State v. Wiggers

[Cite as State v. Wiggers, 2026-Ohio-1410.]


                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               WASHINGTON COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,                  :
                                :     Case Nos. 25CA5 & 25CA10
     Plaintiff-Appellee,        :
                                :
     v.                         :
                                :
DAVID S. WIGGERS, SR.,          :     DECISION AND JUDGMENT
                                :     ENTRY
     Defendant-Appellant.       :
                                :     RELEASED: 04/08/2026
________________________________________________________________
                          APPEARANCES:

Brian T. Goldberg, Cincinnati, Ohio, for appellant.

Nicole Coil, Washington County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kelsey R. Riffle,
Washington County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Marietta, Ohio, for appellee.


Wilkin, J.

        {¶1}     This is a consolidated appeal from two Washington County Court of

Common Pleas judgment entries. In Case No. 23CA5, David S. Wiggers, Sr.

(“appellant”) was convicted of domestic violence, a fourth-degree felony, under

R.C. 2929.25(A). In this case, appellant presents two assignments of error,

challenging both the sufficiency and manifest weight of his conviction. In Case

No. 23CA10, appellant was found to have violated his community control, and, as

a result, the trial court revoked his community control and imposed a 15-month

prison sentence. Appellant argues on appeal that the revocation of community

control and imposition of a prison sentence was not supported by the record

because he wanted to discuss the probation rules with his attorney before

signing.
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                                 2


       {¶2}   After reviewing the parties’ arguments, the record, and the

applicable law, we find no merit to appellant’s assignments of error in either case.

Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court in both cases.

                                   BACKGROUND

       {¶3}   On October 25, 2023, appellant was indicted on a single count of

domestic violence, a fourth-degree felony under R.C. 2919.25(A). He waived his

right to a jury trial, and the case proceeded to a bench trial on November 19,

2024. At the trial, the State called the following witnesses: Phillip J. Wiggers

(“Phillip”) his son Phillip N. Wiggers (“Phillip N.”), and Deputy Thornberry. The

defense called appellant to testify.

       {¶4}   Phillip was the first to testify. He indicated that he is appellant’s

brother. He testified that on October 1, 2023, he went to 35 Ridgewood

Boulevard, in Belpre, Ohio, to retrieve a trailer frame left to him by his father. He

stated that the property is jointly owned by his mother, sister, appellant, and

himself, with appellant residing in the house on the property. Phillip was

accompanied by his youngest son, Ethan, and his oldest son, Phillip N., who

arrived later. Upon arrival, they went directly to the trailer to prepare the frame

for removal, but found it secured with cables and blocks. Thus, Phillip told his

son to grab a pair of bolt cutters to cut the cable. Phillip testified that as they

were preparing to cut the cable, appellant came out of the house swinging an axe

handle and threatening to “kill a couple assholes.” Phillip indicated that this got

his attention because appellant was “dangerous.” Phillip stated that appellant
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                                      3


swung the axe handle at him but missed, allowing Phillip to grab the handle and

strike appellant with his fist.

       {¶5}    Phillip further testified that after the initial confrontation, he pushed

appellant against a building to prevent him from recovering and retaliating.

Appellant’s back was up against the building, causing them to be face-to-face.

Phillip stated that appellant's “body weight had come down on me[,]” preventing

him from getting up, causing injury to his hamstring. Phillip started hollering for

help. His son Ethan intervened and wrestled appellant to the ground. Phillip

stated that he told Ethan to let appellant up, and when he did, appellant lunged at

Phillip again. As they fought, Ethan intervened again and was able to get

appellant on the ground. Phillip stated that appellant then left the scene and did

not return.

       {¶6}    Phillip confirmed that neither he, nor his sons, used the axe handle

or any other weapon against appellant. He also mentioned that he sought

medical treatment for his hamstring injury, which required surgery and resulted in

an infection, necessitating further medical care.

