-5492, ¶ 10 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Graddy, 55 Ohio

St.2d 132, 134 (1978), fn. 1. “Frequently, ‘the reviewing court is bound by the “four

corners” of the affidavit, as that is often the only record available before it.’” Id.,

quoting Garza at ¶ 10.      When reviewing a probable-cause determination, an

appellate court does not conduct a de novo review of the affidavit to decide if it

would have issued the warrant itself. Instead, the court’s duty is to ensure that the

issuing authority had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed.

Id., citing George at paragraph two of the syllabus. See also Garza at ¶ 19

(reasserting that appellate review of an issuing judge’s probable-cause

determination is limited to ensuring there was a “substantial basis” for concluding

that probable cause existed).

       {¶35} “‘There is interplay between probable cause, particularity, and

reasonableness’” when determining the validity of a search warrant. State v. Mack,

2025-Ohio-4812, ¶ 54 (5th Dist.), quoting State v. Castagnola, 2015-Ohio-1565, ¶

70. To satisfy the particularity requirement, a warrant must provide sufficient

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information to “‘“guide and control”’” the executing officer’s judgment and avoid

overbroad categories. Id. at ¶ 55, quoting Castagnola at ¶ 79, quoting United States

v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535 (1st Cir. 1999). Even where a warrant lists broad

categories of items, it remains valid provided the description is as specific as the

circumstances and nature of the investigation permit. Id. “‘Warrants that fail to

describe the items to be seized with as much specificity as the government’s

knowledge and the circumstances allow are “invalidated by their substantial failure

to specify as nearly as possible the distinguishing characteristics of the goods to be

seized.”’” Id., quoting Castagnola at ¶ 80, quoting United States v. Fuccillo, 808

F.2d 173, 176 (1st Cir. 1987).

       {¶36} The application of these principles is particularly nuanced in the

context of digital evidence. “‘The modern development of the personal computer

and its ability to store and intermingle a huge array of one’s personal papers in a

single place increases law enforcement’s ability to conduct a wide-ranging search

into a person’s private affairs, and accordingly makes the particularity requirement

much more important.’” Castagnola at ¶ 74, quoting United States v. Otero, 563

F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009). However, “the Fourth Amendment does not

require heightened protections for computers, nor does it diminish its protections

because of the challenges of searching them.” Id. “The ‘bedrock principle’ is

‘reasonableness on a case-by-case basis.’” Id., quoting United States v. Richards,

659 F.3d 527, 538 (6th Cir. 2011). Thus, while the Fourth Amendment does not

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require a search warrant to specify restrictive search protocols, it does mandate that

officers describe what they believe will be found on a digital device with as much

specificity as possible under the circumstances to enable the searcher to narrow the

search—a requirement that is especially important when the person conducting the

search is not the affiant. Mack at ¶ 56, citing Castagnola at ¶ 88.

       {¶37} On appeal, Houser argues that the trial court erred by denying his

motion to suppress the digital evidence, raising a multi-tiered challenge to the search

of his cloud-based data. Specifically, he contends that his initial consent to search

the physical phone did not encompass data stored on remote servers. He further

asserts that the search warrant was unconstitutionally overbroad and that the

supporting affidavit relied on improper generalizations, failing to establish a

sufficient probable-cause nexus between the alleged offenses and his digital storage.

Finally, he argues that the good-faith exception cannot salvage the search because

law enforcement’s reliance on such a facially deficient warrant was objectively

unreasonable.

                                       Consent

       {¶38} Notwithstanding Houser’s focus on the validity of the warrant, he

initially contends that the search of his cloud data exceeded the scope of his consent.

As a foundational matter, “‘neither a warrant nor probable cause is needed for a

search where the person subject to the search gives consent.’” State v. Davis, 2020-

Ohio-619, ¶ 36 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Marland, 2017-Ohio-4353, ¶ 24 (3d

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Dist.). “In order to be valid, consent must be voluntary.” Marland at ¶ 24.

“Whether consent is voluntary or is instead the product of duress or coercion is a

question of fact to be determined based on the totality of the circumstances.” Davis

at ¶ 36.

