State v. Kendrick

[Cite as State v. Kendrick, 2026-Ohio-1510.]


                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                     ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                            PORTAGE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                  CASE NOS. 2025-P-0019
                                                          2025-P-0020
                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                      2025-P-0021

        - vs -
                                                Criminal Appeals from the
ASHLEY K. M. KENDRICK,                          Court of Common Pleas

                 Defendant-Appellant.
                                                Trial Court Nos. 2024 CR 01126
                                                                 2022 CR 00958
                                                                 2024 CR 00139 D


                            OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                    Decided: April 27, 2026
                           Judgment: Modified and affirmed as modified


Connie J. Lewandowski, Portage County Prosecutor, and Theresa M. Scahill, Assistant
Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Jason M. Jordan, Jason M. Jordan Legal Services, L.L.C., 3580 Darrow Road, Stow,
OH 44224 (For Defendant-Appellant).


EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.

        {¶1}     Appellant, Ashley K. M. Kendrick, appeals the judgment of the Portage

County Court of Common Pleas sentencing her to an aggregate prison term of 23 months.

At issue is whether (1) the trial court erred when it imposed a prison term when it allegedly

did not provide adequate notice of the range of possible prison terms in the event she

violated community control and, (2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive

sentences for a new felony charge upon revocation of community control violations where
there was no prior notice that reserved sentences could be served consecutively. We

modify the trial court’s judgment and affirm the judgment as modified.

       {¶2}    In July 2022, in Case No. 2022 CR 00958, Ms. Kendrick was indicted on

one count of aggravated possession of drugs, in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a felony of the

fifth degree. She was also charged with receiving stolen property, in violation of R.C.

2913.51, a misdemeanor of the first degree. Ms. Kendrick pleaded guilty to the

aggravated possession of drugs count. She was sentenced to community control

sanctions for a period of two years with various conditions. In its judgment entry, the trial

court stated that if Ms. Kendrick violated the terms of community control, she “may receive

more restrictive community control or [she] will serve a specific prison term of 12

months.”1

       {¶3}    In January 2024, in Case No. 2024 CR 00139 D, Ms. Kendrick was indicted

on one count of aggravated possession of drugs, in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a felony of

the fifth degree, and possessing drug abuse instruments, in violation of R.C. 2925.12, a

misdemeanor of the second degree. Ms. Kendrick pleaded guilty to the felony.

       {¶4}    On May 13, 2024, Ms. Kendrick appeared for sentencing in Case No. 2024

CR 00139 D and Case No. 2022 CR 00958 due to a probation violation. At the hearing,

the trial court determined:

               I will find this felony of the fifth degree[, i.e., Case No. 2024
               CR 00139 D,] that you are amenable to community control
               sanctions and that prison sentence is not consistent with the
               purposes and principles of sentenc[ing] for this felony five.
               And for 22 CR 958, the probation violation, I will continue you
               on community control.



1. No transcript of the sentencing hearing was filed in Case No. 2022 CR 00958, and no appeal was taken
from that matter.

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Case Nos. 2025-P-0019, 2025-P-0020, 2025-P-0021
                For the new case, I’ll sentence you to six to twelve months in
                the Ohio Department of Corrections, but I’ll suspend that
                sentence for a period of two years, order that you be placed
                on intensive supervision for the first year, followed by
                standard supervision. I’m ordering that you enter and
                complete Horizon depending on when the bed is available. . .
                .

       {¶5}     The trial court further notified Ms. Kendrick that:

                In the event you would go to prison on the felony of the fifth
                degree, the Adult Parole Authority could choose to supervise
                you for up to two years. If they did that and you violated their
                rules, they could send you back to prison for up to half your
                original sentence and if you committed a new felony, that time
                could be run consecutively with whatever you have left on
                your post release control time up to one year.

(Emphasis added.)

       {¶6}     No appeal was noticed from the May 13, 2024 sentencing entry.

       {¶7}     On December 30, 2024, the State filed a motion to revoke community

control because of another violation. Ms. Kendrick admitted the violation and, in Case No.

2024 CR 01126, she pleaded guilty to aggravated possession of drugs, in violation of

R.C. 2925.11, a felony of the fifth degree.

       {¶8}     On March 7, 2025, Ms. Kendrick appeared for sentencing on the

community-control violations as well as the charge to which she pleaded in Case. No.