       {¶7}    During the cross-examination, Phillip acknowledged that he did not

inform appellant of his visit and hoped he would not be home to avoid any

confrontation. Phillip also had asked his mother to be at the property as a

peacekeeper, but she did not arrive until after the altercation. Phillip further

indicated that he did not believe the trailer was titled, but it was “in [his] father’s

name at the time.”
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                                   4


       {¶8}   Phillip admitted to grabbing the axe handle with his left hand and

punching appellant with his right hand in an attempt to stop him. He confirmed

that appellant did not hit him with the axe handle, nor kick or punch him during

the altercation. Phillip stated that he hit appellant at least six to eight times. He

did not recall appellant losing consciousness but mentioned that his son Ethan

might have restrained appellant, possibly causing his rib injury.

       {¶9}   Further, Phillip denied taking appellant ’s keys or phone, stating

they were on the ground and were given to the sheriff. However, he

acknowledged that he might have stated that he took the keys to unlock the

trailer but did not remember the exact details. Phillip admitted to causing

appellant’s orbital bone and nose injuries but was unsure about the rib injury.

       {¶10} Next to testify was Phillip N., Phillip’s son. On October 1, 2023,

Phillip N. went to 35 Ridgewood Boulevard in Belpre, Ohio, to meet his brother

and father to acquire a trailer. Upon arrival, he observed appellant approaching

his father and brother with what appeared to be a club or axe handle and heard

appellant shouting threats. Phillip N. stated that appellant swung the club at

Phillip and missed, and then Phillip struck appellant. The altercation moved

towards a shed, where Phillip pinned appellant against the building. Phillip N.

noted that his father appeared injured, grabbing his leg and going to the ground,

which led to his brother (Ethan) intervening to control the situation. He did not

see his father or brother pick up any weapons or strike appellant.

       {¶11} Phillip N. stated that law enforcement arrived at the scene, and he

spoke to them about the incident. Phillip N. acknowledged that he was there to
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                               5


be a peacekeeper and had previously been a corrections officer. He confirmed

that his father pushed appellant against the shed and that his father's hamstring

injury ended his physical involvement in the altercation.

       {¶12} Deputy Thornberry was next to testify. Thornberry is employed by

the Washington County Sheriff's Office and has been working there for two

years, with a total of five years of law enforcement experience. On October 1,

2023, Thornberry responded to a domestic call at 35 Ridgewood Boulevard in

Belpre, Washington County, Ohio. Upon arrival, he observed Phillip lying on the

ground and inquired if he needed medical attention, to which Phillip responded

that he would drive himself later if necessary. Thornberry was not wearing a

bodycam during the incident, so there is no recording of his investigation. Phillip

showed him an axe handle allegedly used during the incident, but Thornberry did

not collect it as evidence. After leaving the 35 Ridgewood Boulevard address,

Thornberry went to another location where appellant was believed to be,

intending to obtain a statement from him. Appellant was in the back of an EMS

vehicle but declined to make a statement because rib pain made it difficult to talk.

However, Thornberry indicated that appellant agreed to provide a statement at a

later date, but he never did. Thornberry observed that appellant appeared dazed

and in pain during their interaction. The Deputy claimed that his decision to

arrest appellant was based on the statements of Phillip and witnesses present at

the scene.

       {¶13} However, during cross-examination, Thornberry admitted that he

did not separate the witnesses during the investigation, which is typically
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                                  6


recommended in an assault case. Thornberry admitted that he was unaware of

Ethan Wiggers' involvement in the case until the day of the testimony. He also

acknowledged that he did not obtain medical records related to the

incident. Finally, Thornberry confirmed that Phillip, the alleged victim, stated in a

report that he punched and kicked his brother multiple times during the

altercation.

       {¶14} Appellant testified that he grew up at 35 Ridgewood Boulevard,

Belpre, Ohio, and has lived there continuously since March 2020. He confirmed

that the property's title includes his mother, himself, his sister, and his brother, all

of whom were in the courtroom. Appellant stated he was retired, but previously

worked as a carpenter and is a United States Navy veteran, having served from

1981 to 1984 at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. His father passed away in March 2022.

Appellant stated he has one brother (Phillip) and two sisters (Tia and Valissa).