       {¶39} In this case, Houser does not dispute consenting to the search of his

cell phone on two occasions or contest the validity of his consent. Instead, he argues

that the scope of his consent was strictly limited to the physical device and did not

extend to his cloud data stored on remote servers. “The Supreme Court of Ohio has

held that ‘[t]he standard for measuring the scope of consent under the Fourth

Amendment is objective reasonableness, i.e., what a typical reasonable person

would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect.’” State

v. Dasen, 2017-Ohio-5556, ¶ 43 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Roberts, 2006-Ohio-

3665, ¶ 99. See also United States v. Perez, 712 Fed.Appx. 136, 140 (3d Cir. 2017)

(“In the absence of statutes and doctrine that better address rapidly evolving

technology, the manner of searching digital storage is circumscribed by objective

reasonableness rather than specific search protocols.”).

       {¶40} In evaluating what is objectively reasonable, jurisprudence analyzing

the permissible scope of digital search warrants provides an instructive framework.

In that context, courts have generally recognized that a warrant to search a device

also extends to the files and records stored therein or accessible through it. United

States v. Pompy, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48995, *10-11 (E.D.Mich. Mar. 16, 2021),

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Case No. 15-25-06


citing United States v. Fuller, 77 Fed.Appx. 371, 377 (6th Cir. 2003) and United

States v. Newman, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 221891, *3 (E.D.Tenn. Sep. 8, 2020).

Indeed, even where a warrant does not explicitly list computer data, the authority to

search for “records” generally encompasses the seizure of digital files if it is

reasonable to believe the computer serves as a repository for such evidence. Id.,

citing United States v. Lucas, 640 F.3d 168, 177-178 (6th Cir. 2011).

       {¶41} This broad scope is necessary because “[t]he scope of the privacy

interests at stake is further complicated by the fact that the data a user views on

many modern cell phones may not in fact be stored on the device itself.” Riley v.

California, 573 U.S. 373, 397 (2014).       As the United States Supreme Court

explained, this is due to “cloud computing,” which is “the capacity of Internet-

connected devices to display data stored on remote servers rather than on the device

itself.” Id. Because the same type of data may be stored locally on the device for

one user and in the cloud for another, users often do not know where their

information is actually stored, and the distinction “generally makes little

difference.” Id.

       {¶42} However, because we ultimately conclude that the search was

independently justified by a valid search warrant—or, alternatively, law

enforcement’s good-faith reliance on the warrant—we need not resolve whether

Houser’s initial consent to search his physical device extended to its associated

cloud data. Indeed, our review of the totality of the circumstances presented by this

                                        -21-
Case No. 15-25-06


case reveals that the warrant was sufficiently particular and based on probable cause

to search Houser’s cell phone and corresponding cloud data, and alternatively, that

the executing officers acted in objectively reasonable good faith.

                                Warrant Particularity

       {¶43} Specifically, our review of the warrant that was issued in this case

reveals that it was sufficiently particular. See United States v. Pelayo, 2023 U.S.

App. LEXIS 19624, *3-4 (9th Cir. July 31, 2023) (noting a warrant is not general

when it describes the data to be disclosed and limits the search to outlined crimes).

To satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement, a search warrant must

provide sufficient detail to “guide and control” the executing officer’s discretion

while remaining narrowly tailored to avoid the seizure of unrelated evidence.

Castagnola, 2015-Ohio-1565, at ¶ 79. A warrant is not automatically invalid simply

because it lists broad categories of items to be seized; rather, it remains valid so long

as the description is “‘“‘as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity

under investigation permit.’”’” Id. at ¶ 80, quoting Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336

(6th Cir. 2001), quoting United States v. Henson, 848 F.2d 1374, 1383 (6th Cir.

1988), quoting United States v. Blum, 753 F.2d 999, 1001 (11th Cir. 1985).

“Warrants that fail to describe the items to be seized with as much specificity as the

government’s knowledge and the circumstances allow are ‘invalidated by their

substantial failure to specify as nearly as possible the distinguishing characteristics



                                          -22-
Case No. 15-25-06


of the goods to be seized.’” Id., quoting United States v. Fuccillo, 808 F.2d 173,

176 (1st Cir. 1987).

       {¶44} Because a computer’s vast storage capacity creates a “‘a greater

potential for the “intermingling” of documents and a consequent invasion of

privacy,’” executing officers “‘must be clear as to what it is they are seeking on the

computer and conduct the search in a way that avoids searching files of types not

identified in the warrant.’” Id., quoting United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986

(10th Cir. 2001). “‘[P]ractical accuracy rather than technical precision’ is the

operative consideration.” Id., quoting United States v. Dorrough, 927 F.2d 498, 500

(10th Cir. 1991).

       {¶45} Importantly, the search warrant affidavit at issue in this case

specifically identified the target device—a black Samsung cell phone along with its

specific identification number—and requested authorization to search it for a broad

array of digital data. This request listed specific categories including

       [m]essages, text messages, photos, multimedia messages, pictures and
       images, video and audio recordings, call history, logs to include,
       received calls, missed calls and dialed calls. Phonebook and contacts,
       calendar and test [sic] list entries, emails stored on the handset,
       internet browsing history, social networking artifacts, applicator
       artifacts, address books, expansion cards, subscriber phone number,
       deleted messages, location area identifier, and GPS historical data.

(State’s Ex. 2). In addition to the data stored directly on the digital device, the search

warrant affidavit requested permission to search “all associated cloud-based data”

relevant to the crimes of aggravated murder, murder, voluntary manslaughter,

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Case No. 15-25-06


involuntary manslaughter, burglary, tampering with evidence, and abuse of a

corpse. (Id.). To clarify the scope of this request, the search warrant affidavit

explicitly defined “cloud-based storage” as any “off-site” storage solution, such as

third-party servers, that allows a user to free up device memory while keeping data

accessible through the device. (Id.). The search warrant that was subsequently

issued authorized this request, reiterating the specific descriptions provided in the

search warrant affidavit.

       {¶46} We conclude that the detail contained in the search warrant affidavit,

and subsequently the warrant itself, defeats Houser’s vagueness argument since it

expressly identified the target device, exhaustively listed the digital data to be

searched, and explicitly limited the scope of the search to evidence of the listed

offenses related to the homicide investigation. Compare Mack, 2025-Ohio-4812, at

¶ 62 (5th Dist.) (assessing that “the warrant at issue expressly incorporated the

affidavit by reference, specified the device to be searched, the information being

sought and the reason therefore, and where the information could be found on the

phone”); United States v. Conway, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119929, *37 (E.D.Ky.

June 4, 2018) (finding a warrant sufficiently particularized because, when read as a

whole and in context with the supporting affidavit, an authorization to search for

evidence of “a crime” clearly referred to the specific offense under investigation).

See also State v. McCrory, 2011-Ohio-546, ¶ 49 (6th Dist.) (“The overwhelming

weight of authority is to the effect that warrants need not contain any sort of search

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Case No. 15-25-06


protocol, methodology, or other strategy restricting a computer search to specific

programs or terms in order to satisfy the particularity requirement.”). Consequently,

we conclude that the warrant was sufficiently particular in its scope and did not

constitute an unconstitutional general warrant.

                                       Probable Cause Nexus

         {¶47} Having established the warrant’s particularity, we turn to Houser’s

argument that the affidavit lacked a sufficient nexus to establish probable cause.2

Crim.R. 41(C) provides that an affidavit in support of a search warrant

         shall name or describe the person to be searched or particularly
         describe the place to be searched, name or describe the property to be
         searched for and seized, state substantially the offense in relation
         thereto, and state the factual basis for the affiant’s belief that such
         property is there located.

“‘When considering whether a nexus exists between the alleged crime and the place

to be searched, “‘the circumstances must indicate why evidence of illegal activity

will be found in a particular place.’”’” State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6667, ¶ 37 (3d

Dist.), quoting State v. Phillips, 2016-Ohio-5944, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.), quoting United

States v. Washington, 380 F.3d 236, 240 (6th Cir. 2004), quoting United States v.

Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 2004). In making such an assessment, a



2
  “The probable cause ‘nexus’ requirement is not to be confused with the ‘minimally sufficient nexus’
requirement that Ohio courts . . . have applied in determining whether to apply the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule.” State v. Johnson, 2024-Ohio-1147, ¶ 15, fn. 1 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Schubert,
2022-Ohio-4604, ¶ 9-13. “The ‘minimally sufficient nexus’ requirement for the good faith exception is a
distinct and lower standard than the probable cause ‘nexus’ requirement, and a ‘minimally sufficient nexus’
is insufficient for concluding a magistrate had a ‘substantial basis’ for probable cause.” Id.


                                                   -25-
Case No. 15-25-06


judicial officer may give considerable weight to the conclusions of experienced law

enforcement officers regarding where evidence of a crime is likely to be found and

is “entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely to be kept,

based on the nature of the evidence and the type of offense.” (Citations omitted.)

State v. Eng, 2005-Ohio-375, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.).

       {¶48} Considering the totality of the circumstances of this case (and being

mindful of the deference provided to a neutral issuing authority’s decision regarding

the existence of probable cause), we conclude that the search warrant affidavit in

this case sets forth sufficient facts to establish a nexus between the alleged criminal

activity and Houser’s cell phone and corresponding cloud data. To establish the

necessary nexus between the target data and the crime, the affiant, Chief Deputy

Kyle Fittro (“Chief Deputy Fittro”) of the Van Wert County Sheriff’s Office,

averred that law enforcement sought this information as a direct result of their

investigation into the victim’s death, which led them to question Houser. To support

the finding of probable cause, Chief Deputy Fittro averred that “people in possession

of cellular phones, and engaged in illegal activities, commonly utilize these cellular

phones in connection with these illegal activities and the cellular devices almost

always hold records relating to these illegal activities.” (State’s Ex. 2).

       {¶49} Nevertheless, pointing to this generalized assertion, Houser argues

that the affidavit offered only improper conclusory generalizations to connect the

crime to the targeted digital evidence. It is true that mere “‘conclusory statements

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Case No. 15-25-06


do not provide an issuing judge with a substantial basis for determining the existence

of probable cause, and instead “provid[e] virtually no basis at all for making a

judgment regarding probable cause.”’” State v. Thompson, 2021-Ohio-3390, ¶ 65

(4th Dist.), quoting State v. Henderson, 2019-Ohio-1974, ¶ 32 (9th Dist.), quoting

Gates, 462 U.S. at 239. However, “established precedent . . . requires courts to

examine the totality of the circumstances when evaluating whether a search-warrant

affidavit sets forth specific facts giving rise to probable cause.” (Emphasis added.)

Id. at ¶ 66.

       {¶50} Here, an examination of the affidavit as a whole establishes a

sufficient nexus between the alleged criminal activity and the digital evidence

sought.        Importantly, the affidavit did not rest on Chief Deputy Fittro’s

generalization alone. Rather, it provided sufficient factual context demonstrating

why Houser’s device and corresponding cloud data were likely to hold evidence of

the alleged criminal activity. As the trial court highlighted in its entry denying

Houser’s motion to suppress, the search warrant affidavit established that Houser

and the victim were in a volatile “on-again/off-again” relationship where they

“routinely fought,” and that Houser had “threatened to kill” the victim previously.

(Doc. No. 104). Furthermore, the trial court noted the search warrant affidavit

detailed that the victim’s own cell phone was missing from the scene, and that,

during questioning, Houser admitted to being with the victim near the time of her

demise and demonstrated unprompted knowledge that she had been shot.

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Case No. 15-25-06


       {¶51} Nonetheless, Houser challenges the use of these facts to establish

probable cause, contending that Chief Deputy Fittro improperly relied on hearsay

evidence gathered by other investigating officers.        There is no merit in this

argument. “‘Hearsay may serve as the basis for the issuance of a warrant as long as

there is a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.’” State v. Courtney, 2012-Ohio-

989, ¶ 21 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Underwood, 2005 Ohio 2309, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.).

Critically, “‘statements made to fellow police officers in the same investigation are

an inherently reliable basis for another police officer to create an affidavit for a

search warrant.’” State v. Brown, 2011-Ohio-1461, ¶ 24 (3d Dist.), quoting State v.

Bradley, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 5685, *17 (3d Dist. Dec. 5, 1996). “So long as

the officer reasonably believes the information to be true, hearsay information may

be relied upon by an affiant, especially since practical considerations often require

reliance on information provided by other sources.” Id., quoting Bradley at *17.

Decisively, Chief Deputy Fittro explicitly averred that the facts within his affidavit

were gathered from fellow law enforcement officers actively investigating the

homicide. Because statements relayed between investigating officers provide an

inherently reliable basis for probable cause, the issuing judge properly credited the

information. See id.

