State v. Lucero

[Cite as State v. Lucero, 2026-Ohio-1414.]


                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                     ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                           TRUMBULL COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                      CASE NO. 2025-T-0048

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                    Criminal Appeal from the
        - vs -                                      Court of Common Pleas

DAVID LUCERO,
                                                    Trial Court No. 2024 CR 00892
                 Defendant-Appellant.


                            OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

                                        Decided: April 20, 2026
                                         Judgment: Affirmed


Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Charles L. Morrow, Assistant
Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH
44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Christopher P. Lacich, Roth Blair Roberts Strasfield & Lodge, L.P.A., 100 East Federal
Street, Suite 600, Youngstown, OH 44503 (For Defendant-Appellant).


ROBERT J. PATTON, J.

        {¶1}      Defendant-appellant, David Lucero (“Lucero”), appeals from the judgment

of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him to an aggregate prison

term of 7 to 10½ years as a result of his convictions of eight counts of pandering sexually

oriented mater involving a minor, felonies of the second degree, and two counts of illegal

use of a minor in nudity oriented material or performance, felonies of the second degree.

For the following reasons, we affirm.

        {¶2}     On appeal, Lucero asserts that the sentences imposed by the trial court are

contrary to law. Lucero alleges that by opting to impose a lengthy term of incarceration,
the trial court failed to consider the purposes and principles of felony sentencing pursuant

to R.C. 2929.11, and the seriousness and recidivism factors contained in R.C. 2929.12.

       {¶3}   Upon review, we conclude that the court below expressly stated that it

considered the purposes and principles of sentencing and the recidivism and seriousness

factors. Lucero’s sentences are within the statutory guidelines. Thus, Lucero’s sentences

are consistent with, and not contrary to, law.

       {¶4}   As Lucero’s sole assignment of error is without merit, the judgment of the

Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                           Substantive and Procedural Facts

       {¶5}   On November 19, 2024, the Trumbull County Grand Jury, by secret

indictment, charged Lucero with the following 30 counts: 19 counts of pandering sexually

oriented matter involving a minor, felonies of the second degree, in violation of R.C.

2907.322(A)(1) and (C) (“Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28,

29, and 30”) and 11 counts of illegal use of minor in nudity oriented material or

performance, felonies of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(1) and (B)

(“Counts 3, 7, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22”).

       {¶6}   That same day, Lucero pleaded not guilty to the charges at arraignment.

Bond was set at $100,000 cash or surety with the condition that Lucero have no contact

with any minor without the presence of the child’s parent or legal guardian. Bond was

posted on November 26, 2024. The trial court imposed additional bond conditions on

December 12, 2024, which included electronic monitoring and a prohibition on the use or

possession of electronic devices.




                                        PAGE 2 OF 9

Case No. 2025-T-0048
        {¶7}    Lucero’s initial defense counsel filed a request for bill of particulars on

November 26, 2024. Initial counsel subsequently withdrew. New counsel renewed the

request for a bill of particulars on February 26, 2025, and filed a motion to suppress on

March 12, 2025.

        {¶8}    At the suppression hearing on May 6, 2025, Lucero withdrew his motion to

suppress. Lucero then entered a change of plea to an amended indictment consisting of

eight counts of pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor, felonies of the

second degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(1) and (C) (“Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9,

10”), and two counts of illegal use of a minor in nudity oriented material or performance,

felonies of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.323(A)(1) and (B) (“Counts 3, 7”).

        {¶9}    The State offered the following factual basis at the plea hearing:

                      Had we proceeded, the State would have proven each
                and every element of each and every offense beyond a
                reasonable doubt.

                       Specifically, investigators with the Youngstown
                Mahoning County Human Trafficking Task Force received
                several cyber tips concerning child pornography emanating
                from this Defendant’s I.P. address. A search warrant was
                executed at his address. The Defendant was found to be
                creating, developing, producing, reproducing, and publishing
                child pornographic material, as outlined further in the
                indictment.

                       The State would have offered the testimony of agents
                with that Task Force. As well as the material itself to prove its
                case.

        {¶10} The court below accepted Lucero’s pleas and found him guilty of each of

the offenses. A presentence investigation (“PSI”) was ordered, which included a

psychological evaluation or recidivism assessment.1 Bond was continued with electronic


1. An order for the evaluation and recidivism assessment was filed on May 13, 2025.

                                             PAGE 3 OF 9

Case No. 2025-T-0048
monitoring. Upon motion by the State, the remaining charges in the indictment, Counts

11-30, were dismissed.

         {¶11} Lucero filed a sentencing brief on July 10, 2025. In the brief, Lucero argued

for “rehabilitation and strict supervision over prolonged incarceration.” Specifically, Lucero

requested a term of local incarceration capped at 180 days and five years of intensive

community control.

         {¶12} The trial court proceeded to sentencing on July 16, 2025. At sentencing, the

State asked the court to impose a term of incarceration but did not specify length. Defense

counsel requested a sentence “somewhere between . . . straight Community Control . . .

and six months in county jail.”

         {¶13} The trial court stated: “I’ve reviewed the Presentence Investigation. I’ve

looked at the evidence and the descriptions of the videos and photographs that were

taken. I was appalled by it. Rape of little children tied up and held down and penetrated

and things that were in there are beyond common decency.”

         {¶14} The trial court informed Lucero of his duty and obligation to register as a

Tier II sex offender. After considering the record, the oral statements, any victim impact

statement(s), as well as the principles and purposes of sentencing and the seriousness

and recidivism factors, the trial court imposed an indefinite prison term of a minimum of 7

years to a maximum of 10½ years in prison on Count 1. The trial court additionally

imposed 7-year terms on each of the remaining counts, Counts 2-10. The sentences were

ordered to be served concurrently to each other for an aggregate prison term of 7 to 10½

years.

         {¶15} Lucero timely appeals from the sentencing entry.



                                         PAGE 4 OF 9

Case No. 2025-T-0048
                                        The Appeal

       {¶16} Lucero raises a single assignment of error for review:

              [1.] The trial court erred and imposed a sentence clearly and
              convincingly contrary to law, by issuing an indeterminate
              sentence in the aggregate of a minimum of 7 years and a
              maximum of 10 and 1/2 years, plus fines and costs.

       {¶17} Lucero asserts that the trial court had a duty to consider alternatives to a

lengthy sentence of incarceration. Lucero alleges that by opting to impose a lengthy term

of incarceration, the trial court failed to consider the purposes and principles of felony

sentencing, R.C. 2929.11, and the seriousness and recidivism factors contained in R.C.

2929.12. We disagree.

       {¶18} We review felony sentencing pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v.

Lamb, 2023-Ohio-2834, ¶ 9 (11th Dist.). After an appellate court reviews the record and

sentence on appeal, the court “may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence

that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand . . . if it clearly

and convincingly finds . . . [t]hat the sentence is . . . contrary to law.” R.C.

2953.08(G)(2)(b). “‘A sentence is contrary to law when it does not fall within the statutory

range for the offense or if the trial court fails to consider the purposes and principles of

felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors set forth in R.C.

2929.12.’” State v. Shannon, 2021-Ohio-789, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Brown,

2017-Ohio-8416, ¶ 74 (2d Dist.).

       {¶19} “The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that while ‘R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a)

permits an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence if it clearly and convincingly

finds that “the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings under” certain

specified statutory provisions. But R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 are not among the statutory

                                        PAGE 5 OF 9

Case No. 2025-T-0048
provisions   listed    in   R.C.   2953.08(G)(2)(a).    Only   R.C.   2929.13(B)   and   (D),

2929.14(B)(2)(e) and (C)(4), and 2929.20(I) are specified.’” State v. Feidler, 2024-Ohio-

2040, ¶ 10 (11th Dist.), appeal not accepted, 2024-Ohio-4501, quoting State v. Jones,

2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 28. Accordingly, “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) . . . does not provide a basis

for an appellate court to modify or vacate a sentence based on its view that the sentence

is not supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” Jones at ¶ 31.