       {¶15} Regarding the incident on October 1, 2023, appellant explained the

property situation, referencing a trailer that was once a camper, which he and

others stripped down; he planned on selling the tongue and using beams from it

to repair his house. He told his mother about these intentions the day before the

incident.

       {¶16} On the day of the incident, appellant claimed he was sitting in his

living room watching the Browns football game when he noticed Phillip arriving in

a red truck. He claimed that Phillip had a five-or six-foot wooden post. Appellant

grabbed an axe handle from his house and went out to meet his brother, but

purposely did not yell or escalate the situation even though he was irritated.
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                                 7


       {¶17} Appellant testified that as he approached Phillip, he attempted to

tell him to leave, but before he could say anything, Phillip lunged at him with the

post, striking him in the middle of the chest. Simultaneously, appellant claimed

Phillip’s son (Phillip N.) came from behind, placed an arm around his neck, and

held him. Appellant stated he recognized Phillip N. by his size.

       {¶18} Appellant asserted that after Phillip tossed the post aside and while

being held by Phillip N., Phillip punched him in the face, breaking his nose.

Appellant indicated he lost consciousness. Upon regaining consciousness, he

claimed he was lying beside the building with Phillip striking and threatening him.

Appellant said Phillip N. then drove his head back into the ground, likely

fracturing his orbital bone and he again lost consciousness.

       {¶19} Appellant described awakening to his dog licking him and sees

Phillip instructing Phillip N. to remove cables from the trailer. Appellant

recounted rolling down a hill into a wooded area, crossing a creek to a neighbor’s

house, where he called for help and collapsed. The homeowner and his son

came to assist him and called 911.

       {¶20} Appellant explained that Phillip demanded his phone and keys but

he threw them over Phillip’s head in hopes of creating a distraction to escape.

While at the neighbor’s house, he informed the EMTs, who were treating him,

that he had been hit with a post in the chest, kicked, suffered a broken nose, and

had rib pain.

       {¶21} Certified copies of appellant’s medical records were admitted into

evidence as Defendant’s Exhibit D. Appellant read the records which stated that
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                               8


he had been “assaulted by three other men, and he was able to escape them.”

He was “hit multiple times on the left side of his chest and ribs and was knocked

to the ground.” He stated that “he did lose consciousness when he was kicked in

the head and face.”

       {¶22} On cross-examination, appellant was questioned about his

statements to EMTs and hospital staff concerning his alcohol and marijuana use

on the day of the incident. On direct examination, appellant testified that he only

had two mixed drinks that contained two shots of alcohol. However, on cross-

examination it was established that his medical records indicated he told the

EMT he had four shots and smoked some marijuana, and that he told the

hospital staff that he had consumed seven to eight shots. Appellant admitted

smoking marijuana and having four shots, but denied telling the hospital staff that

he had seven or eight shots.

       {¶23} Upon the completion of appellant ’s testimony, the defense rested,

and the State had no rebuttal witnesses. Closing arguments were then

conducted and the trial judge found appellant guilty as charged. The trial court

sentenced appellant to 5 years of community control, restitution of $19,526.85,

and 120 days in jail. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from this conviction on

February 12, 2025.

       {¶24} Subsequent to sentencing, the State filed a complaint charging

appellant with violating his community control because “he failed or refused to

sign his terms and conditions of community control.” On January 28, 2025, the

court held a probable cause hearing on the alleged violation. Appellant waived
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                                9


probable cause and the court set a hearing on February 26, 2025, to resolve the

complaint. The trial court then asked appellant if he understood that “[i]f you

refuse to sign terms and conditions of community control, I have no option but to

send you to prison because I can’t put you on community control.” Appellant

indicated that he understood.

       {¶25} On February 26, 2025, the trial court held the community control

violation hearing. The court stated: “All right. So my understanding is [appellant]

wants to admit to the motion and complaint charging a violation of community

control and then argue sentencing?” Appellant’s counsel responded

affirmatively. The court also asked appellant if he admitted to the violation and

appellant responded: “Yes sir.” The court asked appellant if he understood by

admitting to the violation the State no longer had to prove by clear and

convincing evidence that appellant had violated his community control because

“you’re admitting it.” Again, the appellant responded affirmatively. After the court

confirmed that the parties had stipulated that there was a “factual basis for the

violation[,]” it accepted appellant’s admission.

       {¶26} The court then proceeded with resentencing appellant. The

prosecutor argued that a prison sentence was appropriate while defense counsel

sought community control. In determining appellant’s sentence, the court

indicated that it “considered the record, the written reports, all oral statements

made, and Ohio laws relating to the sentencing for a felony.” The court further

stated that

        it weighed the seriousness and recidivism factors, has considered
        the overriding purposes of felony sentencing, and that is
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                             10


        [necessary] to protect the public from future crime by the
        [appellant] and others, and to punish [appellant], using the
        minimum sanctions and that the court determines accomplishes
        those purposes, without imposing an unnecessary burden on
        state or local government, and having considered the need for
        incapacitating the [appellant] deterring the [appellant] from other
        future crime, rehabilitating the [appellant] and making restitution.

The court also found that appellant had been dishonest after trial and again at

this hearing.

       {¶27} The court then expressly revoked appellant’s community control

and found appellant was not amenable to community control. Instead, the court

found that a prison term was consistent with the purposes and principles of

sentencing, and imposed a definite prison term of 15 months with 102 days of

jail-time credit plus transport time, and notified him of optional post-release

control up to 2 years. Appellant filed a notice of appeal from this sentence on

March 13, 2025.

       {¶28} We sua sponte consolidated the appeals of his conviction in Case

No. 25CA5 and of his re-sentencing in Case No. 25CA10 for purposes of this

decision.

                          ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR ONE
                               CASE NO. 25CA5

       APPELLANT’S CONVICTION WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY
       SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND WAS CONTRARY TO THE
       MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE


       {¶29} Appellant argues in his sole assignment of error in Case No. 25CA5

that his conviction for domestic violence was not supported by sufficient evidence

and was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. He contends that the
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                               11


State failed to present adequate evidence to prove he committed the offense, as

the trial court did not establish that he caused or attempted to cause physical

harm to his brother, Phillip, a necessary element under R.C. 2919.25(A).

Appellant emphasizes that the trial court's reasoning was based on an alleged

swing at his brother, which he argues was not substantiated. Appellant highlights

that his brother and nephew arrived uninvited to remove a trailer, and his actions

were in response to their unexpected and aggressive behavior.

       {¶30} Furthermore, appellant claims that the testimony from the State's

witnesses was inconsistent and did not credibly establish his guilt. He points out

that both witnesses testified he swung an axe handle but missed, while he

testified he did not swing the handle because he was assaulted first and never

had the chance. Appellant argues that he was the victim, suffering significant

injuries, including a broken nose and fractured orbital bone, while his brother,

who initiated the confrontation, was unharmed by any physical act of appellant.

He concludes that the evidence showed his brother was a trespasser looking for

a fight, and thus, the conviction should be vacated.

       {¶31} Finally, appellant notes that his neighbor called the police.

Appellant argues that logically, if his brother, Phillip was truly the victim, he would

have called the police.

       {¶32} The State argues that appellant's conviction for domestic violence

was supported by sufficient evidence. The State highlights that appellant did not

deny swinging an axe handle at the victim, which was corroborated by both the

victim and an eyewitness. It argues that appellant's claim that he lacked intent to
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                                 12


cause harm is “preposterous,” because swinging an axe handle at someone's

head clearly implies an awareness of probable harm. Additionally, the State

notes that appellant’s actions during the altercation, such as putting his weight on

the victim, resulted in injury, further supporting the sufficiency of the evidence.

       {¶33} The State also argues that appellant’s conviction is not against the

manifest weight of the evidence. The State maintains that it introduced

substantial evidence for all elements of the offense, and the jury did not lose its

way. The State points out that two witnesses testified consistently that appellant

was the only one with a weapon and that he swung it at the victim's head. The

State disputes appellant's claim that he caused the victim no physical harm,

stating that the victim's injury was a direct result of the appellant's actions.