       {¶52} Consequently, examining the totality of the circumstances presented

by this case, rather than isolating Chief Deputy Fittro’s generalized statement about

cell phone usage, the issuing judge could have reasonably inferred that the evidence

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Case No. 15-25-06


of these communications, threats, and relationship history would be found in the

cloud data associated with Houser’s cell phone. See Mack, 2025-Ohio-4812, at ¶

50 (5th Dist.) (noting that, “with respect to the issuance of warrants ‘due weight

should be given “to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local

law enforcement officers.”’”), quoting State v. Grace, 2023-Ohio-3781, ¶ 23 (5th

Dist.), quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 698 (1996). Therefore, we

conclude that the search warrant affidavit set forth sufficient facts to establish a

nexus between the alleged criminal activity and the targeted digital evidence.

       {¶53} Moreover, safeguards were in place to prevent an overbroad search.

Notably, Chief Deputy Fittro was the same officer conducting the forensic search.

Consequently, his specific awareness of the case’s scope and evidentiary bounds

provided a safeguard that might be absent were the search conducted by an unrelated

analyst without knowledge of the specific investigation. See id. at ¶ 62 (analyzing

that the affiant was the same person who executed the warrant and “that the only

information reviewed pursuant to that particular warrant was the security camera

footage contained on the downloaded app”).

       {¶54} Finally, the record demonstrates that the issuing authority exercised

actual review rather than acting as a rubber stamp. That is, even though the warrant

application initially utilized boilerplate language common to drug investigations, it

is clear that Chief Deputy Fittro and the issuing authority reviewed and amended

the document, crossing out the inapplicable drug-crime references and inserting the

                                        -29-
Case No. 15-25-06


correct homicide information relevant to this case. This attention to detail confirms

that the warrant was issued based on a specific consideration of the facts at hand.

       {¶55} In sum, while the better practice would always be to explicitly detail

the nexus between the device and the specific crime—such as citing specific witness

statements confirming that Houser and the victim argued via text message—the

affidavit here, when viewed in its totality, provided sufficient context to support a

probable cause finding. See, e.g., United States v. McCall, 84 F.4th 1317, 1328

(11th Cir. 2023) (suggesting that “[c]loud or data-based warrants with a sufficiently

tailored time-based limitation can undermine any claim that they are the ‘internet-

era version of a “general warrant”’”), quoting United States v. Blake, 868 F.3d 960,

974 (11th Cir. 2017). Therefore, we conclude that the issuing authority had a

substantial basis to conclude that probable cause existed for the issuance of the

search warrant in this case.

                               Good-Faith Exception

       {¶56} Nevertheless, even if the warrant was technically deficient, the good-

faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply. “‘“The exclusionary rule

operates to exclude evidence obtained by the government in violation of the United

States Constitution.”’” Bd. of Trustees Blanchard Twp. v. Simon, 2023-Ohio-1704,

¶ 46 (3d Dist.), quoting State v. Hoffman, 2013-Ohio-1082, ¶ 20 (6th Dist.), quoting

State v. Helton, 2005-Ohio-1789, ¶ 14 (11th Dist.). “‘“The purpose of this rule is

to deter police misconduct.”’” Id., quoting Hoffman at ¶ 20, quoting Helton at ¶ 14.

                                        -30-
Case No. 15-25-06


“‘“The exclusionary rule reaches not only primary evidence obtained as a direct

result of an illegal search or seizure, but also evidence that is subsequently

discovered and derivative of that prior illegality.”’” Id., quoting Hoffman at ¶ 20,

quoting State v. McLemore, 2012-Ohio-521, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.). “Consequently, ‘“[t]he

derivative-evidence rule, or fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine as it is widely

known, requires suppression of evidence that was seized in a seemingly lawful

manner but about which police learned because of a prior constitutional violation

such as an illegal search or seizure.”’” Id., quoting Hoffman at ¶ 20, quoting

McLemore at ¶ 20.

       {¶57} “‘The exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence police obtain in

good faith in reliance on the validity of a warrant.’” Id. at ¶ 48, quoting Hoffman at

¶ 22. “‘Under the good faith exception, we are to uphold searches when police

reasonably and in good faith relied upon a warrant subsequently declared to be

invalid, because excluding evidence under such circumstances would not deter

police misconduct.’” Id., quoting Hoffman at ¶ 22. See also Gonzales, 2014-Ohio-

557, at ¶ 35 (3d Dist.) (acknowledging that the exclusionary rule’s good-faith

exception encompasses warrants found to be technically deficient due to a lack of

probable cause or a failure of particularity).