       {¶20} Lucero was convicted of eight counts of pandering sexually oriented matter

involving a minor, felonies of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2907.322(A)(1) and

(C) (“Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10”), and two counts of illegal use of a minor in nudity

oriented material or performance, felonies of the second degree, in violation of R.C.

2907.323(A)(1) and (B) (“Counts 3, 7”).

       {¶21} The statutory terms are outlined as follows:

              For a felony of the second degree committed on or after March
              22, 2019, the prison term shall be an indefinite prison term
              with a stated minimum term selected by the court of two,
              three, four, five, six, seven, or eight years and a maximum
              term that is determined pursuant to section 2929.144 of the
              Revised Code, except that if the section that criminalizes the
              conduct constituting the felony specifies a different minimum
              term or penalty for the offense, the specific language of that
              section shall control in determining the minimum term or
              otherwise sentencing the offender but the minimum term or
              sentence imposed under that specific language shall be
              considered for purposes of the Revised Code as if it had been
              imposed under this division.

R.C. 2929.14(A)(2)(a).

       {¶22} Lucero’s sentences are within the statutory range for the offenses. Lucero

does not dispute that the trial court specifically mentioned both R.C. 2929.11 and R.C.

2929.12. Indeed, the trial court stated at the sentencing hearing and in its judgment entry



                                          PAGE 6 OF 9

Case No. 2025-T-0048
that it considered the purposes and principles of sentencing and the recidivism and

seriousness factors. The sentencing entry provides in relevant part:

              The Court has considered the record, oral statements, and
              any victim impact statements, as well as the principles and
              purposes of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and has balanced
              the seriousness and recidivism factors of R.C. 2929.12.

       {¶23} Lucero argues that the trial court should have considered an alternative to

lengthy incarceration because he was successful on electronic monitoring and had

pursued counseling and treatment. Lucero contends that other sentencing alternatives

were “more in line with guideposts of R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.” In other words,

Lucero argues that the trial court should have given him a lesser sentence.

       {¶24} Lucero essentially asks this court to reweigh the evidence and determine

that his sentences are inconsistent with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Pursuant to Jones,

this court is not permitted to do so.

              A ‘trial court is not required to give any particular weight or
              emphasis to a given set of circumstances; it is merely required
              to consider the statutory factors in exercising its discretion.’
              State v. DelManzo, 2008-Ohio-5856, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.). A
              sentencing court fulfills its duties under R.C. 2929.11 and
              2929.12 by stating that it considered them. State v. DeLuca,
              2021-Ohio-1007, ¶ 18 (11th Dist.).

State v. Miller, 2025-Ohio-339, ¶ 21 (11th Dist.).

       {¶25} Here, the trial court imposed a sentence within the statutory guidelines for

each offense. The court below stated that it considered the purposes and principles of

sentencing and the seriousness and recidivism factors. This court is not permitted to

independently reweigh the competing factors on appeal or review whether the record

supports the imposition of a prison term rather than community control. See State v. Hall,



                                        PAGE 7 OF 9

Case No. 2025-T-0048
2025-Ohio-5281, ¶ 24 (11th Dist.). Thus, Lucero’s sentences are not clearly and

convincingly contrary to law.

       {¶26} Lucero’s sole assignment of error is without merit.

                                      Conclusion

       {¶27} Accordingly, the judgment of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas

is affirmed.



JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,

concur.




                                      PAGE 8 OF 9

Case No. 2025-T-0048
                                 JUDGMENT ENTRY



       For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignment of error

is without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Trumbull

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

       Costs to be taxed against appellant.




                                                 JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON



                                                  JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND,
                                                         concurs



                                                 JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI,
                                                        concurs


           THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY

    A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
              pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.




                                        PAGE 9 OF 9

Case No. 2025-T-0048