2024 CR 01126. Ms. Kendrick entreated the court to provide her with another chance to

meet community control conditions. The court, however, declined. At sentencing, the trial

court stated:

                I’m looking back to the ’22 case through the ’24 case, early in
                2024 and then this one. You refused to be assessed by
                NEOCAP for your own reasons, you are making excuses
                about that. You’ve had the opportunity to go to Horizon before.
                PARC’s [presumably Portage Area Recovery House/Center]
                removed as a requirement because you honestly just have

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Case Nos. 2025-P-0019, 2025-P-0020, 2025-P-0021
              pretty much defied everything that we’ve tried to do starting
              with your assessment by NEOCAP, which you refused to do.

              You were denied HOPE court because you refused to be
              assessed by NEOCAP. I feel that we have given you
              countless opportunities over the years to do the program that
              honestly professionals have come up with.

              You want to do it your own way, and now three years later,
              starting in 2022 and now in 2025, you are in the same exact
              spot you were in. So you have not listened to really anything
              that probation’s tried to do, that I’ve tried to do, and, honestly,
              it’s time for you to sit down and be held accountable
              completely. So for the case, the new case I’m referring to it as
              24 CR 1126, it’s the sentence of this court that you serve
              eleven months in the Ohio Department of Corrections.

              In Case Numbers 24 CR 139D and 22 CR 958, you also had
              twelve months on those cases. I’m ordering that those cases,
              the sentence be imposed. I will order that those two probation
              violations run concurrently with each other, but they will run
              consecutively with the eleven months on 24 CR 1126. I will
              give you credit for the time that you have served in our jail
              over the years toward that almost two years.

              I am specifically finding that consecutive sentences are
              necessary to protect the public from future crime and to punish
              you and they are not disproportionate to the seriousness of
              [your] conduct and to the danger that you pose to the public
              and to yourself.

              I will specifically find that one or more of the offenses were
              committed while you - - this offense was committed while you
              were on community control and that is why you are receiving
              a consecutive sentence. And even though these are felonies
              of the fifth degree, I’m specifically finding that that
              presumption for community control is overcome based upon
              your criminal history and the fact that you’ve been on
              community control and continue to violate.

       {¶9}   Ms. Kendrick appeals the trial court’s sentencing entry imposing a term of

imprisonment as well as the consecutive nature of the prison term in Case No. 2024 CR

01126. Her first assigned error reads:



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Case Nos. 2025-P-0019, 2025-P-0020, 2025-P-0021
       {¶10} “The trial court committed reversible and plain error when it imposed a

prison sentence on defendant-appellant for community control violations.”

       {¶11} Under this assignment of error, Ms. Kendrick contends the trial court erred

when it imposed prison sentences following her community control violations in Case No.

2022 CR 00958 and Case No. 2024 CR 00139 D. Specifically, Ms. Kendrick maintains

that when she was sentenced to community control under those case numbers, the trial

court did not properly specify the range of prison terms which could be imposed if

community control was not successfully completed. We disagree.

       {¶12} “R.C. 2953.08(G) governs our review of felony sentences, and provides, in

relevant part, that after an appellate court’s review of the record, it ‘may increase, reduce,

or otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the

sentence and remand . . . if it clearly and convincingly finds . . . [t]hat the sentence is . .

. [otherwise] contrary to law.’” State v. Lamb, 2023-Ohio-2834, ¶ 9 (11th Dist.), quoting

R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b), and citing State v. Meeks, 2023-Ohio-988, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.).

       {¶13} “‘“[A] sentence is contrary to law when it does not fall within the statutory

range for the offense or if the trial court fails to consider the purposes and principles of

felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors set forth in R.C.

2929.12.”’” Lamb at ¶ 10, quoting State v. Shannon, 2021-Ohio-789, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.),

quoting State v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-8416, ¶ 74 (2d Dist.). Further, the phrase

“‘otherwise contrary to law’ means “‘in violation of statute or legal regulations at a given

time.”’” State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-1878, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729,

¶ 34, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). The Second Appellate District has

also observed that the phrase “contrary to law” may be defined as “‘a sentencing decision



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Case Nos. 2025-P-0019, 2025-P-0020, 2025-P-0021
[that] manifestly ignores an issue or factor which a statute requires a court to

consider.’” State v. Morgan, 2023-Ohio-3913, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.), quoting State v. Lofton, 2004-

Ohio-169, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.).

       {¶14} Under R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) and 2929.15(B), “a trial court sentencing an

offender to a community control sanction must, at the time of the sentencing, notify the

offender of the . . . prison term that may be imposed for a violation of the conditions of the

sanction, as a prerequisite to imposing a prison term on the offender for a subsequent

violation.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Brooks, 2004-Ohio-4746, at paragraph two of the

syllabus.

       {¶15} R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) sets forth what a sentencing court must do when it

imposes a term of community control in lieu of a prison sentence. That section provides:

              If the sentencing court determines at the sentencing hearing
              that a community control sanction should be imposed and the
              court is not prohibited from imposing a community control
              sanction, the court shall impose a community control sanction.
              The court shall notify the offender that, if the conditions of the
              sanction are violated, if the offender commits a violation of any
              law, or if the offender leaves this state without the permission
              of the court or the offender’s probation officer, the court may
              impose a longer time under the same sanction, may impose a
              more restrictive sanction, or may impose a prison term on the
              offender and shall indicate the range from which the prison
              term may be imposed as a sanction for the violation, which
              shall be the range of prison terms for the offense that is
              specified pursuant to section 2929.14 of the Revised
              Code and as described in section 2929.15 of the Revised
              Code.

(Emphasis added.)

       {¶16} The trial court must therefore notify the offender regarding certain

consequences of violating the conditions of community control, including that the court




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Case Nos. 2025-P-0019, 2025-P-0020, 2025-P-0021
“may impose a prison term” and it must indicate the range in which the term may be

imposed. Id.2

        {¶17} In Brooks, 2004-Ohio-4746, the Supreme Court of Ohio concluded that

compliance with this statute requires that “a trial court sentencing an offender to a

community control sanction must, at the time of the sentencing,” as opposed to during a

plea hearing, for example, “notify the offender of the . . . prison term that may be imposed

for a violation of the conditions of the sanction, as a prerequisite to imposing a prison term

on the offender for a subsequent violation.” See id. at ¶ 29. Again, because R.C.

2929.19(B)(4) has been amended, the trial court needs only to reference the range of the

prison term to which an offender may be subject. Notwithstanding this point, in Brooks,

the Court also observed that if a court informs an offender “prior to sentencing, (e.g. at a

plea hearing)” what a maximum term would be, and the trial court eventually imposes the

maximum for a violation, such notification is sufficient. Id. at ¶ 32.

        {¶18} “The statutorily mandated notice regarding the specific prison term that the

trial court could impose becomes relevant when the offender violates his [or her]

community control.” State v. Howard, 2020-Ohio-3195, ¶ 14.

        {¶19} As noted above, in Case No. 2022 CR 00958, Ms. Kendrick pleaded guilty

to a felony-five count of aggravated possession of drugs. No transcript of the sentencing

hearing is in this court’s record. Ms. Kendrick was given community control and did not

appeal that judgment. In its judgment entry, however, the trial court stated that, if Ms.




2. In 2021, R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) was amended via Am. Sub. H.B. 110, 2021 Ohio Laws File 30, which
eliminated the specificity requirement for prison terms that could be imposed. Accordingly, a trial court need
only give the “range from which” the prison term may be imposed.

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Case Nos. 2025-P-0019, 2025-P-0020, 2025-P-0021
Kendrick violated community control, she “may receive more restrictive community control

or [she] will serve a specific prison term of 12 months.”

       {¶20} Pursuant to the foregoing authority, a trial court is required, at the time of

the sentencing, to notify the offender of the range from which a prison term may be

imposed. This court, however, has no transcript of the sentencing hearing in the 2022

case. “Without a transcript, it is impossible for us to know whether the trial court adhered

to this statutory mandate.” State v. Rendina, 2009-Ohio-1434, ¶ 29 (11th Dist.) Because

Ms. Kendrick failed to file a transcript of the sentencing hearing or an acceptable App.R.

9 alternative, this court must presume regularity in the trial court’s proceedings on the

matter. Rendina at ¶ 30, citing State v. Lawson, 2002-Ohio-5605 (11th Dist.). The

judgment entry nevertheless reflects a proper advisement and, accordingly, the record is

not devoid of an advisement. Ms. Kendrick was therefore on notice of the possibility that,

if she violated the trial court’s community-control conditions, she could be sent to prison.

       {¶21} Next, in Case No. 2024 CR 00139 D, the trial court found Ms. Kendrick

amenable to community control but determined that she would be sentenced to six to 12

months in prison (which was suspended for a period of two years). The trial court

observed that community control sanctions were consistent with the purposes and

principles of felony sentencing and placed Ms. Kendrick under the supervision of the

adult-probation department for 24 months. The entry additionally stated that if Ms.

Kendrick violated the terms of community control, she could be sentenced to up to 12

months in prison. The trial court accordingly provided Ms. Kendrick notice of the range

from which any prison term might be imposed.




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Case Nos. 2025-P-0019, 2025-P-0020, 2025-P-0021
        {¶22} Regarding Case No. 2024 CR 00139 D, the trial court ordered community

control and a suspended sentence. Ms. Kendrick argues that “community control

sanctions and prison terms are mutually exclusive and therefore cannot be imposed at

the same time on the same count of conviction.” See State v. Berry, 2012-Ohio-4660, ¶

21 (3d Dist.). Accordingly, she claims, a trial court cannot suspend a prison term or make

community control the condition of a suspended prison term. See State v. Duncan, 2016-

Ohio-5559, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.). See also State v. Anderson, 2015-Ohio-2089, ¶ 31 (“as a

general rule, when a prison term and community control are possible sentences for a

particular felony offense, absent an express exception, the court must impose either a

prison term or a community-control sanction or sanctions”).

        {¶23} Ms. Kendrick maintains that the trial court’s action of imposing community

control negates the possibility of imposing a suspended prison term in the 2024 matter.

See State v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-4485, ¶ 15 (“A reserved prison term is a potential future

sentence but is not a contemporaneous sentence with a sentence of community control;

the original sentence is community control, period.”). It is unclear whether the

nomenclature of “suspended sentence” differs from the use of the phrase “reserved

sentence.”3 Nevertheless, we conclude Ms. Kendrick’s construction of the cases she cites

as authority is misplaced. We accordingly find no error.

        {¶24} In Berry, a case upon which Ms. Kendrick primarily relies, the Third

Appellate District observed:



3. See State v. Proctor, 1998 WL 336946, *2, fn. 2 (7th Dist. June 24, 1998), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary
(6 Ed. Rev. 1990) (“A suspended sentence has been defined as, ‘[a] conviction of a crime followed by a
sentence that is given formally, but not actually served. A suspended sentence in criminal law means in
effect that [the] defendant is not required at the time sentence is imposed to serve the sentence.’”
(Emphasis added in Proctor.)) A “reserved sentence” appears to have the same effect as a suspended
sentence.

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Case Nos. 2025-P-0019, 2025-P-0020, 2025-P-0021
               This district has determined that “there is no provision in the
               sentencing statute which permits a court to suspend a prison
               term or make community control a condition of a suspended
               prison term.” State v. Riley, . . .1998 WL 812044 ([3d Dist.]
               Nov. 12, 1998). Rather, current felony sentencing statutes,
               contained primarily in R.C. 2929.11 to 2929.19, require trial
               courts to impose either a prison term or community control
               sanctions on each count. State v. Williams, . . . 2011-Ohio-
               995, . . . ¶ 17 [(3d Dist.)] . . . .

Berry at ¶ 21; accord Duncan at ¶ 19, construing Anderson, 2015-Ohio-2089.

       {¶25} The court in Berry further pointed out:

               The purpose of the community control statute cited above is
               not to sentence a defendant to a specific prison term and then
               suspend or reserve that prison term, the purpose is to notify a
               defendant of a specific prison term that a defendant will
               receive if he [or she] violates community control. The key is
               that a defendant must be notified of the prison sentence the
               defendant would receive if the defendant violated his [or her]
               community control, not sentenced to that prison term.

(Emphasis in original.) Id. at ¶ 25.

       {¶26} Moreover, in Duncan, 2016-Ohio-5559 (12th Dist.), the court, citing Berry

underscored:

               [T]he purpose of the community control statute is not to
               sentence a defendant to a specific prison term and then
               suspend or reserve that prison term. Berry, 2012-Ohio-4660 .
               . ., at ¶ 25. Rather, the purpose of the statute is to notify the
               defendant of a specific prison term that may be imposed if the
               defendant violates community control. Brooks at ¶ 23 (R.C.
               2929.19[B][4] notification puts the defendant on notice of the
               specific prison term he faces if he violates community
               control); Berry at ¶ 25. In other words, when a defendant is
               sentenced to community control on a count of conviction and
               notified at that time of the specific prison term he [or she] faces
               should he [or she] violate his [or her] community control, the
               defendant is only sentenced to community control sanctions
               and is not sentenced to that prison term. Id.; Brooks at ¶ 21
               (while R.C. 2929.19[B][4] requires the judge to state the
               specific prison term the offender faces in the event of a



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Case Nos. 2025-P-0019, 2025-P-0020, 2025-P-0021
              community control violation, that term is not necessarily what
              the offender will receive if a violation occurs).

Duncan at ¶ 21.

       {¶27} The trial court in this matter did not violate the pronouncement set forth in

Berry. In Case No. 2022 CR 00958, Ms. Kendrick pleaded guilty to one felony-five count

of aggravated possession of drugs and was sentenced to community control.

       {¶28} In Case No. 2024 CR 00139 D, the trial court found Ms. Kendrick in violation

of community control in the 2022 case but permitted her to remain on community control

for the subsequent felony-five aggravated-possession-of-drugs plea. Prison was

suspended and Ms. Kendrick was placed on notice that, if she violated community control,

she could be sentenced to prison. As such, Ms. Kendrick was sentenced to community

control on both the 2022 and the original 2024 case. She was notified that if she violated

community control, she may receive a more restrictive sanction or be sentenced to a

specific prison term of 12 months.

       {¶29} This matter is neither in conflict nor legally “at odds” with the holdings in

Berry or Duncan. In those matters, the appellate courts determined a court may only

impose a prison term or a community control sanction on each discrete count. Here, the

trial court imposed community control on the 2022 and the original 2024 cases and did

not make community control a condition of the suspended prison term.

       {¶30} Moreover, the trial court in this case notified Ms. Kendrick of the possibility

of prison terms in the event of violations. In short, Ms. Kendrick was aware that, if she

violated the conditions of community control, not the least of which involved committing a

separate and additional criminal violation, she could be sentenced to prison in the

underlying cases.

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Case Nos. 2025-P-0019, 2025-P-0020, 2025-P-0021
       {¶31} We also point out that, even though we find no error in the trial court’s

actions, Ms. Kendrick did not appeal the decision in Case No. 2024 CR 00139 D. The trial

court’s actions do not render the judgment void. State v. Henderson, 2020-Ohio-4784, ¶

27 (“A sentence is void only if the sentencing court lacks jurisdiction over the subject

matter of the case or personal jurisdiction over the accused.”). The trial court’s alleged

error is a “sentencing error.” See State v. Hall, 2021-Ohio-791, ¶ 24, 40 (11th Dist.). The

Supreme Court of Ohio “has expressly held that ‘sentences based on an error, including

sentences in which a trial court fails to impose a statutorily mandated term, are voidable

if the court imposing the sentence has jurisdiction over the case and the defendant.’” Hall

at ¶ 24, quoting State v. Henderson, 2020-Ohio-4784, ¶ 1. “Thus, ‘if a judgment is

voidable, the doctrine of res judicata bars a party from raising and litigating in any

proceeding, except a direct appeal, claims that could have been raised in the trial

court.’ [Henderson] at ¶ 19. See also State v. Hudson, . . . 2020-Ohio-3849, . . . ¶

16 (concluding that because the defendant could have, but did not, raise a claimed

sentencing error on direct appeal, the error was ‘now barred by the doctrine of res

judicata’).” Hall at ¶ 24

       {¶32} There is nothing to indicate the trial court lacked subject matter or personal

jurisdiction over either the case or Ms. Kendrick. By failing to appeal Case No. 2024 CR

00139 D, Ms. Kendrick has forfeited any alleged error regarding the trial court’s imposition

of both community control and a suspended sentence. We discern no error.

       {¶33} The trial court expressly stated it found Ms. Kendrick amenable to

community control sanctions and that a “prison sentence is not consistent with the

purposes and principles of sentenc[ing] for this felony five. . . For the new case I’ll



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Case Nos. 2025-P-0019, 2025-P-0020, 2025-P-0021
sentence you to six to twelve months . . . but I’ll suspend the sentence for a period of two

years.” Although the trial court indicated its intention to suspend the six- to 12-month

prison sentence, the court made it clear that Ms. Kendrick would remain under community

control.

       {¶34} In State v. Keenan, 2020-Ohio-1077 (11th Dist.), this court determined that

“it is not necessary to expressly inform the defendant that the term could be imposed for

a community control violation, i.e., that portion of the required notification can be inferred.”

Id. at ¶ 15. Further, in Keenan, this court employed a practical application regarding prison

notification when a defendant is sentenced to community control. In that matter, this court

observed:

              [A]fter the trial court made its finding concerning appellant’s
              amenability to community control, the court stated that it was
              sentencing him to eighteen months in prison but was also
              suspending the prison term for five years. As noted, the trial
              court then discussed the nature of the probation department’s
              supervision over him and the nature of the conditions he had
              to satisfy. At the end of that discussion, the court stated: “In
              the event you violate and go to prison, upon your release from
              prison the Adult Parole Authority could choose to supervise
              you for up to three years.” (Emphasis added).

              The italicized portion of the foregoing sufficiently informs
              appellant that if he failed to comply with the conditions recited
              by the trial court, he could go to prison as a result.
              Furthermore, because the only prior reference made by the
              trial court to a prison term indicated that the length of the
              sentence would be eighteen months, the only reasonable
              interpretation appellant could draw from the court’s
              statements was that he could go to prison for eighteen months
              if he violated. To this extent, the court’s statements during the
              sentencing hearing were sufficient to not only inform appellant
              of the specific duration of his potential prison term, but also
              inform him of what could lead to the imposition of that term.

(Footnote omitted.) Keenan at ¶ 18-19.



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Case Nos. 2025-P-0019, 2025-P-0020, 2025-P-0021
       {¶35} Here, the trial court provided Ms. Kendrick with the conditions of her

community control. It also observed that “in the event you would go to prison on the felony

of the fifth degree, the Adult Parole Authority could choose to supervise you for up to two

years.” (Emphasis added.) Although the trial court stated the prison term in this matter

could be between six and 12 months, Ms. Kendrick was on express notice of the potential

range and duration of the prison term she could serve if she violated community control.

See R.C. 2929.19(B)(4). In our view, as in Keenan, the court’s statements were sufficient

to inform Ms. Kendrick of the potential prison term and what could trigger the imposition

of the term.

       {¶36} With these observations in mind, Ms. Kendrick also (peripherally) argues

the trial court was required to re-notify her of the potential prison term when it continued

her community control (in Case No. 2024 CR 00139 D) following her previous violation.

She cites State v. Fraley, 2004-Ohio-7110, in support of this apparent contention.

       {¶37} In Fraley, the Supreme Court of Ohio determined that “[f]ollowing a

community control violation, the trial court conducts a second sentencing hearing. At this

sentencing hearing, the court sentences the offender anew and must comply with the

relevant sentencing statutes.” (Citation omitted.) Id. at ¶ 17. The Court stated that “a trial

court sentencing an offender upon a violation of the offender’s community control sanction

must, at the time of such sentencing, notify the offender of the specific prison term that

may be imposed for an additional violation of the conditions of the sanction as a

prerequisite to imposing a prison term on the offender for a subsequent violation.” Id. at

¶ 18. The Court observed “[t]he trial court could therefore comply with both the sentencing

statutes and our holding in Brooks[, 2004-Ohio-4746,] if at this second hearing the court



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Case Nos. 2025-P-0019, 2025-P-0020, 2025-P-0021
notifies the offender of the specific prison term that may be imposed for a subsequent

violation occurring after this second hearing.” Fraley at ¶ 17.

       {¶38} Pursuant to Howard, 2020-Ohio-3195, however, the Supreme Court

rejected the position that its “holding in Fraley [requires] that a trial court must repeat the

prison-term notification at every revocation hearing in order to preserve its ability to

sentence an offender to prison for violating community control.” (Emphasis in original.)

Howard at ¶ 19.

       {¶39} In Howard, the trial court imposed the prison term of which it provided the

offender notice at the initial sentencing hearing. Id. at ¶ 22. The Supreme Court observed

“the purpose of the notice requirement in R.C. 2929.19(B)(4) ‘is to make the offender

aware before a violation of the specific prison term that he or she will face for the

violation.’” (Emphasis in original.) Howard at ¶ 22, quoting Brooks at ¶ 33. Pursuant to

Howard, therefore, notice to Ms. Kendrick was met when she received sufficient notice at

her initial sentencing hearing and “the trial court was not required to renotify [her] of [the]

potential prison [term] before it imposed the prison [term].” Id. at ¶ 22.

       {¶40} Considering the full context of each hearing, we conclude that Ms. Kendrick

was given sufficient notice that she could be sent to prison for violating community control.

The imposition of prison vis-à-vis concurrent prison terms in Case Nos. 2022 CR 00958

and 2024 CR 00139 D was not contrary to law.

       {¶41} Ms. Kendrick’s first assignment of error lacks merit.

