State v. Magan

[Cite as State v. Magan, 2026-Ohio-1466.]


                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                  TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

State of Ohio,                                    :
                                                                  No. 25AP-306
                Plaintiff-Appellee,               :           (M.C. No. 2024 CRB 4937)

v.                                                :       (REGULAR CALENDAR)

Sabestian A. Magan,                               :

                Defendant-Appellant.              :



                                            D E C I S I O N

                                     Rendered on April 23, 2026


                On brief: Zachary M. Klein, City Attorney, Melanie R.
                Tobias-Hunter, and Dave Pelletier, for appellee. Argued:
                Dave Pelletier.

                On brief: Blake Law Firm Co., LLC, and Dustin M. Blake, for
                appellant. Argued: Dustin M. Blake.


                      APPEAL from the Franklin County Municipal Court

EDELSTEIN, J.
        {¶ 1} Following a bench trial, defendant-appellant, Sabestian A. Magan, was found
guilty of assault and domestic violence. Mr. Magan now appeals from the February 25,
2025 judgment of conviction entered by the Franklin County Municipal Court. He argues
his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight
of the evidence. Mr. Magan also argues ineffective assistance of counsel caused him to
reject a plea bargain offered by plaintiff-appellee, the State of Ohio. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
        {¶ 2} On March 25, 2024, Mr. Magan was charged with assault, domestic violence,
and unlawful restraint, all misdemeanor offenses, by officer complaint filed in the Franklin
No. 25AP-306                                                                               2


County Municipal Court. All offenses involved an altercation with N.P., Mr. Magan’s live-
in romantic partner and the mother of his three children, on March 25, 2024.
       {¶ 3} Mr. Magan voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial and elected to be tried
by the trial court. His bench trial commenced on February 25, 2025. As described below,
the state presented testimony from N.P. and her sister, H.K., and Mr. Magan exercised his
right to testify on his own behalf. Following the presentation of all testimony and evidence,
the trial court found Mr. Magan guilty of assault and domestic violence, both first-degree
misdemeanor offenses, but not guilty of unlawful restraint. At Mr. Magan’s request, the
trial court proceeded immediately to sentencing. Because the domestic violence and assault
counts stemmed from the same conduct, they merged for purposes of conviction and
sentencing. See, e.g., R.C. 2941.25(A); State v. Johnson, 2019-Ohio-4265, ¶ 9-14 (10th
Dist.). The state elected to proceed on the domestic violence count. (Feb. 25, 2025 Tr. at
95.) After hearing arguments from counsel and permitting Mr. Magan to speak, the court
imposed a 180-day jail sentence, awarded credit for two days of time served in jail pending
trial, and suspended the remaining 178 days for two years of non-reporting probation. As
a condition of probation, Mr. Magan was ordered to stay away from N.P., subject to any
orders entered in the parties’ pending custody dispute. (Tr. at 98-99; Feb. 25, 2025
Sentence Entry.)
       {¶ 4} Mr. Magan’s conviction and sentence were memorialized in the court’s
February 25, 2025 judgment entry. Mr. Magan now appeals from that judgment and raises
the following three assignments of error for our review:

              [I.] THE TRIAL COURT’S VERDICT FINDING THE
              DEFENDANT GUILTY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
              ASSAULT WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
              EVIDENCE.

              [II.] THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF
              LAW TO SUSTAIN CONVICTIONS FOR DOMESTIC
              VIOLENCE AND ASSAULT.

              [III.] TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED INEFFECTIVE
              ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHICH CAUSED THE [MR.
              MAGAN] TO REJECT A FAVORABLE PLEA BARGAIN
              OFFERED BY THE STATE.
No. 25AP-306                                                                                  3


       {¶ 5} Mr. Magan attributes error to a range of legal matters, so the relevant facts
are summarized within our analysis of each assignment of error below.
II. ANALYSIS
       {¶ 6} For ease of discussion and in the interest of clarity, we address Mr. Magan’s
three assignments of error out of order. First, we consider the ineffective assistance of
counsel claim raised in Mr. Magan’s third assignment of error. Then we review the
sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting the trial court’s determination of guilt as
to the domestic violence and assault offenses and its judgment entering a conviction against
Mr. Magan, as challenged in Mr. Magan’s first and second assignments of error.
       A. Third Assignment of Error: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
       {¶ 7} In his third assignment of error, Mr. Magan alleges an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim based on his rejection of a plea bargain offered by the state prior to trial.
However, because he fails to establish he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s allegedly
deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), we find no
merit to his claim, as explained below.
       1. Controlling Law and Standard of Review
       {¶ 8} A defendant asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must
establish: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient or objectively unreasonable, as
determined by “ ‘prevailing professional norms,’ ” and (2) counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced the defendant. State v. Spaulding, 2016-Ohio-8126, ¶ 77, quoting Strickland at
694.
       {¶ 9} To show trial counsel’s performance was deficient or unreasonable, the
defendant must overcome the presumption that counsel provided competent
representation and must show counsel’s actions were not trial strategies prompted by
reasonable professional judgment. Strickland at 689. Counsel is entitled to a strong
presumption that all decisions fall within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance. State v. Sallie, 81 Ohio St.3d 673, 675 (1998). Tactical or strategic decisions,
even if unsuccessful, do not generally constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. State v.
Frazier, 61 Ohio St.3d 247, 255 (1991). Rather, the errors complained of must amount to a
substantial violation of counsel’s essential duties to his client. See State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio
St.3d 136, 141-42 (1989).
No. 25AP-306                                                                                 4


       {¶ 10} Prejudice results when “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ”
Bradley at 142, quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “ ‘A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” Bradley at 142, quoting
Strickland at 694.
       {¶ 11} A criminal defendant is entitled to the effective assistance of counsel during
all critical stages of the criminal proceedings, including plea negotiations. See, e.g., Lafler
v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 165 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 142-44 (2012). Counsel
has a duty to communicate the terms of any formal plea offers from the state to his client.
State v. McKelton, 2016-Ohio-5735, ¶ 302; Frye at 145-46. Prejudice may arise under
Strickland if trial counsel’s deficient performance caused the defendant to reject a plea deal
that would have resulted in a less severe sentence. McKelton at ¶ 302, citing Lafler at 164.
To satisfy the prejudice requirement in such circumstances, a defendant must show that (1)
but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer
would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the
plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening
circumstances); (2) the court would have accepted its terms; and (3) the conviction or
sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the
judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed. See, e.g., Lafler at 164; Frye at 147.
       {¶ 12} When analyzing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellate court
“need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” Strickland at
697. See also State v. Wade, 2021-Ohio-4090, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.). “If it is easier to dispose
of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice . . . that course
should be followed.” Strickland at 697. In determining a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, our review is limited to the record before us. See State v. Prophet, 2015-Ohio-
4997, ¶ 32 (10th Dist.).
       2. Analysis
       {¶ 13} As the record in this case shows, Mr. Magan’s trial counsel communicated the
state’s plea offer to Mr. Magan prior to trial in conformity with Frye. (See Tr. at 5-6.) Mr.
Magan does not contend on appeal that his defense counsel advised him to reject the plea
No. 25AP-306                                                                              5


offer, nor does the record permit the conclusion that defense counsel gave any advice to
reject the plea offer in violation of Lafler.
       {¶ 14} Prior to the commencement of trial, the trial court informed Mr. Magan of
the potential maximum penalties of all three offenses charged in the indictment. (Tr. at 4-
5.) The state also informed the trial court of the plea offer it had extended to Mr. Magan:
in exchange for Mr. Magan’s guilty plea to one count of the lesser-included offense of
disorderly conduct (a misdemeanor of the fourth degree under the Columbus City Code)
and a joint sentencing recommendation of two years of non-reporting community control
with conditions (no acts of violence and compliance with a no-contact order), the state
would move to dismiss the remaining pending charges. (Tr. at 5.) Mr. Magan’s trial counsel
confirmed he had communicated that offer to Mr. Magan, and Mr. Magan affirmed his
intention to reject the state’s plea offer and proceed to trial:

               [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . I would like to just make a record
               on that. [The prosecutor] is a polished, intelligent prosecuting
               attorney who’s prosecuted hundreds of these cases. We
               understand that when he gives that offer, it is certainly a
               clear reduction. It doesn’t -- I want to explain this on the
               record also to my client -- It does not include any
               behavior that’s assaultive in nature. [The state is] not
               asking for any reporting probation, and I have
               discussed this with my client at length. And while that
               seems like a good offer, it would be a good offer if my client
               were guilty, but he’s not guilty of any of these offenses, so he
               has decided -- And do you agree with me that you’re
               not taking any offer of any kind; is that right?

               [MR. MAGAN]: Yes. Yes, Your Honor.

(Emphasis added.) (Tr. at 5-6.)
       {¶ 15} On appeal, Mr. Magan alleges his trial counsel failed to adequately advise him
regarding “the strength of the evidence, the risks of trial, and the comparative sentencing
exposure.” (Appellant’s Brief at 9.) In support, Mr. Magan points out that the transcript
contains “no record of discussion regarding sentencing ranges, trial risks, or the State’s
evidentiary weaknesses,” thus constituting deficient performance. (Appellant’s Brief at 9.)
       {¶ 16} However, as already described, the record confirms the trial court informed
Mr. Magan of the maximum potential consequences he could face if found guilty of the
No. 25AP-306                                                                               6


three offenses charged in the indictment. Mr. Magan was also aware of the state’s intention
to seek non-reporting probation, with conditions, as part of the offered plea bargain.
Defense counsel indicated he had discussed the offer “at length” with Mr. Magan, and it is
expected that such conversation would not be transcribed given the confidential nature of
attorney-client communications. (See Tr. at 6.) Further, even on the record, defense
counsel emphasized the offer was “certainly a clear reduction,” did “not include any
behavior that’s assaultive in nature,” and would not require Mr. Magan to be on reporting
probation. (Tr. at 5-6.) To the extent Mr. Magan believes the trial court should have
engaged in a further dialogue to confirm he understood the plea offer, appreciated the
difference in the potential penalties he might receive, was advised of the benefits and
consequences of accepting the offer, was satisfied with the advice of counsel, and was
formally rejecting the plea offer, he has not argued as much on appeal.
       {¶ 17} In any event, even assuming defense counsel engaged in deficient
performance by failing to ensure the trial court engaged in such dialogue, Mr. Magan has
not demonstrated resulting prejudice. See, e.g., State v. Sowell, 2016-Ohio-8025, ¶ 138.
       {¶ 18} Mr. Magan argues he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s deficient
performance because “the plea offered a lower misdemeanor with non-reporting
community control, an outcome drastically more favorable than two first-degree
misdemeanor” offenses. (Appellant’s Brief at 10.) But, as just discussed, the record shows
Mr. Magan knew this when he rejected the state’s plea offer. (See Tr. at 4-6.) Suffice it to
say, we do not find this argument compelling.
       {¶ 19} Mr. Magan also maintains that “[p]rejudice is clear on this record” based on
an excerpted statement made by trial counsel during sentencing: “In hindsight, it was
probably better for him to have taken the offer . . . I think just because he exercised his
rights, shouldn’t mean he’s punished.” (Appellant’s Brief at 10, quoting Tr. at 98.) We
believe Mr. Magan misunderstands the context within which this statement was made.
       {¶ 20} During sentencing, the state asked the trial court to place Mr. Magan “on two
years of community control” with “a No-Contact Order, a counseling assessment
and follow up, and no acts of violence as conditions” of his probation. (Emphasis added.)
(Tr. at 95.) In addressing the state’s sentencing request, Mr. Magan’s trial counsel argued:
No. 25AP-306                                                                                 7


                I don’t think anything has really changed since the [pretrial
                plea] offer. In hindsight, it was probably better for [Mr. Magan]
                to have taken the offer, but I think two years non-
                reporting [probation] is reasonable. I didn’t hear
                whether [the trial prosecutor] said [the probation
                the state was requesting] was reporting or not. I think
                just because [Mr. Magan] exercised his rights, shouldn’t mean
                he’s punished. Thank you for hearing me out.

(Emphasis added.) (Tr. at 98.) Based on this statement, Mr. Magan’s trial counsel
understood the state to be asking the court to impose reporting probation as part of Mr.
Magan’s sentence. Had Mr. Magan accepted the state’s plea offer, however, the state
indicated it would ask for non-reporting probation with “no acts of violence and
compl[iance] with a No-Contact Order” ordered as conditions but “[n]o counseling
assessment.” (Emphasis added.) (Tr. at 5.) Understood in this context, we find no merit
to Mr. Magan’s contention that his trial counsel’s statement at sentencing—which actually
pertained to the change in the state’s position on the type of probation Mr. Magan should
be sentenced to—was an “admission” demonstrating that his trial counsel’s “earlier advice
was not grounded in a reasoned cost-benefit analysis but in misplaced confidence.”
(Appellant’s Brief at 10.)
       {¶ 21} Notably, Mr. Magan has not actually argued that, but for the deficient
performance of his trial counsel, he would have accepted the state’s plea offer. Even still,
any such claim would be belied by Mr. Magan’s statement to the court prior to trial. After
defense counsel endorsed the state’s description of the plea offer, confirmed he had
discussed the offer with Mr. Magan, and emphasized why he believed it was a “good offer,”
Mr. Magan’s trial counsel told the court Mr. Magan was “not taking any offer of any
kind.” (Emphasis added.) (Tr. at 5-6.) Mr. Magan agreed with trial counsel’s presentation
of his intention to reject any offer made by the state. (Tr. at 6.) Again, to the extent Mr.
Magan believes the trial court should have conducted a more robust inquiry to confirm he
understood the plea offer, appreciated the difference in the potential penalties he might
receive, was advised of the benefits and consequences of accepting the offer, was satisfied
with the advice of counsel, and was formally rejecting the plea offer, that issue is not before
us on appeal.
No. 25AP-306                                                                                 8


       {¶ 22} Based on the foregoing, we do not find Mr. Magan has demonstrated a
reasonable probability that he would have accepted the plea offer prior to trial but for trial
counsel’s conduct. Ineffective assistance of counsel only lies if, “but for counsel’s errors,
the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Sowell, 2016-Ohio-8025, at
¶ 138. Because Mr. Magan has not shown that he sustained prejudice as a result of the
actions of his counsel, he is unable to demonstrate he received ineffective assistance of trial
counsel under Strickland. Accordingly, we overrule Mr. Magan’s third assignment of error.
       B. First and Second Assignments of Error: Insufficient Evidence and
          Manifest Weight
       {¶ 23} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Magan contends his conviction is against
the manifest weight of the evidence. And in his second assignment of error, Mr. Magan
argues the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to find him guilty of domestic
violence and assault. For the following reasons, we disagree.
       1. Legal Standard and Standard of Review
       {¶ 24} Whether evidence is sufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction
involves a determination of whether the state met its burden of production at trial. See,
e.g., State v. Smith, 2004-Ohio-4786, ¶ 16 (10th Dist.); State v. Frazier, 2007-Ohio-11, ¶ 7
(10th Dist.); State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). We do not weigh the
evidence but instead determine “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Leonard, 2004-Ohio-
6235, ¶ 77, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
       {¶ 25} In evaluating a sufficiency challenge, we assume the state’s witnesses testified
truthfully and determine whether that testimony and any other evidence presented at trial
satisfied each element of the offense. See State v. Watkins, 2016-Ohio-8272, ¶ 31 (10th
Dist.), quoting State v. Hill, 2008-Ohio-4257, ¶ 41 (10th Dist.). Thus, evidence is sufficient
to support a conviction where, if believed, that evidence would allow any rational trier of
fact to conclude that the state proved each element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Frazier at ¶ 7, citing Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus.
       {¶ 26} In contrast, a manifest weight challenge attacks the credibility of the evidence
presented and questions whether the state met its burden of persuasion. See, e.g., State v.
No. 25AP-306                                                                                   9


