State v. Wray

[Cite as State v. Wray, 2026-Ohio-1538.]


STATE OF OHIO                     )                  IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                  )ss:               NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT                  )

STATE OF OHIO                                        C.A. No.      30979

        Appellee

        v.                                           APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                     ENTERED IN THE
DEAIR RAYSHON WRAY                                   COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                     COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
        Appellant                                    CASE No.   CR-2022-07-2582-C

                                 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: April 29, 2026



        HENSAL, Judge.

        {¶1}     Deair R. Wray appeals his convictions by the Summit County Court of Common

Pleas. This Court affirms.

                                                I.

        {¶2}     On the evening of May 26, 2022, someone shot G.S. and D.R. through the living

room window of D.R.’s Cuyahoga Falls apartment. D.R. sustained one gunshot wound to her leg

and recovered. G.S. sustained four gunshot wounds and died as a result of his injuries. The next

morning, a crime analyst employed by the Akron Police Department received an automated email

notifying the department that someone wearing an ankle monitor was in the vicinity of D.R.’s

apartment at the time of the shooting. The analyst forwarded the information to police in Cuyahoga

Falls, who traced the ankle monitor to an individual named D.M. Although he initially denied

involvement, D.M. later told police that he and his cousins, J.M. and Mr. Wray, drove to D.R.’s

neighborhood on the evening of the shooting to buy drugs. According to his statement, he
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remained in the car when the other two individuals got out and, moments later, he heard gunshots.

D.M. maintained that he was not involved.

          {¶3}   On August 17, 2022, Mr. Wray and J.M. were indicted on charges of murder under

Revised Code sections 2903.02(A) and (B), felonious assault, and improperly discharging a

firearm at or into a habitation or school safety zone, along with three firearm specifications. J.M.

was also charged with obstructing justice. After the indictment issued, J.M. agreed to cooperate

with prosecution. A jury found Mr. Wray guilty of each charge, and the trial court sentenced him

to twenty-nine years to life in prison. Mr. Wray appealed, assigning four errors for this Court’s

review.

                                  ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

          THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THE STATE
          FAILED TO ESTABLISH ON THE RECORD SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
          SUPPORT THE CHARGES LEVIED AGAINST MR. DEAIR WRAY.

          {¶4}   Mr. Wray’s first assignment of error maintains that the State did not produce

sufficient evidence that he was the shooter. Specifically, Mr. Wray argues that there was no

“[i]ndependent evidence” that he committed the crimes.

          {¶5}   “Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law that

this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Williams, 2009-Ohio-6955, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.), citing State v.

Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The relevant inquiry is whether the prosecution has

met its burden of production by presenting sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. Thompkins

at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). For purposes of a sufficiency analysis, this Court must view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

We do not evaluate credibility, and we make all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. State

v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 (1991). The evidence is sufficient if it allows the trier of fact to
                                                3


reasonably conclude that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable

doubt. Id.

       {¶6}     Mr. Wray’s only argument with respect to sufficiency is that the State did not

produce “independent evidence” to demonstrate that he was the shooter. In the context of his

appellate brief, Mr. Wray’s argument appears to take issue with credibility of J.M., who testified

that he accompanied Mr. Wray to R.D.’s apartment complex, heard gunshots, and saw Mr. Wray

running away with a gun in his hand. This credibility argument relates to the weight of the

evidence, not to the sufficiency of the evidence presented by the State. State v. Calhoun, 2021-

Ohio-1713, ¶ 22 (9th Dist.). Mr. Wray makes a conclusory statement about the sufficiency of the

evidence, but he has not developed a sufficiency argument. This Court will not construct one on

his behalf. See State v. Ross, 2023-Ohio-1185, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). Mr. Wray’s first assignment of

error is overruled.

                                               II.

                                ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

       MR. DEAIR WRAY’S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST
       WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS
       CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION (CLAUSE XIV, SECTION 1, UNITED
       STATES CONSTITUTION).

       {¶7}    In his second assignment of error, Mr. Wray argues that his convictions are against

the manifest weight of the evidence. This Court does not agree.

       {¶8}    When considering whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the

evidence, this Court must:

       review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider
       the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the
       evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
       miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
                                                4


State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th Dist. 1986). A reversal on this basis is reserved for

the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction. Id., citing State

v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983). Identity may be proved by direct or

circumstantial evidence, which do not differ with respect to probative value. See State v. Flynn,

2007-Ohio-6210, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.). See also State v. Treesh, 90 Ohio St.3d 460, 485 (2001).

       {¶9}    D.R. testified that she had been in an on-again, off-again relationship with Mr.

Wray for over three years. The couple had lived together at one point, and she testified that Mr.

