State v. Woofter
Docket 2025-G-0025
Court of record · Indexed in NoticeRegistry archive · AI-enriched for research
- Filed
- Jurisdiction
- Ohio
- Court
- Ohio Court of Appeals
- Type
- Opinion
- Case type
- Criminal Appeal
- Disposition
- Dismissed
- Judge
- Lucci
- Citation
- State v. Woofter, 2026-Ohio-1506
- Docket
- 2025-G-0025
Appeal from denial of a motion for release/return of evidence following dismissal of criminal charges in Chardon Municipal Court
Summary
The Court of Appeals dismissed Brian K. Woofter’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Woofter, criminally charged in municipal court for purchasing and selling alcohol to minors, had the charge dismissed and then sought return of six cases of alcohol seized by the sheriff. The trial court denied his motion but said it could be reconsidered if Woofter produced proof of purchase. The appellate court held that the denial was not a final, appealable order because it anticipated further action and did not affect a substantial right or foreclose effective relief on the motion.
Issues Decided
- Whether the trial court's denial of the motion for return of seized property constituted a final, appealable order
- Whether the trial court's entry affected a substantial right or prevented meaningful relief on appeal
Court's Reasoning
The court applied Ohio's final-order statutes and precedent establishing that an order is final only if it affects a substantial right or otherwise meets R.C. 2505.02(B). Because the trial court's entry expressly allowed reconsideration upon presentation of proof of purchase, it did not foreclose future relief and therefore did not affect a substantial right or prevent a later judgment. For those reasons, the order was not final and the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to decide the merits.
Authorities Cited
- Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2)
- R.C. 2505.02(B)
- Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr.67 Ohio St.3d 60 (1993)
Parties
- Appellant
- Brian K. Woofter
- Appellee
- State of Ohio
- Judge
- Eugene A. Lucci
- Judge
- Matt Lynch
- Judge
- Scott Lynch
- Attorney
- John W. Bosco
Key Dates
- Decision date
- 2026-04-27
- Motion filed
- 2025-06-02
- Trial court entry denying motion
- 2025-06-12
What You Should Do Next
- 1
Provide proof of purchase to trial court
Submit the requested proof of purchase to the municipal court so the trial judge can reconsider the motion for return of the seized alcohol.
- 2
Consult an attorney
Speak with counsel about what documentation will satisfy the court and about any alternative legal remedies to regain possession of the property.
- 3
Monitor for final order before appealing
If the trial court issues a final denial after reconsideration, prepare and file a timely appeal from that final, appealable order.
Frequently Asked Questions
- What did the appeals court decide?
- The court dismissed the appeal because the trial court’s order denying the return of the seized alcohol was not a final, appealable order.
- Who is affected by this decision?
- Brian Woofter is affected because he cannot obtain appellate review of the denial at this time; the trial court still may reconsider the motion if he provides proof of purchase.
- What does 'not a final, appealable order' mean for me?
- It means the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to decide the case now because the trial court’s entry leaves open further action and does not finally resolve the dispute over the property.
- Can this decision be appealed further?
- Not from this order; the appeals court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. If the trial court issues a final order later that denies return of the property without opportunity for further relief, that order could be appealed.
The above suggestions and answers are AI-generated for informational purposes only. They may contain errors. NoticeRegistry assumes no responsibility for their accuracy. Consult a qualified attorney before relying on them.
Full Filing Text
[Cite as State v. Woofter, 2026-Ohio-1506.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
GEAUGA COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-G-0025
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Chardon Municipal Court
BRIAN K. WOOFTER,
Trial Court No. 2025 CRB 00251
Defendant-Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: April 27, 2026
Judgment: Appeal dismissed
John W. Bosco, Assistant Prosecutor, Chardon Municipal Court, 231 Main Street, Third
Floor, Chardon, OH 44024 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Brian K. Woofter, pro se, NEOCAP, 411 Pine Avenue S.E., Warren, OH 44483
(Defendant-Appellant).
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Brian K. Woofter, appeals the judgment denying his motion for
release of evidence. We dismiss the appeal for lack of a final, appealable order.
{¶2} In 2025, Woofter was charged with purchasing and selling alcohol to minors.
Woofter pleaded not guilty, and, thereafter, the charge was dismissed.
{¶3} On June 2, 2025, Woofter filed a motion requesting the court to order the
sheriff’s department to release to his friend six cases of alcohol that it had confiscated
relative to the dismissed charge.
{¶4} On June 12, 2025, the trial court denied the motion in an entry stating:
This matter came on for consideration on June 12, 2025 upon
defendant’s Motion for RELEASE OF EVIDENCE.
Upon due consideration, the Court finds said Motion not well-
taken.
IT IS THEREFORE THE ORDER OF THIS COURT that said
motion is hereby denied.
The Motion may be reconsidered with proof of purchase.
{¶5} Woofter noticed an appeal from the June 12, 2025 entry. In his appellant’s
brief, he maintains that he should not be required to present proof of purchase to regain
possession of his property. In the State’s appellee’s brief, it maintains, in part, that the
June 12, 2025 entry is not a final, appealable order. We agree with the State.
{¶6} This court’s appellate jurisdiction is set forth in Ohio Const., art. IV, §
3(B)(2), which provides that “[c]ourts of appeals shall have such jurisdiction as may be
provided by law to review and affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the
courts of record inferior to the court of appeals within the district . . . .”
{¶7} R.C. 2505.02(B) defines various categories of final orders. Such categories
include:
(1) An order that affects a substantial right in an action that in
effect determines the action and prevents a judgment;
(2) An order that affects a substantial right made in a special
proceeding or upon a summary application in an action after
judgment;
...
(4) An order that grants or denies a provisional remedy and to
which both of the following apply:
(a) The order in effect determines the action with respect to
the provisional remedy and prevents a judgment in the action
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Case No. 2025-G-0025
in favor of the appealing party with respect to the provisional
remedy.
(b) The appealing party would not be afforded a meaningful or
effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment as to
all proceedings, issues, claims, and parties in the action.
{¶8} To “affect” a substantial right, an appellant “must demonstrate that in the
absence of immediate review of the order [he] will be denied effective relief in the future.”
Bell v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 67 Ohio St.3d 60, 63 (1993); see also Wilhelm-Kissinger v.
Kissinger, 2011-Ohio-2317, ¶ 7.
{¶9} We review the substance of the appealed order to determine its finality
under R.C. 2505.02(B). Harkai v. Scherba Industries, Inc., 136 Ohio App.3d 211, 220 (9th
Dist. 2000); see also Rymers v. Rymers, 2010-Ohio-2684, ¶ 20 (11th Dist.) (“The principal
function of a final, appealable order is the termination of a case or controversy.”).
{¶10} Here, the appealed order specifically anticipates further action—receipt of
Woofter’s proof of purchase—prior to declaring a final ruling on the motion for return of
property. Thus, the order does not foreclose effective relief in the future. Accordingly, the
order does not “affect” a substantial right and is not final under R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) or
(B)(2). Likewise, because the order does not prevent a judgment with respect to Woofter’s
motion, it is not final under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4). As the order fails these prongs of a “final
order” under subdivisions R.C. 2505.02(B)(1), (B)(2), and (B)(4), we need not consider
whether the order meets the remaining elements of a “final order” as set forth in these
subdivisions. The remaining subdivisions of R.C. 2505.02(B) are clearly inapplicable to
the present case.
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Case No. 2025-G-0025
{¶11} Accordingly, the June 12, 2025 entry is not a final order, and we have no
jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal.
{¶12} Appeal dismissed.
MATT LYNCH, P.J.,
SCOTT LYNCH, J.,
concur.
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Case No. 2025-G-0025
JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the memorandum opinion of this court, it is ordered that
the appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Costs to be taxed against appellant.
JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI
PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH,
concurs
JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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Case No. 2025-G-0025