State v. Warren

[Cite as State v. Warren, 2026-Ohio-1193.]


                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                     :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,               :
                                                            No. 115327
                 v.                                :

DERRICK WARREN, II,                                :

                 Defendant-Appellant.              :


                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 2, 2026


         Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                            Case No. CR-24-696442-A


                                             Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Michael Timms, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Allison S. Breneman, for appellant.


EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J.:

                   Defendant-appellant Derrick Warren, II (“Warren”) appeals his rape

convictions and sexually-violent-predator designation. Upon review, we affirm.
    I.       Facts and Procedural History

                  In November 2024, Warren was indicted by a grand jury in a six-

count indictment for offenses that occurred in November 2012 against A.L. Counts

1 through 4 charged Warren with rape, first-degree felonies. Each carried a sexually-

violent-predator specification for either fellatio, vaginal intercourse, digital vaginal

penetration, or digital anal penetration. Count 5 charged Warren with aggravated

robbery, a first-degree felony, and Count 6 charged him with robbery, a second-

degree felony. Warren pleaded not guilty and elected to bifurcate the sexually-

violent-predator specifications. The matter proceeded with a jury trial in April 2025.

                  The following evidence was presented by the State at Warren’s jury

trial.1    First, A.L. offered testimony regarding the events that transpired in

November 2012 and the circumstances that surrounded the initial investigation.

A.L. — who was sober and pursuing a career as a chemical dependency counselor at

the time of trial — acknowledged that she previously battled a drug addiction, which

she supported through sex work. A.L. explained that she posted online ads and

normally met with “regulars.” However, there came a day in November 2012 when

she “was in a desperate situation” because she did not have any regular clients to

meet and needed money to support her drug habit. A.L. testified: “[Warren] spoke

with me about meeting up. And as I recall, we were going to have sex. The amount

was $200-ish. I was supposed to bring $50 in change. That was weird, but again, I




          1 Some witness testimony is discussed out of order for clarity.
was in a desperate situation.” In her desperation, A.L. looked past the abnormal

request, borrowed $50 and a car, and drove to meet Warren at his house on the east

side of Cleveland — an area that was “not at all” familiar to her.

               When A.L. arrived, she called Warren, pulled into the middle of a

parking lot near a strip of houses, and inquired about the meeting’s location. Rather

than providing an address, Warren walked up to the car, entered the vehicle, and

immediately asked for the $50. A.L. testified that Warren’s demeanor changed; he

started “acting really, really funny,” reaching in his pockets, and stalling.    A.L.

“started to get super nervous” and “knew something bad was about to happen.” In

response to this “gut feeling,” A.L. hid the $50 in her mouth and removed the keys

from the ignition.

               A.L. testified, “That’s when he had unzipped his pants and very, very

forcefully — this is not where it is not any longer an escort relationship. It’s not —

this is where it becomes non-consensual. He unzipped his pants and forcefully

grabbed my hair and started shoving his penis into my face and my mouth.” Warren

did not know the $50 was in A.L.’s mouth and repeatedly asked where it was. A.L.

was panicked and believed Warren wanted to rape and rob her. According to A.L.,

Warren maintained control by forcefully grabbing and pulling her hair.

               A.L. then recounted how the encounter continued to escalate:

     He was so hung up on this money in between assaulting me. He was
     very, very, very aggressive. That all happened very fast. He then got
     into the backseat in the middle, always had my hair. Always had my
     hair, even if he had to switch, you know, in the back and grab my hair
     from another angle to get me to come. Now, I’m naked, okay, and he
     has me naked, his pants down, and that’s when he grabs me and puts
     me — and he rapes me vaginally. While he rapes me vaginally, he’s also
     raping with me with his fingers in my vagina and my [buttocks], also
     while he’s holding on to my hair and having his arms on me to have full
     control. He kept on — he kept on saying, do you want to have my baby,
     in a yelling tone, and every time I said no, he had punched me . . . [i]n
     my face, under my face, my head.

Warren did not use a condom and ejaculated inside of A.L. A.L. testified that she

“always, always used protection” when she escorted. Warren then pushed or

punched A.L. onto the floor of the front seat, where she located the car keys and was

able to grab or pull her hair out of Warren’s hand. Warren continued to ask about

the $50, and A.L. told him that the money was shoved in the backseat. When

Warren began looking for the money with “maybe like one knee in the car [and] one

leg out,” A.L. put the keys in the ignition and “took off.”

               Naked and bloody, A.L. fled to a convenience store, said that she had

been raped, and requested that 9-1-1 be called. Police and an ambulance responded

to the call, and A.L. was taken to the hospital, where a sexual assault nurse

examination was performed. A.L. recalled how the experience made her feel,

stating:

      Honestly, I felt like all the nurses and people, even the police and stuff,
      I constantly felt like they — everyone was staring at me. Like I did
      something wrong. Like I was kind of, you know, I was going to escort.
      That’s wrong. But I just — I didn’t feel like I was a victim. I felt like I
      was being judged. I was embarrassed. For the most part, that’s the
      feelings I had and disgusting. I felt disgusting.

A.L. testified that she was not truthful when she spoke to the police and nurse

because she was ashamed and thought she was going to be judged, disbelieved, and
“in trouble” for prior warrants. A.L. did not follow up with police because she felt

like she “did [her] part” but was not supported thereafter. A.L. explained that police

made retrieving some of her things “very, very difficult” and “no one was being

professional about the next steps that were needed . . . .”

               Despite her initial lack of cooperation, A.L. recently met with

investigators and began helping with their investigation. A.L. testified that her

current experiences with investigators and life circumstances were “[l]ike day and

night” compared to those in 2012:

      You know, I smile when I bring up you guys because you guys have been
      great. You guys made me fe[el] supported. You guys have really been
      there. Just a really positive atmosphere.

      Back then, my life was so different. Today I’m sober. I have over two
      years sober. Solid sobriety. I’ve had a few years of solid sobriety since
      back then. I’m a mom, a stay-at-home mom. Like there’s a lot of things
      that I do today that I would have never done back then. Going back to
      school. There are a whole lot of things that are different in a positive
      manner. I’m comfortable. That’s the main one.

               A.L. acknowledged that she made a statement to an investigator that

her sexual encounter with Warren would have been consensual if he paid her,

further explaining:

      And not punched me or raped me or there are so many factors that
      made it not consensual. It could have been consensual, if he didn’t
      beat me and forcefully put his penis in my vagina, he if he didn’t
      forcefully put his fingers in my [buttocks] or my [vagina]. You know,
      consensual sex normally doesn’t involve punching or forceful nature
      without protection when you’re saying no and they don’t stop. That’s
      when it’s not consensual. It wasn’t even — at that point, the money
      wasn’t even — it turned into a fight and flight situation.

      ...
      What I meant by that is that if we would have met up like discussed,
      made a transaction like discussed, wasn’t forcefully attacked, raped,
      undressed, assaulted, then . . . it could have been consensual, but all
      these other things happened, which made it an obvious rape and
      assault. You can’t even make it seem or sound like it wasn’t.

      ...

      I planned for a consensual encounter with protection with not ever
      being punched or raped or held down or my hair ripped out of my head
      or have my baby, you want to have my baby, to the point where I’m
      blacking out and every time I say no, I know you want to hit me. If all
      of these things wouldn’t have happened, yes, then it could have been
      consensual if he would have acted 100 percent like a normal, non-
      violent, threatening person, yes, it could have been.

A.L. reviewed photographs taken at the hospital following the assault and testified

that they “show[] no justice” since her face — which was normally “way, way thinner”

from drug use — was more swollen than it appeared. A.L. believed she identified the

perpetrator in a photo lineup “[w]ith 90 percent confidence” in December 2023.

A.L. also identified crime-scene photographs of the car she was driving and her

belongings on the day of the incident as well as articles of clothing that were collected

as evidence.

               On cross-examination, A.L. was questioned about the lies she told

police and medical providers immediately following the incident — many of which

she did not remember. A.L. reiterated that some of her initial statements were

untruthful because she was embarrassed, ashamed, and felt disgusting; however,

“the rape wasn’t a lie.” A.L. regretted lying and wished she would have told the truth.

A.L. was also extensively questioned about subsequent statements she made to

investigators and during her testimony on direct-examination. A.L. testified that
those accounts were not different versions of the 2012 encounter, stating: “There’s

one version. Depending on how I say it, doesn’t make it not true.” Defense counsel

highlighted discrepancies in A.L.’s recounting of events and challenged her

credibility by questioning “little slip-ups” in her rehabilitation. Defense counsel also

revisited A.L.’s medical records, which had “absolutely no objective findings of

injury” to her face, head, lips, eyes, or throat. A.L. countered that the medical

records were “a load of junk.”

               Next, testimony was offered about the initial investigation. Jarod

Schlacht (“Deputy Chief Schlacht”), Cleveland Police Department’s Deputy Chief at

the time of trial, was working as a patrol officer in November 2012. He responded

to a convenience store after a worker reported that a female came into the store

saying she was raped. When Deputy Chief Schlacht arrived, A.L. was naked, covered

with something given to her by the store’s clerk, and distraught. Deputy Chief

Schlacht learned that the assault occurred at a nearby location and “[n]ot too long

beforehand.” Deputy Chief Schlacht also obtained a description of the perpetrator

before A.L. was taken to a local hospital. Deputy Chief Schlacht then processed the

vehicle driven by A.L., which was towed and collected as evidence, and completed a

report. Deputy Chief Schlacht’s report did not include any information about A.L.’s

physical appearance in terms of swelling, contusions, abrasions, or marks.

                Nina Charmley (“Charmley”), a sexual assault nurse examiner,

examined A.L. at the hospital following the incident in 2012. Charmley explained

that she took notes for a sexual-assault kit based on the information provided by
A.L. Those notes — which included a handwritten narrative of the events reported

to Charmley by A.L. — indicated that A.L. was assaulted by one male who penetrated

her vagina, anus, and mouth; ejaculated; and did not use a condom. With A.L.’s

permission, Charmley was able to complete a full physical examination. Charmley

testified that her visual findings were unremarkable, meaning she did not observe

any bruising, swelling, or scratches at the time of the exam. During the examination,

Charmley collected samples for the sexual-assault kit, including vaginal, rectal, and

oral swabs and foreign black hairs located around A.L.’s pubic region.

              Those samples were itemized, documented, and prepared for DNA

testing by Gaurie Kaur Sran (“Kaur Sran”), a former DNA technician at the

Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner’s Office. According to Kaur Sran, those items

were then passed along to a DNA analyst. Marissa Esterline (“Esterline”) — who

was a forensic scientist at the Cuyahoga County Regional Forensic Science

Laboratory at the time of trial — was the DNA technician or analyst who tested those

samples following the 2012 incident. Esterline testified that she completed a multi-

step laboratory process for each sample and the data obtained was then given to

Laura Stanton (“Stanton”) for report-writing purposes.

              Stanton, who was working in the Cuyahoga County Medical

Examiner’s Office as a forensic DNA analyst in 2012, offered testimony about her

analysis of the DNA test results and the report she issued in 2013. Stanton testified

that seminal material was identified in A.L.’s vaginal and rectal swabs. Presumptive

tests also indicated the presence of semen in A.L.’s oral swabs, although the sample
could not be confirmed. Stanton further testified that an unknown male’s DNA

profile was obtained from some of the items, including the vaginal and rectal swabs.