       {¶58} However, suppression remains appropriate under the good-faith

exception when (1) the affiant misled the judge with knowingly or recklessly false

information; (2) the judge wholly abandoned their neutral judicial role; (3) the

                                         -31-
Case No. 15-25-06


affidavit is so bare bones that a belief in probable cause is entirely unreasonable; or

(4) the warrant is so facially deficient in its particularity that an officer cannot

reasonably presume it to be valid. Mack, 2025-Ohio-4812, at ¶ 57 (5th Dist.).

       {¶59} Based on our review of the record, we conclude that there is no

evidence of the type of police misconduct or judicial abandonment that would

preclude application of the good-faith exception. Indeed, there is no allegation or

evidence in the record to suggest that Chief Deputy Fittro misled the issuing judge

with knowingly or recklessly false information. Likewise, the record reflects that

the issuing judge did not wholly abandon their neutral judicial role. Rather, the

record reflects that the issuing judge actively reviewed the warrant by amending it

to replace boilerplate drug-crime references with facts specific to this homicide

investigation.

       {¶60} Moreover, the search warrant affidavit was not so bare bones as to

render official belief in probable cause entirely unreasonable. “‘An affidavit that is

so lacking in indicia of probable cause that no reasonable officer would rely on the

warrant has come to be known as a “bare bones” affidavit.’” State v. Shields, 2024-

Ohio-2317, ¶ 19 (5th Dist.), quoting United States v. White, 874 F.3d 490, 496 (6th

Cir. 2016). “An affidavit is considered ‘bare bones’ when it fails to establish a

minimally sufficient nexus between the item or place to be searched and the

underlying illegal activity.” Id. “To avoid being labeled as ‘bare bones,’ an

affidavit must” rely on more than mere suspicions or conclusions. State v. Schubert,

                                         -32-
Case No. 15-25-06


2022-Ohio-4604, ¶ 10. Instead, it must provide “underlying factual circumstances

regarding veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge” that successfully establish

“some connection between the illegal activity and the place to be searched.”

(Citations omitted.) Id.

       {¶61} Based on our review of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude

that the search warrant affidavit established a minimally sufficient nexus between

the offenses under investigation and the need to search Houser’s cell phone and its

associated cloud data. This nexus was anchored not in mere generalizations, but in

specific factual allegations, including the victim’s missing cell phone, Houser’s

history of threats and his volatile relationship with the victim, and Houser’s

unprompted statements revealing knowledge of the cause of death. See State v.

Maniaci, 2017-Ohio-8270, ¶ 30 (3d Dist.). But see State v. Hikec, 2024-Ohio-1940,

¶ 28-29 (5th Dist.) (concluding that the good-faith exception was inapplicable where

a digital warrant was “so facially deficient” because it relied on an improper

“layered inference”—the mere possibility that an assault might have been

recorded—without specific evidence linking the crime to the device’s data).

       {¶62} Finally, the warrant was not so facially deficient in its particularity that

the executing officers could not reasonably presume it to be valid. Importantly, the

warrant specifically identified the target Samsung device and limited the search to

evidence of the outlined offenses—a limitation Chief Deputy Fittro was uniquely

positioned to respect as both the affiant and the searching officer.

                                          -33-
Case No. 15-25-06


       {¶63} Therefore, based on the totality of the information presented, we

conclude that Chief Deputy Fittro acted in objectively reasonable reliance on the

issued warrant. See State v. Gibson, 2025-Ohio-5497, ¶ 37 (5th Dist.). Thus, the

good-faith exception applies to prevent the suppression of evidence.

       {¶64} For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err by

denying Houser’s motion to suppress.

       {¶65} Houser’s second assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶66} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                Judgment Affirmed

MILLER and WILLAMOWSKI, J.J., concur.




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Case No. 15-25-06


                            JUDGMENT ENTRY

       For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error

are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby

rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the

judgment for costs.

       It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.

27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the

proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.




                                            William R. Zimmerman, Judge



                                            Mark C. Miller, Judge



                                            John R. Willamowski, Judge

DATED:
/hls




                                         -35-