Richey, 2018-Ohio-3498, ¶ 50 (10th Dist.), citing Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179,
¶ 11-13, citing Thompkins at 386-87. “Although evidence may be sufficient to sustain a
guilty verdict, the issue of manifest weight requires a different type of analysis.” State v.
Walker, 2003-Ohio-986, ¶ 43 (10th Dist.). “ ‘[W]eight of the evidence concerns the
inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence offered to support one side of the
issue rather than the other.’ ” State v. Petty, 2017-Ohio-1062, ¶ 60 (10th Dist.), quoting
State v. Boone, 2015-Ohio-2648, ¶ 49 (10th Dist.), citing Thompkins at 387.
       {¶ 27} When considering an appellant’s claim that a conviction following a bench
trial is against the manifest weight of the evidence, we must examine the entire record,
weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the witnesses’ credibility, and
determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way
and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and
a new trial ordered. See, e.g., Sparre v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 2013-Ohio-4153, ¶ 10 (10th
Dist.); Eastley at ¶ 20; Thompkins at 387; State v. Martin, 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 26.
       {¶ 28} Although we review credibility when considering the manifest weight of the
evidence, we are cognizant that determinations regarding credibility of witnesses and the
weight of testimony are primarily for the trier of fact. See, e.g., State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio
St.2d 230 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus; Morris v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.,
2021-Ohio-3803, ¶ 64 (10th Dist.), citing Watson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2012-
Ohio-1017, ¶ 31 (10th Dist.), citing Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80
(1984). The trier of fact is best able “to view the witnesses and observe their demeanor,
gestures and voice inflections, and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the
proffered testimony.” Seasons Coal Co., Inc. at 80.
       {¶ 29} To reverse a jury verdict as being against the manifest weight of the evidence,
a unanimous concurrence of all three judges on the court of appeals panel reviewing the
case is required pursuant to Article IV, Section 3(B)(3) of the Ohio Constitution. Bryan-
Wollman v. Domonko, 2007-Ohio-4918, ¶ 2-4, citing Thompkins at paragraph four of the
syllabus.
No. 25AP-306                                                                                            10


         2. Analysis
         {¶ 30} Mr. Magan argues the trial court’s findings of guilt as to the domestic violence
and assault counts are not supported by sufficient evidence. In the alternative, he contends
his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
       a. Domestic Violence
         {¶ 31} For the trial court to find Mr. Magan guilty of domestic violence, the state had
to prove Mr. Magan knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to a family or
household member. R.C. 2919.25(A). In the context of a domestic violence offense, a
“family or household member” is statutorily defined to include a person living as a spouse
of the offender who is residing or has resided with the offender, R.C. 2919.25(F)(1)(a)(i), as
well as a person who is “[t]he natural parent of any child of whom the offender is the other
natural parent or is the putative[1] other natural parent,” R.C. 2919.25(F)(1)(b).
         {¶ 32} “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware
that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain
nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such
circumstances probably exist.” R.C. 2901.22(B). In the absence of a defendant’s admission,
resolution of whether an individual acts knowingly must be determined from all the
surrounding facts and circumstances. State v. Fielding, 2014-Ohio-3105, ¶ 51 (10th Dist.);
State v. Henry, 2018-Ohio-1128, ¶ 51 (10th Dist.). Thus, the test is subjective but usually is
decided on objective criteria. See State v. Perry, 2025-Ohio-2054, ¶ 68 (10th Dist.).
“Additionally, a defendant acts knowingly, when, although not intending the result, he or
she is nevertheless aware that the result will probably occur.” State v. Anderson, 2010-
Ohio-5561, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.), citing State v. Edwards, 83 Ohio App.3d 357, 361 (10th Dist.
1992).
         {¶ 33} To sustain a conviction for domestic violence, the state was not required to
prove that N.P. was actually harmed, only that Mr. Magan attempted to cause physical


1 “Putative” is an adjective meaning “commonly accepted or supposed” or “assumed to exist or to have

existed.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/putative
(accessed Apr. 22, 2026) [https://perma.cc/ZXC8-J3QW]. See also Cambridge Dictionary Online,
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/putative    (accessed       Apr.      22,      2026)
[https://perma.cc/2NCK-NJ54] (defining “putative” as “generally thought to be or to exist, even if this may
not really be true”).
No. 25AP-306                                                                                  11


harm to her. See R.C. 2903.13(A). R.C. 2901.01(A)(3) defines “physical harm” as “any
injury, illness, or other physiological impairment, regardless of its gravity or duration.”
       {¶ 34} In this case, it is undisputed Mr. Magan and N.P. were living together as a
married couple (though they were not legally married) on March 25, 2024 and shared three
children together. (Tr. at 14-16, 56-57, 70-71, 80-82.) And, on appeal, Mr. Magan does not
contend N.P. was not a “family or household member” as defined in R.C. 2919.25(F).
Instead, Mr. Magan challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting the
“physical harm” element of the domestic violence offense. As to the issue of whether Mr.
Magan knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to N.P., the parties presented
the following testimony and evidence at trial.
       {¶ 35} N.P. testified that on March 25, 2024, she and Mr. Magan were sleeping in
the same bed when he woke her up at approximately 6:30 a.m. and started screaming at
her about a disagreement they had the night before. (Tr. at 16-17, 31.) Specifically, Mr.
Magan was still upset N.P. was unable to recall the password to a television streaming
service account. (See Tr. at 17, 31.) Detecting a tone in Mr. Magan’s voice that suggested to
her the situation was “escalating quickly”—and with their young children in mind—N.P.
asked Mr. Magan to lower his voice and attempted to leave the bedroom. (See Tr. at 17-18.)
       {¶ 36} According to N.P., Mr. Magan began yelling louder and “came up behind
[N.P.], removed [her] hands from the door forcibly[,] and threw [N.P.] to the ground on
[her] tailbone,” causing her to experience “excruciating pain.” (Tr. at 18-19.) While still on
the ground, N.P. scooted towards the door to leave but was stopped by Mr. Magan. (Tr. at
19-20.) N.P. testified Mr. Magan got on top of her, pinned her down by pressing his knee
on the back of her arm, and closed their bedroom door. (See Tr. at 19-21.) N.P. was
eventually able to hoist herself up onto the bed but, despite Mr. Magan’s continued
screaming, did not leave the bedroom because she was “too afraid.” (Tr. at 20-22.)
       {¶ 37} The altercation ended when their son knocked on the door to ask for
assistance with the television. (Tr. at 22-25. See also Tr. at 79.) Mr. Magan opened the
door for him and permitted N.P. to leave the bedroom with her phone, which she explained
served as the remote to their television. (See Tr. at 22-25.) She testified Mr. Magan left for
work by at least 9:30 a.m., while N.P., who is a stay-at-home mother, remained at home.
(Tr. at 25, 41-42, 72.)
No. 25AP-306                                                                                 12


       {¶ 38} After Mr. Magan left, N.P. observed a bruise on the back of her upper left arm
and confirmed it was not there before the altercation she had with Mr. Magan that morning.
(Tr. at 26-27.) She described that area of her body feeling “like a burning, almost like [she]
had been cut.” (Tr. at 26.) N.P. took photographs of her injury and sent them to a friend
around 9:54 a.m., which were presented at trial and admitted without objection as State’s
Exhibit 1. (Tr. at 6, 27-28.) N.P. also called her sister, H.K., later that morning and told her
about the altercation. (Tr. at 25-26, 42-43, 57-58.) At trial, H.K. described N.P.’s demeanor
during that call: “Instantly I heard fear. Her voice was very broken. She was crying. So it
took a while for her to get everything out.” (Tr. at 57-58.) H.K. testified N.P. told her Mr.
Magan “had held her down -- knocked her to the floor, held her down with his knee on her
arm to where she couldn’t get up.” (Tr. at 62. See also Tr. at 57.) H.K. also recounted N.P.
saying “her arm was black and blue,” “her tailbone was very sore,” and “she was in a lot of
pain from the hit to the floor.” (Tr. at 62.)
       {¶ 39} H.K. called 9-1-1 to report Mr. Magan’s assault on N.P. at 11:56 a.m. that same
day. (Tr. at 63-65. See also Tr. at 58-59.) H.K. testified she “insisted on calling the police”
and stayed on the phone with N.P. until they arrived. (Tr. at 58-59, 63-64.) Medics and
police officers responded to N.P.’s home shortly thereafter. (See Tr. at 29, 50-51.) N.P. was
treated at the scene for her injuries but declined transport to the hospital. (Def.’s Ex. A.)
At 2:45 p.m., officers filed a criminal complaint against Mr. Magan in the Franklin County
Municipal Court and obtained a warrant for his arrest. (Def.’s Ex. A.) H.K. came to N.P.’s
home around 7:00 p.m. that same evening, where she described seeing N.P. “in a lot of
pain” and her arm “swollen and completely black and blue.” (Tr. at 59-60.)
       {¶ 40} In his trial testimony, Mr. Magan provided a very different account. He
categorically denied assaulting N.P. on March 25, 2024. (Tr. at 70.) Mr. Magan admitted
he argued with N.P. the night before concerning their television streaming service. (Tr. at
72-73.) More generally, Mr. Magan testified about issues he had with N.P.’s spending and
explained that N.P.’s purported refusal to give him access to streaming services he paid for
was “[the] last straw.” (See Tr. at 72-73.) Ostensibly, this disagreement caused Mr. Magan
to decide he wanted to end his ten-year relationship with N.P. (See Tr. at 70-73.)
       {¶ 41} Mr. Magan testified he woke up around 6:30 a.m. on March 25, 2024 to pray,
and after he finished praying, N.P. asked him if he was “done” with their relationship. (Tr.
No. 25AP-306                                                                               13


at 73.) After confirming he was, Mr. Magan claimed he suggested N.P. find somewhere else
to live, offered to pay her rent, and indicated he would permit her to have “open visitation”
with their children. (Tr. at 73-74.) Mr. Magan claimed N.P. then “got up -- as soon as she
got up the -- the bed, she tripped on the -- on the sheet that was on the bed.” (Tr. at 74.)
He attributed N.P.’s fall to coordination difficulties she has due to various health problems.
(See Tr. at 74-76, 84-85.)
       {¶ 42} Mr. Magan explained he “got her up” from the floor and then called his
brother, who did not testify at trial, because he believed he “was in an uncomfortable
situation.” (Tr. at 74.) Although Mr. Magan categorically denied yelling at or assaulting
N.P. in their bedroom on the morning of March 25, 2024, he agreed with N.P.’s testimony
about their son knocking on the door and asking for assistance with the television. (Tr. at
78-79.)
       {¶ 43} Mr. Magan testified that, on his brother’s suggestion, he decided to go into
work early, and left the home “around 7:49” on March 25, 2024. (Tr. at 77-78.) Before he
left, Mr. Magan claimed he offered to “call the police for [N.P.], and they can arrive here
and [he] can be a witness on myself of exactly what happened if [N.P.] want to make a
complaint [about him hitting her].” (See Tr. at 77-78. But see Tr. at 83, 85-86 (Mr. Magan
testifying on cross-examination and redirect that he offered to call the police to assist N.P.
with leaving the home).) According to Mr. Magan, N.P. said she was “not attempting or
trying to call any police on [him],” was fine with him leaving, and wanted him “to go and
make [his] own decision.” (Tr. at 78.)
       {¶ 44} As to the photographic evidence depicting bruising to N.P.’s arm, Mr. Magan
maintained the bruise was actually from N.P. falling down and striking her arm on a coffee
table a day or two earlier. (Tr. at 76-77.) Although Mr. Magan claimed N.P. called and
texted him about her fall when it happened, he did not present any evidence corroborating
his account of N.P.’s prior injury at trial. Mr. Magan also alleged he had video cameras
installed internally and externally at the home and acknowledged he had control and access
to their recorded video footage through an online security portal. (See Tr. at 78, 82-84.)
But Mr. Magan did not present any video footage from those cameras at trial.
       {¶ 45} Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the state, as we must on
a sufficiency of the evidence review, we find the evidence presented at trial was sufficient
No. 25AP-306                                                                                14


for a rational trier of fact to conclude that, on March 25, 2024, Mr. Magan knowingly caused
or attempted to cause physical harm—i.e., “any injury, illness, or other physiological
impairment, regardless of its gravity or duration,” R.C. 2901.01(A)(3)—to N.P., a family or
household member of Mr. Magan.
       {¶ 46} Having found no merit to his sufficiency challenge, we next turn to Mr.
Magan’s contention that his domestic violence conviction was against the manifest weight
of the evidence. In support of that challenge, Mr. Magan contends N.P. was not a credible
witness. We find Mr. Magan’s arguments unavailing, for the following reasons.
       {¶ 47} Mr. Magan cites to N.P.’s failure to call the police or seek medical attention
as a “strong indicator[] of unreliability.” (Appellant’s Brief at 6.) Notably, evidence and
testimony presented at trial established N.P. told a friend and her sister about the incident
shortly after Mr. Magan left the home on March 25, 2024. Further, N.P. was aware that her
sister intended to call the police that day. Indeed, evidence at trial showed that, within nine
hours of the incident, H.K. called 9-1-1 to report Mr. Magan’s conduct (11:56 a.m.), N.P.
answered officers’ questions when they responded, and Mr. Magan was charged by criminal
complaint (2:45 p.m.). We fail to see how this series of events impinges on N.P.’s credibility.
       {¶ 48} We likewise find no merit to Mr. Magan’s contention that N.P.’s decision not
to seek additional medical treatment necessarily undermined the credibility of N.P.’s
testimony about her injuries. N.P. testified she suffered physical pain as a result of Mr.
Magan knocking her to the ground and holding her down by pressing his knee into her arm.
While medical evidence can certainly corroborate testimony and provide additional
evidence of physical harm, it is not necessary to sustain a domestic violence conviction. Mr.
Magan also suggests N.P.’s testimony about her tailbone injury was not credible because it
“was not documented anywhere in the EMT or police reports.” (Appellant’s Brief at 6, citing
Tr. at 34-35, 50-51.) It is true N.P. admitted she did not know whether her tailbone injury
was mentioned in medical or police reports. (See Appellant’s Brief at 3, 6. See, e.g., Tr. at
35-36, 51.) However, because no first responder testified at trial in this case, we have no
way of confirming whether the tailbone injury was documented in their reports, much less
knowing for certain whether N.P. reported the tailbone injury to first responders on March
25, 2024. In any event, N.P.’s testimony about Mr. Magan pinning her to the ground while
No. 25AP-306                                                                                15


pressing his knee into her upper left arm, alone, established N.P. suffered some injury,
irrespective of its gravity or duration. See R.C. 2901.01(A)(3).
       {¶ 49} Further, we are not persuaded by Mr. Magan’s suggestion that some unclear
aspects of N.P.’s testimony—e.g., the bedroom door locked versus jammed; N.P. being
thrown to the ground versus falling down—support finding N.P. was not a credible witness.
(See Appellant’s Brief at 6.) It is well-established that the finder of fact “may consider
conflicting testimony from a witness in determining credibility and the persuasiveness of
the account by either discounting or otherwise resolving the discrepancies.” State v.
Harris, 2023-Ohio-3994, ¶ 41 (10th Dist.), citing State v. Taylor, 2015-Ohio-2490, ¶ 34
(10th Dist.), citing Midstate Educators Credit Union, Inc. v. Werner, 2008-Ohio-641, ¶ 28
(10th Dist.). “ ‘The finder of fact can accept all, part or none of the testimony offered by a
witness, whether it is expert opinion or eyewitness fact, and whether it is merely evidential
or tends to prove the ultimate fact.’ ” Petty, 2017-Ohio-1062, at ¶ 63 (10th Dist.), quoting
State v. Mullins, 2016-Ohio-8347, ¶ 39 (10th Dist.). See also State v. Mann, 2011-Ohio-
5286, ¶ 37 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Nivens, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 2245, *7 (10th Dist.
May 28, 1996) (“ ‘While [a factfinder] may take note of the inconsistencies and resolve or
discount them accordingly, * * * such inconsistencies do not render defendant’s conviction
against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence.’ ”).
       {¶ 50} Even if we accepted as true the purported discrepancies Mr. Magan claims
existed in N.P.’s testimony, a defendant “is not entitled to a reversal on manifest weight
grounds merely because inconsistent evidence was presented.” State v. Rankin, 2011-Ohio-
5131, ¶ 29 (10th Dist.). See also State v. J.E.C., 2013-Ohio-1909, ¶ 42 (10th Dist.). At
bottom, we find that none of the minor inconsistences with which Mr. Magan takes issue
appreciably bore upon the trial court’s determination that the state’s evidence credibly
proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, Mr. Magan knowingly caused N.P. to suffer some
injury, irrespective of its gravity or duration, in violation of the domestic violence statute.
See R.C. 2901.01(A)(3) (defining “physical harm”).
       {¶ 51} Mr. Magan also contends N.P.’s testimony was not credible because she had
a “personal incentive to portray him as violent” on account of the parties’ pending custody
dispute—which commenced after the March 25, 2024 incident. (Appellant’s Brief at 6.
See, e.g., Tr. at 36-37, 42-49, 52.) To the extent Mr. Magan is suggesting N.P. lied to her
No. 25AP-306                                                                                                16


friend, her sister, the police, and medics on March 25, 2024 about being assaulted by Mr.
Magan with a future custody dispute in mind, we find nothing in the record to support such
claim.    While it may be true that Mr. Magan’s domestic violence conviction could
negatively impact his position in the parties’ custody matter, we find no basis under the
facts and circumstances of this case to conclude that this practical reality undermined the
credibility of N.P.’s testimony about being physically harmed by Mr. Magan on March 25,
2024.
         {¶ 52} Mr. Magan generally suggests H.K. was not a credible witness either, by
virtue of being N.P.’s sister. (See Appellant’s Brief at 6.) In support, he purports to quote
from H.K.’s testimony stating she “ ‘would always’ side with her sister.” (Appellant’s Brief
at 6, quoting Tr. at 66.) However, on review, we find Mr. Magan does not accurately depict
what H.K. actually said. The portion of the transcript cited by Mr. Magan contains the
following exchange between his trial counsel and H.K. during cross examination:
                 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And you’re saying [N.P.] didn’t even
                 ask you to call 911?

                 [H.K.]: I didn’t give her a chance to.

                 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You were looking out for your sister,
                 right?

                 [H.K.]: Yep. Absolutely.

                 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You’re still looking out for your sister?

                 [H.K.]: Well, of course. Always.

                 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: You always -- Understood. No further
                 questions.

(Tr. at 65-66.) And, in fact, H.K. expressly stated she would not lie for her sister during
cross-examination. (Tr. at 61.) We find nothing in the record to support any claim that
H.K. reported false information to the police or lied under oath at trial.2

2 We note Mr. Magan also asserts H.K. was not a credible witness because she “exaggerated [N.P.’s] injuries,

describing a ‘completely black and blue arm’ contradicted by photographs.” (Appellant’s Brief at 6.)
However, we note H.K. did not visit with her sister until 7:00 P.M. that night (Tr. at 59), while N.P. took the
photograph of her arm about 20 minutes after Mr. Magan left for work. (See Tr. at 27-28; State’s Ex. 1.).
No. 25AP-306                                                                                         17


        {¶ 53} For these reasons, and based on our review of the record before us, we decline
Mr. Magan’s invitation to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, as the finder of
fact, concerning N.P.’s credibility or the weight to be afforded her testimony. The state was
only required to prove Mr. Magan knowingly caused or attempted to cause “physical harm,”
as defined by R.C. 2901.01(A)(3), to N.P. to sustain a domestic violence conviction. Even
ignoring N.P.’s testimony about her tailbone injury, the photographic evidence depicting a
bruise on the back of N.P.’s left upper arm (State’s Ex. 1; Tr. at 27-29) was consistent with
N.P.’s testimony about Mr. Magan pinning her on the ground by pressing his knee against
the back of her arm. (Tr. at 19-20.) This evidence supports Mr. Magan’s domestic violence
conviction.
        {¶ 54} We acknowledge Mr. Magan presented a different account of events.
However, “ ‘where a factual issue depends solely upon a determination of which witnesses
to believe, that is the credibility of witnesses, a reviewing court will not, except upon
extremely extraordinary circumstances, reverse a factual finding . . . as being against the
manifest weight of the evidence.’ ” In re L.J., 2012-Ohio-1414, ¶ 21 (10th Dist.), quoting In
re Johnson, 2005-Ohio-4389, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.). The trial court judge, as the trier of fact,
was in the best position to consider the discrepancies in the testimony regarding the events
that took place on March 25, 2024. The trial court judge was also in the best position to
evaluate the credibility of the live testimony from N.P. in contrast with the live testimony
of Mr. Magan. The trial court judge was likewise free to reject the implication by Mr.
Magan’s trial counsel that N.P. was not a credible witness or otherwise failed to provide
truthful testimony.
        {¶ 55} After reviewing the record and for the reasons set forth above, we cannot say
this is one of the rare cases where the trier of fact clearly lost its way in believing N.P.’s
testimony when the court found Mr. Magan guilty of domestic violence and entered
judgment convicting him of that offense. Accordingly, we overrule Mr. Magan’s challenges
to the sufficiency and weight of the evidence in support of his domestic violence conviction.




Thus any inconsistencies between the photograph and H.K.’s description could be explained by the passage
of time rather than H.K.’s truthfulness.
No. 25AP-306                                                                              18


      b. Assault
       {¶ 56} The trial court also found Mr. Magan guilty of assault, in violation of
R.C. 2903.13(A), which prohibits a person from knowingly causing or attempting to cause
physical harm to another. As previously discussed, evidence and testimony presented at
trial established Mr. Magan knocked N.P. to the ground and pinned her down by pressing
his knee into her arm. N.P. testified to experiencing pain as a result. Photographic evidence
of a bruise to the back of N.P.’s upper left arm corroborated her account.
       {¶ 57} Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the state, as we must, we
find the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to conclude that Mr. Magan
knowingly caused or attempted to cause injury, irrespective of its gravity or duration, to
N.P. See R.C. 2901.01(A)(3) (defining “physical harm”). For these reasons, we find the
evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the trial court to find Mr. Magan guilty of
assault following a bench trial.
       {¶ 58} Regarding Mr. Magan’s challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence
supporting a conviction for assault, Mr. Magan again relies on his own testimony describing
a different series of events than those described by N.P. and contends N.P. was not a
credible witness. However, our analysis of Mr. Magan’s manifest weight challenge is
limited to the domestic violence offense. This is because, under R.C. 2941.25(A), Mr.
Magan’s domestic violence and assault convictions merged for purposes of conviction and
sentencing, and the state elected to proceed on the domestic violence count. (See Tr. at 95-
101.) If we found Mr. Magan’s domestic violence conviction to be against the manifest
weight of the evidence, however, we would also evaluate the evidence underlying the assault
offense. See, e.g., State v. Stewart, 2023-Ohio-1493, ¶ 49 (10th Dist.), citing State v.
McKinney, 2008-Ohio-6522, ¶ 44 (10th Dist.) and State v. Kpoto, 2020-Ohio-3866, ¶ 13,
16-21 (10th Dist.). But, having found no basis to conclude Mr. Magan’s domestic violence
conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence, analyzing the weight of the
evidence supporting the assault offense is not necessary in this case. See id.
      c. Disposition
      {¶ 59} Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court’s findings of guilt as to the
domestic violence and assault counts were supported by sufficient evidence. And we find
no basis to conclude Mr. Magan’s domestic violence conviction was against the manifest
No. 25AP-306                                                                          19


weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we overrule Mr. Magan’s first and second assignments
of error.

III. CONCLUSION
      {¶ 60} Having overruled Mr. Magan’s three assignments of error, we affirm the
February 25, 2025 judgment of the Franklin County Municipal Court.

                                                                     Judgment affirmed.

                      BEATTY BLUNT and MENTEL, JJ., concur.