               Testimony was then offered about the investigation that occurred

years later.   Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office Investigator Chris Gortz

(“Investigator Gortz”) took over A.L.’s case in August 2024. Investigator Gortz

began his investigation by reviewing prior work on the case and reports completed

by his office. Investigator Gortz learned that A.L. did not select Warren in the photo

lineup completed in December 2023. Next, Investigator Gortz interviewed A.L. and

Warren, both of whom were cooperative.

               During Warren’s interview, Investigator Gortz showed him

photographs of A.L., the location where the incident occurred, and the vehicle A.L.

drove. Warren indicated that he never met or was sexually active with A.L. and

handwrote “no sexual contact” on some of the photographs. While Warren was

familiar with the incident’s location, he did not recognize the vehicle driven by A.L.

and was unfamiliar with the 2012 sexual-assault allegations. On cross-examination,

Investigator Gortz acknowledged that there was no demonstrative evidence that

Warren was ever in the vehicle aside from A.L.’s own testimony.

               Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office Investigator Dennis Bruening

(“Investigator Bruening”) assisted in the investigation and was present during

Warren’s interview.     Investigator Bruening researched Warren’s residences,

identified a map of the area, and testified that two addresses associated with Warren

in 2012 were marked on the map. Investigator Breunig also collected two buccal
swabs from Warren during his interview. The swabs were submitted to the county’s

crime laboratory for analysis.

                  Esterline testified that she authored a supplemental DNA report in

2024, which included Warren’s buccal swabs, the original laboratory findings, and

additional findings based on updated technology. Warren’s DNA matched epithelial

and sperm fractions obtained from A.L.’s vaginal and rectal swabs and extracts from

the black hair collected in 2012. Esterline testified that only A.L.’s DNA and

Warren’s DNA were found in all of her testing.

                  The State rested and the following exhibits were admitted without

objection: A.L.’s medical records, hospital photos, and sexual-assault kit; the 2013

DNA report; the 2024 DNA report; a map of the incident’s location; the 2023 photo

lineup; crime-scene photographs of the car driven by A.L. and her belongings; the

clothes A.L. was wearing at the time of the incident; Warren’s buccal swabs; and the

photographs shown to Warren during his interview.             The defense moved for

acquittal under Crim.R. 29, which was denied by trial court. The defense then

renewed its motion and rested.

                  Ultimately, the jury found Warren guilty of rape, as charged in Counts

1 through 4 of the indictment, and not guilty of aggravated robbery and robbery, as

charged in Counts 5 and 6 of the indictment. The trial court indicated that it would

rule on the sexually-violent-predator specifications at sentencing.

                  In the interim, a hearing was held on the sexually-violent-predator

specifications.     First, Deborah Casey (“Casey”), a retired sexual assault nurse
examiner, offered testimony about the sexual-assault examination she performed

on a woman in February 2013 (“2013 victim”). The 2013 victim reported that she

met the assailant on an escorting website and went to his house. The assailant told

the 2013 victim that he was looking for money, covered her mouth and nose with his

hand, claimed to be a police officer, threatened her, removed her clothing, and

inserted his penis into her mouth and vagina. According to the 2013 victim, she told

the assailant to stop but he did not listen. When the assailant was finished, he told

the 2013 victim to get dressed and that he was not going to arrest her. After leaving

the house, the 2013 victim called police. In addition to recording the 2013 victim’s

narrative, Casey performed a physical exam and collected swabs for a sexual-assault

kit.

              Next, Investigator Gortz offered testimony in conjunction with a

video recording of his interview with Warren.       During the interview, Warren

indicated that he was previously involved in a similar situation, claiming that “in

2013 a female lied on him.” Investigator Gortz reviewed the 2013 case and advised

that Warren ultimately pleaded guilty to attempted felonious assault, a nonsexual

offense.

              According to Investigator Gortz, Warren also referenced a 2019 case

during the interview, claiming that another female lied about his involvement in

another sexual assault. Investigator Gortz reviewed and collected records from the

2019 case, including medical records with the victim’s sexual-assault-kit narrative.

