State v. Moore

[Cite as State v. Moore, 2026-Ohio-1284.]


                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :
                                                             No. 115503
                 v.                               :

MARK MOORE,                                       :

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :


                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 9, 2026


         Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                            Case No. CR-25-699939-A


                                            Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Lucas Kirkland, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
                 Robert McCaleb, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.


DEENA R. CALABRESE, J.:

                Following a bench trial held July 9, 2025, the trial court found

defendant-appellant Mark Moore guilty of one count of domestic violence. The trial

court subsequently sentenced appellant to one year of community-control sanctions
under the supervision of the adult probation department’s community-based

correctional facility unit and a term of postrelease control.       Appellant timely

appealed, arguing that the trial court’s guilty verdict was against the manifest weight

of the evidence. Finding no merit to the appeal, we affirm.

I. Procedural History and Trial

  A. Procedural Background

             On March 13, 2025, the Cuyahoga County Grand Jury returned a one-

count indictment charging appellant with domestic violence, a felony of the third

degree in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). The charges stemmed from his mother’s

February 28, 2025 report that appellant had attacked her in their shared home.

             Following discovery and pretrial conferences, the case came on for trial

on July 9, 2025. Prior to the commencement of trial, appellant waived his right to

trial by jury on the record. The signed waiver was docketed that morning. The case

proceeded to trial before the bench the same day. After opening statements, the trial

court took testimony from three witnesses.

  B. The State’s Case-in-Chief

             The State called two witnesses at trial. We summarize their testimony

in order.

     1. Testimony of B.S.

             B.S. testified that she was 62 years of age, a widow, and resided in

Parma, Ohio. She identified appellant as her son and stated that he had previously

lived with her. B.S. described her son as an alcoholic:
      I knew when I took him in that he was an alcoholic and I was hoping
      that as a mother I could change that. And I lived with him on a day-to-
      day basis. I prayed about it and everything, and it never changes, it just
      progressively got worse.

(Tr. 14.) B.S. described the end of their time living together as “like a hostage

situation” and “really bad.” (Tr. 14.) According to B.S., appellant did not stop

drinking, and she, “in turn, drank just to deal with it.” (Tr. 14.)

             B.S. testified concerning events leading to the purported incident on

February 28, 2025. She stated that during previous days appellant had “been

drinking and was being just weird.” (Tr. 16.) Specifically, appellant had been sitting

in the dark with the curtains drawn and told her he was no longer able to work. B.S.

testified that on February 27, 2025, she summoned Parma police because she was

“afraid” and “didn’t know what was wrong with him.” (Tr. 16.) According to B.S.,

the police advised her that appellant was considered a tenant not subject to removal

except through legal proceedings. (Tr. 16.) She testified that the police refused to

remove appellant from the household “unless he put his hands on [her].” (Tr. 16.)

According to B.S., after the police visit appellant, whom she described as a large

man, “carried on” the entire day and that it “got really dramatic.” (Tr. 16.) B.S.

testified that she “screamed leave me the F alone because [appellant] kept messing

with [her].” (Tr. 19.) She stated that she “thought [she] was going to die that night,

as mad as he became” because of the police visit. (Tr. 18.)

             B.S. stated that on February 28, 2025, between 11:00 a.m. and noon,

appellant wanted her to buy him cigarettes. B.S. testified that she followed the
advice of others and told him she did not have the money to do so. He “became

upset” when she refused his demand. (Tr. 17.) Specifically:

        [H]e had asked me to get him some cigarettes and when I did what I
        was told by the family to just tell him I couldn’t afford to get his stuff
        anymore, and he became angry and that’s when my face got shoved in
        a freezer door by him.

        ...

        He just — he became angry because I refused. I wasn’t going to get all
        that stuff anymore and into the freezer door I went, the top. My whole
        right side of my body went into the refrigerator.

(Tr. 17 and 20.) B.S. stated that she then left the house. She “lied and said [she] was

going to the store” but instead “went to the police station.” (Tr. 20.) B.S. testified

that the police saw “her face was swollen” and “took pictures.” (Tr. 21.) According

to B.S., the police asked her to sit in a park while they removed appellant from the

home.

