State v. Link

[Cite as State v. Link, 2026-Ohio-1640.]


STATE OF OHIO                     )                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                  )ss:                 NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT                  )

STATE OF OHIO                                          C.A. No.       31506

        Appellee

        v.                                             APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                       ENTERED IN THE
CHARLES F. LINK                                        COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                       COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
        Appellant                                      CASE No.   CR-2024-07-2274

                                  DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: May 6, 2026



        STEVENSON, Judge.

        {¶1}     Defendant-Appellant Charles Link appeals the judgment of the Summit County

Court of Common Pleas finding him guilty of six counts of rape and seven counts of gross sexual

imposition (“GSI”) and sentencing him on these offenses. For the following reasons, this Court

affirms.

                                                  I.

        {¶2}     A grand jury indicted Mr. Link on seven counts of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02,

a felony of the first degree, and eight counts of GSI in violation of R.C. 2907.05, a felony of the

third degree. The rape charges and seven of the GSI charges arose from Mr. Link’s alleged conduct

against C.D. from the time C.D. was 6 to 12 years old. The remaining GSI charge arose from Mr.

Link’s alleged conduct against K.N. from the time K.N. was 10 to 12 years old. C.D. and K.N.

both had a familial relationship with Mr. Link. The indictment alleged that the charged offenses

occurred between November 29, 2007, and March 26, 2021. The State later dismissed one count
                                                  2


of rape and one count of GSI relating to C.D. Mr. Link pleaded not guilty to the charged offenses

and the matter proceeded to a jury trial.

       {¶3}    At the time of trial, victim C.D. was 23 years old. C.D. testified that Mr. Link is

married to her paternal grandmother (“Gail”) and that he is “[her] grandpa.” C.D. regularly stayed

at her grandparents’ house from the age of 4 to 12 while her parents were working. Gail operated

a daycare out of the home and watched other children in addition to C.D.

       {¶4}    C.D. testified that Mr. Link started touching her inappropriately when she was four

years old. The inappropriate touching started with Mr. Link sitting C.D. on his lap in the living

room and “kiss[ing] [her] ears and [her] neck” and “groping” her “chest” and “private parts.” C.D.

testified the inappropriate touching got worse and that Mr. Link started to “[r]ape” her beginning

when she was “[f]ive to six.” The rapes occurred in Mr. Link’s bedroom, which she referred to as

“[t]he prayer room.” C.D. testified that the touching would occur during the day “throughout the

week” and that the rapes happened “at night.”

       {¶5}     C.D. testified that Mr. Link penetrated her vagina with his fingers, anally raped

her, and that he forced his penis in her mouth. This conduct occurred “[o]nce a week” from the

age of 7 to 9. She testified that this conduct became “[a] little less frequent” starting at the age of

10.

       {¶6}    C.D. recalled an incident that occurred when she was 8 or 9 years old and she spent

the night at Mr. Link’s house after attending a concert. She testified that Mr. Link held her down

on the bed and that she was anally penetrated. C.D. testified that Gail was knocking on the door

and telling Mr. Link to unlock the door during this incident. C.D. stated that her “clothes were so

dirty” and that Gail had her shower after the incident.
                                                 3


       {¶7}    C.D. testified that she never told anyone what was going on because Mr. Link had

told her to keep it between them. She reported the incidents to the police after her husband and

parents became suspicious that something had happened between C.D. and Mr. Link.

       {¶8}    Victim K.N. was 16 years old at the time of trial. K.N. is Gail’s biological great-

granddaughter and she viewed Mr. Link as her grandfather. Gail and Mr. Link raised K.N.’s

mother.

       {¶9}    Gail babysat K.N. at her in-home daycare from birth until K.N. “was like 10-ish.”

K.N. went to Gail’s daycare before and after school once she started school, with the bus picking

her up at the Link residence. K.N. testified that Mr. Link was usually not home in the mornings,

but there was an hour overlap when she was at the house with Mr. Link in the afternoon.

       {¶10} K.N. testified that Mr. Link would make her “stay on his lap or - - would hug [her]

for like strange amounts of time” and that he would hug her “really close.” She testified that that

Mr. Link would take her to the prayer room and close the door. According to K.N., Gail was always

home but she never went into the prayer room with her and Mr. Link. K.N. did not testify to any

inappropriate sexual conduct occurring in the prayer room.

       {¶11} K.N. testified to an incident when she was “[a]round 10” and was sitting on Mr.

