State v. Smith

[Cite as State v. Smith, 2026-Ohio-1262.]



                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                    HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO


STATE OF OHIO,                                :        APPEAL NO.        C-250216
                                                       TRIAL NO.         24/CRB/12818
         Plaintiff-Appellee,                  :

   vs.                                        :
                                                            JUDGMENT ENTRY
MELISSA SMITH,                                :

         Defendant-Appellant.                 :



          This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs.
          For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
          Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal,
allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24.
          The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the
Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial
court for execution under App.R. 27.



To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on 4/8/2026 per order of the court.


By:_______________________
      Administrative Judge
[Cite as State v. Smith, 2026-Ohio-1262.]



                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                    HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO


STATE OF OHIO,                              :     APPEAL NO.     C-250216
                                                  TRIAL NO.      24/CRB/12818
         Plaintiff-Appellee,                :

   vs.                                      :
                                                         OPINION
MELISSA SMITH,                              :

         Defendant-Appellant.               :



Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: April 8, 2026



Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, William T. Horsley, Chief Prosecuting Attorney,
and Phoebe Cates, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Alana Van Gundy, for Defendant-Appellant.
                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


BOCK, Judge.

       {¶1}    Defendant-appellant Melissa Smith appeals her conviction for

disorderly conduct under R.C. 2917.11(A)(1), challenging the sufficiency and weight of

the evidence. Smith argues that the evidence proved that she reacted defensively when

the victim (“D.J.”) hit Smith’s phone out of her hand twice in a single night.

       {¶2}    We disagree and hold that the evidence proved that Smith’s behavior

was turbulent and recklessly caused inconvenience, alarm, and annoyance to D.J.

Despite D.J. asking Smith to stop, Smith refused to stop broadcasting D.J.’s face and

name on social media. Smith also blocked D.J.’s mother’s driveway with her car at

2:00 a.m. and broadcast D.J.’s mother’s house and address on social media. We

further hold that the evidence proved that Smith recklessly caused inconvenience,

alarm, and annoyance to D.J.’s mother by fighting and engaging in turbulent behavior

in front of D.J.’s mother’s house at 2:00 a.m.

       {¶3}    We overrule Smith’s assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                        I. Factual and Procedural History

       {¶4}    Police arrested Smith and charged her with misdemeanor assault in

violation of R.C. 2903.13. Before trial, Smith filed a notice of self-defense.

A. The State’s case

       {¶5}    At trial, D.J. testified that she and Smith “have issues” and “don’t talk to

each other.” D.J. traced those issues back to early July 2024, when D.J. broke up a

fight between Smith and D.J.’s cousin. Smith filed a police report about the incident.

       {¶6}    Later that month, D.J. arrived at Bar 29 sometime around 11:00 p.m.

and encountered Smith in the parking lot. There, Smith approached D.J.’s friend and




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asked for a lighter. Smith “turned on her phone” to livestream the encounter1 on

Facebook and “pointed it right in [D.J.’s] face.” According to D.J., Smith was repeating

D.J.’s name and that D.J.’s mother owned a daycare. At one point, Smith livestreamed

D.J.’s significant other and friends.

        {¶7}    When D.J. left the bar, Smith approached D.J. “with her phone pointed

in [D.J.’s] face.” After Smith got “so close” to D.J., she “smack[ed] the phone out of

[Smith’s] hand.” Smith gathered her phone and “put [D.J.] right back on social media.”

D.J. recalled asking Smith to “get away” and asked security to “get her away from me.”

Smith’s behavior angered D.J.

        {¶8}    D.J., her significant other, and a friend went to D.J.’s mother’s house,

which is “less than a five-minute walk” to Smith’s house. They arrived at D.J.’s

mother’s house around 2:00 a.m. and found Smith blocking the driveway with her car.

This also angered D.J., who asked Smith to move her car multiple times. Smith

refused. Instead, Smith livestreamed the encounter. During the livestream, Smith

recited D.J.’s name, D.J.’s mother’s name, D.J.’s mother’s address, and “point[ed] her

phone towards” the house. Smith told D.J. that she was at D.J.’s mother’s house “to

tell your mom that you smacked my phone out of my hand.” D.J. recalled being “calm

and collect[ed],” while Smith was “loud” and smelled of alcohol.

        {¶9}    With Smith in her car and the windows down, D.J. tried to “punch

[Smith] or punch the phone out of her hand.” Smith got out of her car, pushed D.J.,

“and then it just went from there.” The two “start[ed] fighting.” D.J. testified, “She

punched me. I punched her back. Or she pushed me, I pushed her back.”




1 The transcript suggests that the livestream was played at trial, but there is no recording of the

livestream in the record.


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       {¶10} D.J.’s mother came out of the house, called 9-1-1, and yelled, “Stop, you

guys.” While D.J. stopped, Smith approached D.J.’s mother, who asked Smith to “back

up,” told Smith that the police were on their way, and accused Smith of trespassing.

D.J. and Smith started “figh[ting] again.” D.J. clarified that they were “tussling” and

fell over garbage cans. D.J. explained that she had trouble recalling whether punches

were exchanged because the incident happened a year before the trial. Smith

continued livestreaming the events with her phone until the police arrived.

       {¶11} Officer Koch-Hutchinson responded to the 9-1-1 call and recalled

“hear[ing] plenty of screaming” as she arrived at the scene. Officer Koch-Hutchinson

questioned D.J., while Officer Paddon questioned Smith. Although neither Smith nor

D.J. needed medical attention, Smith was taken to a hospital. And while Smith told

officers that she had called 9-1-1, Smith refused to discuss the specifics of the incident

with the officers. Officer Paddon testified and described Smith’s demeanor as “very

aggressive,” “very irate,” and “very unhappy.”

       {¶12} At the close of the State’s case, Smith moved for an acquittal under

Crim.R. 29. The trial court denied her motion, but it sua sponte amended the

misdemeanor assault count to misdemeanor disorderly conduct under R.C. 2917.11.

B. Smith’s defense

       {¶13} Smith testified that she drove to D.J.’s mother’s house because Smith

had “a rapport” with D.J.’s mother, who cared for Smith’s children. Smith wanted to

inform D.J.’s mother that things were “getting out of control.” Smith testified that she

called 9-1-1 and began livestreaming herself when she arrived.

       {¶14} After D.J. arrived home, D.J. approached Smith “and immediately

started assaulting [Smith].” At the time, Smith was “outside of [the] car talking to

Facebook live and 911 waiting for the officers to respond before I approached the house


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[at] about 2:00 in the morning.” Smith told the dispatcher2 that D.J. was assaulting

Smith. Smith testified that D.J. was “lying” during her testimony.

        {¶15} Smith recalled that D.J., her significant other, and friend “jumped, beat,

[and] stomped” on Smith. Smith denied having tried to hit D.J. and simply clenched

her phone as she shielded her face from D.J.’s attack. Smith recalled being knocked to

the ground and trying “to take cover” under her car. Smith testified that she was

screaming for help as D.J. demanded Smith hand over her phone.

        {¶16} Smith explained that D.J.’s mother walked out of her home and told

everyone to “stop” and “[g]et off of her,” to which D.J. replied, “Fuck her.” When the

attack ended, Smith tried to read D.J.’s license plate to the dispatcher as D.J. fled.

When D.J. saw Smith reading her license plate, D.J. returned to continue the attack.

        {¶17} Smith recalled that, when the attack ended, she approached D.J.’s

mother, who was standing outside of her house. D.J. “shot up, ran up, and then she

just began to boom, boom, boom.” Smith, still on the phone with 9-1-1, narrated the

attack and told the dispatcher that D.J. had “knocked [Smith] over the fucking trash

cans.” Smith pleaded, “[h]elp, help, help the whole damn time.”

        {¶18} After Smith finished testifying, the trial court pointed out that “the

record can’t really capture the decibel level and the physicality of [Smith’s] outbursts.”

It described her outbursts as “substantial”3 and suggested that Smith was experiencing

“extraordinary emotional or psychological problems.”

        {¶19} The trial court found that “the State[] overc[a]me the defendant’s

motion for self-defense.” And it found Smith guilty of disorderly conduct based on


2 The 9-1-1 call is not in the record, despite Smith repeatedly asking her attorney to “play 911 for the

Judge.”
3 During a brief recess while Officer Paddon was on the witness stand, the State informed the trial

court that Smith had photographed Paddon at a previous hearing and posted it to social media.
After Smith was told to delete the photograph, she reportedly “called the officer a clown.”


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                OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


D.J.’s and the responding officers’ testimony. The trial court sentenced Smith to one

day of jail and credited Smith with one day of time served.

                                    II. Analysis

       {¶20} On appeal, Smith raises a single assignment of error challenging the

sufficiency and weight of the evidence supporting her disorderly-conduct conviction.

Smith argues that the evidence proves that she reacted defensively to D.J. approaching

her and knocking her phone out of her hand. Smith also disputes whether she

recklessly caused annoyance, inconvenience, or harm.

A. Sufficiency of the evidence

       {¶21} Smith asserts that her conviction is not supported by sufficient

evidence. We note that Smith raised self-defense as a defense to the original assault

charge and the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that in, self-defense cases, “‘the state’s

rebuttal of a defendant’s claim of self-defense’ is not ‘subject to review under the

sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard.’” State v. Knuff, 2024-Ohio-902, ¶ 206, quoting

State v. Messenger, 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 1.

       {¶22} Here, however, it is unclear whether self-defense could serve as a full

affirmative defense to every element of a disorderly-conduct charge. This is especially

true where the State does not specify upon which conduct it bases a charge.

Accordingly, we address Smith’s invitation to review her conviction for both the

sufficiency and the weight of the evidence.

       {¶23} We review the sufficiency of the evidence by asking “‘whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.’” State v. Johnson, 2008-Ohio-705, ¶ 15 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Waddy, 63

Ohio St.3d 424, 430 (1992).


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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


       {¶24} Although not specified by the trial court at trial or on the judge’s sheet,

the parties agree that Smith was convicted of disorderly conduct in violation of R.C.

2917.11(A)(1), which prohibits recklessly causing “inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm

to another by . . . [e]ngaging in fighting, in threatening harm to persons or property,

or in violent or turbulent behavior.”

              1. Smith fought and engaged in turbulent behavior

       {¶25} First, the State had to prove that Smith’s conduct fell within the

activities proscribed by the disorderly-conduct statute—fighting, threatening harm to

people or property, or “violent or turbulent behavior.” R.C. 2917.11(A)(1).

       {¶26} D.J. testified that Smith pushed and struck her. D.J. recalled, “She

punched me. I punched her back. Or she pushed me, I pushed her back.”

       {¶27} Self-defense is an affirmative defense that “may exonerate an accused’s

admitted use of force.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Parrish, 2020-Ohio-4807, ¶ 4 (1st

Dist.). And fighting is an exchange of mutual blows or being “‘one of two or more

combatants in physical combat.’” City of Cleveland Hts. v. Cohen, 2015-Ohio-1636,

¶ 50 (8th Dist.), quoting The New Lexicon Webster’s Dictionary of the English

Language (Encyclopedic Ed. 1989). So, Smith’s assertion of self-defense is an

admission to fighting D.J., an act prohibited under R.C. 2917.11(A)(1). A rational trier

of fact could have found that Smith fought D.J.

       {¶28} Smith and the State appear to dispute whether her conduct amounted

to turbulent behavior. Turbulent behavior is “‘tumultuous behavior or unruly conduct

characterized by violent disturbance or commotion.’” Johnson, 2008-Ohio-705, at

¶ 12 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Reeder, 18 Ohio St.3d 25, 27 (1985).

       {¶29} A rational trier of fact could find that Smith’s behavior was “turbulent”

at the bar and at D.J.’s mother’s house based on D.J.’s and responding officers’


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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


testimony. According to D.J., she has a contentious relationship with Smith. D.J.

recalled being at the bar when Smith, camera in hand, shadowed D.J. and broadcast

D.J.’s face and name on social media over D.J.’s objection. Despite the volatility at the

bar, Smith chose to drive to D.J.’s mother’s house at 2:00 a.m. and block the driveway.

There, Smith refused to move her car, recited D.J.’s name and her mother’s address

on the livestream, and advanced towards D.J.’s mother after the fight.

       {¶30} A rational trier of fact could find that Smith fought and that her behavior

was turbulent at both the bar and D.J.’s mother’s house.

              2. Smith recklessly caused inconvenience, annoyance, and alarm

       {¶31} Second, the State’s evidence had to prove that Smith recklessly caused

inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm to another. See R.C. 2917.11(A)(1). Smith

maintains that the evidence failed to prove that she was reckless and, instead, reveals

that she responded to D.J. with “defensive action[s].”

       {¶32} Smith behaved recklessly if the evidence showed she acted “with

heedless indifference to the consequences,” and disregarded a substantial and

unjustifiable risk that her behavior would likely cause a certain result. R.C. 2901.22(C).

The State may prove recklessness with circumstantial evidence. See State v. Briers,

2025-Ohio-5727, ¶ 15.

       {¶33} Conduct is “likely to cause a certain result” if “‘there is merely good

reason for expectation or belief.’” State v. Hardman, 2016-Ohio-498, ¶ 38 (8th Dist.),

quoting State v. Young, 2005-Ohio-3584, ¶ 17 (8th Dist.), citing 1974 Committee

Comment to R.C. 2901.22(C). In other words, the evidence must prove that Smith

recognized she risked inconveniencing, annoying, or causing alarm to another person

and “‘proceed[ed] with a perverse disregard for it.’” Briers at ¶ 15, quoting State v.

Ramey, 2012-Ohio-1015, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.). The State may prove inconvenience,


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annoyance, or alarm via testimony describing “the impact of the event on another.” In

re J.S., 2019-Ohio-35, ¶ 21 (5th Dist.).

       {¶34} Viewing D.J.’s testimony in a light most favorable to the State, her

testimony proved Smith recklessly caused annoyance, alarm, and inconvenience to

D.J. at the bar. D.J. provided Smith notice that her behavior upset D.J.—she told her

friends to ignore Smith, asked security to prohibit Smith from entering the bar,

slapped Smith’s phone out of her hand, and asked Smith to “get away,” but Smith

continued to follow D.J. and then broadcast her on social media. See State v. Bailey,

2002-Ohio-3133, ¶ 37 (1st Dist.) (holding that the evidence sufficed to prove that

defendant’s advances recklessly caused annoyance and alarm to a 16-year-old girl

when he did not desist and followed her around the gym after she asked him to leave

her alone). D.J.’s reactions reveal that D.J. was annoyed, alarmed, and

inconvenienced. Moreover, D.J. testified that Smith’s behavior was upsetting.

       {¶35} And D.J.’s testimony proved that Smith recklessly caused annoyance,

alarm, and inconvenience to both D.J. and D.J.’s mother at D.J.’s mother’s house.

Smith parked in front of D.J.’s mother’s driveway at 2:00 a.m. and, despite D.J.’s

reactions to Smith at the bar, continued to broadcast D.J. and D.J.’s mother’s house

on social media. D.J. asked Smith to move her car and hit the phone out of Smith’s

hand again. The responding officers and D.J. described Smith as loud, and D.J.’s

mother emerged from the house in the middle of the night after Smith fought D.J. As

Smith approached D.J.’s mother, D.J.’s mother asked Smith to “back up” and warned

Smith that she was trespassing. A rational trier of fact could infer that Smith knew, or

should have known, that her behavior at D.J.’s mother’s house caused D.J. and her

mother inconvenience, annoyance, and alarm.




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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


       {¶36} In sum, the State’s evidence was sufficient to prove that Smith’s

turbulent behavior at the bar and at D.J.’s mother’s house, as well as Smith fighting

D.J. at her mother’s house, caused inconvenience, alarm, and annoyance to D.J. and

her mother.

   B. Smith’s conviction is not contrary to the weight of the evidence

       {¶37} Smith argues that her conviction is against the weight of the evidence.

We may reverse a conviction as against the manifest weight of the evidence and order

a new trial if we find, following an independent review of the record, that the trier of

fact “‘clearly lost its way in resolving conflicts in the evidence and created such a

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’”

State v. Nichols, 2025-Ohio-1515, ¶ 18 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Sorrels, 71 Ohio

App.3d 162, 166 (1st Dist. 1991).

       {¶38} Smith argues that the evidence proves D.J. initiated both physical

confrontations when she knocked Smith’s phone out of her hand. In doing so, she

appears to challenge the trial court’s finding that the State disproved her self-defense

claim. Smith does not identify which self-defense element(s) she believes the State

failed to disprove. In any event, the weight of the evidence proves that she was at fault

for the affray at the bar and at D.J.’s mother’s house.

       {¶39} The State may disprove a defendant’s self-defense claim by disproving

any one of the self-defense elements, including that the defendant was not “at fault in

causing the circumstances that led to the altercation.” Nichols at ¶ 25. In other words,

the accused cannot have been the first aggressor. Id. But “‘[a] person may not provoke

an assault or voluntarily enter an encounter and then claim a right of self-defense.’”

Id., quoting State v. Elam, 2022-Ohio-1895, ¶ 14 (12th Dist.).




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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


       {¶40} The trial court did not err when it afforded more weight to D.J.’s and

the responding officers’ testimony than to Smith’s testimony. And their testimony

showed that Smith provoked D.J. at the bar and then willingly advanced to a volatile

situation at D.J.’s mother’s house. Although we independently review the evidence,

the trier of fact is in the “best position to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the

weight to be given to the evidence presented.” State v. Bullock, 2022-Ohio-925, ¶ 14

(1st Dist.). We hold that the trial court did not clearly lose its way in resolving conflicts

in the evidence or create a miscarriage of justice.

       {¶41}    Because Smith’s conviction for disorderly conduct is supported by

sufficient evidence and the weight of the evidence, we overrule the assignment of error.

                                    III. Conclusion

       {¶42} We overrule Smith’s assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

                                                                       Judgment affirmed.

KINSLEY, P.J., and CROUSE, J., concur.




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