              At that point the State identified two exhibits, State’s exhibit Nos. 1

and 2, which were pictures of both sides of B.S.’s face. Referencing State’s exhibit

No. 2, B.S. testified that “[t]he whole right side of [her] face went right into the

freezer door.” (Tr. 23.)

              B.S. testified that she delayed seeking medical attention because she

was afraid to lose her job. She stated that she “was in trouble financially” so she told

the police she would visit a hospital as soon as possible. (Tr. 23.) B.S. testified she

went to an emergency room in Parma the following Sunday and that they took x-

rays.
              The State then identified State’s exhibit No. 3 as B.S.’s certified

medical records related to the incident, which appellant conceded had been

produced in discovery. The trial court permitted appellant to testify regarding the

records, overruling appellant’s objection. The exhibit indicates that B.S. visited the

hospital on March 3, 2025. It references, inter alia, “concussion without loss of

consciousness” and “[c]ontusion, multiple sites.” B.S. further testified that she

suffered from confusion and pain “for weeks” and that she “[hasn’t] been right

since.” (Tr. 27.) Her direct testimony ended with a reference to a previous domestic

violence incident with appellant. The trial court took “judicial notice [that appellant

is] on probation to me in case number 678418.” (Tr. 28.)

              On cross-examination, B.S. admitted that according to her direct

testimony Parma police had informed her on February 27, 2025, that they could not

remove appellant from the home unless he put his hands on her and then the very

next day she told the police he did precisely that. Appellant also sought to impeach

B.S.’s account of the injuries she sustained based upon a handwritten statement that

was not admitted into evidence and the medical records identified as State’s exhibit

No. 3.

              On redirect, the State elicited further testimony from B.S. using her

medical records. Specifically, page 8 of State’s exhibit No. 3 contains a body diagram

identifying three contusion sites on B.S.’s right side and none on her left side.
     2. Testimony of Officer Sean Gilligan

              The State next called Parma police officer Sean Gilligan. Officer

Gilligan testified that he served in the “uniform patrol division” and had worked in

that capacity for nine years. (Tr. 43.) He testified that on February 28, 2025, an

individual came to the police lobby to make a complaint and he was the responding

officer.   In conducting an investigation, it was “[d]etermined to be domestic

violence,” and it was further “determined that the preferred outcome would be to

make an arrest, which is what [they] did.” (Tr. 44-45.) Officer Gilligan also testified

that he photographed B.S., the victim. He identified State’s exhibit Nos. 1 and 2.

  C. Admission of Exhibits and Appellant’s Crim.R. 29 Motion

              The State rested subject to the admission of exhibits. Appellant

indicated his only objection was to the authenticity of State’s exhibit No. 3, the

medical records. The trial court admitted that exhibit over appellant’s objection. In

addition to the three exhibits described above, the trial court also accepted, without

objection, State’s exhibit No. 4, a certified journal entry for case number CR-23-

678418, and State’s exhibit No. 5, a certified journal entry for case number 2012 CRB

038835.

               Appellant then made a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. His core

argument was that B.S.’s testimony was self-serving and not credible.            More

specifically, appellant argued that B.S. had followed the roadmap given to her by

Parma police, falsely accusing her son of violence to trigger his arrest and removal
from the home, and further that the photos and medical records did “not show any

injury whatsoever.” (Tr. 50.) The court denied appellant’s Crim.R. 29 motion.

  D. Appellant’s Case-in-Chief

              Appellant admitted that he had two prior domestic violence

convictions, one for domestic violence against his mother and another involving the

mother of his child. With respect to the events of February 28, 2025, he testified

that it was uneventful until Parma police arrived to arrest him. According to

appellant, B.S. came to his room in the morning to ask him if he needed to shower

“because she wanted to do laundry.” (Tr. 55.) He said he would take a shower later.

She returned about an hour later to ask if he “needed anything from the store.” (Tr.

55.) Appellant continued:

       I told her just a pack of cigarettes and she said okay and she went down,
       left, and the next thing I know the dog is barking, I looked out the front
       window, officers were there.

(Tr. 55.)

              Appellant testified that he assumed the police visit related to the day

before, when B.S. told him that “she called them on [him] because she was afraid of

[him] and she wanted [him] out of the house.” (Tr. 56.) He testified that he asked

her why she was afraid and that she responded that he looked like his father and

watched horror movies. (Tr. 56.)

              Appellant flatly denied shoving his mother into the refrigerator,

putting his hands on her face, or otherwise putting his hands on her. (Tr. 57.) He

insisted she just wanted him out of the house.
               On cross-examination, appellant admitted he had a prior domestic-

violence conviction regarding a conflict with his mother but stated he “didn’t put

[his] hands on her then either.” (Tr. 59.) He acknowledged hearing his mother’s

testimony and viewing the pictures of her face and the medical records describing a

concussion and multiple contusions. He nevertheless testified:

       Q.      So it’s your testimony today that your mother did this to herself?

       A.      Yes.

(Tr. 60.)

  E. Renewed Crim.R. 29 Motion, Closing Arguments, and Verdict

                The defense rested and renewed its Crim.R. 29 motion, which the trial

court denied. Counsel gave their closing arguments.

               Following a recess, the trial court found appellant guilty of domestic

violence in violation of 2919.25(A). It stated:

       The Court finds there is evidence believed by the Court that the
       defendant did knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to
       [B.S.], who was a family or household member.

       Furthermore, that he had two prior offenses, was convicted in case
       number 678418 and CRB 038835 in Cleveland Municipal Court, two
       offenses of domestic violence or sections that were commensurate with
       domestic violence.

(Tr. 67-68.)

                The trial court scheduled sentencing for a later date, ordering a

presentence-investigation report and a community-based correctional facility

referral.
  F. Sentencing

              The sentencing hearing took place on August 7, 2025.            Because

appellant has not assigned error with respect to sentencing, we will not describe

those proceedings in detail. The trial court sentenced appellant to one year of

community-control sanctions under the supervision of the adult probation

department’s community-based correctional facility unit, with several specified

conditions, and a term of postrelease control.

              This timely appeal followed.

II. Assignment of Error

              Appellant presents a single assignment of error for our review:

      The conviction here was obtained against the manifest weight of the
      evidence.

              Finding no merit to the assignment of error, we affirm.

III. Analysis

  A. Standard of Review

              “A manifest-weight-of-the-evidence challenge attacks the credibility

of the evidence presented and questions whether the State met its burden of

persuasion.” Berea v. Blackshear, 2025-Ohio-4757, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), citing State v.

Whitsett, 2014-Ohio-4933, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.). See also State v. Hill, 2013-Ohio-578,

¶ 32 (8th Dist.). “In our manifest weight review of a bench trial verdict, we recognize

that the trial court serves as the factfinder, and not the jury.” Cleveland v. McCoy,

2023-Ohio-3792, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Travis, 2022-Ohio-1233, ¶ 28 (8th

Dist.); see also Cleveland v. Hale, 2024-Ohio-2712, ¶ 4 (8th Dist.) (analyzing
manifest-weight issue in context of bench trial); Cleveland v. Clark, 2024-Ohio-

4491, ¶ 45 (8th Dist.) (same); State v. Kennedy, 2024-Ohio-1586, ¶ 65 (8th Dist.)

(same). Accordingly, this court has previously written:

      “[T]o warrant reversal from a bench trial under a manifest weight of
      the evidence claim, this court must review the entire record, weigh the
      evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of
      witnesses and determine whether in resolving conflicts in evidence, the
      trial court clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage
      of justice that the judgment must be reversed, and a new trial ordered.”

Kennedy at ¶ 65, quoting State v. Strickland, 2009-Ohio-3906, ¶ 25 (8th Dist.). An

appellate court will reverse on manifest weight “‘only in the exceptional case in

which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” State v. McLoyd, 2023-

Ohio-4306, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.), quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387. This is

because “in a manifest-weight review, the weight to be given the evidence and the

credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the finder of fact.” State v. Metz, 2019-

Ohio-4054, ¶ 70 (8th Dist.); see also Cleveland v. Johns, 2024-Ohio-3301, ¶ 24 (8th

Dist.). Indeed, an appellate court ““‘may not substitute its own judgment for that of

the finder of fact.’”” Id., quoting State v. Harris, 2021-Ohio-856, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.),

quoting State v. Maldonado, 2020-Ohio-5616, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.). See also State v.

McGrath, 2025-Ohio-2600, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.).

  B. Discussion

              The trial court heard the competing testimony of victim B.S. and

appellant. Simply put, B.S. testified that appellant, her own son, pushed her into an

appliance in a fit of anger, thereby injuring the right side of her head and body.

Appellant cross-examined B.S. by questioning the extent of her injuries and delayed
reporting. Appellant’s cross-examination also confirmed that B.S. admitted to

wanting appellant out of her house, that she had been informed by Parma police that

they could not remove appellant unless he laid hands on her, and that according to

B.S. precisely that scenario played out the next morning. Appellant testified on his

own behalf and simply denied he attacked his mother in any fashion and that her

police report was a pretext to accomplish her goal of removing him from the home.

              Appellant does not contend that B.S. provided inconsistent testimony,

but rather that her testimony was not credible. He mainly points to B.S.’s delayed

trip to the hospital as suggesting she had not actually been injured and further

argues that the photographs and medical records did not adequately establish

injury.   With respect to the delay, however, B.S. testified that she did not

immediately seek treatment because she needed to go to work and feared losing her

job. “Generally we must give deference to the trier of fact who has the opportunity

to assess the victim’s demeanor and inconsistencies.” State v. Sefcik, 2014-Ohio-

5792, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.). As in Sefcik, another manifest-wight case, “[t]he trial court

heard all the evidence, including the inconsistencies in [the victim’s] testimony, and

determined [the victim] credible[.]” Id. at ¶ 16.

              In addition, with respect to the nature and extent of B.S.’s injuries,

“[t]his court has held that, because the word ‘attempt’ is in the domestic violence

statute, ‘an offender does not have to cause a tangible injury to his victim in order to

be convicted of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A).’” Blackshear,

2025-Ohio-4757, at ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Stover, 2017-Ohio-291, ¶ 15
(8th Dist.). In Blackshear, the defendant-appellant highlighted the purported lack

of “visible evidence” of injury to the victim in arguing that his domestic-violence

conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. This court rejected that

contention: “To be convicted of domestic violence under R.C. 2919.25(A), visible

evidence of an injury is not required.” Blackshear at ¶ 18. Even if it were required,

however, as in Sefcik “[t]here was physical evidence supporting [the victim’s]

version of events in the kitchen.” Sefcik at ¶ 15. The State offered photographs of

each side of B.S.’s face, along with medical records indicating multiple contusions

on the right side of her body and symptoms of a concussion. It was for the trial court

to weigh those exhibits in light of the competing testimony.

              Appellant also suggests that if B.S. was in fact injured, she deliberately

hurt herself as a pretext to have appellant removed from the house. As already

noted, appellant highlights the undisputed fact that the purported attack occurred

the day after Parma police informed B.S. that appellant would need to “put his hands

on” her if she wanted him removed without eviction proceedings.              While we

acknowledge that the timing could be viewed as undermining B.S.’s credibility, the

trial court was presented with, and rejected, that defense theory. The trial court had

the benefit of observing the witnesses. Having heard the testimony of both mother

and son, the trial court chose to credit B.S.’s testimony. “In this he-said/she-said

type of case with limited physical evidence, we must defer to the trier of fact’s

resolution of disputed facts.” Sefcik at ¶ 16. In other words, “[i]f a case amounts to

a ‘he said, she said’ dispute, [this court] will not second-guess the trier of fact’s
resolution of that dispute where the defendant has not set forth any corroborating

evidence as to why this court should disrupt that [resolution], other than reiterating

to us what ‘he said.’” (Cleaned up.) State v. Lanier, 2021-Ohio-379, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.),

quoting State v. Taylor, 2016-Ohio-2765, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.).

              We have independently reviewed the testimony of each witness and

every exhibit admitted into evidence. On this record, we cannot conclude that this

is the exceptional case where the trial court clearly lost its way and created a manifest

miscarriage of justice. Appellant’s sole assignment of error is overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.              The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.




DEENA R. CALABRESE, JUDGE

LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR