Bushong v. Bushong

[Cite as Bushong v. Bushong, 2026-Ohio-1573.]


                            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                 TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Mark A. Bushong,                                :

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             :
                                                                   No. 25AP-669
v.                                              :                (C.P.C. No. 13DR-3755)

Christina M. Bushong,                           :          (ACCELERATED CALENDAR)

                Defendant-Appellant.            :




                                         D E C I S I O N

                                    Rendered on April 30, 2026


                On brief: Hillard M.                Abroms,      for    appellant.
                Argued: Hillard M. Abroms.

                 APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,
                             Division of Domestic Relations

LELAND, J.
        {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant Christina M. Bushong challenges the July 21, 2025
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations,
that denied her Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment.
I. Facts and Procedural History
        {¶ 2} On October 9, 2013, plaintiff-appellee Mark A. Bushong filed a complaint for
divorce from appellant. Later, on December 11, 2014, the parties filed a motion for shared
parenting, a shared parenting plan, and a decree of shared parenting. On February 27,
2015, the parties entered into an agreed entry for a decree of divorce. About six years later,
on March 2, 2021, appellee moved to modify the shared parenting plan. The parties
eventually filed an amended shared parenting plan, causing the court on March 16, 2022 to
enter an agreed judgment entry reflecting the parties’ points of agreement.               On
December 12, 2022, however, appellee filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment,
No. 25AP-669                                                                              2


alleging appellant failed to fully disclose her income for purposes of calculating child
support. The trial court held a hearing on appellee’s Civ.R. 60(B) allegations on August 29,
2023 and ordered the magistrate to recalculate child support using complete income
information. On November 17, 2023, the parties in a memorandum of agreement stipulated
to the income levels to be used in the child support calculation. The memorandum of
agreement contained the following provision: “PURSUANT TO CIVIL RULE 41(B)(1), YOU
ARE HEREBY GIVEN NOTICE THAT THE PENDING MATTERS WILL BE DISMISSED
UNLESS THE ENTRY JOURNALIZING THIS AGREEMENT AND ALL OTHER
REQUIRED DOCUMENTS (WITHHOLDING ORDERS, GUIDELINES, ETC.) ARE
RECEIVED BY 12/18/23.” (Emphasis in original.) (Nov. 17, 2023 Memo of Agreement.)
       {¶ 3} The magistrate’s decision resolving the child support issue was dated
January 26, 2024, yet it first appeared on the record attached to the February 6, 2024 trial
court judgment entry adopting the magistrate’s decision. Neither party filed objections to
the magistrate’s decision. On March 28, 2025, appellant filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for
relief from judgment from the trial court’s February 6, 2024 entry adopting the magistrate’s
decision. On July 21, 2025, the court denied appellant’s March 28, 2025 Civ.R. 60(B)
motion. Appellant filed her notice of appeal on August 19, 2025, indicating she was
appealing the court’s July 21, 2025 entry.
       {¶ 4} Additionally, appellee filed a motion for contempt on May 27, 2024. The
magistrate granted the motion in a decision dated June 10, 2025, and the court adopted the
magistrate’s decision on June 24, 2025. Neither party filed objections to the magistrate’s
decision. On July 9, 2025, appellant filed a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment
from the court’s adoption of the magistrate’s decision. The Civ.R. 60(B) motion is pending
in the court below.
       {¶ 5} Appellant’s notice of appeal cited only the court’s July 21, 2025 entry that
denied her March 28, 2025 Civ.R. 60(B) motion.
II. Assignments of Error
       {¶ 6} Appellant assigns the following as errors for our review:
              [I.] The trial court abused its discretion and committed
              prejudicial error by proceeding in judgment in a matter for
              which the Court had no jurisdiction due to an unconditional
              dismissal by virtue of the specific language of the
              memorandum of agreement of November 17, 2023.
No. 25AP-669                                                                                   3



              [II.] The trial court abused its discretion and committed
              prejudicial error by adopting the Magistrate’s June 10, 2025,
              decision for which neither Defendant nor Defendant’s counsel
              was notified/served and was not lawfully journalized on the
              clerk’s docket.

III. Discussion
       {¶ 7} In her first assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court erred by
issuing a judgment after the court purportedly lost jurisdiction over the case by operation
of the November 17, 2023 memorandum of agreement. Although the memorandum of
agreement at issue referenced the case’s dismissal in the event the parties failed to meet
certain conditions, the court did not file a judgment entry dismissing the case prior to
entering a final judgment. Typically, a court must file a judgment entry of dismissal to
formally dismiss a case. See Civ.R. 41(A)(2); Civ.R. 58(A); Centofanti v. Wayne Homes,
2012-Ohio-4116, ¶ 28-29 (7th Dist.); and Ettayem v. State Auto Ins. Cos., 2017-Ohio-8464,
¶ 10 (10th Dist.) (“[T]he trial court did not dismiss the action, but rather, contemplated
issuing a dismissal after the parties completed their court-ordered obligations and
informed the court of their compliance.”). A narrow exception is Civ.R. 41(A)(1), which
allows a plaintiff to initiate a self-executing dismissal—but this is inapplicable in the present
case because appellee did not attempt to voluntarily dismiss the case. See Murphy v.
Ippolito, 2002-Ohio-3548, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.). Thus, without a judgment entry dismissing the
case, the trial court retained jurisdiction and did not err by proceeding to final judgment.
Accordingly, we overrule the first assignment of error.
       {¶ 8} In her second assignment of error, appellant argues the court erred by
adopting the magistrate’s June 10, 2025 decision. The notice of appeal, however, does not
include the June 24, 2025 judgment adopting the June 10, 2025 magistrate’s decision and
instead lists only the July 21, 2025 judgment. In other words, appellant appealed only the
judgment relating to the child support issue, and failed to appeal the judgment relating to
the contempt issue.
       {¶ 9} “The notice of appeal . . . shall designate the judgment, order or part thereof
appealed from.” App.R. 3(D). The only jurisdictional requirement for a valid appeal is that
appellant timely files the notice of appeal. App.R. 3(A); J.V.C.-N. v. M.P.D., 2012-Ohio-
1418, ¶ 20 (10th Dist.), citing Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Nolan, 72 Ohio St.3d 320 (1995),
No. 25AP-669                                                                                  4


syllabus. “ ‘When presented with other defects in the notice of appeal, a court of appeals is
vested with discretion to determine whether sanctions, including dismissal, are
warranted.’ ” J.V.C.-N. at ¶ 20, quoting Transamerica Ins. Co. at syllabus.
         {¶ 10} Here, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the July 21, 2025
judgment, but she did not file a timely notice of appeal from the June 24, 2025 judgment
adopting the June 10, 2025 magistrate’s decision. The notice of appeal, therefore, “did not
properly apprise the opposite part[y] of the nature of the appeal.” Transamerica Ins. Co.
at 324. “Unlike a case where the notice of appeal was vague and could have only been
intended to reference one judgment, . . . the notice of appeal in this case was expressly
sought to appeal from one judgment to the exclusion of another.” J.V.C.-N. at ¶ 22. While
appellee was certainly on notice of appellant’s intent to appeal the trial court’s July 21, 2025
judgment, appellant provided no indication whatsoever that her appeal would challenge
the June 24, 2025 judgment. For that reason, we conclude appellant failed to file a timely
notice of appeal as to the June 24, 2025 judgment, leaving this court without jurisdiction
to review that particular judgment. Accordingly, we overrule the second assignment of
error.
IV. Conclusion
         {¶ 11} Having overruled both assignments of error, we affirm the July 21, 2025
judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations.
                                                                          Judgment affirmed.
                          BOGGS, P.J., and JAMISON, J., concur.