State v. Ingram

[Cite as State v. Ingram, 2026-Ohio-1512.]


                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                     ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                            PORTAGE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                 CASE NO. 2025-P-0060
CITY OF KENT,

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,           Criminal Appeal from the
                                               Municipal Court, Kent Division
        - vs -

MARCELLUS LA'SHAWN INGRAM,                     Trial Court No. 2024 TRC 02414 K

                 Defendant-Appellant.


                           OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

                                    Decided: April 27, 2026
                          Judgment: Reversed, vacated, and remanded


Connie J. Lewandowski, Portage County Prosecutor, Theresa M. Scahill, and Heaven
DiMartino, Assistant Prosecutors, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For
Plaintiff-Appellee).

Gary L. Van Brocklin, 4410 Market Street, Youngstown, OH 44512 (For Defendant-
Appellant).


ROBERT J. PATTON, J.

        {¶1}      Defendant-appellant, Marcellus La'shawn Ingram (“Ingram”), appeals from

the judgment of the Portage County Municipal Court, Kent Division, convicting him of

operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs (“OVI”), a misdemeanor of the

first degree, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a). Ingram pleaded no contest to the

charge to preserve the suppression issue for appeal. On appeal, Ingram asserts that the

trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress finding officers had reasonable

suspicion to extend the stop to conduct field sobriety tests.
       {¶2}   Upon review of the record, we conclude that law enforcement officers

lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct the field sobriety tests. Accordingly,

the judgment of the Portage County Municipal Court, Kent Division, is reversed and

Ingram’s conviction is vacated. This matter is remanded to the trial court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                              Substantive and Procedural Facts

       {¶3}   On November 25, 2024, a traffic complaint was filed in the Portage County

Municipal Court, Kent Division, charging Ingram with operating a vehicle under the

influence of alcohol or drugs (“OVI”), a misdemeanor of the first degree, in violation of

R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a) (“Count 1”), OVI, a misdemeanor of the first degree, R.C.

4511.191(A)(1)(h) (“Count 2”), and illumination of rear license plate, a minor

misdemeanor, in violation of R.C. 4513.05. The traffic citation indicated that Ingram had

a Blood Alcohol Concentration (“BAC”) of .185. On November 27, 2024, Ingram appeared

before the court for arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty on each offense.

       {¶4}   On March 18, 2025, Ingram filed a motion to suppress or in the alternative

for an order in limine prohibiting the introduction of any and all evidence obtained from

the warrantless breathalyzer and field sobriety tests. Specifically, Ingram alleged that the

law enforcement officers did not have reasonable suspicion to prolong a traffic stop where

the basis of the stop was an equipment violation. Ingram sought to suppress the field

sobriety tests and the subsequent breathalyzer results.

       {¶5}   A suppression hearing was held on June 16, 2025. The trial court denied

the motion to suppress the same day. Specifically, the court below determined:

              Based upon the testimony and evidence presented, as well as
              the [c]ourt’s review of the body-cam footage, the [c]ourt finds

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Case No. 2025-P-0060
              that Officer Kucinic had a reasonable articulable suspicion to
              continue the stop to investigate for OVI based upon the totality
              of the circumstances, including the odor of alcoholic beverage
              emitting from the vehicle, [Ingram]’s admission of earlier
              alcohol consumption and [Ingram]’s acknowledgment other
              passengers had been drinking. The [c]ourt notes [Ingram] was
              polite and cooperated during the stop. The [c]ourt finds the
              Officer’s testimony credible and further investigation in the
              stop to be reasonable.

       {¶6}   The matter was scheduled for trial on July 22, 2025. On the day of trial,

Ingram executed a waiver of his constitutional rights and entered a plea of no contest to

preserve the suppression issue for appeal. Ingram pleaded no contest to a “low tier” OVI,

a misdemeanor of the first degree, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a). Ingram waived a

reading of the facts in open court. The trial court accepted Ingram’s plea and found him

guilty of the offense. All remaining counts were dismissed on the State’s motion.

       {¶7}   The trial court proceeded directly to sentencing. The trial court imposed a

sentence of 180 days in jail. The jail sentence was suspended on the conditions that

Ingram “register and pay for a[n] accredited three-day continuous, [BMV-approved]

Driver’s Intervention Program [(“DIP”)] within 90 days” and complete the program within

180 days. The trial court informed Ingram that his driver’s license would be suspended

for one year. The trial court terminated the Administrative License Suspension and

informed Ingram he was eligible for driving privileges. The trial court granted driving

privileges for “job seeking . . . necessities, medical, and [DIP].” The court imposed a fine

of $425 plus costs.

       {¶8}   Ingram timely appeals from the trial court’s sentencing entry.




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Case No. 2025-P-0060
                                            The Appeal

       {¶9}   Ingram raises a single assignment of error for review: “[t]he trial court erred

when it found that the State of Ohio proved a reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic

stop for further investigation of a possible OVI.”

       {¶10} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact.” State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. “[T]he trial court assumes the role of

trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate

the credibility of witnesses.” Id. citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St. 3d 357. We must accept

the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence, and

then independently decide whether those facts satisfy the applicable legal standards

without deference to the trial court’s decision. Id. “Once an appellate court determines

whether the trial court's factual findings are supported by the record, the court must then

engage in a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to those facts.” State

v. Eggleston, 2015-Ohio-958, ¶ 18 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Lett, 2009-Ohio-2796, ¶ 13

(11th Dist.), citing State v. Djisheff, 2006-Ohio-6201, ¶ 19 (11th Dist.).

       {¶11} At the suppression hearing, the State presented one witness, Brimfield

Township Police Officer Justin Kucinic (“Officer Kucinic”), and one exhibit, the video from

Officer Kucinic’s body worn camera (“State’s Exhibit A”). The trial court also took judicial

notice of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) manual. The basis

for the suppression hearing was the extension of the stop. The following testimony was

presented at the suppression hearing:

       {¶12} On November 24, 2024, Officer Kucinic was working the midnight shift with

Officer Schreckengost. While driving southbound on State Route 43 in Portage County,



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Case No. 2025-P-0060
Ohio, Officer Kucinic observed a vehicle with an unilluminated license plate at

approximately 2:57 a.m. When the vehicle turned onto Sanctuary View Drive, Officer

Kucinic initiated a traffic stop for a violation of R.C. 4513.05, or illumination of rear license

plate. Officer Kucinic testified that he did not observe any other traffic violations prior to

initiating the traffic stop.

       {¶13} Officer Kucinic approached the vehicle. The vehicle had four occupants, the

driver, identified as Ingram, and three passengers. Officer Kucinic testified that he

informed Ingram of the reason for the stop, which was the lack of illumination of the

license plate. Officer Kucinic inquired where Ingram was coming from. Ingram replied that

he had gone to pick up some friends who had been drinking. At the hearing, Officer

Kucinic testified that he observed an odor of alcoholic beverage emanating from the

vehicle. Officer Kucinic inquired whether Ingram had anything to drink. Ingram told Officer

Kucinic that he had an alcoholic beverage earlier in the evening around 9 p.m.

       {¶14} At the hearing, the State played a portion of State’s Exhibit A. On the

recording, Officer Kucinic indicated to his Field Training Officer that he did not smell any

alcohol from Ingram. Officer Kucinic also stated in the recording that Ingram’s eyes “don’t

really look bloodshot, don’t see any glossiness to them” and that Ingram was “not slurring

his speech or anything.” On the video, Officer Kucinic was told to back up and conduct

the Field Sobriety Tests.

       {¶15} Officer Kucinic testified that he was concerned that Ingram may be

operating the vehicle while intoxicated due to the odor and the admission by Ingram that

he had consumed an alcoholic beverage. Officer Kucinic then had Ingram exit the vehicle




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Case No. 2025-P-0060
for purposes of performing field sobriety tests to determine whether it was safe for Ingram

to operate the vehicle.

        {¶16} In his sole assignment of error, Ingram argues that the trial court erred when

it denied his motion to suppress and determined that officers had reasonable suspicion

to extend the traffic stop and investigate an OVI.1 We agree.

        {¶17} “In order to abide by the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution's prohibition ‘against unreasonable searches and seizures,’ reiterated in

Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution, ‘an officer may not request a motorist to

perform field sobriety tests unless the request is * * * justified by a reasonable suspicion

based upon articulable facts that the motorist is intoxicated.’. . . ‘A court will analyze the

reasonableness of the request based on the totality of the circumstances, viewed through

the eyes of a reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events

as they unfold.‘” State v. Lyndon, 2021-Ohio-1370, ¶ 10 (11th Dist.), quoting State v.

Russo, 2020-Ohio-3236, ¶ 29 (11th Dist.), and citing State v. Fitzgerald, 2020-Ohio-4346,

¶ 10 (9th Dist.); Westlake v. Blakely, 2019-Ohio-3670, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.).

        {¶18} This court has utilized a non-exhaustive list of factors that can be

considered by a court to determine whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to

administer field sobriety tests under the totality of the circumstances. State v. Evans, 127

Ohio App.3d 56 (11th Dist. 1998). The non-inclusive list includes:

                  “(1) the time and day of the stop (Friday or Saturday night as
                 opposed to, e.g., Tuesday morning); (2) the location of the
                 stop (whether near establishments [are] selling alcohol); (3)
                 any indicia of erratic driving before the stop that may indicate
                 a lack of coordination (speeding, weaving, unusual braking,
                 etc.); (4) whether there is a cognizable report that the driver
                 may be intoxicated; (5) the condition of the suspect's eyes

1. Ingram does not challenge the initial stop of the vehicle.

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               (bloodshot, glassy, glazed, etc.); (6) impairments of the
               suspect's ability to speak (slurred speech, overly deliberate
               speech, etc.); (7) the odor of alcohol coming from the interior
               of the car, or, more significantly, on the suspect's person or
               breath; (8) the intensity of that odor, as described by the
               officer (“very strong,” “strong,” “moderate,” “slight,” etc.); (9)
               the suspect's demeanor (belligerent, uncooperative, etc.);
               (10) any actions by the suspect after the stop that might
               indicate a lack of coordination (dropping keys, falling over,
               fumbling for a wallet, etc.); and (11) the suspect's admission
               of alcohol consumption, the number of drinks had, and the
               amount of time in which they were consumed, if given. All of
               these factors, together with the officer's previous experience
               in dealing with drunken drivers, may be taken into account by
               a reviewing court in determining whether the officer acted
               reasonably. No single factor is determinative.”

Id. at 63, fn. 2.

       {¶19} While these factors are relevant, not all must be present for an officer to

have reasonable suspicion. State v. Wiesenbach, 2011-Ohio-402, ¶ 22. “‘A reviewing

court must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop as “viewed

through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must

react to events as they unfold.”’” Id., quoting State v. Tournoux, 2010-Ohio-2154, ¶ 15

(11th Dist.), citing State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88 (1991). Further, “‘[w]here a

non-investigatory stop is initiated and the odor of alcohol is combined with glassy or

bloodshot eyes and further indicia of intoxication, such as an admission of having

consumed alcohol, reasonable suspicion exists.’ (Citations omitted.)” State v. Osborne,

2019-Ohio-3235, ¶ 31 (11th Dist.), quoting Wiesenbach, at ¶ 24. Therefore, the inquiry

as to whether reasonable suspicion exists is fact intensive turning on the totality of

circumstances.

       {¶20} On review, we must look at the totality of the circumstances through the

eyes of Officer Kucinic, giving due deference to his training and experience, to determine

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Case No. 2025-P-0060
whether reasonable suspicion existed for the officer to conduct field sobriety

testing. Based on the record before this court and the evidence and testimony presented

in the court below, we determine that Officer Kucinic did not have a reasonable suspicion

to conduct the field sobriety tests based on the totality of the circumstances.

       {¶21} Upon review, four of the Evans factors were met. Ingram was stopped at

approximately 3:00 a.m. on November 24, 2025, a Sunday morning. Ingram informed

officers that he picked his friends up from a night of drinking and was acting as the

designated sober driver. Three passengers were inside the vehicle. At the time of the

stop, Ingram admitted that he had consumed an alcoholic beverage earlier that evening.

Officer Kucinic testified at the suppression hearing that, at the time of the stop, he

observed an odor of alcohol coming from the vehicle. We recognize that Officer Kucinic

also made statements, captured on the body worn camera, wherein he told his Field

Training Officer that he did not smell any odor of alcoholic beverage from Ingram and did

not observe any glossiness of Ingram’s eyes or slurred speech.

       {¶22} “[A]t a suppression hearing, ... the credibility of witnesses are issues for the

trier of fact.” State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366 (1992). “[A] reviewing court should not

disturb the trial court's findings on the issue of credibility.” State v. Ashford, 2001 WL

137595, *2 (11th Dist. Feb. 16, 2001). See Russo, 2020-Ohio-3236 at ¶ 35 (11th Dist.).

The trial court found Officer Kucinic’s testimony to be credible, and we will not disturb that

finding in this instance.

       {¶23} However, Officer Kucinic also testified that he did not observe any erratic

driving or any maneuvering that would indicate impaired driving. Ingram was stopped for

an equipment violation, lack of illumination of the rear license plate. Officer Kucinic



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Case No. 2025-P-0060
testified that Ingram was cooperative during the stop, did not fumble through his

documents, and responded appropriately to questioning. Indeed, other than the smell of

alcohol from the vehicle, which contained three other people that were picked up after a

night of drinking, Ingram’s admission to drinking one beverage earlier in the evening,

Officer Kucinic did not testify to any other indicia of impairment.

       {¶24} The Seventh District Court of Appeals has noted: “[t]he mere detection of

an odor of alcohol, unaccompanied by any basis, drawn from the officer's experience or

expertise, for correlating that odor with a level of intoxication that would likely impair the

subject's driving ability, is not enough to establish that the subject was driving under the

influence. Nor is the subject's admission that he had had one or two beers.” State v. Reed,

2006-Ohio-7075, ¶ 17 (7th Dist.). The Fifth Appellate District found similarly in State v.

Baker, 2018-Ohio-2285, ¶ 26 (5th Dist.) concluding that an officer did not have reasonable

suspicion to justify the request to perform field sobriety tests, “based on the condition of

appellant's eyes and the strong odor of alcohol; first emanating from the vehicle prior to

appellant being asked to step out of the vehicle and then on his breath, and no additional

indicia of intoxication[.]”   Therefore, based on the totality of the circumstances and

applying the above case law, the record in this case does not establish that reasonable

suspicion existed to extend the traffic stop and administer field sobriety tests.

       {¶25} While the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record, upon

application of the law to the facts, we conclude that the trial court erred when it denied

appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. Accordingly, Ingram’s sole assignment of error

has merit.

                                            Conclusion



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Case No. 2025-P-0060
       {¶26} For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the Portage County

Municipal Court, Kent Division, is reversed, Ingram’s conviction is vacated, and the matter

is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.



EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,

SCOTT LYNCH, J.,

concur.




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Case No. 2025-P-0060
                                JUDGMENT ENTRY



       For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, it is the judgment and order of

this court that the judgment of the Portage County Municipal Court, Kent Division, is

reversed, the conviction vacated, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further

proceedings consistent with the opinion.

       Costs to be taxed against appellee.




                                                JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON



                                                JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI,
                                                       concurs



                                                  JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH,
                                                        concurs


           THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY

    A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
              pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.




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Case No. 2025-P-0060