The 2019 victim reported that she was lost and pulled into an apartment complex.
Her assailant pistol whipped her, jumped in her car, held her at gunpoint, pulled her

hair, hit her, ripped off her clothes, and forced her to perform fellatio and engage in

sexual intercourse without a condom. The 2019 victim called the police once the

perpetrator left the scene. Warren was subsequently indicted for kidnapping, rape,

and having weapons while under disability and ultimately pleaded guilty to

attempted rape and having weapons while under disability. On cross-examination,

Investigator Gortz acknowledged that A.L.’s case was Warren’s second sexual-

assault conviction.

               The State admitted medical records and journal entries from the 2013

and 2019 cases and the video recording of Warren’s interview. Based on the

evidence presented, the State argued that Warren should be designated a sexually-

violent predator since his sexually-motivated crimes continued and escalated after

the rape of A.L. in 2012. The State further argued that Warren showed no remorse

and continued to blame his victims.

               Following the hearing, a presentence-investigation report was

ordered. The State filed a sentencing memorandum and sexually-violent-predator

brief. The defense also filed a sentencing memorandum.

               At the sentencing hearing, the trial court heard from A.L., the State,

and defense counsel, who advised Warren against making a statement for appellate

purposes. The trial court noted that it considered the record, oral statements of the

parties and victim, and the presentence-investigation report before sentencing

Warren to life in prison with parole eligibility after ten years. The trial court also
determined that Warren was a sexually violent predator pursuant to R.C. 2971.01,

finding that Warren committed one or more offenses in which the victims were

harmed to the degree that their lives were in jeopardy. Finally, the trial court

designated Warren a Tier III sex offender with lifetime registration requirements.

                 Warren appeals, raising three assignments of error for review.

         Assignment of Error No. 1

         The jury found, against the manifest weight of the evidence, that
         [Warren] committed the acts alleged in the indictment.

         Assignment of Error No. 2

         The evidence was not legally sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict.

         Assignment of Error No. 3

         The trial court erred in finding [Warren] met the standards of a
         sexually-violent predator.

   II.      Law and Analysis

                 A. Sufficiency and Manifest Weight of the Evidence

                 For ease of analysis, we address Warren’s first and second

assignments of error together. In his first assignment of error, Warren argues that

his convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence and the jury lost its

way in finding him guilty. Warren asserts that the State relied solely on A.L.’s

testimony — which was neither credible nor truthful — to establish he was guilty of

rape. In his second assignment of error, Warren challenges the sufficiency of the

evidence, claiming again that A.L.’s testimony was not credible. Warren asserts that
A.L.’s testimony alone, without corroborating evidence, is insufficient to prove his

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

              Sufficiency of the evidence and manifest weight of the evidence are

two distinct concepts: “‘sufficiency is a test of adequacy’” while manifest weight

depends on the evidence’s “‘“effect in inducing belief.”’” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703,

¶ 13, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386-387 (1997), quoting

Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990).

              A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction

requires a reviewing court to determine whether the State has met its burden of

production at trial. Thompkins at 390. When reviewing a sufficiency challenge, an

appellate court “examine[s] the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether

such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph

two of the syllabus. “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in

a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

               During its review for sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court

does not assess whether the State’s evidence is to be believed, “but whether, if

believed, the evidence against a defendant would support a conviction.” Thompkins

at 390. Indeed, when evaluating evidence’s sufficiency, a reviewing court does not

contemplate witness credibility or weigh the evidence; rather, “the reviewing court

assumes that witnesses testified truthfully and evaluates whether that testimony,
along with any other direct or circumstantial evidence presented at trial, satisfies

each element of the offense.” State v. Haskins, 2024-Ohio-5908, ¶ 37 (8th Dist.),

citing State v. Young, 2022-Ohio-3132, ¶ 47 (8th Dist.), and Cleveland v. Clark,

2024-Ohio-4491, ¶ 37, 39 (8th Dist.) (noting that a challenge to the sufficiency of

the evidence presents a question of law, not fact).

               “But ‘even if a trial court judgment is sustained by sufficient evidence,

an appellate court may nevertheless conclude that the judgment is against the

manifest weight of the evidence.’” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, at ¶ 14, quoting

Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 12. Unlike a sufficiency challenge, which

questions whether the State has met its burden of production, a manifest-weight

challenge questions whether the State has met its burden of persuasion. State v.

Bowden, 2009-Ohio-3598, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 390.

In order to evaluate whether a judgment or verdict is against the manifest weight of

the evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence

and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses, and determine

whether the jury clearly lost its way in resolving conflicts and created such a manifest

miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.

State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio-3800, ¶ 17, citing Thompkins at 387, and State v.

Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172 (1st Dist. 1983).

               The Ohio Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “[a] manifest-

weight challenge should be sustained ‘“only in the exceptional case in which the

evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.”’’’ State v. Nicholson, 2024-Ohio-
604, ¶ 71, quoting Thompkins at 387, quoting Martin at 175; State v. Hundley,

2020-Ohio-3775, ¶ 80. “‘[A] defendant is not entitled to a reversal on manifest-

weight grounds merely because inconsistent evidence was presented at trial.’” State

v. Kilton, 2019-Ohio-87, ¶ 20, quoting State v. Mossburg, 2013-Ohio-1664, ¶ 22

(8th Dist.). Nor is a conviction against the manifest weight of the evidence simply

because the trier of fact chose to believe the State’s version of events over the

defendant’s. State v. Wells, 2021-Ohio-2585, ¶ 40 (8th Dist.), citing State v.

Williams, 2018-Ohio-3368, ¶ 67 (8th Dist.).

              With these concepts in mind, we review Warren’s rape convictions to

determine 1) whether sufficient evidence was presented and 2) whether the

convictions were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

              Warren     was    convicted   of   four    counts   of   rape       under

R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), which provides: “No person shall engage in sexual conduct with

another when the offender purposefully compels the other person to submit by force

or threat of force.” R.C. 2907.01 defines “sexual conduct” as

      vaginal intercourse between a male and female; anal intercourse,
      fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of sex; and,
      without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any part of
      the body or any instrument, apparatus, or other object into the vaginal
      or anal opening of another. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to
      complete vaginal or anal intercourse.

              After thorough review of relevant caselaw and the record before us,

we find that Warren’s rape convictions are supported by sufficient evidence. A.L.’s

testimony established that her “escort relationship” with Warren ended and the
encounter quickly became nonconsensual when Warren became aggressive and

began violently assaulting her. A.L. testified that Warren grabbed and pulled her

hair to maintain control; pushed and punched her; and forced her to undress,

perform fellatio, and engage in vaginal intercourse without protection, digital

vaginal penetration, and digital anal penetration.        A.L. further testified that

Warren’s assault continued despite her pleas to stop. A.L. fled to a convenience

store, naked and bloody, and immediately reported the rape to police. A.L. told

police and the sexual assault nurse examiner that she was assaulted by a male who

penetrated her vagina, anus, and mouth without a condom. Swabs and samples

collected from A.L.’s examination contained DNA that was later matched to Warren.

               We emphasize that this court does not assess A.L.’s credibility or

determine whether the State’s evidence is to be believed in a sufficiency analysis.

Instead, we ask whether, if believed, the evidence against Warren would support his

rape convictions. After viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State,

we find that any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of

rape were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, Warren’s convictions for rape

are supported by sufficient evidence.

               Moreover, we cannot say that this is the exceptional case where the

evidence weighs heavily against Warren’s rape convictions. We acknowledge some

discrepancies in A.L.’s recounting of events throughout the course of multiple

investigations spanning over a decade. However, A.L. consistently alleged that she

was forced to perform fellatio and engage in vaginal intercourse without protection,
digital vaginal penetration, and digital anal penetration from the onset. Throughout

her testimony, A.L. readily acknowledged that she lied to police and medical

professionals during the initial investigation, explaining that she felt ashamed and

disgusting and thought she was going to be judged, disbelieved, and in legal trouble.

A.L. testified that her recent experiences with investigators and life circumstances

were much different than they were in 2012: she felt supported, was “solid” in her

sobriety, became a mother, and was enrolled in school to pursue a career as a

chemical dependency counselor.

               Based on this record, the jury did not clearly lose its way in resolving

conflicts or create a manifest miscarriage of justice when it found that Warren

engaged in sexual conduct with A.L. and purposefully compelled her to submit to

that conduct by force or threat of force. Indeed, it is well-established that “[a]

conviction may rest solely on the testimony of a single witness, including the victim,

if believed, and there is no requirement that a victim’s testimony be corroborated to

be believed.” State v. Flores-Santiago, 2020-Ohio-1274, ¶ 38 (8th Dist.) (citing

multiple cases in support); State v. Rivera, 2024-Ohio-4896, ¶ 64 (8th Dist.)

(noting that this well-settled principle applies to cases involving allegations of sexual

assault); State v. Winston, 2024-Ohio-4583, ¶ 49 (8th Dist.) (upholding a

defendant’s convictions for rape and other offenses — despite some inconsistencies

between the victim’s trial testimony and prior statements made when she disclosed

the abuse — where the defendant argued on appeal that the State’s entire case rested

solely on the credibility of the victim’s testimony). Warren is not entitled to a
reversal on manifest-weight grounds merely because certain evidence or aspects of

a witness’ testimony were inconsistent. Nor is Warren entitled to reversal because

the trier of fact chose to believe the State’s version of events over his. Thus, Warren’s

rape convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

                 Accordingly, Warren’s first and second assignments of error are

overruled.

                 B. Sexually-Violent-Predator Designation

                 In his third assignment of error, Warren argues that the trial court

erred in finding that he met the standards of a sexually violent predator.

                 A “sexually violent predator” is “a person who, on or after January 1,

1997, commits a sexually violent offense and is likely to engage in the future in one

or more sexually violent offenses.” R.C. 2971.01(H)(1). Thus, in order to establish

that a sexually-violent-predator specification applies to a defendant, the State must

prove three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: “‘(1) the offense occurred on or

after January 1, 1997; (2) the defendant commit[ted] a sexually violent offense; and

(3) it is likely that the defendant will engage in at least one more sexually violent

offense in the future.’” State v. Wardlaw, 2025-Ohio-2221, ¶ 85 (8th Dist.), quoting

State v. Belle, 2019-Ohio-787, ¶ 34 (8th Dist.), and citing State v. Goudlock, 2010-

Ohio-3600, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.). The third element is “‘the key inquiry’” in determining

whether      a   defendant   qualifies   as   a   sexually   violent   predator   under

R.C. 2971.01(H)(1). Id., quoting id.
                 It is undisputed that the first two elements are satisfied: Warren

committed a sexually violent offense after January 1, 1997. Therefore, the only issue

before this court is whether Warren is likely to engage in a sexually violent offense

in the future.

                 Fortunately, the statute provides some guidance regarding this third

element and key inquiry. R.C. 2971.01(H)(2) enumerates a nonexclusive list of six

factors that “may be considered as evidence tending to indicate that there is a

likelihood that the person will engage in the future in one or more sexually violent

offenses.” (Emphasis added.) Those factors are:

      (a) The person has been convicted two or more times, in separate
          criminal actions, of a sexually oriented offense or a child-victim
          oriented offense. For purposes of this division, convictions that
          result from or are connected with the same act or result from
          offenses committed at the same time are one conviction, and a
          conviction set aside pursuant to law is not a conviction.

      (b) The person has a documented history from childhood, into the
          juvenile developmental years, that exhibits sexually deviant
          behavior.

      (c) Available information or evidence suggests that the person
          chronically commits offenses with a sexual motivation.

      (d) The person has committed one or more offenses in which the person
          has tortured or engaged in ritualistic acts with one or more victims.

      (e) The person has committed one or more offenses in which one or
          more victims were physically harmed to the degree that the
          particular victim’s life was in jeopardy.

      (f) Any other relevant evidence.
R.C. 2971.01(H)(2). Notably, “[t]here is no requirement that all [six] factors must

be satisfied to find a person to be a sexually violent predator.” Wardlaw at ¶ 87,

citing State v. Sopko, 2009-Ohio-140, ¶ 48 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Williams, 2001

Ohio App. LEXIS 4188, *14 (8th Dist. Sept. 20, 2001).

               On appeal, Warren argues that many of the R.C. 2971.01(H)(2)

factors are inapplicable and challenges those that arguably are. First, Warren

asserts that his rape convictions in the underlying case should not be included when

considering R.C. 2971.01(H)(2)(a) — whether “[t]he person has been convicted two

or more times, in separate criminal actions, of a sexually oriented offense.” Warren

claims that he was convicted of only one other sexual offense — his 2019 conviction

for attempted rape — and, therefore, the first factor is inapplicable. Next, Warren

argues that the evidence failed to establish that his offenses involved life-threatening

physical harm under R.C. 2971.02(H)(2)(e). Warren further asserts that the trial

court did not specify any of the “other relevant evidence” that it considered for

purposes of R.C. 2971.02(H)(2)(f)’s catchall.        Finally, Warren contends that

evidence of his prior attempted-rape conviction, alone, is inadequate to establish his

likelihood of recidivism. While Warren references R.C. 2971.02 and discusses the

R.C. 2971.02(H)(2) factors, he does not cite any authority directly supporting his

arguments. When an appellant fails to cite any legal authority in support of their

claims, this court is allowed to disregard them.        See App.R. 12(A)(2); App.R.

16(A)(7).
               Based on the record before us — and in the absence of authority cited

to the contrary — we cannot say that the trial court erred in designating Warren a

sexually violent predator. The record reveals that after Warren raped A.L. in 2012,

two other women made sexual-assault allegations resulting in convictions. The 2013

victim reported that she met her assailant on an escorting website. When she met

with the assailant, he was looking for money, covered her mouth and nose with his

hand, claimed to be a police officer, threatened her, removed her clothing, and

inserted his penis into her mouth and vagina. According to the 2013 victim, she told

the assailant to stop but he did not listen. Charges were brought against Warren

based on her report. Warren entered a plea deal and was convicted of attempted

felonious assault.

               The 2019 victim reported that she was raped after getting lost and

pulling into an apartment complex. Her assailant pistol whipped her, jumped in her

car, held her at gunpoint, pulled her hair, hit her, ripped off her clothes, and forced

her to perform fellatio and have sexual intercourse without a condom. As a result of

the 2019 victim’s report, Warren was indicted for kidnapping, rape, and having

weapons while under disability. Warren entered a plea deal and was convicted of

attempted rape and having weapons while under disability. During his interview

with investigators, Warren claimed that 2013 and 2019 victims “lied on him.”

               While Warren was ultimately convicted of a nonsexual offense in

2013, the evidence presented establishes that his sexually-motivated crimes

continued — and even violently escalated — after A.L.’s rape in 2012. Warren has
not provided any legal support to suggest that his sexually-violent-predator

designation was unlawful under the specific facts and circumstances of this case.

Nor can we say that the trial court erred in determining that Warren was likely to

engage in another sexually violent offense in the future based on this record.

Accordingly, we decline to find that the trial court erred in designating Warren a

sexually violent predator and overrule his third assignment of error.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.          The defendant’s

convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.



EMANUELLA D. GROVES, PRESIDING JUDGE

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., and
TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR