State v. Jackson

[Cite as State v. Jackson, 2026-Ohio-1325.]




             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                             SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COLUMBIANA COUNTY

                                          STATE OF OHIO,

                                          Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                                   v.

                                     DAVANTE L. JACKSON,

                                        Defendant-Appellant.


                        OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                         Case No. 25 CO 0029


                                  Criminal Appeal from the
                      Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio
                                   Case No. 2024 CR 652

                                          BEFORE:
                   Mark A. Hanni, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.


                                              JUDGMENT:
                                                Affirmed.


Atty. Vito J. Abruzzino, Columbiana County Prosecutor, and Atty. Christopher R.W.
Weeda, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee and

Atty. Colin P. Cochran, Cochran Legal, LLC, for Defendant-Appellant.

                                          Dated: April 10, 2026
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HANNI, J.

       {¶1}    Defendant-Appellant, Davante L. Jackson, appeals from a Columbiana
County Common Pleas Court judgment convicting him of trafficking in a fentanyl-related
compound, possession of a fentanyl-related compound, trafficking in drugs, possession
of drugs, and tampering with evidence. Appellant entered a no contest plea to these
charges. He now contends his trial counsel was ineffective for withdrawing a motion to
suppress and he did not enter his plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Because
trial counsel was not ineffective and Appellant entered his plea knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
       {¶2}    Because Appellant entered a no contest plea in this matter, the facts of the
case are scant. On February 2, 2024, Appellant was the driver of a vehicle subject to a
traffic stop for not having a visible license plate. Appellant was also impaired and was
placed in the police cruiser along with his passenger. While in the cruiser, Appellant
withdrew a container of pills from his pocket and handed them to his passenger. The pills
contained 14.58 grams of a fentanyl-related compound, which he attempted to conceal.
       {¶3}    On December 16, 2024, a Columbiana County Grand Jury indicted
Appellant on one count of trafficking in a fentanyl-related compound, a second-degree
felony in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) (Count 1); one count of possession of a fentanyl-
related compound, a second-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) (Count 2); one
count of trafficking in drugs, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) (Count
3); one count of possession of drugs, a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)
(Count 4); and one count of tampering with evidence, a third-degree felony in violation of
R.C. 2921.12(A)(1) (Count 5). Appellant initially entered a not guilty plea.
       {¶4}    After a February 13, 2025 hearing, and again after an April 11, 2025
hearing, the trial court noted that Appellant had several other cases pending and he was
attempting to reach a global resolution with Plaintiff-Appellee, the State of Ohio.
       {¶5}    On August 5, 2025, Appellant’s counsel filed a motion to suppress alleging
there was no probable cause for the traffic stop. But three days later, on August 8, 2025,
counsel withdrew the motion to suppress because a plea agreement had been reached.
       {¶6}    On August 18, 2025, the trial court held a change of plea hearing for this
case and another case pending against Appellant for having weapons under a disability


Case No. 25 CO 0029
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(2024 CR 178). A third case (2023 CR 227) was also pending against Appellant during
this time. Appellant indicated he wished to enter a no contest plea to the indictment in
this case. In exchange, the State agreed to recommend concurrent four-to-six year prison
terms on Counts 1 and 2; concurrent 12-month prison terms on Counts 3 and 4, to be
served concurrently to the sentences in Counts 1 and 2; and an 18-month prison term on
Count 5, to be served consecutively to the other terms.        In total, the State would
recommend a sentence of 5½ (minimum) to 7½ (maximum) years.
       {¶7}   At the change of plea hearing, the court informed Appellant that his counsel
had filed and then withdrawn a motion to suppress. Appellant indicated he was unaware
of this. The court then allowed Appellant and his counsel to discuss the matter. After
their discussion, the court again asked Appellant if he understood that his attorney had
filed and then withdrawn a motion to suppress. Appellant indicated he understood. The
trial court then went on to discuss the charges Appellant faced and the rights he was
waiving by entering a no contest plea. The court accepted Appellant’s plea, entered a
finding of guilt, and set the matter for sentencing.
       {¶8}   The court held a sentencing hearing on September 16, 2025. It sentenced
Appellant to an indefinite prison term with a stated minimum of four years minimum on
Count 1, an indefinite prison term with a stated minimum of four years minimum on Count
2, a definite prison term of 12 months on Count 3, a definite prison term of 12 months on
Count 4, and a definite prison term of 18 months on Count 5. The court ordered the
sentences on Counts 1 and 2 to be served concurrently with each other and the sentences
on Counts 3 and 4 to be served concurrently with each other. It ordered the sentence on
Count 5 to be served consecutively to the sentences in Counts 1 and 2 and Counts 3 and
4.   Additionally, the court ordered Appellant to serve the sentence in this case
consecutively to the sentences imposed in Case No. 2024 CR 178 and Case No. 2023
CR 227. Appellant’s total sentence in this case is a minimum of 5½ years to a maximum
of 7½ years. And the court imposed a mandatory $7,500 fine on Count 1.
       {¶9}   Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on October 1, 2025. He now raises
two assignments of error for our review.
       {¶10} Appellant’s first assignment of error states:




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       APPELLANT’S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE
       OF COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED WHEN SUCH COUNSEL WITHDREW A
       MOTION TO SUPPRESS WITHOUT APPELLANT’S KNOWLEDGE.

       {¶11} Appellant argues his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel filed a
motion to suppress yet later withdrew that motion without Appellant’s knowledge. The
motion to suppress was for evidence obtained during the traffic stop. Appellant claims
the motion would have been successful because there was no probable cause for the
traffic stop. He says the trooper stopped him for having an inoperable license plate light
and not having a license plate displayed that could be seen from the patrol car. Appellant
claims he had a temporary tag in the left top area of his rear window. Thus, Appellant
argues his counsel should have pursued the motion to suppress.
       {¶12} To prove an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant
must satisfy a two-prong test.      First, the appellant must establish that counsel's
performance has fallen below an objective standard of reasonable representation.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136
(1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. Second, the appellant must demonstrate that he
was prejudiced by counsel's performance. Id. To show that he has been prejudiced by
counsel's deficient performance, the appellant must prove that, but for counsel's errors,
the result of the trial would have been different. Bradley at paragraph three of the
syllabus.
       {¶13} Appellant bears the burden of proof on the issue of counsel's
ineffectiveness. State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 289 (1999). In Ohio, a licensed
attorney is presumed competent. Id.
       {¶14} In determining whether the failure to file a motion to suppress constitutes
ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court has stated:

              More specifically, where a defendant complains trial counsel failed
       to file a suppression motion, the defendant must prove there was a valid
       ground to suppress the evidence in dispute. [State v.] Spaulding, 151 Ohio
       St.3d 378, 2016-Ohio-8126, 89 N.E.3d 554 at ¶ 94, citing State v. Brown,
       115 Ohio St.3d 55, 2007-Ohio-4837, 873 N.E.2d 858, ¶ 65. The defendant
       must also show there is a reasonable probability the result of the trial would


Case No. 25 CO 0029
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       have been different if the evidence had been suppressed. Spaulding, 151
       Ohio St.3d 378, 2016-Ohio-8126, 89 N.E.3d 554 at ¶ 94.                A claim of
       ineffective assistance of counsel in a direct appeal must be established by
       the evidence in the record. See, e.g., State v. Hartman, 93 Ohio St.3d 274,
       299, 754 N.E.2d 1150 (2001) (if establishing ineffective assistance of
       counsel requires proof outside the record, then such claim is not
       appropriately considered on direct appeal); State v. Ishmail, 54 Ohio St.2d
       402, 406, 377 N.E.2d 500 (1978) (the appellate court is limited to what
       transpired as reflected by the record on direct appeal). See also State v.
       Gervin, 3d Dist. No. 9-15-51, 2016-Ohio-5670, 2016 WL 4608483, ¶ 23 (if
       the record developed at trial is inadequate to support the unraised
       suppression argument, the ineffective assistance of counsel fails).

State v. Carter, 2017-Ohio-7501, ¶ 78 (7th Dist.).
       {¶15} There are few actual facts in the record of this case. Appellant’s statements
regarding the motion to suppress and his statement that he would likely prevail are
nothing but speculation based on facts that are not in the record.
       {¶16} Additionally, the decision not to file a motion to suppress may be considered
a matter of trial strategy and a trial attorney is not “per se” ineffective for failing to file a
motion to suppress. State v. Cabiness, 2025-Ohio-3087, ¶ 25 (5th Dist.). The same can
be said for deciding to withdraw a motion to suppress.
       {¶17} Finally, Appellant had three pending criminal cases at the same time.
Appellant’s counsel and the State had been actively seeking a resolution to the cases by
way of a plea agreement for several months. It is possible that dismissing the motion to
suppress was part of the plea negotiations. Given the fact that Appellant was facing a
maximum sentence of over 25 years in this case, it is difficult to find that his counsel was
ineffective in negotiating a 5½ to 7½ year sentence.
       {¶18} Accordingly, Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit and is
overruled.
       {¶19} Appellant’s second assignment of error states:

       APPELLANT WAS PRECLUDED FROM KNOWINGLY, INTELLIGENTLY,
       AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERING A PLEA.


Case No. 25 CO 0029
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       {¶20} Here, Appellant contends he did not make his plea knowingly and
intelligently because he did not have a full understanding of the consequences of the
withdrawn motion to suppress and his constitutional rights. He claims the trial court made
no effort to ensure that he was aware of the effects and consequences of the withdrawn
motion to suppress and, therefore, he did not knowingly and intelligently enter his plea.
       {¶21} When determining the validity of a plea, this court must consider all of the
relevant circumstances surrounding it. State v. Trubee, 2005-Ohio-552, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.),
citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). Pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2), the trial
court must follow a certain procedure for accepting guilty pleas in felony cases. Before
the court can accept a guilty plea to a felony charge, it must conduct a colloquy with the
defendant to determine that he understands the plea he is entering and the rights he is
voluntarily waiving. Crim.R. 11(C)(2). If the plea is not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary,
it has been obtained in violation of due process and is void. State v. Martinez, 2004-Ohio-
6806, ¶ 11 (7th Dist.), citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969).
       {¶22} A trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) pertaining to the
waiver of federal constitutional rights. Martinez at ¶ 12. These rights include the right
against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one's accusers, the
right to compel witnesses to testify by compulsory process, and the right to proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).
       {¶23} The trial court strictly complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) in this case by advising
Appellant of each of the constitutional rights he was waiving by entering a no contest plea.
The court informed Appellant he was giving up his right to a jury trial, his right to confront
witnesses against him, the right to compel witnesses to testify on his behalf, his right
against self-incrimination, and his right to require the State to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Sentencing Tr. 28-30). Appellant told the court that he understood
that he was waiving each of these rights. (Sentencing Tr. 28-30).
       {¶24} A trial court need only substantially comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) pertaining
to non-constitutional rights such as informing the defendant of “the nature of the charges
with an understanding of the law in relation to the facts, the maximum penalty, and that
after entering a guilty plea or a no contest plea, the court may proceed to judgment and
sentence.” Martinez at ¶ 12, citing Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)(b).



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       {¶25} Here, the court explained the nature of each of the charges Appellant was
facing. (Sentencing Tr. 16-19). It also explained the maximum sentences Appellant faced
on each Count. (Sentencing Tr. 21-22). The court failed to inform Appellant that it could
proceed immediately to judgment and sentence. However, Appellant does not take issue
with this. Moreover, the trial court did not proceed immediately to sentencing. Instead, it
scheduled Appellant’s sentencing hearing for approximately a month later and indicated
it would first review a presentence investigation. (Plea Tr. 37). Thus, the trial court
substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) by advising Appellant of his non-
constitutional rights.
       {¶26} Appellant’s main contention here is that the trial court made no effort to
ensure that he was aware of the consequences of the withdrawn motion to suppress.
       {¶27} Regarding the motion to suppress, the following exchange took place:

                 THE COURT: Thank you.

                 Now, in the 652 case, Mr. Jackson, Attorney Dailey did file a motion
       to suppress on your behalf. And then filed a motion to - - or a notice of
       withdrawal of the motion to suppress.

                 Are you aware of that?

                 THE DEFENDANT: No.

                 (Attorney-client confer off record.)

                 THE COURT: I guess, the point of my question is - - Mr. Jackson - -
       is there was a motion to suppress filed on your behalf. And then a notice of
       withdrawing that motion.

                 The point of withdrawing the motion or upshot is I will not need to
       decide that motion, it’s been withdrawn from my consideration, perhaps,
       based upon the agreement reached in this case. I don’t know.

                 Do you understand that?

                 THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(Plea Tr. 11).



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       {¶28} Shortly thereafter, the court asked Appellant:

                 THE COURT: Did she [defense counsel] answer any questions you
       might have had about the plea agreements?

                 If you had questions, Mr. Jackson, did Attorney Dailey answer them?

                 THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

                 THE COURT: All right.

                 Do you have any questions you wish to ask me about the plea
       agreements?

                 THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor.

(Plea Tr. 12).
       {¶29} The record demonstrates that the court took the time to ensure Appellant
was entering his plea knowingly and intelligently. When Appellant told the court he was
unaware of the motion to suppress and its withdrawal, the court paused the proceedings
so Appellant could confer with his counsel. The court then asked Appellant if his counsel
had answered all of his questions. And the court provided Appellant with the opportunity
to ask it questions. Nothing on the record indicates that Appellant’s plea was anything
less than knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered.
       {¶30} Accordingly, Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit and is
overruled.
       {¶31} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby affirmed.

Waite, P.J., concurs.

Robb, J., concurs.




Case No. 25 CO 0029
[Cite as State v. Jackson, 2026-Ohio-1325.]




        For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas of Columbiana County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be waived.
        A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.




                                        NOTICE TO COUNSEL

        This document constitutes a final judgment entry.