State v. Stiffler

[Cite as State v. Stiffler, 2026-Ohio-1576.]


                                  IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS
                                    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                    TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO


  STATE OF OHIO                                   Case No. 2025 AP 10 0033

   Plaintiff - Appellee                           Opinion and Judgment Entry

  -vs-                                            Appeal from the Tuscarawas County Court of
                                                  Common Pleas, Case No. 2025 CR 03 0084
  LEE B. STIFFLER
                                                  Judgment: Affirmed
  Defendant - Appellant
                                                  Date of Judgment Entry: April 30, 2026



BEFORE: William B. Hoffman; Robert G. Montgomery; Kevin W. Popham, Judges

APPEARANCES: Kristine W. Beard, Assistant Tuscarawas County Prosecuting
Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee; Travis Collins, for Defendant-Appellant.




Hoffman, J.


         {¶1} Defendant-appellant Lee Stiffler appeals the judgment entered by the

Tuscarawas County Common Pleas Court following his pleas of no contest to failure to

comply with an order or signal of a police officer (R.C. 2921.331) and resisting arrest (R.C.

2921.33), and sentencing him to a term of community control of two years. Plaintiff-

appellee is the State of Ohio.

                                     STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

         {¶2} On February 22, 2025, Officer Joshua Shaffer was working the midnight

shift for the New Philadelphia Police Department. Around 11:45 p.m. the officer was on
patrol on Wabash Avenue. The officer stopped his cruiser behind a black Audi at a traffic

light. Officer Shaffer was unable to see a rear plate or temporary tag on the Audi. The

Audi made a left turn onto Tuscarawas Avenue, and the officer activated his lights to

initiate a stop.

       {¶3} The Audi, which was driven by Appellant, briefly went up over the curb and

back onto the roadway before stopping. Once stopped, the officer still could not see a rear

license plate or temporary tag.

       {¶4} While walking toward the vehicle, the officer saw a white piece of paper in

the top left corner of the vehicle’s rear window. He could not read the tag until he was

standing near the taillight of the car. Officer Shaffer’s ability to read the tag was further

hampered by the window tint on the car.

       {¶5} Appellant rolled down the window. The officer asked Appellant how he was

doing and explained the reason for the stop. Appellant responded using profanity. The

officer requested Appellant’s license, registration, and proof of insurance. Appellant was

agitated, aggressive, and belligerent toward the officer, continuing to use profanity. Due

to Appellant’s behavior, Officer Shaffer radioed for backup.

       {¶6} Appellant produced his driver’s license after rifling through some papers.

When asked again for the registration and proof of insurance, Appellant became further

agitated. Appellant called his mother, the owner of the vehicle, and allowed her to speak

with the officer. Appellant’s mother indicated she had proof of her insurance in her email

and would attempt to send that to Appellant electronically. She stated the registration

was in the glove compartment.

       {¶7} Appellant had difficulty producing the registration. He initially handed

Officer Shaffer a tire receipt. When the officer informed Appellant the document was not
the registration, Appellant handed him a bank receipt.           The officer could see the

registration in the stack of papers Appellant retrieved from the glove compartment, and

told Appellant he would trade Appellant the tire receipt for the registration, which he

pointed out to Appellant. He handed Appellant the tire receipt, and Appellant handed the

officer the tire receipt a second time. Appellant finally produced the registration with help

from Officer Shaffer.

       {¶8} Officer Shaffer returned to the cruiser to check the status of Appellant’s

license and to check for warrants. Officer Shaffer discussed the situation with Sergeant

Wayne Clark, who had arrived in response to the call for backup. Officer Shaffer was

concerned Appellant was under the influence based on his difficulty identifying and

producing the registration, his slurred speech, and his agitated and aggressive behavior.

Both officers agreed Officer Shaffer should ask Appellant to step out of the vehicle to

perform field sobriety tests.

       {¶9} Officer Shaffer approached the vehicle again, and asked Appellant to turn

off the car and step out of the vehicle. Appellant repeatedly refused. Appellant argued

with the officer, then rolled up his window. Appellant drove away.

       {¶10} Appellant was indicted by the Tuscarawas County Grand Jury with one

count of failure to comply with the order or signal of a police officer and one count of

resisting arrest. He filed a motion to suppress all evidence related to the traffic stop on

the basis the officer lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to initiate the stop,

lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant, and lacked probable cause to arrest

Appellant. The trial court overruled the motion following an evidentiary hearing.

       {¶11} Appellant entered a plea of no contest to both of the charges in the

indictment. The trial court sentenced him to a term of community control of two years.
It is from the October 3, 2025, judgment of the trial court Appellant prosecutes his appeal,

assigning as error:



              I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING

       THAT     OFFICER     SHAFFER       COULD     NOT     READ     APPELLANT’S

       TEMPORARY TAG UNTIL HE WAS STANDING AT THE TAILLIGHT OF

       APPELLANT’S VEHICLE.

              II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY

       FINDING THAT APPELLANT’S TEMPORARY TAG WAS NOT IN “PLAIN

       VIEW” AS REQUIRED BY R.C. 4503.21 DUE TO WINDOW TINTING.

              III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING

       THAT APPELLANT DROVE ONTO THE CURB AFTER OFFICER

       SHAFFER INITIATED THE TRAFFIC STOP.

              IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING THAT

       APPELLANT’S AGITATION PROVIDED OFFICER SHAFFER WITH

       REASONABLE SUSPICION TO CONTINUE DETAINING APPELLANT

       AFTER READING THE TEMPORARY TAG.



       {¶12} All of Appellant’s assignments of error argue the trial court erred in

overruling his motion to suppress.

       {¶13} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact. State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress,

the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is in the best position to resolve

questions of fact and to evaluate witness credibility. See State v. Dunlap, 1995-Ohio-243;
State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20 (1982). Accordingly, a reviewing court must defer to

the trial court's factual findings if competent, credible evidence exists to support those

findings. See Burnside at ¶ 8. However, once this Court has accepted those facts as true,

it must independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met the

applicable legal standard. Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706, 707 (4th

Dist. 1997); See, generally, United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002); Ornelas v.

United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996). That is, the application of the law to the trial court's

findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review. Ornelas at 697. Moreover, due

weight should be given “to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local

law enforcement officers.” Id. at 698.

       {¶14} It is pursuant to this standard we review Appellant’s assignments of error.

                                               I., II.

       {¶15} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in

finding the officer could not see the temporary tag on his vehicle until the officer was

standing at the taillight. He argues from the body camera video, the officer appeared to

be able to read the “Ohio” portion of the tag from a car length or more behind the vehicle.

He also argues the trial court erred in finding the window tint caused the officer to believe

the temporary tag was not in plain view.

       {¶16} The trial court made the following finding regarding Officer Shaffer’s ability

to see the temporary tag on the vehicle:



              The Court FINDS that the evidence establishes that Officer Shaffer

       reasonably believed that the vehicle was being driven in violation of R.C.

       4503.21(A)(3) when he initiated the traffic stop.
              The Court FINDS that Officer Shaffer was unable to see a rear plate

       or temporary tag on the vehicle when the police cruiser was stopped

       immediately behind the vehicle. Officer Shaffer did not see the temporary

       tag until he was walking toward the vehicle due to window tinting, and he

       was unable to read the temporary tag until he was standing by the taillight

       of the vehicle. The Court finds this testimony to be credible.

              The Court FINDS that Officer Shaffer’s testimony supports a finding

       that he reasonably believed that the temporary tag was not displayed in

       plain view due to the window tinting.



       {¶17} Judgment Entry, July 8, 2025, p. 8.

       {¶18} R.C. 4503.21(A)(3) requires a license plate or temporary tag to be displayed

in plain view. The initial stop of the vehicle was based on the officer’s belief the tag was

not in plain view due to his inability to see the sticker from his cruiser. However,

Appellant concedes in his brief he is not challenging the initial stop on appeal:



              Appellant does not contest the initial stop. However, at some point

       after the stop, Officer Shaffer discovered that Appellant had a valid,

       temporary tag in the rear window of his vehicle. The issue before the Court

       is thus, whether Officer Shaffer had a reasonable suspicion to justify his

       continued detention of Appellant AFTER he was able to determine that

       Appellant had a valid temporary license plate in the rear window of his

       vehicle.
       {¶19} Brief of Appellant, p. 5.

       {¶20} Whether the officer was standing at the taillight or farther back when he

first could read the temporary tag, whether the officer needed a flashlight to read the tag,

and whether the window tint prevented the tag from being in plain view are all factual

issues which go to the initial stop, and not to the continued detention. The credibility

issues concerning whether the officer could read the tag go to the issue in the trial court

of whether the officer initially had a reasonable suspicion to stop the car on the basis the

tag was not in plain view, an issue Appellant has abandoned on appeal. We therefore find

Appellant’s first two assignments of error have no bearing on the issue raised on appeal

of whether the continued detention of Appellant AFTER the officer was able to read the

tag was valid.

       {¶21} Further, we find no error in the trial court’s factual findings. From the

video, it appears the officer is standing at or near the taillight of the car when he reads the

numbers on the tag to the dispatcher. After viewing the video footage, the officer admitted

he was mistaken when he initially testified he used his flashlight to read the tag. Supp.

Tr. 19. The officer testified he had difficulty initially reading the tag due to the tint on the

window, and the trial court did not err in making a finding the tint contributed to the

officer’s belief the tag was not in plain view when he initially stopped the vehicle.

       {¶22} We find the trial court’s findings concerning when and how the officer was

able to read the tag were generally supported by the evidence in the case, and further were

relevant only to the issue before the trial court of whether the officer had a reasonable

suspicion of criminal activity to justify the initial stop, an issue Appellant has abandoned

on appeal.

       {¶23} The first and second assignments of error are overruled.
                                              III., IV.

       {¶24} In his third assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in

finding he drove over a curb, giving the officer cause to detain him after observing the

temporary tag. In his fourth assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred

in finding his agitation during the stop provided the officer with a suspicion of criminal

activity to further detain him. Because both assignments of error address the same legal

issue, we address them together.

       {¶25} Appellant argues pursuant to State v. Chatton, 11 Ohio St.3d 59 (1984), once

the officer observed a valid temporary tag in the rear window of his vehicle, the officer

could approach his vehicle and explain to him the reason for the stop, but could not detain

him absent specific and articulable facts which demonstrated the detention was

reasonable. Appellant asserts he did not drive over a curb, but rather over a driveway to

an adjacent church, and his agitation alone did not provide cause to detain him. Appellant

argues the officer violated Chatton by continuing to detain him to request his license and

registration. However, the case law in Ohio has developed and changed subsequent to

Chatton.

       {¶26} In Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), the United States

Supreme Court held a traffic stop could not be prolonged for purpose of a canine sniff of

a vehicle. However, in reaching this conclusion, the court discussed the mission of a

traffic stop:



                Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s

       mission includes “ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.” Caballes,

       543 U. S., at 408, 125 S. Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842. Typically such inquiries
       involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are

       outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s

       registration and proof of insurance. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U. S. 648,

       658-660, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979). See also 4 W. LaFave,

       Search and Seizure §9.3(c), pp. 507-517 (5th ed. 2012). These checks serve

       the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles

       on the road are operated safely and responsibly. See Prouse, 440 U. S., at

       658-659, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660; LaFave, Search and Seizure

       §9.3(c), at 516 (A “warrant check makes it possible to determine whether

       the apparent traffic violator is wanted for one or more previous traffic

       offenses.”).



       {¶27} Id. at 355.

       {¶28} After Rodriguez, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Dunlap, 2024-

Ohio-4821. In that case, the officer received information the registered owner of a vehicle

did not have a valid driver’s license.       Upon approaching the vehicle, it became

immediately apparent to the officer that the driver of the vehicle did not match the

physical description of the vehicle’s owner. Nonetheless, the officer asked the driver for

his operator’s license, and determined the driver did not have a valid license.

       {¶29} In a plurality opinion, the court held the officer could detain the driver for

the purpose of checking the driver’s license. The lead opinion of the court cited to

Rodriguez, finding even though the initial reason for the stop dissipated upon the officer’s

observation of the driver, the mission of the stop, which included basic safety measures
such as checking the operator’s license, registration, and proof of insurance, allowed the

officer to detain the vehicle. Id. at ¶¶ 19-21.

