State v. Stafford

[Cite as State v. Stafford, 2026-Ohio-1378.]


                                COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                       :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                 :
                                                              No. 115414
                 v.                                  :

TYLER STAFFORD,                                      :

                 Defendant-Appellant.                :


                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 16, 2026


          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                    Case Nos. CR-24-691606-A, CR-25-700742-B,
                                and CR-25-701171-A


                                               Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Tasha L. Forchione, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
                 Thomas T. Lampman, Assistant Public Defender, for
                 appellant.
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J.:

               Defendant-appellant Tyler Charles Stafford (“Stafford”) appeals from

his guilty plea to having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C.

2923.13(A)(2). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural History

               In June 2025, Stafford entered into a plea agreement with the State

under Cuyahoga C.P. Nos. CR-24-691606-A, CR-25-700742-B, and CR-25-701171-

A (respectively, “CR-24-691606,” “CR-25-700742,” and “CR-25-701171”).

               Relevant to this appeal, in CR-24-691606, Stafford pleaded guilty to

having weapons while under disability pursuant to R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), a felony of

the third degree, and the State dismissed the remaining counts. The State alleged

that at the time of the offense, Stafford was under indictment in Summit County for

involuntary manslaughter and therefore, was not permitted to possess a firearm.1

               In CR-25-700742, a 15-count indictment, Stafford pleaded guilty to

five counts, including failure to comply with the order or signal of a police officer,

obstruction of official business, vandalism, tampering with evidence, and drug

possession. The State dismissed the remaining ten counts.

               In CR-25-701171, Stafford pleaded guilty to felonious assault with a

one-year firearm specification, and the State dismissed the remaining count.




      1 Stafford’s counsel acknowledged that his client was indicted for voluntary
manslaughter but notified the court that the case was subsequently tried and Stafford was
convicted of a misdemeanor assault.
              The court proceeded to sentencing on all cases immediately after the

plea, imposing nine months on the having-weapons-while-under-disability charge

in CR-24-691606, and additional penalties on the remaining charges resulting in an

aggregate sentence of 16 years in prison.

              The trial court reconvened in July 2025 for a hearing. The trial court

explained that it agreed to delay journalizing the sentences in each case to allow the

defense to submit case law regarding the mandatory consecutive sentence for failure

to comply with the order or signal of a police officer. The parties informed the court

that they agreed that the consecutive sentence for a violation of R.C. 2921.331 only

applied to that count and did not mandate consecutive sentences on the other

charges. The trial court then imposed nine months on the having-weapons-while-

under-disability charge. The aggregate sentence on all charges was 15 years, 9

months in prison.

              Stafford appeals raising the following assignments of error for our

review.

                           Assignment of Error No. 1

      It was plain error to allow Stafford to plead guilty to a crime, which this
      court had already held facially unconstitutional.

                           Assignment of Error No. 2

      Advising Stafford to plead guilty to an unconstitutional offense was
      ineffective assistance.
               In this appeal, Stafford’s sole challenge is to his conviction under CR-

24-691606 for having weapons while under disability pursuant R.C. 2923.13(A)(2);

therefore, we confine our review to that conviction.

               Stafford argues that because of this court’s decision in State v.

Philpotts, 2025-Ohio-1179 (8th Dist.), which found R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) facially

unconstitutional, the trial court plainly erred when it accepted his plea and his trial

counsel committed ineffective assistance by advising him to enter the plea. The

State points out that Philpotts was stayed by the Ohio Supreme Court; and therefore,

the opinion had no precedential value at the time Stafford entered his plea. Further,

the State argues that Stafford voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly entered his

plea, thus the conviction should not be reversed.2

               When a party fails to object to an error at the trial-court level, they are

limited to arguing plain error on appeal. State v. Bouyer, 2023-Ohio-4793, ¶ 62

(8th Dist.). In order to establish plain error, the appellant has the burden of

establishing that (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was obvious; and (3) but for the

error the outcome of the proceeding would be different. Id. Further, it is generally

recognized that an appellate court should be cautious when finding plain error, and

only do so when reversal is necessary to correct a manifest miscarriage of justice. Id.



      2 The State also challenges our holding in Philpotts.     We note that Stafford’s
arguments on appeal do not challenge the constitutionality of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), but
challenge whether the Philpotts decision should have been considered when the court
accepted his plea and when his counsel advised him about the plea. As it will be discussed,
consideration of Philpotts was not required and thus, we need not address the State’s
arguments here.
However, failure to raise the issue in the trial court when the issue is readily

apparent constitutes a waiver, and this court need not address the issue for the first

time on appeal.        Cleveland v. Clark, 2019-Ohio-1999, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.), citing

Cleveland v. Peoples, 2015-Ohio-674 (8th Dist.), citing Cleveland v. Meehan, 2014-

Ohio-2265, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing Cleveland v. Taylor, 2013-Ohio-4708, ¶ 7-8 (8th

Dist.).

                  Nevertheless, the record establishes there was no error. At the time

Stafford entered his plea, the Ohio Supreme Court had granted the State’s request

for a stay of this court’s order in Philpotts. The Ohio Supreme Court has found:

          “The effect of a stay pending review in a criminal appeal is preventive
          in nature. It preserves the status quo of the litigation pending appellate
          review and suspends the power of the lower court to issue execution of
          the judgment or sentence.”

State v. Roberts, 2008-Ohio-3835, ¶ 24, quoting Loeb v. State, 387 So.2d 433, 435-

436 (Fla.App. 1980).

                  Thus, at the time of Stafford’s plea the statute was constitutional on

its face and remained in effect. The trial court did not plainly err when it accepted

Stafford’s plea. Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.

                  Turning to Stafford’s second assignment of error, in order to establish

ineffective assistance of counsel, Stafford must demonstrate that (1) his counsel was

deficient in some aspect of his representation, and (2) there is a reasonable

probability that, were it not for counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have

been different.       Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984).
Moreover, “‘the failure to make a showing of either deficient performance or

prejudice defeats a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.’” State v. Harris, 2021-

Ohio-856, ¶ 21, citing In re S.A., 2019-Ohio-4782, ¶ 46, quoting State v. Davenport,

2018-Ohio-2933, ¶ 25, citing Strickland at 697. Furthermore, an attorney is entitled

to the presumption that his ‘“conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance.”’ State v. Daniels, 2018-Ohio-1701, ¶ 23 (1st Dist.), quoting

Strickland at 689.

               Stafford’s challenge hinges on whether his attorney erred when he did

not raise the constitutionality of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) before the trial court. Stafford

suggests, based on a silent record, that his trial lawyer did not consider the

constitutionality of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2) or review it with Stafford prior to the plea.

However, it is well settled that alleged ineffectiveness must be apparent from the

record on appeal. State v. Rowe, 2011-Ohio-5739, ¶ 22 (3d Dist.). A party alleging

errors outside of the record may utilize a postconviction-relief petition to raise them.

Id., citing State v. Coleman, 85 Ohio St.3d 129, 134 (1999). A postconviction-relief

petition is a collateral attack on a judgment and allows a petitioner to submit

documentation and affidavits to support their argument. State v. Broom, 2016-

Ohio-1028, ¶ 28 and R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(b).

               Stafford’s attorney informed the court before the plea that he met

with his client, reviewed discovery and his client’s constitutional rights, and believed

Stafford was entering into the plea deal knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

When questioned, Stafford averred that he was satisfied with the performance of his
counsel and understood his constitutional rights and the nature of his plea. Based

on the record before us, we do not find any evidence that overcomes the

presumption that Stafford’s lawyer’s conduct fell within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance.

              Accordingly, the second assignment of error is overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.          The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.


                                 ____
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, PRESIDING JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR