State v. Lochtefeld

[Cite as State v. Lochtefeld, 2026-Ohio-1240.]




                       IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                LOGAN COUNTY




STATE OF OHIO,                                      CASE NO. 8-25-18

         PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

    v.

ERIC LOCHTEFELD,                                    OPINION AND
                                                    JUDGMENT ENTRY
         DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.




                      Appeal from Bellefontaine Municipal Court
                            Trial Court No. 24TRD04774

                                      Judgment Affirmed

                               Date of Decision: April 6, 2026



APPEARANCES:

         William T. Cramer for Appellant

         Crystal K. Welsh for Appellee
Case No. 8-25-18




WILLAMOWSKI, J.

         {¶1} Defendant-appellant Eric Lochtefeld (“Lochtefeld”) brings this appeal

from the judgment of the Bellefontaine Municipal Court finding him guilty of

driving under an administrative suspension. Lochtefeld claims on appeal that 1) his

conviction was not supported by the weight of the evidence; 2) he was denied the

effective assistance of counsel; and 3) the trial court erred by excluding evidence of

a valid Florida driver’s license. For the reasons set forth below, the judgment is

affirmed.

         {¶2} On November 25, 2024, Deputy Will Edgar (“Edgar”) stopped a red

truck because he believed that the driver’s license of the owner had been suspended.

When he stopped the vehicle, it was being driven by Lochtefeld. Edgar confirmed

that Lochtefeld’s Ohio driving privileges were subject to an administrative

suspension. As a result, Lochtefeld was charged with driving under an OVI

suspension in violation of R.C. 4510.14, a misdemeanor of the first degree. A jury

trial was held on July 25, 2025. At the trial the State presented the testimony of

Edgar.

         {¶3} Edgar testified that on November 25, 2024, he was conducting routine

traffic patrols. While doing so, he conducted a registration check on a passing

vehicle and noted that the owner had a suspended license. As a result, Edgar stopped

the vehicle. Edgar confirmed that the vehicle was being driven by Lochtefeld, who

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had a suspended Ohio driver’s license. The information regarding the suspension

was verified through the Law Enforcement Automated Data System (“LEADS”).

LEADS indicated that Lochtefeld’s suspension was active due to refusing to submit

to a chemical test for a suspected operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated on

October 2, 2024. The suspension was in effect until October 2, 2025. On cross-

examination, Edgar admitted that Lochtefeld told him he only lived in Ohio part

time.   Edgar also admitted that he knew none of the facts that lead to the

administrative suspension.

        {¶4} Lochtefeld testified in his own defense. Lochtefeld testified that on the

day of the stop, he was leaving town to return to Florida where he lived. Lochtefeld

testified that he did not know he had a suspension. According to Lochtefeld he had

checked with his insurance company that day and was told that his license was valid.

On cross-examination Lochtefeld admitted that he had previously been stopped for

an OVI in Lima, but indicated that he passed the chemical test. Lochtefeld testified

that he had initially refused the test, but later submitted. Lochtefeld admitted that

they read the form to him telling him his license would be suspended if he refused,

but denied receiving a copy of the form claiming he never saw any documents from

the stop.

        {¶5} After Lochtefeld’s testimony, the matter was submitted to the jury. The

jury returned a verdict of guilty. The trial court then sentenced Lochtefeld to two



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years of community control. Lochtefeld appealed from this judgment and raised the

following assignments of error.

                            First Assignment of Error

       [Lochtefeld’s] conviction for driving under suspension is not
       support[ed] by the weight of the evidence.

                           Second Assignment of Error

       [Lochtefeld] was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel
       guaranteed by the federal and state constitutions when defense
       counsel failed to request a jury instruction that driving under
       suspension requires proof that the defendant had notice of the
       suspension.

                            Third Assignment of Error

       The trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of a
       valid Florida driver’s license as not relevant.

For the purpose of clarity, we will address the assignments of error out of order.

                               Exclusion of Evidence

       {¶6} In the third assignment of error, Lochtefeld claims the trial court erred

by excluding evidence of the fact that his Florida driver’s license was still valid at

the time he was stopped. The State filed a motion in limine arguing that the fact

that Lochtefeld may have had a valid Florida driver’s license at the time of the stop

was irrelevant as to whether Lochtefeld’s driving privileges in Ohio were

suspended. The trial court granted this motion. Lochtefeld argues that it was

relevant because it shows that he lacked notice of the suspension.



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       {¶7} R.C. 4510.14 sets forth the requirements for a conviction for driving

under an OVI suspension.

       (A) No person whose driver’s or commercial driver’s license or
       permit or nonresident operating privilege has been suspended under
       section 4511.19, 4511.191, or 4511.196 of the Revised Code or under
       section 4510.07 of the Revised Code for a conviction of a violation of
       a municipal OVI ordinance shall operate any motor vehicle upon the
       public roads or highways within this state during the period of the
       suspension.

R.C. 4510.14(A). When a person suspected of an OVI is asked to submit to a

chemical test and does not agree to do so, “the failure to submit automatically

constitutes a refusal to submit to the test”. R.C. 4511.192(A). A person who refuses

to take the requested chemical test shall have their driver’s license or nonresident

operating privileges suspended by the arresting officer. R.C. 4511.191(B). “A

suspension of a person’s driver’s [license] or nonresident operating privilege . . . is

effective immediately from the time at which the arresting officer serves the notice

of suspension upon the arrested person.” R.C. 4511.191(D)(1). Service of the

notice occurs when the Form 2255 is read to the defendant informing him or her of

the consequences of refusing the chemical test. R.C. 4511.192. The form notifies

the defendant that “[i]f you refuse to take any chemical test required by law, your

Ohio driving privileges will be suspended immediately, and you will have to pay a

fee to have the privileges reinstated.” R.C. 4511.192(B).

       {¶8} The statutes show that the same rules apply regardless of whether one

has an Ohio driver’s license or an out of state license which grants a nonresident the

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privilege of operating a vehicle on Ohio roads. Once the test is refused, the officer

is required to suspend the suspect’s Ohio driving privileges regardless of the state

where the offender obtained a license. Thus, the trial court did not err in holding

that it was irrelevant whether the state of Florida had suspended Lochtefeld’s

license. The only issue before the jury was whether Lochtefeld’s driving privileges

were suspended within the state of Ohio. For this reason, the third assignment of

error is overruled.

                             Manifest Weight of the Evidence

       {¶9} Lochtefeld’s first assignment of error claims that the conviction was

against the weight of the evidence because the State did not prove he knew of the

suspension.

       When reviewing a judgment to determine if it is against the manifest
       weight of the evidence, an appellate court “review[s] the entire record,
       weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the
       credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts
       in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a
       manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed
       and a new trial ordered.” . . . A new trial should be granted only in
       the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against
       conviction. . . . Although the appellate court acts as a “thirteenth
       juror,” due deference to the findings made by the fact-finder must still
       be given.

State v. Hulbert, 2021-Ohio-2298, ¶ 23 (3d Dist.) (internal citations removed).

       {¶10} Here, Lochtefeld does not deny the suspension existed, but rather

claims that he had no notice that he lacked driving privileges. However, he admitted

during his testimony that when he was stopped, he initially refused the chemical test

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and the officer told him that his driving privileges in Ohio would be subject to

suspension. Lochtefeld also admitted that the officer had read the form notifying

him of the suspension, but denied receiving a copy of it. Regardless, of whether he

received a copy of the form, Lochtefeld was informed that his driving privileges in

Ohio were suspended. The jury could reasonably determine that Lochtefeld had

actual knowledge of the suspension and find him guilty of driving while his

privilege to do so was suspended. Thus, the jury did not lose its way and create a

manifest miscarriage of justice requiring a new trial. The first assignment of error

is overruled.

                                   Effectiveness of Counsel

       {¶11} Lochtefeld claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request

a jury instruction indicating that the State had to prove that he had notice of the

suspension.

       In evaluating whether a petitioner has been denied effective assistance
       of counsel, this court has held that the test is “whether the accused,
       under all the circumstances, . . . had a fair trial and substantial justice
       was done.” . . . When making that determination, a two-step process
       is usually employed. “First, there must be a determination as to
       whether there has been a substantial violation of any of defense
       counsel's essential duties to his client. Next, and analytically separate
       from the question of whether the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights
       were violated, there must be a determination as to whether the defense
       was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness.” . . .

       On the issue of counsel's ineffectiveness, the petitioner has the burden
       of proof, since in Ohio a properly licensed attorney is presumably
       competent.


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State v. Calhoun, 1999-Ohio-102 at page 289 (internal citations omitted). “The

failure to prove either 1) a substantial violation or 2) prejudice caused by the

violation makes it unnecessary for a court to consider the other prong of the test.”

State v. Walker, 2016-Ohio-3499, ¶ 20 (3d Dist.).          “To show prejudice, the

defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result

of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Conway, 2006-Ohio-2815,

¶ 95. “The prejudice inquiry, thus, focuses not only on outcome determination, but

also on ‘whether the result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or

unreliable.’” State v. Montgomery, 2016-Ohio-5487, quoting Lockhart v. Fretwell,

506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993).

       {¶12} We note initially, as discussed above, that Lochtefeld essentially

admitted that he knew of the suspension. Thus, even if counsel had requested an

instruction asking the jury to consider the issue of notice, the outcome was unlikely

to change. Without a showing of prejudice, the claim for ineffective assistance of

counsel fails.

       {¶13} Additionally, “to sustain a conviction for driving under OVI

suspension, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant (1)

operated (2) any motor vehicle (3) on a public road or highway (4) during the period

of a license suspension rendered under R.C. 4511.19, 4511.191, 4511.196, or

4510.07.” State v. Owens, 2019-Ohio-440, ¶ 8 (3d Dist.). These requirements are

based upon the statutory language which does not require that notice be sent from

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the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”), but rather notice occurs when the

BMV form 2255 is read to a defendant by the arresting officer. See R.C. 4511.192.

The form notifies a defendant that if they refuse to submit to the requested chemical

test, “your Ohio driving privileges will be suspended immediately, and you will

have to pay a fee to have the privileges reinstated.” Id. Since the notice occurs at

the time of the refusal, no further notification from the BMV is necessary. Thus,

the jury instruction Lochtefeld wished to have submitted to the trial court was not

required and the failure to request such would not be an error. As counsel did not

substantially violate her duties to Lochtefeld, counsel was not ineffective. The

second assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶14} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars

assigned and argued, the judgment of the Bellefontaine Municipal Court is affirmed.

                                                                Judgment Affirmed

MILLER and WALDICK, J.J., concur.




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                            JUDGMENT ENTRY

       For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignments of error

are overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby

rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the

judgment for costs.

       It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.

27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the

proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.




                                            John R. Willamowski, Judge



                                            Mark C. Miller, Judge



                                            Juergen A. Waldick, Judge

DATED:
/hls




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