State v. Perenkovich

[Cite as State v. Perenkovich, 2026-Ohio-1344.]


                        IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
                                  STARK COUNTY, OHIO


  STATE OF OHIO                                   Case No. 2025CA00108

   Plaintiff - Appellee                           Opinion and Judgment Entry

  -vs-                                            Appeal from the Stark County Court of
                                                  Common Pleas, Case No. 2023CR2195
  NICOLE PERENKOVICH
                                                  Judgment: Affirmed
  Defendant - Appellant
                                                  Date of Judgment Entry: April 7, 2026



BEFORE: Andrew J. King; William B. Hoffman; Craig R. Baldwin, Judges

APPEARANCES: Kyle L. Stone, Stark County Prosecuting Attorney, Kameisha J.
Johnson, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Appellate Division, for Plaintiff-Appellee;
Mary Catherine Corrigan, for Defendant-Appellant.




Hoffman, J.


         {¶1} Defendant-appellant Nicole Perenkovich appeals the judgment entered by

the Stark County Common Pleas Court dismissing her petition for post-conviction relief

without a hearing. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.

                                 STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

         {¶2} Appellant’s probation officer paid a visit to her home on September 18,

2023. Appellant was on probation as a result of 2019 convictions of aggravated trafficking

in drugs and aggravated possession of drugs. During the visit, the probation officer asked

Appellant if she had used any illegal narcotics.              Appellant admitted to using
methamphetamine, and she confessed she had a pipe in her purse. Because her admitted

use of methamphetamine was in violation of the conditions of her probation, a search of

her residence was triggered. The officer radioed to other officers for assistance. When

asked by the officers if anyone else was staying there, Appellant responded no. Tr. (I)

220.

       {¶3} During the search of Appellant’s bedroom, police found a digital scale with

trace amounts of a crystal-like substance consistent with methamphetamine. They also

found a cellphone in the living room. After searching the home, officers searched the car

in which Appellant arrived. They found a bag containing two baggies of what was

ultimately confirmed to be 231 grams of methamphetamine, roughly 77 times the bulk

amount of 3 grams, the amount defined by statute as indicative of more than an amount

for personal use.

       {¶4} Officer Jordan Shank transported Appellant to the jail. Appellant asked to

make a phone call. The officer heard Appellant say to the person on the phone, “Yeah,

they found it,” and, “Yeah, in my Malibu.” Tr. (I)179-180. In a recording of a subsequent

phone call from jail, Appellant stated she told her probation officer she needed rehab,

admitted to ownership of the methamphetamine, and said she gives it to people, “like

friends and stuff for cutting grass and stuff.” Tr. (I) 180-181. In another recorded call,

Appellant discussed multiple cellphones, and instructed an individual to delete and erase

phones and lock up accounts.

       {¶5} Upon review of a cellphone found during the search, officers found

messages from Appellant directing the recipient as to where they should leave the drugs

in her vehicle, and how to secure the vehicle after making the drop. She indicated this

arrangement was preferable to hand-to-hand drug transactions or to in-person dealing.
       {¶6} Appellant was indicted by the Stark County Grand Jury with one count of

aggravated trafficking in drugs and aggravated possession of drugs. The case proceeded

to jury trial in the Stark County Common Pleas Court.

       {¶7} Diedre Patterson, Appellant’s mother, testified at trial. She testified like

Appellant, her daughter Cecelia also had issues with drug use. She testified both Appellant

and Cecelia had access to the Chevy Malibu in September of 2023, during which time

Patterson was the registered owner of the vehicle. She testified Cecelia was living with

Appellant at the time the drugs were found. On cross-examination, Patterson admitted

she never contacted either the police or the FBI with any of the information she testified

to at trial. She testified she had not spoken to Cecelia since the search leading to the

charges against Appellant, and did not know where Cecelia was at the time of trial.

       {¶8} Appellant testified her sister Cecelia lived with her in September of 2023.

Appellant stated although she was driving the Chevy Malibu on September 18, she had

not previously used it that weekend. Appellant testified she told officers the drugs

belonged to Cecelia or to Cecelia’s boyfriend, and the exhibits introduced by the State did

not come from her phone.          Appellant admitted the scale and the shards of

methamphetamine found on the pipe in her purse were her drugs, but testified she was

not selling drugs. She also testified her daughter occupied the second bedroom of the

home, and Officer Shank lied when he testified the bedroom was not occupied.

       {¶9} The jury found Appellant guilty of both charges, and the trial court

convicted Appellant upon the jury’s verdict. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a term

of incarceration of eight to twelve years. Appellant’s conviction and sentence were

affirmed by this Court on appeal. State v. Perenkovich, 2025-Ohio-521 (5th District).
       {¶10} Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court

pursuant to R.C. 2953.21, alleging three grounds for relief: (1) trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to subpoena her stepsister Cecelia to testify, (2) trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to impeach Officer Swank’s testimony he found the second bedroom of Appellant’s

bedroom to be unoccupied with photographs indicating the bedroom was occupied by

Appellant’s daughter, and (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Officer

Swank with a cellphone bill indicating Appellant called her daughter from the back of the

police cruiser.   Attached to the petition was an affidavit of Appellant’s mother; a

photocopy of an unsigned, handwritten note; screenshots of photographs from what

appears to be the Snapchat app; and a cell phone call ledger with “[Appellant’s

Daughter’s] cell” and Appellant’s cell phone number handwritten at the top. The trial

court dismissed the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. It is from the July

22, 2025, judgment of the trial court Appellant prosecutes her appeal, assigning as error:



              I. THE TRIAL COURT ERROR [SIC] BY FAILING TO GRANT THE

       PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AS TO CLAIM NUMBER ON

       [SIC] WITHOUT A HEARING.

              II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GRANT THE

       PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AS TO CLAIM NUMBER

       TWO WITHOUT A HEARING.

              III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GRANT THE

       PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AS TO CLAIM NUMBER

       THREE WITHOUT A HEARING.
                        Post-Conviction Relief Standard of Review

       {¶11} Each of Appellant’s assignments of error alleges the trial court erred in

overruling her petition for post-conviction relief, which alleged ineffective assistance of

trial counsel, without holding a hearing, and are all therefore governed by the same

standard of review.

       {¶12} A petition for post-conviction relief is a collateral civil attack on a criminal

judgment, not an appeal of the judgment. State v. Lenard, 2020-Ohio-1502, ¶ 8 (8th

Dist.), citing State v. Steffen, 1994-Ohio-111. To prevail on a petition for post-conviction

relief, a defendant must establish a violation of his constitutional rights which renders the

judgment of conviction void or voidable. R.C. 2953.21. A petition for post-conviction relief

is a means to reach constitutional issues which would otherwise be impossible to reach

because the evidence supporting those issues is outside the record of the petitioner's

criminal conviction. State v. Brown, 2025-Ohio-274, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.).

       {¶13} R.C. 2953.21, which governs post-conviction relief, does "not expressly

mandate a hearing for every post-conviction relief petition and, therefore, a hearing is not

automatically required." State v. Jackson, 64 Ohio St.2d 107, 110 (1980). Rather, in

addressing a petition for post-conviction relief, a trial court plays a gatekeeping role as

to whether a defendant will receive a hearing. State v. Gondor, 2006-Ohio-6679, ¶ 51.

"Pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(C), a trial court properly denies a defendant's petition for

postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing where the petition, the

supporting affidavits, the documentary evidence, the files, and the records do not

demonstrate that petitioner set forth sufficient operative facts to establish substantive

grounds for relief." State v. Calhoun, 1999-Ohio-102, paragraph two of the syllabus;

Gondor at ¶ 51. The decision to deny a petition for post-conviction relief without holding
an evidentiary hearing is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v.

Lichtenwalter, 2021-Ohio-1394 (5th Dist.). An abuse of discretion means a decision is

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217

(1983).

       {¶14} In each of her claims for post-conviction relief, Appellant alleged her trial

counsel was ineffective. A properly licensed attorney is presumed competent. State v.

Hamblin, 37 Ohio St.3d 153 (1988). Therefore, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, Appellant must show counsel's performance fell below an objective

standard of reasonable representation and but for counsel’s error, the result of the

proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984);

State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989). In other words, Appellant must show

counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that

the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Id.

       {¶15} It is pursuant to these standards we review Appellant’s three assignments

of error.

                                                 I.

       {¶16} In her first assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in

denying her an evidentiary hearing on her claim trial counsel was ineffective for failing to

subpoena her stepsister, Cecelia, to testify at trial. We disagree.

       {¶17} Attached to Appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief was an affidavit of

Appellant’s mother, Deidre Patterson. In her affidavit, Patterson averred she received a

letter from Cecelia after Appellant was charged in this case. Patterson stated the letter

indicated the drugs belonged to Kevin, Cecelia’s boyfriend. She averred she gave the letter

to Appellant’s trial counsel, but Cecelia was not called as a witness even though Appellant
wanted Cecelia to be called to testify. Patterson stated since Appellant was convicted,

Cecelia had gotten sober and cut ties with the family. Patterson stated in the past Cecelia

told her the drugs belonged to Kevin; however, now Cecelia has refused to admit her part

in this matter.

       {¶18} A photocopy of a letter is also attached to the petition. Patterson’s affidavit

does not identify this letter as the letter Patterson claimed she received from Cecelia and

gave to trial counsel. In the first line, the letter purports to be from Cecelia, although the

letter is not signed at the end, and is not a sworn affidavit from Cecelia. Further, the letter

does not state definitively the drugs belonged to Kevin, but rather states it is a possibility

the drugs were left in the car by Kevin.

       {¶19} We find Appellant has not demonstrated a reasonable probability of a

chance in the outcome had counsel called Cecelia to testify. The petition did not include

a sworn affidavit from Cecelia stating if called to testify, she would have testified the drugs

belonged to Kevin. Patterson’s affidavit does not identify the letter attached to the

petition as the letter she received from Cecelia. Even assuming arguendo the letter was

properly authenticated, the letter states “possibly” Kevin left the drugs in the car, and does

not affirmatively state the drugs belonged to Kevin. Both Patterson and Appellant

testified at trial that Appellant and Cecelia were both using the car. Appellant testified

she told the police the drugs belonged to either Cecelia or Kevin.         Appellant has not

demonstrated a reasonable probability of a change in the outcome had Cecelia also been

called to testify there is a possibility the drugs belong to Kevin. We find Appellant has not

demonstrated ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to subpoena Cecelia as a

witness, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her an evidentiary

hearing on this claim.
       {¶20} The first assignment of error is overruled.

                                                 II.

       {¶21} In her second assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in

denying her an evidentiary hearing on her claim counsel was ineffective for failing to

impeach Officer Shank’s testimony the second bedroom in Appellant’s home was

unoccupied with photographs from Snapchat of Appellant’s daughter occupying the

room. We disagree.

       {¶22} In her affidavit, Patterson stated Appellant’s daughter had her own room in

Appellant’s home and would send Patterson Snapchat photos of herself in the room.

Photocopies of screenshots of what appear to be Snapchat photos are attached to the

petition, but again are not identified in Patterson’s affidavit as the photographs she

received from Appellant’s daughter.

       {¶23} Assuming arguendo the photographs were properly authenticated, the

photographs do not demonstrate the room was occupied. The photographs are too dark

to determine what is depicted, with the exception of several photographs in which a dog

is clearly visible. Further, Patterson does not state in her affidavit that she provided these

photographs to trial counsel to use as impeachment of Officer Shank’s testimony.

       {¶24} Even if the photographs were of sufficient quality to demonstrate the second

bedroom was occupied, we find no prejudice from counsel’s failure to impeach Officer

Shank’s testimony concerning the occupation of the bedroom. Appellant argues the State

was permitted to paint Appellant’s home as a “trap house” by virtue of the unoccupied

second bedroom. Appellant points to no place in the record where the State argued the

home was a trap house, and Officer Shank did not testify he believed the home to be a trap
house. Rather, he merely testified he did not search the second bedroom because it was

unoccupied.

       {¶25} We find Appellant did not demonstrate counsel was ineffective, and the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in denying her an evidentiary hearing on this issue.

       {¶26} The second assignment of error is overruled.

                                                III.

       {¶27} In her third assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in

failing to grant her an evidentiary hearing on her claim trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to impeach Officer Shank’s testimony concerning the phone call Appellant made

while he transported her to the jail. We disagree.

       {¶28} In her affidavit, Patterson stated she is the account holder for Appellant’s

daughter’s cellphone. She stated the cellphone records showed Appellant called her

daughter from the back of the cruiser. Attached to the petition is what appears to be an

account of a cellphone, with handwritten notations indicating this account is for

Appellant’s daughter’s phone, and listing Appellant’s cellphone number, with an arrow

pointing to a call. Again, Patterson’s affidavit does not identify this exhibit, and does not

demonstrate counsel was aware of the cellphone bill.

       {¶29} The trial court made the following findings regarding the cellphone bill:



              Finally, Perenkovich accuses counsel of being ineffective because he

       did not impeach “Officer Shank’s testimony about statements he heard

       Perenkovich make while he was transporting her to jail.” Perenkovich

       seems to be making the case that the illegible phone bill would show that

       Perenkovich made a call to her daughter’s cell phone while she was in the
      police cruiser. Shank acknowledged that the individual answering the call

      was an unknown subject. Even if counsel had competent evidence to show

      that she called her daughter’s phone number, and even if counsel had been

      made aware of the evidence, it still could not have been used to impeach

      Office [sic] Shank’s testimony. Officer Shank could not have contradicted

      himself because he referred to the person on the other end of the call as an

      “unknown caller.”




      {¶30} Judgment entry, July 22, 2025, p. 4.

      {¶31} We agree with the reasoning of the trial court.        Appellant argues the

cellphone bill would demonstrate the call was made to Appellant’s daughter, and not to

“any ancillary drug acquaintances.” Brief of Appellant, p. 13. However, Officer Shank did

not testify the call was made to ancillary drug acquaintances. The officer testified as to

what he heard on the call, which he stated was made to an unknown caller. We find

Appellant has not demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel, and the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant an evidentiary hearing on this claim.

      {¶32} The third assignment of error is overruled.
      {¶33} For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the judgment of the

Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

      {¶34} Costs to Appellant.



By: Hoffman, J.

King, P.J. and

Baldwin, J. concur.