State v. Mehring

[Cite as State v. Mehring, 2026-Ohio-1511.]


                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                     ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                            PORTAGE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                                     CASE NO. 2025-P-0045

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                   Civil Appeal from the
        - vs -                                     Court of Common Pleas

AUSTIN A. MEHRING,
                                                   Trial Court No. 2021 CR 00877
                 Defendant-Appellant.


                           OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

                                       Decided: April 27, 2026
                                        Judgment: Affirmed


Connie J. Lewandowsi, Portage County Prosecutor, and Theresa M. Scahill, Assistant
Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Austin A. Mehring, pro se, 840 Medford Road, Cleveland Heights, OH 44121
(Defendant-Appellant).


ROBERT J. PATTON, J.

        {¶1}     Defendant-appellant, Austin A. Mehring (“Mehring”), appeals from the

judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas denying his successive post-

conviction petition without a hearing. For the following reasons, we affirm.

        {¶2}     On appeal, Mehring asserts that the trial court erred when it denied his

successive post-conviction petition without hearing. Upon review, we conclude that the

trial court was without jurisdiction to consider Mehring’s successive post-conviction

petition as Mehring failed to satisfy R.C. 2953.23(A). Additionally, the claims raised in
Mehring’s petition were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. As such, the trial court did

not err by denying Mehring’s petition for post-conviction relief without hearing.

        {¶3}    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Portage County Court of

Common Pleas.

                                  Substantive and Procedural Facts

        {¶4}    On September 16, 2021, the Portage County Grand Jury returned a four-

count indictment charging Mehring with one count of aggravated burglary, a felony of the

first degree, in violation of R.C. 2911.01 (“Count 1”), two counts of felonious assault,

felonies of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2903.11 (“Counts 2 and 3”); and one

count of assault, a misdemeanor of the first degree, in violation of R.C. 2903.13 (“Count

4”). Counts 2, 3, and 4 involved different victims, R.M., J.L., and A.R., respectively.

        {¶5}    Mehring pleaded not guilty at arraignment on September 20, 2021. The

bond set by the municipal court in Portage County Municipal Court Case No. 2021 CRA

01377K was transferred to the court of common pleas and continued.1 As a condition of

bond, Mehring was ordered to have no contact with the victims and undergo weekly

random substance abuse testing.2

        {¶6}    On May 24, 2022, Mehring appeared before the court with counsel and

entered a plea of guilty to Counts 2 and 3, as amended to aggravated assault, fourth-

degree felonies, and to Count 4, assault, a first-degree misdemeanor. The State entered

a nolle prosequi on Count 1. At the hearing, when the court below inquired whether he

understood the plea, Mehring stated that he did. Mehring further indicated that he



1. Bond was posted in the municipal court case on September 13, 2021.
2. The trial court later amended the conditions of bond, discontinuing the substance abuse screenings, on
January 26, 2022.

                                             PAGE 2 OF 13

Case No. 2025-P-0045
understood the potential penalties and the rights he was waiving by entering a plea of

guilty. The following exchange occurred at the plea hearing:

              THE COURT: Are you entering these pleas of guilty of your
              own free will?
              MR. MEHRING: Yes, I am.
              THE COURT: Has anyone promised you anything other than
              what was discussed in court today?
              MR. MEHRING: No.
              THE COURT: Is anybody forcing or threatening you in any
              way to enter this plea?
              MR. MEHRING: No, Your Honor.
              THE COURT: Did your attorney go over the written plea of
              guilty with you . . .?
              MR. MEHRING: Yes, he did.
              THE COURT: Are you satisfied with your attorney?
              MR. MEHRING: Yes, Your Honor.
       {¶7}   Additionally, the Written Plea of Guilty, signed by Mehring, further provided

in relevant part: “7. That no promises or threats have been made to me by anyone to

secure my guilty plea in this case, nor have I been coerced in any way by any person to

plead guilty . . . 9. That I have received discovery in this matter, and would move to

withdraw any motions previously filed on my behalf, including but not limited to a motion

for a Bill of Particulars.” The State did not present a factual basis for the plea. The trial

court subsequently accepted Mehring’s plea, found him guilty of the offenses, as charged

and amended, and ordered a presentence investigation.

       {¶8}   Sentencing was held on August 8, 2022. At the hearing, Mehring’s counsel

stated: “[Mehring] regrets his extreme actions that night. We would indicate that he was

a victim of a robbery himself that night. He was a victim of multiple assaults that night. He

left the premises prior to any of this. He was followed out from the premises by a group

                                       PAGE 3 OF 13

Case No. 2025-P-0045
of three to four girls. Three of the four girls assaulted him at that point. His friends tried to

stick up for him. He didn’t act rationally as far as Rikki is concerned. He was being hit

multiple times.” Mehring stated on his own behalf: “I feel terrible about everything that

transpired that night . . . I never had any intention of anyone being harmed that night. It

was just a night that got out of control.”

       {¶9}   The trial court found that Mehring was amenable to community control

sanctions. The trial court imposed a prison sentence of 6 to 18 months on each of the

fourth-degree felonies and 6 months in jail on the misdemeanor assault. The trial court

suspended those sentences and imposed three years of community control. As conditions

of his community control, the trial court ordered an updated substance abuse assessment

and a mental health assessment. Mehring was further ordered to maintain employment,

complete anger management, and serve 20 days in the Portage County Jail. During

sentencing, Mehring indicated he was a resident of Georgia and planned to return to

Georgia. The trial court informed Mehring that he could apply to transfer his community

control to Georgia after he served his time in the jail.

       {¶10} Mehring did not file a direct appeal from his conviction or sentence. On

October 24, 2022, Mehring filed a motion to modify his sentence and suspend the

imposed jail sentence. The motion was denied on October 28, 2022. Mehring did not

appeal this decision. On March 6, 2025, Mehring file a motion to terminate his probation.

The motion to terminate supervised probation was granted on March 12, 2025.

       {¶11} On April 28, 2025, Mehring filed a pro se petition to vacate or set aside

judgment of conviction or sentence and a motion for expert assistance. In his motion to

vacate, Mehring asserted that his conviction violated the Fifth and Fourth Amendments



                                         PAGE 4 OF 13

Case No. 2025-P-0045
of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1, Sections 10 and 16 of the Ohio Constitution.

Mehring alleged that he was a victim of assault and was acting in self-defense. Mehring

further explained that his cell phone captured part of the assault which supported his

theory of self-defense. In his motion, Mehring stated “after release on bond, [he] located

the discarded phone and submitted the recovered video to the prosecution. The video

captures physical aggression by the alleged victims and supports self-defense theory.

The state proceeded without acknowledging or investigating this evidence.” Mehring

alleged that despite having the video, the “prosecutor did not reconsider the charges” and

that “defense counsel failed to use this evidence to challenge the case or suppress the

plea.”

         {¶12} On May 6, 2025, the State filed its response to Mehring’s motion to vacate.

The State asserted that Mehring’s petition should be dismissed as untimely as his petition

was due on or before September 9, 2023, pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a). The State

further contended that the trial court could not entertain the untimely petition as it did not

meet the criteria contained in R.C. 2953.23(A)(1) or (2).

         {¶13} On May 9, 2025, the trial court dismissed the petition as untimely.3 Mehring

did not appeal from this decision.

         {¶14} On June 24, 2025, Mehring filed a second petition for post-conviction relief,

which was again premised on the State’s handling of the cellphone recording that Mehring

had provided “prior to sentencing” and defense counsel’s failure to argue self-defense.

The State again filed a motion to dismiss the successive post-conviction petition and

argued that the successive petition did not meet the criteria contained in R.C.


3. After the trial court dismissed the petition, Mehring filed a reply in opposition to the State’s motion to
dismiss wherein he asserted that he met the criteria undern R.C. 2953.23(A)(1).

                                              PAGE 5 OF 13

Case No. 2025-P-0045
2953.23(A)(1) or (2). The trial court denied Mehring’s successive petition for post-

conviction relief on July 8, 2025.

       {¶15} Mehring timely appeals from this entry.

                                            The Appeal

       {¶16} On appeal, Mehring raises three assignments of error for review:

               1. The trial court erred by denying Appellant's successive
                  postconviction petition without addressing or evaluating
                  the newly presented evidence that satisfies both prongs of
                  R.C. 2953.23(A)(1).

               2. The trial court erred by denying relief without a hearing,
                  despite unrebutted evidence that law enforcement failed to
                  recover material exculpatory evidence in violation of
                  Appellant's due process rights under Brady v. Maryland,
                  373 U.S. 83 (1963).

               3. The trial court erred by failing to consider whether trial
                  counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not informing
                  Appellant of the exculpatory value of the witness
                  statement, thereby rendering the plea involuntary under
                  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

       {¶17} We address Mehring’s assignments of error collectively. Mehring asserts

that the trial court erred in denying his successive post-conviction petition without hearing.

We disagree.

       {¶18} An appellate court reviews the denial of a motion for post-conviction relief

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Mitchell, 2019-Ohio-844, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.), citing State

v. Adams, 2005-Ohio-348, ¶ 37 (11th Dist.). “An abuse of discretion is the trial court's

‘failure to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.’” Id. quoting State v.

Cline, 2013-Ohio-1843, ¶ 9 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Beechler, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62

(2d Dist.), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 11 (8th Ed.2004).




                                        PAGE 6 OF 13

Case No. 2025-P-0045
       {¶19} Before considering the claims Mehring raises in his petition, we must first

determine whether the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the successive petition for

post-conviction relief.

       {¶20} “Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense . . . and who

claims that there was such a denial or infringement of the person's rights as to render the

judgment void or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United

States, . . . may file a petition in the court that imposed sentence, stating the grounds for

relief relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence

or to grant other appropriate relief.” R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a)(i).

       {¶21} A petition under R.C.2953.21(A)(1)(a)(i) must be filed ”no later than three

hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript is filed in the court of

appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction or adjudication . . . If no appeal

is taken, except as otherwise provided in section 2953.23 of the Revised Code, the

petition shall be filed no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the expiration of the

time for filing the appeal.” R.C. 2953.21(A)(2)(a).

       {¶22} As noted above, the sentencing entry was filed on August 10, 2022.

Mehring’s notice of appeal was due on or before September 9, 2022. Mehring did not file

a direct appeal. Therefore, Mehring’s post-conviction petition was due on or before

September 9, 2023. Mehring filed his initial post-conviction petition on April 28, 2025. In

other words, Mehring’s initial petition was over 19 months late. The initial petition was

dismissed as untimely. Mehring did not appeal. Instead, Mehring filed a second petition

for post-conviction relief on June 24, 2025.




                                        PAGE 7 OF 13

Case No. 2025-P-0045
       {¶23} In order for a court to entertain a petition filed after the expiration of the

period set for in R.C. 2953.21, or a second petition or successive petitions for similar relief

on behalf of a petitioner, the petition must meet either exception provided under R.C.

2953.23(A)(1) or (2). Mehring asserts that his petition meets the criteria under R.C.

2953.23(A)(1). We disagree.

       {¶24} Under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1), for the trial court to entertain a successive

petition for post-conviction relief, both of the following must be met:

          (a) Either the petitioner shows that the petitioner was unavoidably
              prevented from discovery of the facts upon which the
              petitioner must rely to present the claim for relief, or,
              subsequent to the period prescribed in division (A)(2) of
              section 2953.21 of the Revised Code or to the filing of an
              earlier petition, the United States Supreme Court recognized
              a new federal or state right that applies retroactively to
              persons in the petitioner's situation, and the petition asserts a
              claim based on that right.

          (b) The petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence that,
              but for constitutional error at trial, no reasonable factfinder
              would have found the petitioner guilty of the offense of which
              the petitioner was convicted. . . .

(Emphasis added.)

       {¶25} In other words, a petitioner must establish that: (1) a new federal or state

right has been recognized or that he or she was unavoidably prevented from the discovery

of facts upon which the successive petition for post-conviction relief is premised and (2)

he or she would not have been convicted in the trial court by a reasonable factfinder but

for the constitutional error. State v. Miller, 2025-Ohio-4639, ¶ 11 (11th Dist.). Because

these two prongs are framed in the conjunctive, both must be met. Id.

       {¶26} Mehring’s convictions were the result of a guilty plea, therefore he cannot

meet the requirements of R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b). Mitchell, 2019-Ohio-844, at ¶ 14 (11th

                                        PAGE 8 OF 13

Case No. 2025-P-0045
Dist.), citing State v. Pough, 2004-Ohio-3933, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.). Further, Mehring was not

unavoidably prevented from discovering the video recording. According to Mehring’s

petition, he was aware of the recording on his phone and that at some point during the

proceedings, Mehring recovered his phone and the recording.

       {¶27} In his initial petition to the trial court, Mehring indicated that the cell phone

was recovered when he was released on bond by using GPS technology. According to

the municipal court’s publicly accessible docket, Mehring posted bond on September 13,

2021. Mehring stated in his initial petition that he provided the recording to the prosecutor

who “proceeded without acknowledging or investigating this evidence.” Based on

Mehring’s own statements in his petition, Mehring was not unavoidably prevented from

discovering the evidence on which his petition relies. It appears from his petition that

Mehring had possession of this evidence, if not prior to his plea, prior to sentencing.

Further, defense counsel discussed Mehring being attacked and described him as a

victim of robbery himself during the sentencing hearing. Mehring does not point to any

evidence that he was unavoidably prevented from discovering prior to his plea or

sentencing. Furthermore, Mehring does not cite to any new federal or state right that

might support his petition. Because Mehring cannot satisfy both prongs under R.C.

2953.23(A)(1), the exception does not apply.4

       {¶28} If a petitioner fails to satisfy R.C. 2953.23(A), a trial court does not have

jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of a successive post-conviction petition. Miller at ¶ 12,




4. R.C. 2953.23(A)(2) addresses DNA evidence that establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, actual
innocence. Mehring also does not contend any exculpatory DNA evidence was discovered. Accordingly,
that subsection does not apply to the instant matter.

                                            PAGE 9 OF 13

Case No. 2025-P-0045
citing State v. Apanovitch, 2018-Ohio-4744, ¶ 36; see State v. Noling, 2008-Ohio-2394,

¶ 37 (11th Dist.).

       {¶29} It is well established that “[a] petition for postconviction relief does not

provide a petitioner a second opportunity to litigate his or her conviction.” State v. Hobbs,

2011-Ohio-5106, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.), citing State v. Hessler, 2002-Ohio-3321 ¶ 23 (10th

Dist.). “[T]he doctrine of ‘[r]es judicata applies to any claim that was raised or could have

been raised in a prior petition for postconviction relief.’ (Citation omitted.) State v.

Clemmons, 2019-Ohio-2997, ¶ 25 (2d Dist.)” Miller at ¶ 13. Thus, res judicata operates

to “‘“bar raising piecemeal claims in successive postconviction relief petitions. . . .”'” Id.,

quoting State v. Lawson, 2014-Ohio-3554, ¶ 53 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Johnson,

2013-Ohio-1398, ¶ 47 (5th Dist.).

       {¶30} Mehring did not file a direct appeal from his conviction. As a result, his

claims regarding the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent nature of his plea, his theory of

self-defense, contradictions in statements of victims, contents of the police reports, and

the video recording from the cellphone Mehring recovered himself, are barred by res

judicata.

       {¶31} Additionally,     Mehring      previously    raised    trial   counsel's    alleged

ineffectiveness in his initial post-conviction petition. Specifically, in his initial petition, he

alleged that counsel “failed to use [the video recording] to challenge the case or suppress

the plea.” His initial petition was deemed untimely and not appealed. In his successive

petition, Mehring alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to demand

preservation and use of the evidence or request expert testimony. Because Mehring could




                                         PAGE 10 OF 13

Case No. 2025-P-0045
have raised these claims either in a direct appeal or in his initial post-conviction petition,

these claims are also barred by res judicata.

       {¶32} Because Mehring failed to satisfy R.C. 2953.23(A), the trial court was

without jurisdiction to consider his successive post-conviction petition. Where a trial court

is without jurisdiction to entertain the petition, “it follows that the trial court did not err in

failing to conduct a hearing prior to denying the petition.” Miller at ¶ 16, citing Noling,

2008-Ohio-2394, at ¶ 102 (11th Dist.). Furthermore, when a trial court dismisses an

untimely [or successive petition] post-conviction petition, the trial court is not required to

issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. Mitchell, 2017-Ohio-8440, at ¶ 40 (11th

Dist.), citing State ex rel. James v. Coyne, 2007-Ohio-2716, ¶ 5, citing State ex rel.

Kimbrough v. Greene, 2002-Ohio-7042, ¶ 6. “‘“This rule applies even when the defendant,

as here, claims, under R.C. 2953.23, that he was unavoidably prevented from discovery

of the facts to present his claim for post-conviction relief.”’ [Coyne], quoting State ex rel.

Hach v. Summit Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 2004-Ohio-1800, ¶ 9.” Mitchell at ¶ 40.

       {¶33} Additionally, “a trial court may also dismiss a petition for postconviction relief

without holding an evidentiary hearing when the claims raised in the petition are barred

by the doctrine of res judicata.” Adams, 2005-Ohio-348, at ¶ 38 (11th Dist.). Therefore,

the trial court did not err in denying Mehring’s successive post-conviction petition without

issuing findings of fact and conclusions of law and/or without a hearing.

       {¶34} Accordingly, Mehring’s assignments of error are without merit.




                                         PAGE 11 OF 13

Case No. 2025-P-0045
                                        Conclusion

       {¶35} For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the Portage County Court

of Common Pleas is affirmed.



EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,

SCOTT LYNCH, J.,

concur.




                                    PAGE 12 OF 13

Case No. 2025-P-0045
                                JUDGMENT ENTRY



       For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignments of error

are without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the

Portage County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

       Costs to be taxed against appellant.




                                                JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON



                                                JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI,
                                                       concurs



                                                  JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH,
                                                        concurs


           THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY

    A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
              pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.




                                      PAGE 13 OF 13

Case No. 2025-P-0045