State v. Jones

[Cite as State v. Jones, 2026-Ohio-1265.]



                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                    HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO


STATE OF OHIO,                              :       APPEAL NOS.      C-250269
                                                                     C-250270
         Plaintiff-Appellee,                :       TRIAL NOS.       23/CRB/9901/A
                                                                     23/CRB/5612
   vs.                                      :

SPARKLE JONES,                              :
                                                         JUDGMENT ENTRY
         Defendant-Appellant.               :



          This cause was heard upon the appeals, the records, and the briefs.
          For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgments of the
trial court are affirmed in the appeal numbered C-250270 and reversed and appellant
discharged in the appeal numbered C-250269.
          Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for these appeals,
allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed 50% to appellant and 50% to appellee.
          The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the
Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial
court for execution under App.R. 27.



To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on 4/8/2026 per order of the court.


By:_______________________
      Administrative Judge
[Cite as State v. Jones, 2026-Ohio-1265.]



                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                    HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO


STATE OF OHIO,                              :     APPEAL NOS.    C-250269
                                                                 C-250270
         Plaintiff-Appellee,                :     TRIAL NOS.     23/CRB/9901/A
                                                                 23/CRB/5612
   vs.                                      :

SPARKLE JONES,                              :
                                                         OPINION
         Defendant-Appellant.               :



Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed in C-250270; Reversed and Appellant
                             Discharged in C-250269

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: April 8, 2026



Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney,
and Robert E. Rickey and Meagan W. Myers, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Arenstein & Gallagher and Hal R. Arenstein for Defendant-Appellant.
                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


BOCK, Judge.

        {¶1}     After police officers obtained a search warrant, they searched

defendant-appellant Sparkle Jones’s home. During the search, they discovered that

Jones’s boyfriend Stephon Barnes’s two minor children were alone in the home with

two accessible loaded firearms. Officers also located a small quantity of drugs, drug

scales, cash, and baggies in the home. After a bench trial, the trial court convicted

Jones of permitting drug abuse and child endangerment under Cincinnati Mun.Code

915-3(a).1 Jones appeals, arguing that her convictions were based on insufficient

evidence and that Cincinnati Mun.Code 915-3(a) is preempted by R.C. 9.68.

        {¶2}     We sustain in part and overrule in part Jones’s first assignment of error.

First, we hold that the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Jones’s

permitting-drug-abuse conviction based on the presence of drug scales, baggies, large

amounts of cash, firearms, and a small quantity of drugs in her home. But we

determine that Jones’s child-endangerment convictions are based on insufficient

evidence because the State failed to present any evidence that Jones had “custody or

control” over Barnes’s children.

        {¶3}     Based on our resolution of her first assignment of error, we decline to

address Jones’s second assignment of error as moot.

                           I. Factual and Procedural History

    A. Procedural history

        {¶4}     In April 2023, a grand jury indicted Jones on one count of permitting

drug abuse in violation of R.C. 2925.13(B), a first-degree misdemeanor. Two months




1 Cincinnati Mun.Code 915-3(a) is, for all purposes relevant to this appeal, identical to Ohio’s child-

endangerment statute, R.C. 2919.22(A). Therefore, our analysis includes cases interpreting R.C.
2919.22(A).


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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


later, the State charged Jones with two counts of child endangerment in violation of

Cincinnati Mun.Code 915-3(a), first-degree misdemeanors.

       {¶5}    Jones, citing West v. Cincinnati, 2024-Ohio-1951 (1st Dist.), moved to

dismiss the child-endangerment counts. She argued that Cincinnati Mun.Code 915-3

was preempted by R.C. 9.68. The trial court denied her motion.

       {¶6}    The trial court consolidated the cases for a bench trial. After trial, the

trial court found Jones guilty on all counts. It sentenced Jones to 180 days in jail with

177 days suspended, credited Jones for three days of time served, imposed one year of

probation, and waived all fines and costs.

       {¶7}    Jones appealed her convictions. This court consolidated the appeals.

   B. Facts

       {¶8}    Officer Brandon Connley of the Cincinnati Police Department testified

that officers had been investigating Barnes for drug trafficking. They determined that

Barnes lived at a residence with Jones and Barnes’s two children, 13-year-old T.B. and

three-year-old E.B. The children were not Jones’s children. Jones leased the residence.

       {¶9}    Several times, officers observed Barnes as he left the home and sold

drugs to a police informant. The officers never saw Jones with Barnes during these

controlled buys. Officers later obtained a search warrant for the home.

       {¶10} When officers went to execute the warrant, they observed Jones and

Barnes leave the home in Barnes’s car. Officers stopped Barnes’s car. They did not find

any controlled substances in the car. Next, officers knocked on the door of the home.

T.B. answered the door. E.B. was also home, sleeping in an upstairs bedroom.

       {¶11} During the officers’ search of the home, they found a small amount of

cocaine, drug presses, and “numerous little red baggies” in the kitchen. In the dining

room, officers located a handgun on top of “like a bar hutch . . . maybe four feet off the


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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


ground.” Also on top of the hutch were a container of candy, a trophy, and a controller

for a gaming device. Officers determined that the gun was loaded with a round in the

chamber. Connley testified that the gun would have been accessible to a child.

       {¶12} There were two walk-in closets in the room where E.B. was sleeping.

Officers found a loaded firearm on a six-foot-high shelf in one of the closets. That

closet contained adult male clothing and children’s clothing. The other closet

contained all female clothing. Connley testified that, while “it might be a stretch saying

that the 3 year old could have got to” the firearm in the closet, he believed the “13 year

old would have had no issue gaining access to that firearm.”

                                     II. Analysis

       {¶13} On appeal, Jones raises two assignments of error. First, she argues that

her convictions for permitting drug abuse and child endangerment were based on

insufficient evidence. Second, she asserts that the City of Cincinnati’s child-

endangerment ordinance, Cincinnati Mun.Code 915-3, is preempted by R.C. 9.68 and

her convictions under that ordinance are accordingly invalid. Because we determine

that her convictions for child endangerment were based on insufficient evidence, we

decline to consider Jones’s second assignment of error as moot.

   A. Standard of review

       {¶14} In reviewing a conviction under a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard,

an appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and

asks whether a reasonable finder of fact “‘could have determined that the state proved

each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Protich, 2025-Ohio-

2981, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Henderson, 2024-Ohio-2312, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.).

       {¶15} On appeal, Jones also describes a manifest-weight standard, but her

assignment of error asserts only that her convictions were based on insufficient


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                OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


evidence and she does not develop a manifest-weight argument in her brief. We

accordingly review her convictions under a sufficiency standard only. See id. at ¶ 13.

   B. Permitting drug abuse

       {¶16} Jones was convicted of permitting drug abuse under R.C. 2925.13(B).

The statute prohibits any person who is the lessee of premises from knowingly

permitting the premises “to be used for the commission of a felony drug abuse offense

by another person.” R.C. 2925.13(B).

       {¶17} Jones’s brief does not cite this statute or explain which element of the

offense the State failed to prove. But she does note that while Barnes was under

investigation for drug trafficking, he never sold drugs at the home. Further, she points

out that she was never with Barnes during any controlled buys, and police found only

one-third of a gram of cocaine in the home.

       {¶18} Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was

sufficient to prove that Jones knowingly permitted her home to be used by Barnes to

traffic cocaine, a felony-drug-abuse offense. See R.C. 2925.03(C)(4)(a); R.C.

2925.01(G)(1), (H). Officers found drug scales, several bags used to package drugs, the

firearms, and, in the adult bedroom next to “female products,” large amounts of cash.

The drug paraphernalia, multiple firearms, and cash provided circumstantial evidence

of drug trafficking. See State v. Marshall, 2021-Ohio-816, ¶ 41 (1st Dist.) (collecting

cases holding that firearms, scales, baggies, and large amounts of currency are

indicators of drug trafficking). These items’ visible presence in the home supported an

inference that Jones was aware of their existence. Accordingly, we hold that sufficient

evidence supported Jones’s conviction for permitting drug abuse.




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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


   C. Child-endangerment convictions

               1. Child-endangerment elements

       {¶19} Jones was convicted under Cincinnati Mun.Code 915-3(a), which

provides, “No person who is the parent, guardian, custodian, person having custody

or control, or person in loco parentis of a child shall create a substantial risk to the

health or safety of the child by violating a duty of care, protection, or support.”

       {¶20} The City of Cincinnati’s municipal code defines a “child” as a person

“under eighteen years of age.” Cincinnati Mun.Code 915-1-C. The State had to prove

that Jones recklessly engaged in the prohibited conduct. See Cincinnati Mun.Code

902-11(b). “A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the

consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the

person’s conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature.”

R.C. 2901.22(C).

               2. Child-endangerment convictions require specified
               relationships between the adult and the child

       {¶21} There is no dispute that Jones was not the children’s parent and the

State did not allege that Jones was their guardian or custodian. So, relevant here,

Cincinnati Mun.Code 915-3(a) applies to a “person having custody or control, or

person in loco parentis of a child.”

       {¶22} Analyzing Ohio’s sexual-battery statute, the Supreme Court of Ohio

determined that a person who is “in loco parentis” to a child “has assumed the

dominant parental role and is relied upon by the child for support.” State v. Noggle,

67 Ohio St.3d 31 (1993), paragraph one of the syllabus (affirming dismissal of a coach’s

sexual-battery conviction under former R.C. 2907.03(A)(5)). An adult may be in loco

parentis to a child even absent financial support. E.g., State v. Thompson, 2017-Ohio-



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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


9044, ¶ 59 (7th Dist.). Some factors courts consider are the adult’s intent to serve as a

parent (which may be shown by the adult’s acts and conduct), if the adult and child

share a close relationship, whether the adult is the child’s primary caretaker when the

parent is absent, and if the child relies on the adult for support. Id., quoting State v.

Abubakar, 2011-Ohio-6299, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.).

       {¶23} The phrase “custody or control” in Ohio’s child-endangerment statute is

distinct from “in loco parentis.” State v. Primous, 2020-Ohio-912, ¶ 44 (8th Dist.). To

show that a person has custody or control over a child, the State must establish more

than a casual relationship between the adult and the child, but less than what is

required to show an in loco parentis relationship. Id., citing State v. Stout, 2006-Ohio-

6089, ¶ 17 (3d Dist.).

       {¶24} A custody-or-control relationship can be temporary and applies where

an adult has been “‘physically entrusted with the care of the child.’” Id., quoting State

v. Kirk, 1994 Ohio App LEXIS 1189, *9 (10th Dist. Mar. 24, 1994); see State v. Gaddis,

2011-Ohio-2822, ¶ 58 (2d Dist.) (“[T]he evidence supports a finding that the injury

occurred while Gaddis had exclusive care and control of the Child.”); see also State v.

Curry, 2018-Ohio-4771, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.) (defendant was the children’s “second

babysitter,” was the sole adult in the room at the time of the incident, frequently helped

out with caring for the children, and was viewed as an authority figure by the children);

State v. King, 2010-Ohio-2402, ¶ 23 (5th Dist.) (“Appellant herself testified she was

the only adult who had control of [the child] on the day of the boy’s injuries.”); State

v. Sigman, 2018-Ohio-3850, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.) (defendant had custody or control over

the child where the defendant knew the child well due to defendant’s romantic

relationship with the child’s mother, had an established visitation schedule with the

child, and testified that he “was involved in the decision-making on the day of the


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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


incident” involving the incident that injured the child); State v. Austin, 2018-Ohio-

3048, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.) (although the child and her mother had a separate apartment,

they lived with the defendant “pretty much all the time,” defendant acted like the

child’s parent, and while the child’s mother was sleeping, defendant began the

“morning routine” by directing the child to brush her teeth and get dressed).

               3. The State presented no evidence involving Jones’s duty to
               Barnes’s children

       {¶25} On appeal, Jones argues that because Barnes’s children are not her

children and the State failed to establish that she had any responsibility toward them,

her child-endangerment convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence. In its

brief, the State offered no argument involving whether Jones’s relationship with the

children met the “duty” element of the ordinance—that she was a “parent, guardian,

custodian, person having custody or control, or person in loco parentis of a child.”

       {¶26} There is no suggestion in the record that Jones was the children’s

parent, legal guardian, or legal custodian. And, after a careful review of the law and

the record in this case, we hold that the State presented insufficient evidence

demonstrating that Jones had custody or control over, or was a person in loco parentis

to, the children.

       {¶27} First, the State presented no evidence that Jones acted in loco parentis.

There is no evidence she assumed a dominant parental role. And nothing in the record

shows Jones had any responsibility for the children, had a close relationship with

them, intended to act as a parent, or was the children’s primary caretaker when Barnes

was absent. The State failed to show that Jones had assumed an in loco parentis

relationship with the children.

       {¶28} Second, the State presented no evidence suggesting that Jones had



                                           9
                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


custody or control over the children at any point. In fact, other than showing that

Jones lived with Barnes and his children, the State presented no evidence involving

Jones’s relationship with Barnes’s children. Cohabitation is not enough to show that

Jones acted as the children’s parent or exercised custody or control over them. Unlike

the plethora of cases finding that a defendant had custody or control over a child,

nothing in the record showed that Jones had been entrusted with the children’s care,

played with the children, put the children to bed, paid rent on behalf of the children,

babysat the children, helped with the children’s care, was viewed by the children as an

authority figure, made any decisions about the children’s care, was in charge of the

children, or acted in any manner as their parent.

       {¶29} Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the

evidence merely established that Jones cohabitated in a home with the children and

their father. This is not sufficient to establish that Jones was in loco parentis, or had

custody or control over the children. Because the State presented insufficient evidence

on the duty element of the child-endangerment ordinance, it failed to present

sufficient evidence to convict Jones of child endangerment.

       {¶30} We sustain Jones’s first assignment of error in part, reverse her child-

endangerment convictions under Cincinnati Mun.Code 915-3(a), and discharge her

from further prosecution on those counts. See Henderson, 2024-Ohio-2312, at ¶ 33

(1st Dist.) (“A conviction based on insufficient evidence violates a defendant’s due-

process rights and precludes the state from retrying the defendant.”).

                                   III. Conclusion

       {¶31} For the foregoing reasons, we sustain in part and overrule in part

Jones’s first assignment of error. We decline to address Jones’s second assignment of

error because it is moot.


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                OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


      {¶32} In the appeal numbered C-250269, we reverse the trial court’s

judgments convicting Jones of child endangerment under Cincinnati Mun.Code 915-

3 and discharge Jones from further prosecution on those counts.

      {¶33} In the appeal numbered C-250270, we affirm the trial court’s judgment

convicting Jones of permitting drug abuse under R.C. 2925.13(B).

                                                            Judgment accordingly.

KINSLEY, P.J., and CROUSE, J., concur.




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