Wray is the father of her son. According to D.R., the couple maintained a good relationship. D.R.

testified that she did not think Mr. Wray knew about her relationship with G.S., which she

characterized as a friendship. According to D.R., on the evening of the shooting, Mr. Wray sent

her a text message to arrange the purchase of some marijuana. She drove to the house where Mr.

Wray lived with his sister, sold him the drugs, and left. D.R. explained that her next stop was

G.S.’s mother’s house, where she picked G.S. up. The two returned to her apartment, where they

sat on the living room couch listening to music and smoking marijuana. D.R. testified that she

received a text from Mr. Wray that read “[N]o matter what, I will always love you.” D.R. described

the text message as “random.” Immediately after she received it, shots were fired through her

window. D.R. did not see who fired the shots. D.R. acknowledged that she told police that Mr.

Wray knew G.S. but that she did not think there were problems between them. She also

acknowledged that she left town with Mr. Wray after the shooting because he denied being the

shooter.

       {¶10} A neighbor who lives five houses away from D.R.’s street testified that on the night

of the shooting, she heard a noise “like people talking, moving around outside” shortly after she

went to bed at 11:00 p.m. She recalled that she got out of bed and looked out of the second-floor
                                                 5


window that faced the road, where she saw two people moving past on the sidewalk toward the

apartments. The neighbor testified that she went back to bed, but she soon heard gunshots and

people yelling. She recalled that when she looked out the window again, she saw two people

running past her house.

       {¶11} The morning after the shooting, a crime analyst employed by the Akron Police

Department received an email notification that GPS data from an ankle bracelet placed someone

under supervision of the parole authority near the scene of the shooting. A representative from

Oriana House identified D.M. as the individual wearing the ankle bracelet through its serial

number, and she testified that the GPS placed D.M. in the area of the shooting for approximately

six minutes. Detective Anthony Avalos testified that he created a map using the coordinates

provided by the GPS data, which demonstrated that D.M. moved from his residence to the house

where Mr. Wray lived at 10:45 p.m., where he stayed for six minutes. After that, the data indicated

that D.M. moved northbound on Route 8 into Cuyahoga Falls, where a cluster of GPS “pings” was

located about seven houses away from the scene of the shooting. Detective Avalos explained that

one minute after a 911 call was placed, the GPS data indicated that D.M. moved south into a

Cuyahoga Falls neighborhood for three minutes before heading south on Route 8 and returning to

Mr. Wray’s house.

       {¶12} D.M. testified that he was taken into custody the day after the shooting for violating

parole. He acknowledged that he lied to the police by denying all involvement and maintaining

that he was deep cleaning a restaurant in Cuyahoga Falls with his cousin J.M. at the time of the

shooting. He explained that when he was arrested in June and told that he was facing a murder

charge, however, that he approached police with his attorney and gave a truthful account of the

events. During trial, D.M. testified that he contacted J.M. on the night of the shooting because Mr.
                                                6


Wray wanted a ride to pick up some drugs at D.R.’s house. After J.M. picked him up, the two

went to Mr. Wray’s house. D.M. recalled that J.M. was driving and Mr. Wray gave directions.

D.M. testified that when they arrived in the neighborhood, they parked at the side of the street

around the corner from the apartments. He explained that Mr. Wray and J.M. exited the vehicle,

but he remained behind listening to music.

       {¶13} D.M. testified that after a few moments, he heard several gunshots. After that, he

panicked and moved to the driver’s seat with the intention of leaving the area, but he explained

that Mr. Wray and J.M. returned before he could do so. D.M. recalled that they ran toward him

from the direction of the apartments. According to D.M., he did not see anything in Mr. Wray’s

hand when he got in the car, but he did see Mr. Wray “looking like he was putting something in a

bag, in a little handbag strapped across his chest.” D.M. also recalled that Mr. Wray said, “she

was in there with that n----r G.” At the time, D.M. did not know who “G” was. D.M. testified that

he drove away, turning into a neighborhood where a family member lived because a police cruiser

was driving up Gorge Boulevard. Because no one was home at the family member’s house, they

drove onto Route 8 southbound. D.M. explained that after dropping Mr. Wray off at his house,

J.M. dropped him off at his own.

       {¶14} J.M.’s testimony was consistent with D.M.’s account of the events. He testified

that he picked D.M. up to get drugs and drove to the house where his nephew, Mr. Wray, was

living. J.M. offered Mr. Wray a ride to get drugs from D.R., whom he knew through Mr. Wray.

J.M. testified that Mr. Wray instructed him to park down the street. According to J.M., he and Mr.

Wray got out of the car, but D.M. stayed behind. He testified that instead of approaching the house

on foot from the front, Mr. Wray told him to approach by walking through a back alley and around
                                                 7


the side. J.M. explained that once they arrived, he waited around the side of the house while Mr.