       {¶35} Regarding appellant’s argument that logically Phillip would have

called the police if he were the victim, the State maintains the use of logic rarely

comes into play during a domestic violence situation, nor is it something that the

State must prove. The State also emphasizes that the trial court's ability to

observe witness testimony and note inconsistencies in the appellant's

statements, contrasting them with the consistent testimony of the victim and

eyewitness.

       {¶36} Thus, the State concludes that there was both sufficient and

substantial evidence to support the conviction, and the trial court did not err in its

judgment.

                                        A. Law
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                                   13


       {¶37} Sufficiency of the evidence and manifest weight of the evidence are

distinct concepts and are “ ‘both quantitatively and qualitatively different.’ ”

Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio

St.3d 380, (1997), paragraph two of the syllabus. “We have stated that

‘sufficiency [of the evidence] is a test of adequacy,’ . . . while weight of the

evidence ‘ “ ‘ . . . depends on its effect in inducing belief.’ ” ’ ” (Second italics

original). In re A.K., 2025-Ohio-2935, ¶ 13 (4th Dist.), quoting Thompkins, at

387, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990). “A determination that a

conviction is supported by the manifest weight of the evidence will also be

dispositive of the issue of sufficiency.” State v. Gonz, 2024-Ohio-5885, ¶ 12 (4th

Dist.), citing State v. Jones, 2013-Ohio-150, ¶ 19 (12th Dist.).

       {¶38} “ ‘In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the

manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court reviews the entire record,

weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of

witnesses, and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury

clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the

conviction must be reversed.’ ” State v. Coleman, 2026-Ohio-666, ¶ 19 (4th

Dist.), quoting Thompkins at 387, citing State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175

(1st Dist. 1983). “ ‘Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence

going to all the essential elements of the case will not be reversed by a reviewing

court as being against the manifest weight of the evidence.’ ” Id, quoting C.E.

Morris Co. v. Foley Const. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279 (1978), syllabus.
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                                 14


          {¶39} The weight and credibility of evidence are to be determined by the

trier of fact. State v. Kirkland, 2014-Ohio-1966, ¶ 132. The trier of fact “is free to

believe all, part or none of the testimony of any witness,” and we “defer to the

trier of fact on these evidentiary weight and credibility issues because it is in the

best position to gauge the witnesses’ demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections,

and to use these observations to weigh their credibility.” State v. Dillard, 2014-

Ohio-4974, ¶ 28 (4th Dist.), citing State v. West, 2014-Ohio-1941, ¶ 23 (4th

Dist.).

          {¶40} In addition, “[a] verdict is not against the manifest weight of the

evidence because the finder of fact chose to believe the State's witnesses.” State

v. Chancey, 2015-Ohio-5585, ¶ 36 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Wilson, 2014-Ohio-

3182, ¶ 24 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Martinez, 2013-Ohio-3189, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.).

“ ‘While the [trier of fact] may take note of inconsistencies and resolve or discount

them accordingly, * * * such inconsistences “sic” do not render defendant's

conviction against the manifest weight or sufficiency of the evidence.’ ” State v.

Corson, 2015-Ohio-5332, ¶ 31 (4th Dist.), quoting State v. Proby, 2015-Ohio-

3364, ¶ 42 (10th Dist.), citing State v. Gullick, 2014-Ohio-1642, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.).

          “Accordingly, if the prosecution presented substantial credible evidence

upon which the trier of fact reasonably could conclude, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that the essential elements of the offense had been established, the

judgment of conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.” State

v. Nickell, 2025-Ohio-1232, ¶ 44 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Picklesimer, 2012-

Ohio-1282, ¶ 24 (4th Dist.), citing Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, at ¶ 12, quoting
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                               15


Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1594 (6th

Ed.1990). “[A] reviewing court should find a conviction against the manifest

weight of the evidence only in the “ ‘ “exceptional case in which the evidence

weighs heavily against the conviction.” ’ ” Id. at ¶ 45, quoting Thompkins, at 387,

quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).

                                    B. Analysis

       {¶41} Appellant was convicted of domestic violence in violation of R.C.

2919.25(A), which provides, “No person shall knowingly cause or attempt to

cause physical harm to a family or household member.” Appellant contests that

he knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to his brother; thus,

we will focus on those elements of the offense.

       {¶42} “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person

is aware that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain result or will

probably be of a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person

has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such

circumstances probably exist.” R.C. R.C. 2901.22(B).

       {¶43} “ ‘When determining whether a defendant acted knowingly, his state

of mind must be determined from the totality of the circumstances surrounding

the alleged crime.’ ” State v. Valladares, 2018-Ohio-1250, ¶ 20 (3rd Dist.),

quoting State v. Ingram, 2012-Ohio-4075, ¶ 22 (10th Dist.). Culpable mental

states are frequently established through circumstantial evidence. Id., citing

Ingram at ¶ 22. “ ‘ “[W]hether a person acts knowingly can only be determined,

absent a defendant's admission, from all the surrounding facts and
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                                16


circumstances, including the doing of the act itself.” ’ ” State v. Jackson, 2019-

Ohio-170, ¶12 (3rd Dist.), quoting State v. Miller 2013-Ohio-3194, ¶ 30 (3rd

Dist.), quoting State v. Huff, 145 Ohio App.3d 555, 563 (1st Dist. 2001), citing

State v. Adams, 1995 WL 360247, *4 (4th Dist. June 8, 1995). “ ‘Physical harm

to persons’ means any injury, illness, or other physiological impairment,

regardless of its gravity or duration.’ ” Id., quoting R.C. 2901.01(A)(3).

       {¶44} Appellant argues it is against the manifest weight of the evidence

that he knowingly caused or attempted to cause physical harm to the victim. We

disagree.

       {¶45} Appellant admitted after he saw Phillip pulling into his yard, he

exited his house with an axe handle in hand. Phillip testified that the appellant

approached him swinging the axe handle, threatening to kill someone. Phillip

further claimed that appellant swung the axe handle at his head but missed, and

then he managed to wrestle the axe handle away from appellant. Appellant

denied swinging the axe handle at Phillip, but Phillip N. corroborated Phillip’s

testimony. Phillip authenticated the photo of the axe handle admitted into

evidence as the State’s Exhibit 7, and Deputy Thornberry confirmed that State’s

Exhibit 7 was the axe handle shown to him at the scene.

       {¶46} Appellant claimed in his testimony that Phillip used an object against

him, but both Phillip and Phillip N. consistently denied appellant’s assertion.

Further, appellant’s credibility was called into question as he gave conflicting

accounts of alcohol consumption. He testified he consumed one-and-a-half

mixed drinks and rejected a medical record indicating he consumed seven to
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                               17


eight shots but then admitted telling EMTs he drank four shots. Finally, appellant

testified that he lost consciousness two times, yet his medical records failed to

diagnose him with a concussion, casting doubt on appellant’s memory and

reliability.

        {¶47} Merely because the court, which is the tier of fact in this case,

believed the State’s testimony does not make its verdict against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Chancey, 2015-Ohio-5585 at ¶ 36 (4th Dist.). Moreover,

we find it is reasonable for a factfinder to infer that a person, who is swinging an

axe handle at someone’s head, is aware that their conduct will probably cause

that person physical harm. Therefore, we conclude that the State presented

substantial evidence to support that appellant knowingly attempted to harm

Phillip, thereby committing domestic violence. This is not the rare case where

the fact finder lost its way and created a manifest injustice. Accordingly, we

overrule appellant's assignment of error in case number 25CA5 and affirm the

trial court’s judgment of conviction.

                             ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
                                CASE NO. 25CA10

           THE TRIAL RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE DECISION TO
           REVOKE APPELLANT’S COMMUNITY CONTROL AND
           IMPOSE A PRISON SENTENCE


        {¶48} Appellant argues in his sole assignment of error in Case No.

25CA10 that the record does not support the trial court’s decision revoking his

community control and imposing a prison sentence. He contends that the

violation was based solely on his refusal to sign the terms and conditions of
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                             18


probation. He wanted to review the rules with counsel before signing and said he

would comply after consulting his attorney. He explained confusion about his

sentence, which improved after seeing it on paper, and he reiterated his desire to

comply. Appellant admitted to the violation, but he characterizes the violation as

minor and asserts he should not be punished for ignorance and lack of

understanding. Further, appellant emphasizes that he was never released from

custody to demonstrate compliance with community control sanctions.

Therefore, appellant requests this court to vacate his revocation of community

control and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing.

       {¶49} The State argues that the record supports revocation because

appellant refused to sign community control terms and conditions, which

undermines enforcement and shows he is not amenable to supervision. The

State asserts the standard under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) limits reversal to findings

specified in subsection (a) or sentences otherwise contrary to law, and none of

the enumerated findings apply to this fourth-degree domestic violence case. The

State contends appellant does not argue the sentence is contrary to law and

cites no legal authority, so he provides no valid basis for reversal. The State

notes appellant admitted the violation, the trial court found him dishonest based

on trial and violation proceedings, and the sentencing colloquy shows he

understood the terms. The State also points to appellant’s criminal history,

including contempt and prior probation violations shows unwillingness to comply,

rather than ignorance.
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                              19


       {¶50} The State further rejects appellant’s claim that custody prevented

compliance, arguing he had an immediate opportunity to demonstrate

compliance by signing the terms while still in custody. The State concludes the

trial court was not required to make findings under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(a),

appellant did not argue the sentence was contrary to law. Therefore, the State

argues that assignment of error should be overruled.

                                        A. Law

       {¶51} Appellant maintains that “the trial court’s record does not support

the trial court’s decision to revoke appellant’s community control and impose a

prison term.” We note that the revocation of community control and the

subsequent resentencing imposed involve separate standards of review.

                                 1. Community Control

       {¶52} The proper standard when reviewing decisions revoking community

control is an abuse of discretion. State v. Stricklett, 2025-Ohio-1247, ¶ 7 (4th

Dist.), citing State v. Mehl, 2022-Ohio-1154, ¶ 7 (4th Dist.). An abuse of

discretion suggests that a decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.

State v. Cihon, 2023-Ohio-3108, ¶ 19 (4th Dist.), citing State v. Adams, 62 Ohio

St.2d 151, 157-158 (1980). “Once a court determines that community control

should be revoked and a prison term imposed, the trial court's sentencing

decision is reviewed under the standard set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).”

Stricklett at ¶ 8, citing Mehl at ¶ 15; State v. Marcum, 2016-Ohio-1992, ¶10.

                                      2. Prison Sentence

       {¶53} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides that
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                             20


               [t]he court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C)
        of this section shall review the record, including the findings
        underlying the sentence or modification given by the sentencing
        court.
               The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise
        modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may
        vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing
        court for resentencing. The appellate court's standard for review
        is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The
        appellate court may take any action authorized by this division if it
        clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:
               (a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's
        findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division
        (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section
        2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;
               (b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

(Emphasis added.)
                                     B. Analysis

                               1. Community Control

        {¶54} In his appeal, appellant vaguely claims that he “did not fully

understand everything” regarding his community control. The requirement to

obey his community control, which included signing its terms and conditions, was

not a complicated obligation. Further, as noted by the trial court during the

appellant’s initial sentencing, he has a criminal history that includes a probation

violation in an OVI case. Thus, it seems unlikely that appellant was unfamiliar

with the obligations of community control.

       {¶55} After his conviction for domestic violence, appellant requested a

community control sentence. The court agreed but warned him that he must

obey the terms and conditions provided by the probation department. The court

specifically instructed appellant that he would have to “sign off on [the term and

conditions of his community control].” The court informed appellant that if he
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                                        21


violated his community control, he could be subject to a prison term. Appellant

ensured the court that he would comply with the terms and conditions of

community control. Despite the court’s admonitions and appellant’s promises,

appellant refused to sign the document that acknowledged the terms and

conditions of his community control.

        {¶56} At his probable cause hearing on his community control violation,

appellant waived probable cause and agreed to proceed directly on the State’s

complaint. The court informed appellant that refusing the terms and conditions of

community control left the court no option but to send him to prison. Appellant

indicated that he understood.

        {¶57} Finally, and perhaps most important to our analysis, several weeks

after his probable cause hearing at his community control revocation hearing,

appellant admitted that he violated his community control sentence.

        {¶58} Appellant was aware from the date of his initial sentencing and was

reminded numerous times by the court in subsequent proceedings that he had to

comply with his community control or he would likely be sentenced to prison. Yet

he failed to do so even though, as divulged at his initial sentencing hearing,

appellant had a criminal history including a parole violation. Thus, appellant’s

argument that he did not understand his obligation under community control rings

hollow.1

        {¶59} Under these facts, we find that the trial court’s revocation of

appellant’s community control sentence was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or


1
 In State v. Talty, the Supreme Court recognized that “community control is the functional
equivalent of probation[.]” 2004-Ohio-4888, ¶ 16.
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                               22


unconscionable. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in doing so.

                                    2. The Prison Term

       {¶60} Similar to Stricklett, because appellant admitted to a violation of his

community control that resulted in resentencing to a prison term, appellant’s

resentencing to an 15-month prison term is reviewed under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).

Stricklett, 2025-Ohio-1247, ¶ 7 (4th Dist.). In part, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), permits

this court to vacate a sentence if the record does not clearly and convincingly

support certain specified findings, or if the sentence is “otherwise contrary to

law.” See State v. Burnett, 2025-Ohio-5307, 32-33 (4th Dist.). Appellant does

not assert that his sentence is contrary to law. Instead, appellant’s assignment of

error asserts only that the trial court’s record does not support the decision to

impose a prison term. In pertinent part, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides that:

        The appellate court may take any action authorized by this division
        if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following: (a) That
        the record does not support the sentencing court's findings under
        division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4)
        of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the
        Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant.

(Emphasis added.)

       {¶61} This language permits an appellant to challenge the trial court’s

findings under R.C. 2923.13(B) or (D), R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or R.C.

2929.20(I) arguing that the record does not support the appellant’s sentence.

See State v. Huges, 2021-Ohio-3127, ¶40-41 (4th Dist.). “However, R.C.

2953.08(G)(2) does not give appellate courts broad authority to review sentences
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                                23


to determine if they are supported by the record.” State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-

6729, ¶ 27.

       {¶62} In the instant case, appellant does not identify R.C. 2929.13(B) or

(D), R.C. 2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or R.C. 2929.20(I) as applying in his case,

let alone whether the court made any findings regarding their application.

Consequently, he was also unable to argue that any required findings were

unsupported by the trial court’s record. “[I]t is not the role of an appellate court to

cobble together an argument for an appellant.” State v. Clark, 2025-Ohio-4410,

¶ 23, citing State ex rel. McKenney v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-583, ¶ 28, quoting State

v. Quarterman, 2014-Ohio-4034, ¶ 19 (“It is not the role of this court to ‘search

the record or formulate legal arguments on behalf of the parties.’ ”).

       {¶63} For the aforementioned reasons, in Case No. 25CA10, we find that

appellant’s assignment of error that the trial court’s record does not support the

trial court’s decision to revoke appellant’s community control and impose a prison

term lacks merit. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s revocation of appellant’s

community control and his resentencing to a 15-month prison term.

                                   CONCLUSION

       {¶64} Pursuant to the analyses infra, we affirm appellant’s conviction in

Case No. 25CA5 and the trial court’s revocation of appellant's community control

and imposition of a 15-month prison term in Case No. 25CA10.


                                                          JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED.
Washington App. Nos. 25CA5 and 25CA10                                                24


                                JUDGMENT ENTRY

       It is ordered that the JUDGMENTS ARE AFFIRMED. Appellant shall pay
the costs.

       The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

     It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Washington County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

        IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL
HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS
COURT, it is temporarily continued for a period not to exceed 60 days upon the
bail previously posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow appellant to
file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency
of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at
the earlier of the expiration of the 60-day period, or the failure of the appellant to
file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the 45-day appeal
period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court
of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to
expiration of 60 days, the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. and Hess, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.


                                        For the Court,


                                    BY: ____________________________
                                       Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge


                               NOTICE TO COUNSEL

      Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.