       {¶30} Most recently, a majority of the Ohio Supreme Court adopted the reasoning

of the lead opinion in Dunlap, including its citation to Rodriguez, as controlling law in

Ohio. In State v. Fips, 2026-Ohio-1207, the officer stopped a vehicle for a headlight

violation. Upon approaching the vehicle, the officer determined the headlight was in fact

operational. The officer asked the driver for his license. Fips told the officer he did not

have it with him, and provided his name, date of birth, and social security number. Using

this information, the officer determined Fips had failed to reinstate his driver’s license,

and had an outstanding arrest warrant. In holding the officer could detain Fips to check

his driver’s license information after determining the headlight, which was the original

basis for the stop, was operational, the court held:



                 We conclude that the extension of the traffic stop in this case was

       reasonable. In reaching this conclusion, we adopt Dunlap's reading of

       Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 191 L. Ed. 2d 492

       (2015). See Dunlap at ¶ 23 (lead opinion). Under Rodriguez, part of the

       mission of a traffic stop is to confirm that the driver is validly licensed.

       Rodriguez at 355. And once a traffic stop has been validly initiated, an

       officer is entitled to complete the mission of the stop, even after the initial

       reasonable suspicion has been dispelled. Dunlap at ¶ 23-24 (lead opinion).

       We also conclude that Fips's failure to produce a driver's license justified

       Officer Rose's extension of the stop to confirm whether Fips was a licensed

       driver.
       {¶31} Id. at ¶ 12.

       {¶32} Pursuant to Fips and Rodriguez, part of the mission of the stop in the

instant case included checking Appellant’s license, registration, and proof of insurance

even after the officer dispelled the original basis of the stop by observing the vehicle

displayed a proper temporary tag in the window. We therefore find the trial court did not

err in finding Officer Shaffer could detain Appellant for the purpose of checking his

license, registration, and proof of insurance.

       {¶33} After determining Appellant’s license was valid and he had no outstanding

warrants, the officer decided to detain Appellant further for field sobriety testing. A

request made of a validly detained motorist to perform field sobriety tests is generally

outside the scope of the original stop and must be separately justified by other specific

and articulable facts showing a reasonable basis for the request. State v. Albaugh, 2015-

Ohio-3536, ¶ 18 (5th Dist.). Although requiring a driver to submit to a field sobriety test

constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, courts have generally

held the intrusion on the driver's liberty resulting from a field sobriety test is minor, and

the officer therefore need only have reasonable suspicion the driver is intoxicated in order

to conduct a field sobriety test. See State v. Bright, 2010-Ohio-1111, ¶ 17 (5th Dist.). In

reviewing this issue, we apply a "totality of the circumstances" approach. See, e.g., State

v. Lucking, 2004-Ohio-90, ¶ 8 (12th Dist.), citing State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291

(1980). Reasonable suspicion constitutes something less than probable cause. State v.

Logan, 2008-Ohio-2969, ¶ 15 (5th Dist.).

       {¶34} During the detention of Appellant to check his documents, further

observations by the officer led to a reasonable suspicion Appellant was driving impaired,

justifying further detention for the purpose of conducting field sobriety tests.          As
Appellant was stopping his vehicle, the officer testified he went over the curb before

reentering the roadway and stopping. While Appellant argues he drove over the entrance

to a church, the video from the police cruiser demonstrates Appellant’s vehicle went up

and over a curb before coming to a stop. When the officer approached the vehicle,

Appellant was immediately agitated and aggressive toward the officer. Appellant’s speech

was slurred. While Appellant was able to produce his license, Appellant could not produce

the vehicle’s registration without significant difficulty. After Appellant called his mom

and learned the registration should be in the glove compartment, he removed the

documents from the glove compartment and initially handed Officer Shaffer a tire receipt.

When the officer pointed out the document was not the registration, Appellant handed

the officer a bank receipt. The officer was able to see the registration. He pointed out the

registration, and asked for it in exchange for the tire receipt. However, after the officer

gave the receipt to Appellant, Appellant handed it back to the officer. From the totality of

the circumstances of the stop, we find the trial court did not err in concluding Officer

Shaffer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion Appellant was impaired to justify

detaining him for field sobriety tests.

       {¶35} The third and fourth assignments of error are overruled.
      {¶36} The judgment of the Tuscarawas County Court of Common Pleas is

affirmed.

      {¶37} Costs to Appellant.



By: Hoffman, P.J.

Montgomery, J. and

Popham, J. concur.