Wray walked to the front.

        {¶15} J.M. testified that he heard gunshots then ran back to the parked car along the front

of the house instead of through the alley. He recalled that Mr. Wray was running ahead of him,

and he testified that he saw a gun in Mr. Wray’s hands. J.M. stated that he did not see the gun

once they got in the car. Like D.M., J.M. testified that D.M. drove the car away from the scene,

stopping in the neighborhood in Cuyahoga Falls where a relative lived for a few minutes. J.M.

testified that Mr. Wray contacted him after a few days. He explained that Mr. Wray was angry

that he had spoken with police and wanted to know what they had discussed. J.M. explained that

he did not know where Mr. Wray was when this conversation occurred. He testified that he did

not know whether Mr. Wray was in a relationship with D.R., and J.M. maintained that he did not

know G.S. and had no reason to kill him.

        {¶16} Like D.M., J.M. acknowledged that he lied during his first encounter with police,

and he admitted that he contacted the manager of a restaurant where he worked and asked the

manager to lie about his whereabouts and the whereabouts of D.M. on the night of the shooting.

He also admitted that because he knew that police were looking for a vehicle that matched the

description of his own, he moved his car to a hotel parking lot when police came looking for him.

J.M. testified that he agreed to cooperate with the State after he was indicted for murder and that,

in exchange for his truthful testimony, he anticipated that the murder charges would be dismissed.

J.M. maintained that he was telling the truth because he did not want to take the blame for someone

else’s actions.

        {¶17} To the extent that this Court can discern an argument in support of Mr. Wray’s

second assignment of error, it appears to be that the testimony of D.M. and J.M. that identified him
                                                  8


as the shooter was not credible. As noted above, both witnesses acknowledged that they had lied

during their initial encounters with police, and both described the charges filed against them and

the circumstances that led to their testimony. As the trier of fact, the jury was in the best position

to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and was “free to believe all, part, or none of the

testimony of each witness.” State v. Rose, 2026-Ohio-340, ¶ 10 (9th Dist), quoting Prince v.

Jordan, 2004-Ohio-7184, ¶ 35 (9th Dist.).

        {¶18} Mr. Wray has not demonstrated that this is the exceptional case in which the

evidence weighs heavily against his convictions. See Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d at 340.                His

convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and Mr. Wray’s second assignment

of error is overruled.

                                  ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

        THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY IMPROPERLY APPLYING THE RULES
        GOVERNING JURY QUESTIONS UNDER [CRIMINAL RULE] 24(J),
        RESULTING IN PREJUDICE AGAINST MR. DEAIR WRAY.

        {¶19} Mr. Wray’s third assignment of error argues that the trial court erred by failing to

instruct the jury that they should not discuss proposed questions among themselves under Criminal

Rule 24(J)(3). The record, however, demonstrates that the trial court provided this instruction to

the jury before trial started. Mr. Wray’s third assignment of error is overruled.

                                  ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

        THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY VIOLATING THE APPELLANT’S SPEEDY-
        TRIAL RIGHTS RESULTING IN PREJUDICE AGAINST MR. DEAIR WRAY.

        {¶20} In his fourth assignment of error, Mr. Wray argues that his speedy-trial rights were

violated. Specifically, Mr. Wray maintains that he did not waive his speedy-trial rights but was

not tried until over one year after his arrest.
                                                 9


       {¶21} On April 12, 2023, Mr. Wray’s attorney filed a motion to continue the jury trial

date that provided:

       Counsel, on behalf of Mr. Wray, is requesting that this Court continue this matter
       so that counsel can further review discovery which is complex and extensive in
       nature. He is further requesting a continuance to ensure that he receives a fair trial
       without any outside distractions.

       As this Court is aware Mr. Wray is facing a potential sentence of life without parole
       should be convicted of the charges as set forth in the indictment. Mr. Wray is
       requesting a continuance in this matter and believes it is necessary so that he can
       adequately defend himself and receive a fair trial. Mr. Wray would waive time in
       this case.

(Emphasis added.). No further mention was made of Mr. Wray’s speedy-trial rights during the

proceedings. Mr. Wray was bound by counsel’s waiver of his right to a speedy trial. See State v.

McBreen, 54 Ohio St.2d 315 (1978), syllabus. See also State v. Taylor, 2002-Ohio-7017, ¶ 36.

His fourth assignment of error is overruled.

                                                III.

       {¶22} Mr. Wray’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                                Judgment affirmed.




       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
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       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellant.




                                                     JENNIFER HENSAL
                                                     FOR THE COURT



CARR, P. J.
FLAGG LANZINGER, J.
CONCUR.


APPEARANCES:

ROSEL C. HURLEY, III, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and C. RICHLEY RALEY, JR., Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.