       {¶42} Ms. Kendrick’s second assignment of error provides:




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Case Nos. 2025-P-0019, 2025-P-0020, 2025-P-0021
       {¶43} “The trial court committed reversible and plain error when it imposed

consecutive prison sentences on defendant-appellant for community control violations

and a new felony charge.”

       {¶44} Ms. Kendrick argues the trial court plainly erred by sentencing her to

consecutive prison terms in the underlying matter. We do not agree.

       {¶45} Ms. Kendrick’s argument is premised upon Jones, 2022-Ohio-4485,

wherein the Supreme Court of Ohio determined:

              [I]n the absence of notice of potential consecutive sentences
              for one or more reserved prison terms when sentencing an
              offender to community control, the prison term or terms
              imposed at the time of revocation may be no more than what
              was stated for the reserved prison term when community
              control was imposed. And when a reserved prison term or
              terms are imposed in the context of an existing prison term, a
              court may not require that they be served consecutively
              unless notice of a potential consecutive sentence was given
              at the time of sentencing to community control. Absent such
              prior notice, the reserved prison term must be imposed to run
              concurrently with the existing prison term.

(Emphasis added.) Jones at ¶ 17.

       {¶46} Ms. Kendrick asserts that she did not receive notice that further possible

community control violations could result in consecutive service. She claims that, without

notice that a future community control violation may result in a consecutive prison

sentence she is entitled to concurrent sentences. In Jones, the Supreme Court stated:

              [C]ontextual statutory considerations suggest that a lack of . .
              . [consecutive service] notice implies that the reserved prison
              term will be concurrent. First, prison terms are generally
              presumed to be concurrent. R.C. 2929.41(A). Second,
              sentences of community control with reserved prison terms
              are given typically for less serious crimes, which would
              generally not, in the first instance, justify a consecutive
              sentence. Compare, e.g., R.C. 2929.13(B)(1) with R.C.
              2929.14(C)(1) through (4). Third, R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(b)

                                       PAGE 16 OF 21

Case Nos. 2025-P-0019, 2025-P-0020, 2025-P-0021
              requires a court imposing sentences for multiple counts to
              specify with regard to each sentence whether it is to be
              concurrently or consecutively served. Together these
              considerations suggest that in the absence of notice to an
              offender that a reserved prison term may be consecutive, a
              concurrent term should be presumed, in accordance with R.C.
              2929.41(A).

(Footnote omitted.) Jones at ¶ 16.

       {¶47} In this case, however, the reserved prison terms entered in Case No. 2022

CR 00958 and Case No. 2024 CR 00139 D were ordered to be served concurrently. We

point out, however, that, in Case No. 2024 CR 00139 D, the trial court expressly stated

at sentencing that “if you committed a new felony, that time could be run consecutively.”

See supra at ¶ 5. This advisement indicates that the potential time imposed in 2024 CR

00139 D could have been ordered consecutively to a violation for a new felony. The trial

court did not order such a sentence. It ordered the earlier terms to be served concurrently

and therefore we need not comment further on the validity of such a possibility.

       {¶48} The new case, Case No. 2024 CR 01126, which was the basis of the final

revocation, was ordered to run consecutively to the reserved prison terms in the older

cases. We fail to see how this outcome runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s pronouncement

in Jones, 2022-Ohio-4485. See State v. Little, 2025-Ohio-768, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.) (“We see

nothing in Jones precluding a trial court from imposing a later sentence on a new charge

consecutively to an earlier sentence imposed upon the revocation of community control.”).

       {¶49} In Jones, the Supreme Court of Ohio certified the following question

“whether a trial court, when imposing a prison sentence that it had previously notified the

offender could be imposed upon revocation of community control (“reserved[-]prison

term”), may require that the sentence be served consecutively to other sentences being



                                       PAGE 17 OF 21

Case Nos. 2025-P-0019, 2025-P-0020, 2025-P-0021
served by the offender.” Id. at ¶ 1. In Jones, the Supreme Court held that a “[r]eserved[-

]prison term may be ordered to be served consecutively to any other sentence at a

community-control-revocation hearing if notice was given when the prison term was

reserved that the term could be required to be served consecutively to another prison

term at the time of revocation.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 15.

       {¶50} The trial court imposed the 11-month term of imprisonment on Case No.

2024 CR 01126 consecutively to the concurrent terms in the earlier cases. The trial court

also made all requisite findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4), a matter not disputed by Ms.

Kendrick. We accordingly hold the imposition of the consecutive sentence was not

contrary to law.

       {¶51} Ms. Kendrick’s second assignment of error lacks merit.

       {¶52} Notwithstanding the foregoing disposition, a review of the appealed

judgment entry (despite the advisements at the sentencing hearing) demonstrates that

the trial court sentenced Ms. Kendrick to a term of imprisonment of 11 months in Case

No. 2022 CR 00958, a term of imprisonment of 12 months in Case No. 2024 CR 00139

D, and a term of imprisonment of 12 months in Case No. 2024 CR 01126. The judgment

entry states that Case No. 2024 CR 01126 and Case No. 2024 CR 00139 D shall run

concurrently to each other but shall run consecutively to Case No. 2022 CR 00958. This

would indicate that Ms. Kendrick is subject to 24 months, not 23 months in prison. The

March 7, 2025, sentencing hearing reflects that Ms. Kendrick will serve (1) 12 months for

Case No. 2022 CR 00958; (2) 12 months for Case No. 2024 CR 00139 D; and (3) 11

months for Case No. 2024 CR 01126. As noted above, the trial court ordered the

sentences on the first two cases to be served concurrently with one another and the



                                       PAGE 18 OF 21

Case Nos. 2025-P-0019, 2025-P-0020, 2025-P-0021
sentence for 2024 CR 01126 to be served consecutively to the concurrent terms. This

statement accurately reflects the trial court’s apparent intention that Ms. Kendrick serve

a total of 23 months.

       {¶53} It is well settled that “courts possess the authority to correct errors in

judgment entries so that the record speaks the truth.” (Citation omitted.) State v. Lester,

2011-Ohio-5204, ¶ 18. “Errors subject to correction by the court include a clerical error,

mistake, or omission that is mechanical in nature and apparent on the record and does

not involve a legal decision or judgment.” Id., citing State v. Miller, 2010-Ohio-5705, ¶

15; and Crim.R. 36. There is a discrepancy between the statement of the court at the

sentencing hearing and the notations in the trial court’s sentencing order. Ms. Kendrick,

however, has not identified any prejudice from this apparent mistake in the judgment

entry. Indeed, the State identifies the issue as a clerical error. We agree with the State.

The correction is a ministerial or clerical error, it has no effect on the aggregate prison

term, and, accordingly, in the interest of judicial economy, we modify the trial court’s

judgment and affirm the judgment as modified to reflect the following:

              (1) a 12-month term of imprisonment in Case No. 2022 CR
              00958; (2) a 12-month term of imprisonment in Case No. 2024
              CR 00139 D, to run concurrently with Case No. 2022 CR
              00958; and (3) an 11-month term of imprisonment in Case No.
              2024 CR 01126, to run consecutively to the concurrent terms
              in the preceding cases, for an aggregate term of 23 months.

       {¶54} Because any error or discrepancy between the court’s statement and its

judgment entry is clerical, we see no compelling reason to require the trial court to correct

it. We therefore modify the trial court’s judgment to properly reflect the valid, legal

judgment entered at the sentencing hearing.



                                       PAGE 19 OF 21

Case Nos. 2025-P-0019, 2025-P-0020, 2025-P-0021
       {¶55} The judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas is modified

and affirmed as modified.



ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,

SCOTT LYNCH, J.,

concur.




                                       PAGE 20 OF 21

Case Nos. 2025-P-0019, 2025-P-0020, 2025-P-0021
                                 JUDGMENT ENTRY



    For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignments of error
are without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Portage
County Court of Common Pleas is modified and affirmed as modified. The trial court’s
judgment is as modified to reflect the following: (1) a 12-month term of imprisonment in
Case No. 2022 CR 00958; (2) a 12-month term of imprisonment in Case No. 2024 CR
00139 D, to run concurrently with Case No. 2022 CR 00958; and (3) an 11-month term
of imprisonment in Case No. 2024 CR 01126, to run consecutively to the concurrent terms
in the preceding cases, for an aggregate term of 23 months.
    The Clerk of Courts is instructed to serve not only the parties to this appeal but also
the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections, Bureau of Sentencing
Computation, P.O. Box 430, Columbus, Ohio 43216, to effectuate the modification of the
underlying sentence.
       Costs to be taxed against appellant.




                                                  JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI



                                                  JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON,
                                                          concurs



                                                    JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH,
                                                          concurs


           THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY

    A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
              pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.


                                       PAGE 21 OF 21

Case Nos. 2025-P-0019, 2025-P-0020, 2025-P-0021