Link’s lap in the living room. According to K.N., Mr. Link was “saying, like, how pretty I was and

that he loved me and [he] asked for a kiss” while she was sitting on his lap. K.N. testified that Mr.

Link proceeded to kiss her “on the mouth” and she “could feel his tongue on [her] mouth.” K.N.

recalled that Gail was in the kitchen when this occurred.

       {¶12} K.N.’s mother (“Mother”) testified that she was raised by Mr. Link and Gail, who

is her paternal grandmother. According to Mother, Mr. Link would take her to the prayer room

where he sometimes had Mother sit on his lap. Mother did not testify to any inappropriate conduct
                                                  4


occurring between her and Mr. Link, but she believes that her memory may be repressed. Mother

acknowledged on cross-examination that she has no claims against Mr. Link. Mother talked to her

children after learning about C.D.’s report concerning Mr. Link and she later talked to Detective

Bryon Cadwell of the Summit County Sheriff’s Office Detective Bureau.

       {¶13} Detective Cadwell testified that he received C.D.’s report concerning her

allegations against Mr. Link and that he conducted the investigation. He spoke to family members

and interviewed C.D. as part of his investigation. He also observed the forensic interview of K.N.

at the CARE Center at Akron’s Children Hospital.

       {¶14} The CARE Center social worker who conducted the forensic interview of K.N.

testified at trial and her findings and a video recording of the interview were admitted into

evidence. The social worker noted K.N.’s report that Mr. Link grabbed her arm and held her by

the waist, forcing her to sit on his lap while they were in the living room. She also noted that K.N.

reported Mr. Link pulled her down on his lap, used his arm to hold her down, and that he rubbed

her waist and leg as she was sitting on his lap with “her butt sitting on his leg.” When the social

worker asked K.N. what part of her leg Mr. Link had touched, K.N. “touched . . . her thigh, her

upper thigh.” The social worker explained that it is “very common” for children to point to a body

part in response to a question during a forensic interview. K.N. reported to the social worker that

Mr. Link also kissed her on the mouth and that she could feel his tongue. The social worker also

noted K.N.’s report that Mr. Link would whisper “in her ear while rubbing her waist” during their

interactions. The social worker does not make referrals for every patient, but she did make two

referrals for K.N., including a referral for trauma therapy.

       {¶15} Another granddaughter and C.D.’s husband also testified on behalf of the State at

trial. According to the granddaughter, it was common for Mr. Link to take children to the prayer
                                                5


room to pray. The granddaughter acknowledged on cross-examination that she does not have any

claims against Mr. Link. C.D.’s husband testified that he went with C.D. to the Link residence on

two different occasions in 2023. He testified that Mr. Link made a sexual comment about C.D. and

tried to kiss her at one visit and that he saw Mr. Link “kissing on [C.D.’s] neck and her ears” at

another visit.

        {¶16} Mr. Link did not testify in his defense at trial. He called Gail as a witness who

testified on his behalf. Gail testified that she was always home when kids were at her house and

that she never saw Mr. Link engage in inappropriate behavior with any of the children. She never

saw anything that would have indicated that C.D. was being sexually assaulted by Mr. Link, nor

did she see anything inappropriate between Mr. Link and K.N. Gail testified that she would have

reported Mr. Link if she had any inkling of any inappropriate behavior. She acknowledged on

cross-examination that Mr. Link took girls to the prayer room and that he would close the door

while inside the room.

        {¶17} The jury found Mr. Link guilty of the rape and GSI charges. Mr. Link appeals his

judgment of conviction raising three assignments of error.

                                                I.

                                ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I.

        APPELLANT CHARLES LINK’S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE
        IN VIOLATION OF [MR.] LINK’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL UNDER THE
        SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION.

        {¶18} Mr. Link argues in his first assignment of error that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel. We disagree.

        {¶19} “[I]n Ohio, a properly licensed attorney is presumed competent.” State v. Gondor,

2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 62. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Link must
                                                 6


establish (1) that his counsel's performance was deficient to the extent that “counsel was not

functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and (2) that “the

deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984). A deficient performance is one that falls below an objective standard of reasonable

representation. State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. The

Ohio Supreme Court has stated that a court, however,

       must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
       range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome
       the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action “might be
       considered sound trial strategy.”

Strickland at 689, quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955). To establish prejudice,

Mr. Link must show that there existed a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's errors,

the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Sowell, 2016-Ohio-8025, ¶ 138.

       {¶20} Mr. Link argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because: (1) his

trial counsel failed to “meaningfully” contest the GSI charge involving K.N.; (2) his trial counsel

failed to object to inadmissible other-acts evidence; and (3) his trial counsel failed to argue that

the GSI and rape charges involving C.D. were allied offenses. He points out that the trial judge

had admonished counsel on the record, expressing concerns relating to counsel’s representation.

The State maintains that Mr. Link “has established neither prong of the Strickland test regarding

any three of the alleged deficiencies he has identified in his trial counsel’s performance.”

       {¶21} Each of Mr. Link's arguments fails to establish that his trial counsel provided

ineffective assistance. As to the GSI claim involving K.N., trial counsel stated in opening statement

that “Gail would have known” if Mr. Link had committed the alleged acts. He produced the

testimony of Mr. Link’s wife Gail, saying that she never witnessed anything inappropriate between

K.N. and Mr. Link. Counsel proceeded with this theory throughout trial, again stating in his closing
                                                  7


argument that “I told you when we started in opening statements that my theme of the case was

going to be that Gail would have known.” Thus, the defense contested all the charges, including

the GSI charge involving K.N.

       {¶22} K.N. testified that the incident with Mr. Link occurred in the living room and that

Gail was in the kitchen when it occurred. Regarding trial counsel's strategic decision to not cross-

examine K.N., who was a minor, this Court has previously stated: “‘[s]trategic trial decisions are

left to the deference of trial counsel and are not to be second-guessed by appellate courts.’” State

v. Granakis, 2017-Ohio-8428, ¶ 29 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Miller, 2007-Ohio-370, ¶ 10 (9th

Dist.), citing State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 558 (1995). See, e.g., State v. Diaz, 2005-Ohio-

3108, ¶ 20-23, 26 (9th Dist.) (trial counsel’s decision not to cross-examine child victims in case

involving rape and GSI may be a “debatable trial strateg[y]” but was within the realm of sound

trial strategy and did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). Specifically, K.N.’s direct

testimony did not contain some of the allegations contained in the social worker’s report, and it

would be a strategic decision to avoid cross-examination to prevent the jury from hearing those

portions of her claims directly from K.N. Counsel called Gail to testify at trial. Gail testified that

she was home when the children were present and that “there was never anything that showed me

that there was anything [inappropriate] happening at my house.” Counsel moved for a Crim.R. 29

motion for acquittal of all charges at the close of the State’s case and he renewed this motion after

the close of all the evidence. We cannot say that trial counsel’s performance was deficient or that

counsel failed to “meaningfully” contest the GSI charge involving K.N.

       {¶23} Next, regarding trial counsel’s failure to object to other acts evidence, “‘[t]his Court

had consistently held that trial counsel's failure to make objections is within the realm of trial

tactics and does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel.’” State v. Sandin, 2023-Ohio-174,
                                                 8


¶ 22 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Smith, 2013-Ohio-3868, ¶ 24 (9th Dist.), quoting State v.

Guenther, 2006-Ohio-767, ¶ 74 (9th Dist.). C.D. and her husband testified that Mr. Link engaged

in inappropriate conduct on two occasions in 2023 and trial counsel did not object to this testimony.

Trial counsel cross-examined both C.D. and her husband, raising credibility issues as to both

witnesses. Counsel then referred to these credibility issues in his closing argument. Counsel’s

failure to object was within the realm of trial tactics and, again, does not establish that counsel’s

performance was deficient.

       {¶24} Lastly, Mr. Link argues that trial counsel was ineffective as he failed to argue at

sentencing that the rape and GSI charges involving C.D. were allied offenses. He maintains that

“[t]he only evidence in the record . . . that could support the GSI convictions is the same conduct

that supports the rape convictions.” The record does not support this contention.

       {¶25} In Ohio, “R.C. 2941.25 codifies the protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause of

the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and [Article I, Section 10,] of the Ohio

Constitution, which prohibits multiple punishments for the same offense.” State v. Underwood,

2010-Ohio-1, ¶ 23. R.C. 2941.25 states as follows:

       (A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute two or
       more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information may contain
       counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may only be convicted of one.

       (B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of dissimilar
       import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of the same or similar
       kind committed separately or with a separate animus as to each, the indictment or
       information may contain counts for all such offenses, and the defendant may be
       convicted of all of them .

       {¶26} “In determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import within the

meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must evaluate three separate factors —the conduct, the animus,

and the import.” State v. Ruff, 2015-Ohio-995, paragraph one of the syllabus. The Court stated that
                                                 9


offenses are not required to merge for sentencing “if the harm that results from each offense is

separate and identifiable.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. A defendant may be convicted of

multiple offenses if his “conduct shows that the offenses were committed separately . . . .” Id. at

paragraph three of the syllabus. “At its heart, the allied-offense analysis is dependent upon the

facts of a case because R.C. 2941.25 focuses on the defendant's conduct.” Ruff at ¶ 26.

       {¶27} In this case, C.D. testified that Mr. Link would inappropriately touch her during the

day “throughout the week” and that the rapes would occur “at night.” She testified that this conduct

occurred from the time she was 4 years old until she was 10 years old. The inappropriate touching

included “[u]nwanted kissing, unwanted hugs, [and] groping” C.D.’s “chest, [and her] private

parts.” These incidents established GSI and were separate from the charged rape offenses that

occurred at night and included digital, oral, and anal penetration.

       {¶28} Rape and GSI convictions are not allied offenses of similar import where a

defendant fails to show that the convictions “stem from a single incident.” State v. Austin, 2017-

Ohio-7845, ¶ 36 (9th Dist.). Mr. Link has not shown that his convictions arose from the same

conduct or incident. The record reflects that the jury could have convicted him of rape separately

from GSI, which occurred at different times. As such, Mr. Link’s convictions for rape and GSI

against C.D. were not allied offenses of similar import and this Court cannot say that counsel’s

failure to present a merger argument as sentencing was deficient.

       {¶29} Mr. Link points out that the trial court expressed concerns regarding counsel’s

failure to cross-examine the lead detective and “one of the prosecuting witnesses[,]” presumably

K.N. as that is the only other of the seven State’s witnesses that counsel did not cross-examine. As

set forth above regarding K.N.’s testimony, counsel’s theory throughout trial was that Gail was

always home when the children were present and that, if anything inappropriate was going on, Gail
                                                 10


would have known. K.N. testified on direct examination that Gail was in the kitchen, confirming

Mr. Link’s theory of the case. Further, she was a minor alleged victim who did not confirm all the

allegations in the social worker’s report and cross-examination would have given her an

opportunity to confirm these additional facts. Counsel’s decision to not cross-examine the lead

detective, who provided limited testimony pertaining to those he talked to as part of his

investigation and the observations he made, was a “[s]trategic trial decision[]” that is “not to be

second-guessed by appellate courts.” Granakis, 2017-Ohio-8428, at ¶ 29 (9th Dist.), quoting

Miller, 2007-Ohio-370, at ¶ 10 (9th Dist.), citing Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d at 558. Mr. Link argues

that this case is unique as courts rarely question an attorney’s tactics on the record. However, the

record reflects that the trial court had also expressed concerns regarding the prosecutor’s conduct

at trial when the prosecutor was questioning the State’s witness, C.D. The court told the prosecutor

that she sounded like she was “being very mean” and that her “tone . . . is brutal.” Thus, it appears

the trial court in this case took a more active role in commenting on counsel’s actions.

       {¶30} Mr. Link has not demonstrated that trial counsel’s conduct was outside the range

of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland at 691. Mr. Link has not satisfied the first prong

set forth in Strickland. Having determined that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient, we

need not proceed to an analysis of whether Mr. Link was prejudiced by a deficiency. Mr. Link’s

first assignment of error is overruled.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II.

       THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED IN NOT MERGING [MR.] LINK’S
       CONVICTIONS FOR RAPE AND [GSI].

       {¶31} Mr. Link argues in his second assignment of error that the trial court erred by not

merging his rape and GSI convictions. We disagree.
                                                  11


       {¶32} Mr. Link did not raise the issue of merger to the trial court and, “as a result, his

argument is subject to plain-error review.” State v. Scott, 2022-Ohio-1796, ¶ 8 (9th Dist.). The

Ohio Supreme Court has stated that: “[a]n accused's failure to raise the issue of allied offenses of

similar import in the trial court forfeits all but plain error, and a forfeited error is not reversible

error unless it affected the outcome of the proceeding and reversal is necessary to correct a manifest

miscarriage of justice.” State v. Rogers, 2015-Ohio-2459, ¶ 3. “Accordingly, an accused has the

burden to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the convictions are for allied offenses of

similar import committed with the same conduct and without a separate animus; absent that

showing, the accused cannot demonstrate that the trial court's failure to inquire whether the

convictions merge for purposes of sentencing was plain error.” Id.

       {¶33} We incorporate our analysis of Mr. Link’s rape and GSI convictions set forth

under the first assignment of error. As set forth in our prior analysis, there is no indication that Mr.

Link’s rape and GSI convictions stemmed “from a single incident.” Austin, 2017-Ohio-7845, ¶ 36

(9th Dist.). C.D. testified that the conduct relating to the GSI occurred during the day, while the

conduct relating to the rape conviction occurred at night.

       {¶34} Having reviewed the record and the arguments presented, this Court concludes

that Mr. Link has not demonstrated that the trial court erred by not inquiring as to whether his

convictions should merge for purposes of sentencing. Rogers at ¶ 3. Accordingly, Mr. Link's

second assignment of error is overruled.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III.

       [MR.] LINK’S CONVICTION ON COUNT 15 OF THE INDICTMENT FOR
       [GSI] IS UNSUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

       {¶35} Mr. Link argues in his third assignment of error that the State failed to present

sufficient evidence to sustain a GSI conviction relating to K.N. We disagree.
                                                  12


        {¶36} Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law, which

this Court reviews de novo. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). “A challenge to

the sufficiency of the evidence concerns the State’s burden of production and is, in essence, a test

of adequacy.” State v. Wilk, 2023-Ohio-112, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.), citing In re R.H., 2017-Ohio-7852, ¶

25 (9th Dist.); Thompkins at 386. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in

a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259

(1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. This Court does not, however, “resolve evidentiary conflicts

or assess the credibility of witnesses, because these functions belong to the trier of fact.” State v.

Hall, 2017-Ohio-73, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.).

        {¶37} Mr. Link was convicted of GSI under R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), which states that “[n]o

person shall have sexual contact with another; . . . when . . . [t]he other person . . . is less than

thirteen years of age[.]” “Sexual contact” means “any touching of an erogenous zone of another,

including without limitation, the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the person is a female,

a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.” R.C. 2907.01(B).

        {¶38} Mr. Link argues that the State failed to produce sufficient evidence that he “touched

an erogenous zone of K.N.’s or that he did so for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.”

The State maintains that it presented sufficient evidence establishing that Mr. Link’s “touching of

K.N.’s thigh, leg, buttocks, and waist were done for the purpose of sexual arousal.”

        {¶39} Upon a thorough examination of the record, this Court concludes that there is

sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably conclude that all the elements of GSI were

established beyond a reasonable doubt. The social worker that interviewed K.N. testified that K.N.

“touched her thigh, her upper thigh” when asked what part of her leg Mr. Link had touched. The
                                                13


social worker further noted in her findings K.N.’s report that Mr. Link rubbed her waist and leg

when she was sitting on his lap with “her butt sitting on his leg.” The social worker’s interview of

K.N. was played for the jury and admitted into evidence. The State presented evidence that Mr.

Link touched K.N.’s waist, leg, thigh, and buttocks with his hands and leg and we conclude that

this is sufficient establish “sexual contact” under R.C. 2907.01(B). See State v. Garner, 2008-

Ohio-1949, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.) (touching of the victim’s buttocks over comforter and pajamas was

sufficient to support “sexual conduct” under GSI statute).

       {¶40} Regarding evidence of touching for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification,

K.N. testified that Mr. Link would hug her for “strange amounts of time” and that he told her “how

pretty [she] was and that he loved [her]” before asking for a kiss and putting his tongue in her

mouth. The social worker also noted K.N.’s report that Mr. Link would whisper “in her ear while

rubbing her waist.” We conclude that the jury could reasonably conclude based on this evidence

that Mr. Link’s touching K.N.’s waist, thigh, and buttocks was for the purpose of sexual arousal.

See State v. Owen, 2001 WL 1379474, *2 (9th Dist. Nov. 7, 2001) (concluding that a rational trier

of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the touching of the victim, and telling her

she had beautiful eyes, was for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification).

       {¶41} In considering the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view the evidence

in a light most favorable to the prosecution. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at paragraph two of the syllabus.

The testimony of K.N. and the social worker, if believed by the trier of fact, was sufficient to

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Link committed the crime of GSI as alleged in count

15 of the indictment. Mr. Link’s third assignment of error is overruled.
                                                14


                                                III.

       {¶42} For the reasons stated above, Mr. Link’s assignments of error are overruled. The

judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                               Judgment affirmed.




       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellant.




                                                       SCOT STEVENSON
                                                       FOR THE COURT



CARR, P. J.
FLAGG LANZINGER, J.
CONCUR.
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APPEARANCES:

JOSEPH SHELL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and C. RICHLEY RALEY, JR., Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.