In re A.S.

[Cite as In re A.S., 2026-Ohio-1292.]




                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT


In the Matter of:                                   :
                                                                    No. 25AP-582
A.S.                                                :          (C.P.C. No. 23JU-10785)

(L.S., Mother,                                      :        (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                 Appellant).                        :

                                                    :



                                           D E C I S I O N

                                        Rendered on April 9, 2026


                 On brief: Jonathan W. Klein, for appellant.

                 On brief: Robert J. McClaren for Franklin County Children
                 Services.

                  APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,
                      Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch

EDELSTEIN, J.

          {¶ 1} Appellant, L.S., mother of A.S., appeals from a decision and judgment entry
of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, Juvenile
Branch, terminating her parental rights and placing A.S. in the permanent custody of
appellee, Franklin County Children Services (“FCCS”). For the following reasons, we
affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History

          {¶ 2} This case involves FCCS’s request for permanent custody of A.S., who was
born on April 14, 2022. FCCS filed a complaint on October 26, 2023 alleging A.S. to be a
No. 25AP-582                                                                             2



dependent child. The October 26, 2023 complaint was the third refiling of the complaint.
FCCS stated in the complaint that the matter was first referred to FCCS in October 2022
after it was reported mother had been sexually assaulted by the child’s father, J.P-V., while
A.S. was present. On another occasion in January 2023, FCCS received a report that
mother was held at gunpoint and raped, again in the presence of the child. Following that
incident, mother reportedly ingested a large quantity of medication. FCCS performed a
well check, and mother was transported to the hospital. Mother indicated she did not have
family or friends to care for the child in the event of hospitalization, and mother did not
respond to FCCS’s multiple attempts to conduct a home visit. The complaint also stated
mother has a history of opioid and marijuana use.
       {¶ 3} On March 6, 2023, FCCS received a temporary order of custody (“TOC”).
FCCS placed A.S. in kinship care while mother received in-patient mental health treatment.
When mother was discharged from in-patient treatment in May 2023, it was recommended
she engage in intensive outpatient programming.            Mother was linked with this
programming but stopped attending in June 2023 and, at the time of the complaint, was
not engaged with any known mental health services.          The complaint stated mother
relocated several times and had completed only two urine screens since August 2023, both
of which were negative.
       {¶ 4} The trial court issued a TOC to FCCS on October 27, 2023. Subsequently, on
December 11, 2023, the trial court adjudicated A.S. a dependent child and awarded
temporary court commitment to FCCS. Thereafter, the trial court approved and adopted a
case plan for mother and father.
       {¶ 5} Following an extension of temporary court commitment in March 2024,
FCCS filed a motion for permanent court commitment (“PCC”) of A.S. on August 2, 2024.
The trial court granted several continuances of the PCC proceedings. First, on September 5,
2024, the trial court granted FCCS’s motion for a continuance to perfect service on father,
who was to have no contact with A.S. until he made himself available to the court. The trial
court granted FCCS a second continuance on October 9, 2024, again to perfect service on
father. On November 19, 2024, the trial court granted mother’s motion for a continuance
based on mother’s opposition to the PCC motion. On January 6, 2025, the trial court
No. 25AP-582                                                                                3



continued the PCC motion for a fourth time because the court was closed due to inclement
weather.
       {¶ 6} Ultimately, the matter came for trial on March 3, 2025. Father did not
contest the PCC motion. At the start of trial, Helena D’Arms, substitute counsel for mother,
moved for a continuance. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 6-8.) Ms. D’Arms indicated she was covering
for mother’s assigned counsel, Robert Nekervis, and both she and Mr. Nekervis, who was
on vacation, had not realized the hearing would actually be the trial date. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr.
at 6.) The trial court noted the docket indicated March 3, 2025 was both a pre-trial and the
trial date. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 5-6.) Ms. D’Arms stated she had only started to review the
case file that day and was “unprepared” to go to trial. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 6-7.) Ms. D’Arms
asked the trial court to “consider a continuance for [assigned counsel] to be present.” (Mar.
3, 2025 Tr. at 7-8.) The trial court declined to rule on the continuance request immediately,
opting instead to hear testimony from the FCCS caseworker and the guardian ad litem.
(Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 8.) The trial court stated, “[I]f there’s something different that comes
out that would -- that would show recent positive efforts towards reunification, then I would
grant [the continuance], but if it -- what’s in the [guardian ad litem’s] report, I -- I’m not
gonna (sic) grant it.” (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 8.)
       {¶ 7} The trial court then heard testimony from the FCCS caseworker. (Mar. 3,
2025 Tr. at 12.) Emily Morgan, the ongoing caseworker assigned to the matter, testified
that A.S. was two years old at the time of trial. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 13.) Ms. Morgan testified
FCCS became involved with A.S. in January 2023 after a report that mother had been
robbed and raped at gunpoint while A.S. was present. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 14.) After mother
attempted self-harm by ingesting medication, FCCS obtained a TOC in March 2023.
(Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 14.) The agency obtained temporary court commitment of A.S. on
December 11, 2023. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 14.)
       {¶ 8} Ms. Morgan testified A.S. is in an approved kinship home and has been in the
same placement since March 2023. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 15.) The kinship home is a
potential adoptive placement. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 15.) Ms. Morgan described A.S. as “very
bonded” with the kinship caregivers, testifying A.S. “appears happy and well cared for” and
refers to the kinship caregivers “as mom and dad.” (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 16.)
No. 25AP-582                                                                            4



       {¶ 9} Ms. Morgan described mother’s case plan requirements, including (1)
completing a psychological evaluation and following any recommendations; (2) complying
with random drug screens; (3) completing an alcohol and drug assessment; (4) completing
parenting classes; (5) completing a domestic violence victim’s assessment and refraining
from relationships involving domestic violence; (6) engaging with a community service
worker through FCCS if referred; (7) linking with a parent mentor if referred; (8) obtaining
safe and stable housing; (9) maintaining employment; (10) signing all releases of
information; and (11) meeting with the FCCS caseworker at least once a month. (Mar. 3,
2025 Tr. at 16-17.) Ms. Morgan testified she went over the case plan requirements with
mother, and she said mother seemed to understand what was required of her. (Mar. 3,
2025 Tr. at 16.)
       {¶ 10} Mother completed a psychological assessment, and it was recommended she
stabilize her mental health by engaging in consistent mental health treatment and
medication management and obtaining safe and stable housing. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 17-
18.) Ms. Morgan testified mother was linked with between five and ten different mental
health providers but has not engaged in consistent treatment. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 18-19.)
Additionally, mother had been hospitalized “about five times” since Ms. Morgan became
involved with this case. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 18.) Ms. Morgan said she had not had any
contact with mother since August 2024, and mother had not maintained her once-a-month
visit for seven consecutive months. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 19.)
       {¶ 11} Mother completed 11 drug screens, all of which were negative. (Mar. 3, 2025
Tr. at 19-20.) However, Ms. Morgan testified mother had missed over 20 drug screens and
had not completed any drug screens since December 2023. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 20.) Ms.
Morgan testified she made efforts to help mother attend drug screens, including providing
bus passes or arranging taxi cabs from her residence to the location of the screens, but
mother did not utilize those resources. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 20.) Mother did complete an
alcohol and drug assessment that resulted in mother’s admission in an intensive in-patient
program for concerns of opiate use relapse, but mother voluntarily left that program early
against medical advice. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 20.)
       {¶ 12} Ms. Morgan testified mother had not completed any parenting classes despite
Ms. Morgan’s efforts to help her attend parenting classes. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 21.)
No. 25AP-582                                                                            5



Additionally, mother did not complete a formal domestic violence victim’s assessment,
though Ms. Morgan testified mother did engage with a domestic violence course but opted
not to link with any supportive services. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 22.) Mother engaged with the
community service worker for assistance with hygiene items, housing resources, and
transportation. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 22-23.) Mother also engaged with a parent mentor
through Ohio Guidestone in May 2024 but declined a separate parent partner program.
(Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 23.)
       {¶ 13} Ms. Morgan testified mother did not have stable housing at the time of trial,
noting mother reported she was living with a friend. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 24.) Ms. Morgan
said mother has provided 11 different addresses to FCCS and has not had stable housing for
the duration of the case. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 24.) Of the three addresses Ms. Morgan was
able to visit, none were appropriate for a child. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 25.) Ms. Morgan
testified mother was not currently employed and had never verified any employment
throughout the case. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 25.)
       {¶ 14} Ms. Morgan said mother maintained consistent contact with her from the
time the case was opened until August 2024. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 26.) Ms. Morgan had not
had any contact with mother from August 2024 until the date of trial despite sending her
monthly appointment letters and attempting to make phone contact with her. (Mar. 3,
2025 Tr. at 26-27.) In total, Ms. Morgan said mother attended approximately 50 visits with
A.S. and missed approximately 30 visits. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 29.) Mother’s last formal
visit with A.S. was at the agency offices in August 2024. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 29.) Ms.
Morgan testified mother “reached out to [her] several times throughout August that
[mother] did not feel she wanted to continue engaging with the Agency to include visiting
with [A.S.] and that she no longer wished to work her case plan.” (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 29.)
Although mother’s agency visitations ceased in August 2024, Ms. Morgan testified mother
had two additional visits with A.S.—one in December 2024 and another in January or
February 2025—that mother had arranged with the kinship caregiver. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at
29-30.)
       {¶ 15} Ms. Morgan testified the interactions between mother and A.S. “varied,”
explaining that mother would sometimes bring additional people to the lobby of the visiting
area, making A.S. “visibly uncomfortable” and causing her to “move to go sit with kinship
No. 25AP-582                                                                               6



caregivers until it was time for the visit to start just between” mother and A.S. (Mar. 3,
2025 Tr. at 30.) Ms. Morgan described some visits as “really engaged” and other visits “that
weren’t as engaged,” noting mother would occasionally be on her phone during visits.
(Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 31.) She also described mother becoming visibly frustrated with A.S.’s
behavior during a visit and saying she was “not doing this anymore.” (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at
31.) Ms. Morgan testified she believes A.S. is bonded to mother. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 31.)
       {¶ 16} Ms. Morgan testified the kinship caregivers are not interested in legal custody
because they do not “feel that is the right decision to protect” A.S. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 32.)
However, Ms. Morgan reiterated the kinship caregivers are a prospective adoptive home
for A.S. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 32.) It was Ms. Morgan’s opinion that granting the motion for
permanent custody was in the best interest of A.S. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 33.) At the
conclusion of Ms. Morgan’s direct testimony, the trial court denied mother’s request for a
continuance and instructed Ms. D’Arms to proceed with cross-examination. (Mar. 3, 2025
Tr. at 34.)
       {¶ 17} The child’s guardian ad litem, Andrew Yiangou, testified A.S. has a “very
strong bond” with the kinship caregivers. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 52.) He said A.S. is “thriving”
in her current placement. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 52.) Mr. Yiangou described mother as
“appropriate” with A.S. during their visits. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 53.) His biggest concerns
with mother were housing instability and mental health, stating mother has had numerous
different addresses during the pendency of the case and has not demonstrated that she is
following through with recommendations for mental health treatment. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr.
at 53.) Mr. Yiangou testified he has “never had a good phone” number for mother, and he
said mother has never reached out to update him on any case plan progress. (Mar. 3, 2025
Tr. at 57.) Mr. Yiangou recommended the trial court grant the PCC motion because it would
be in the best interest of A.S. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 54.) He testified permanent custody was
a better option than legal custody under which mother would still be allowed to visit A.S.
because mother “hasn’t demonstrated a stable lifestyle.” (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 64.) The
attorney for FCCS informed the trial court that the kinship caregivers were not interested
in legal custody. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 67.)
       {¶ 18} V.C., the kinship caregiver for A.S., testified A.S. has lived with her since
March 3, 2023, with official placement occurring March 6, 2023. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 69-
No. 25AP-582                                                                                7



70.) V.C. testified she and A.S. “are very close,” and she said A.S. is “also very attached” to
V.C.’s husband. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 71.) V.C. said she maintains a “good” relationship with
mother and has arranged for A.S. to see mother three times since formal visitations ceased.
(Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 72, 74.) V.C. said A.S. takes some time to warm up to visitations with
mother but “loves” her and “always will.” (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 74.) However, V.C. also said,
“[A]t the end of the day [A.S.] is ready to come home with” the kinship caregivers. (Mar. 3,
2025 Tr. at 74.) V.C. said she is not interested in legal custody because it “allow[s]
mandated visits,” and she has ongoing concerns with mother’s stability and communication
with father despite a no-contact order. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 75.) If the agency was granted
permanent custody, V.C. testified she would “[a]bsolutely” still allow mother to have
supervised visits with A.S. and is a strong proponent of open adoption. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr.
at 78.)
          {¶ 19} At the conclusion of V.C.’s direct testimony, the trial court stated it would
“take a few weeks break,” and reminded mother it was her obligation to demonstrate she
has met the case plan objectives. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 79.) Mother signed a waiver of service
and notice of hearing that day. (Mar. 3, 2025 Waiver of Service and Notice of Hearing.)
          {¶ 20} Trial resumed on April 3, 2025. Both Ms. D’Arms and Mr. Nekervis appeared
as counsel for mother. (Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 5.) Mother was not present when the hearing
began, and counsel indicated mother had communicated she had overslept and would be
late. (Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 7-8.) Additionally, counsel for mother stated “we are not asking
for [the] return of this child to [mother] at this time.” (Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 12.) Mother
arrived at the hearing approximately one hour after the scheduled start time. (Apr. 3, 2025
Tr. at 16.)
          {¶ 21} Ms. D’Arms then conducted the cross-examination of V.C. (Apr. 3, 2025 Tr.
at 17.) V.C. testified the current relationship between mother and A.S. was “harmful.”
(Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 19.) V.C. said there has been a “lack of consistency” with mother’s visits,
and A.S. has developed significant separation anxiety and fear of a caregiver leaving her.
(Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 19-20.) V.C. said her relationship with mother has deteriorated and she
desires permanent custody so mother cannot attempt to return the case to court again in
the future. (Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 21.) V.C. expressed a desire for A.S. to have permanency
and security, and she believed permanent custody would give her a greater ability to protect
No. 25AP-582                                                                              8



A.S. from mother’s instability. (Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 21-22.) V.C. testified it is difficult to
prepare A.S. for mandated visits with mother only for mother not to show up to the visits.
(Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 22.) V.C. said mother had not reached out to ask about A.S. since the
last court hearing. (Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 23.) V.C. testified she would be concerned for A.S.’s
“general well-being and safety” if she were returned to mother’s care. (Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at
33.)
       {¶ 22} Mother, who was 21 years old at the time of trial, testified she spent her own
childhood in foster care in both residential and group homes until she aged out of the
system. (Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 40.) Mother survived numerous instances of sexual assault,
violence, and instability in her childhood. (Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 41.) She testified she was
recently diagnosed with borderline personality disorder. (Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 43.) Mother
experienced postpartum depression after A.S. was born and had a mental health crisis
during which she attempted suicide. (Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 47-48.) She said she felt
“confused” by what was expected of her under the case plan and expressed the difficulty she
felt “trying to support somebody else that is in the system” when she, herself, had spent her
“whole life” in the system. (Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 50.) Mother testified she was receiving
counseling and had a good relationship with her therapist. (Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 52.)
       {¶ 23} Mother testified she loves A.S. and is “grateful for everything [V.C.] has done
for [A.S.] and how [A.S.] feels and how [A.S.] is treated,” describing V.C. as “an amazing
person.” (Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 55.) Mother testified she was not attempting to obtain custody
of A.S., stating “I know that I cannot do this on my own.” (Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 56.) She said
it was her desire that V.C. obtain legal custody of A.S. so she can maintain contact with A.S.
(Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 56.) Mother testified she was not in contact with father. (Apr. 3, 2025
Tr. at 61.)
       {¶ 24} Mother testified she completed a domestic violence course in March 2024.
(Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 63.) She also completed a parenting program between the two hearing
dates. (Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 78.) Mother agreed she asked for visitations with A.S. to stop
due to her own mental health, testifying she had been hospitalized for mental health more
than ten times since the case opened. (Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 66.) She reiterated she wanted
V.C. to have custody of A.S., and mother testified she had no plan to regain custody. (Apr. 3,
2025 Tr. at 67.) Mother also testified she has not had a housing lease since the case opened,
No. 25AP-582                                                                              9



has never provided paystubs to either the FCCS caseworker or the guardian ad litem, and
has never provided her address to the FCCS caseworker. (Apr. 3, 2025 Tr. at 70-74.)
       {¶ 25} Following the hearing, the parties and the guardian ad litem submitted
written closing arguments to the court. In a June 11, 2025 decision and judgment entry,
the trial court granted the PCC motion, terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights,
and placed A.S. in the permanent custody of FCCS. Mother timely appeals.
II. Assignments of Error

       {¶ 26} Mother raises the following two assignments of error for our review:
              [I.] The trial court erred in failing to grant Mother’s motion for
              continuance and that the denial was an abuse of discretion as
              to violate due process.

              [II.] Appellant was prejudicially deprived of her United States
              and Ohio constitutional rights to a fair trial due to the
              ineffective assistance of counsel.

III. Applicable Law

       {¶ 27} Parents have a constitutionally protected fundamental interest in the care,
custody, and control of their children. In re B.C., 2014-Ohio-4558, ¶ 19, quoting Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990) (recognizing
the right to raise one’s children is a basic and essential civil right). However, these rights
are not absolute, and a parent’s natural rights are always subject to the ultimate welfare of
the child. In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106 (1979); In re D.A., 2007-Ohio-1105,
¶ 11. In certain circumstances, therefore, the state may terminate the parental rights of
natural parents when such termination is in the child’s best interest. D.A. at ¶ 11,
citing Cunningham at 105. Because termination of parental rights “has been described as
‘the family law equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case,’ ” parents “ ‘must be
afforded every procedural and substantive protection the law allows.’ ” In re Hayes, 79
Ohio St.3d 46, 48 (1997), quoting In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16 (6th Dist. 1991).
       {¶ 28} R.C. 2151.414 governs the termination of parental rights. In re K.H., 2008-
Ohio-4825, ¶ 42. Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), a trial court may grant permanent
custody of a child to a children services agency if the court determines, by clear and
convincing evidence, that (1) one of the five factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)
No. 25AP-582                                                                                10



through (e) applies, and (2) it is in the best interest of the child to do so. In re Z.C., 2023-
Ohio-4703, ¶ 7. Clear and convincing evidence is the measure or degree of proof “which
will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought
to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the
syllabus. Clear and convincing evidence requires more than a mere preponderance of the
evidence but does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases. Id.
       {¶ 29} To determine the best interest of the child, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) requires the
trial court to consider all relevant facts including, but not limited to, the following:
               (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the
               child’s parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-
               home providers, and any other person who may significantly
               affect the child;

               (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child
               or through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for
               the maturity of the child;

               (c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the
               child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public
               children services agencies or private child placing agencies for
               twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month
               period, or the child has been in the temporary custody of one
               or more public children services agencies or private child
               placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive
               twenty-two-month period and, as described in division (D)(1)
               of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was
               previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in
               another state;

               (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement
               and whether that type of placement can be achieved without a
               grant of permanent custody to the agency;

               (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this
               section apply in relation to the parents and child.

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a) through (e). R.C. 2151.414(D) does not assign any one factor “greater
weight than the others.” In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 56.
No. 25AP-582                                                                                 11



IV. First Assignment of Error—Continuance

       {¶ 30} In her first assignment of error, mother argues the trial court erred when it
failed to grant her request for a continuance on the first day of trial.
       {¶ 31} An appellate court will not reverse a denial of a continuance in a permanent
custody case unless the trial court abused its discretion in denying the continuance. In re
J.R., 2024-Ohio-5619, ¶ 6 (10th Dist.), citing In re J.B., 2009-Ohio-3083, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.),
citing In re B.G.W., 2008-Ohio-3693, ¶ 23 (10th Dist.). An abuse of discretion connotes a
decision that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5
Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983); State ex rel. Deblase v. Ohio Ballot Bd., 2023-Ohio-1823, ¶ 27.
In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a continuance, “an appellate court weighs any potential
prejudice to the movant against the court’s right to control its docket and the public’s
interest in the efficient dispatch of justice.” J.R. at ¶ 6, citing State v. Woods, 2010-Ohio-
1586, ¶ 24 (10th Dist.) and In re M.K., 2010-Ohio-2194, ¶ 14 (10th Dist.). Further, “ ‘[t]here
are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to
violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case,
particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied.’ ”
J.B. at ¶ 26, quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964).
       {¶ 32} In evaluating a request for a continuance, a court considers: (1) the length of
the requested delay; (2) whether the parties have requested and received other
continuances; (3) the inconvenience to the parties, witnesses, opposing counsel, and the
court; (4) whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons or is merely dilatory,
purposeful, or contrived; (5) whether the movant contributed to the circumstances giving
rise to the request for a continuance; and (6) any other relevant factors, depending on the
unique circumstances of each case. J.R. at ¶ 7, citing Woods at ¶ 24, citing State v. Unger,
67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67 (1981) and J.B. at ¶ 26.
       {¶ 33} Considering all the circumstances surrounding mother’s request for a
continuance, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her a
continuance. When substitute counsel for mother requested a continuance on the day of
trial, she noted that assigned counsel believed the hearing was a pre-trial conference, not a
full trial. Despite substitute counsel stating she did not feel prepared to proceed to trial, the
No. 25AP-582                                                                              12



trial court noted substitute counsel was listed as counsel for mother and was “competent
and well qualified to handle” the case. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 34.) Substitute counsel did not
articulate a particular length for the requested continuance. Mother argues it was generally
unfair to require her to go to trial with substitute counsel, but mother does not articulate
any specific deficiencies she faced by proceeding with substitute counsel.
       {¶ 34} We also note that although the trial court denied mother’s continuance
request, it did, after the first day of testimony, continue the matter for one month before
resuming and concluding the trial. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 79.) The trial court specifically
addressed mother before continuing the matter, reminding her it was her responsibility to
demonstrate her compliance with the case plan objectives. (Mar. 3, 2025 Tr. at 79.) Thus,
although the trial court did not grant mother’s initial continuance request, it did ultimately
continue the matter and allow for further presentation of evidence. Both assigned counsel
and substitute counsel were present when trial resumed on April 3, 2025.
       {¶ 35} R.C. 2151.414(A)(2) requires a trial court to hold a trial on a PCC motion no
later than 120 days after the agency files the motion except for “good cause” shown for a
reasonable continuance. Generally, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a
request for a continuance when the PCC hearing is already past the 120-day deadline
contained in R.C. 2151.414(A)(2). J.R., 2024-Ohio-5619, at ¶ 8 (10th Dist.), citing In re J.C.,
2011-Ohio-715, ¶ 46 (10th Dist.). By the time of the March 3, 2025 trial, the PCC motion
had already been pending for 213 days, and the trial court had granted 4 prior continuances.
Additionally, by the time of the permanent custody hearing, A.S. had been in the custody of
FCCS since March 6, 2023, with the potential for adoptive placement with her current
kinship caregivers. J.R. at ¶ 8, citing In re J.M., 2015-Ohio-3988, ¶ 26 (10th Dist.) (a trial
court may consider the child’s length of time in foster care and potential for adoptive
placement as a relevant factor in determining whether to grant or deny a requested
continuance).
       {¶ 36} Though mother argues she was not responsible for her assigned counsel’s
vacation, mother does not articulate how granting another continuance when A.S. had
already been in the temporary custody of FCCS for nearly two years would have been in
A.S.’s best interest. The trial court reserved ruling on the continuance request until it heard
evidence to determine whether any circumstances had changed since the guardian ad litem
No. 25AP-582                                                                             13



filed his report recommending PCC. Ms. Morgan’s testimony, provided before the trial
court ruled on the continuance request, demonstrated mother largely failed to participate
in the case during its nearly two-year duration. In re K.J., 2018-Ohio-471, ¶ 22 (10th Dist.),
citing B.G.W., 2008-Ohio-3693, at ¶ 24-28 (10th Dist.) (trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying a continuance request made on the day of hearing where parent had
failed to show a commitment and willingness to meet the case plan objectives during the
pendency of the case).
       {¶ 37} Mother does not argue the result of the trial would have been different had
she been granted a continuance. In re K.R., 2023-Ohio-359, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.) (no abuse of
discretion in denying continuance request where father did not argue granting the
continuance “would have impacted the trial court’s ultimate decision” regarding permanent
custody). “This court has repeatedly affirmed continuance denials in [PCC] cases where
there is no showing that a granting of the continuance request likely would have changed
the outcome of the case.” Id., citing In re J.J., 2022-Ohio-907, ¶ 24 (10th Dist.) (“putative
father makes no argument that a delay in proceedings” would have enabled him to provide
“any additional testimony or evidence that would have had an impact on the trial court’s
ultimate decision regarding permanent custody”); In re A.P., 2009-Ohio-438, ¶ 5-6 (10th
Dist.) (no abuse of discretion in denying continuance where mother did not show a
continuance would have “remedied the many ways [she] failed to comply with even the
basics of the case plan”). Instead, mother’s own testimony on the second day of trial
confirmed much of the testimony of the FCCS caseworker and the guardian ad litem that
mother had not made meaningful progress toward reunification. Indeed, mother conceded
she was not seeking custody of A.S. Thus, mother does not show a continuance likely would
have changed the disposition of the case.
       {¶ 38} Mother argues it was unfair to require her to proceed to trial with substitute
counsel. Though the trial court initially denied the continuance, it did ultimately continue
the matter to a date where both assigned counsel and substitute counsel attended to
represent mother. On this record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the initial continuance request made on the day of trial. Accordingly, we overrule
mother’s first assignment of error.
No. 25AP-582                                                                              14



V. Second Assignment of Error—Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

       {¶ 39} In her second and final assignment of error, mother argues she received
ineffective assistance of counsel.
       {¶ 40} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.352, a parent “is entitled to representation by legal
counsel at all stages of the proceedings” involving termination of parental rights. The right
to counsel “ ‘also arises from the guarantees of due process and equal protection contained
within the constitutions of Ohio and the United States.’ ” In re Baby Boy N., 2021-Ohio-
1272, ¶ 41 (10th Dist.), quoting In re Brooks, 2004-Ohio-3887, ¶ 24 (10th Dist.), citing State
ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 61 Ohio St.2d 6 (1980), paragraph two of the syllabus.
       {¶ 41} The test for ineffective assistance of counsel in cases involving the involuntary
termination of parental rights is the same as the test for ineffective assistance of counsel in
criminal cases set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Baby Boy
N. at ¶ 42, quoting Brooks at ¶ 24, citing In re McLemore, 2001 Ohio App.LEXIS 1249 (10th
Dist. Mar. 20, 2001). A party asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must
establish: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient or objectively unreasonable, as
determined by “prevailing professional norms,” and (2) counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced the party. State v. Spaulding, 2016-Ohio-8126, ¶ 77, quoting Strickland at 694.
       {¶ 42} To show trial counsel’s performance was deficient or unreasonable, the party
must overcome the presumption that counsel provided competent representation and must
show counsel’s actions were not trial strategies prompted by reasonable professional
judgment. Strickland at 689. Counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that all decisions
fall within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. State v. Sallie, 81 Ohio
St.3d 673, 675 (1998). Tactical or strategic decisions, even if unsuccessful, do not generally
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Frazier, 61 Ohio St.3d 247, 255 (1991).
Rather, the errors complained of must amount to a substantial violation of counsel’s
essential duties to his client. See State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 141-42 (1989).
       {¶ 43} Prejudice results when “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ”
Bradley at 142, quoting Strickland at 694. “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.’ ” Id., quoting Strickland at 694.
No. 25AP-582                                                                              15



       {¶ 44} When analyzing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, an appellate court
“need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.” Strickland at
697. If a party cannot show the requisite prejudice under the second prong of Strickland,
we need not address the first prong of Strickland concerning deficient performance. State
v. Wade, 2021-Ohio-4090, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.), quoting State v. Cosolis, 2002-Ohio-4302, ¶ 53
(10th Dist.).
       {¶ 45} Mother asserts her assigned counsel was ineffective in failing to notify the
trial court of his vacation and sending substitute counsel in his place without adequately
preparing her for trial. Despite mother’s concerns with counsel’s performance, she fails to
articulate any prejudice from substitute counsel proceeding to trial in place of assigned
counsel. Mother does not challenge the trial court’s determination that granting FCCS’s
motion for permanent custody was in A.S.’s best interest. Mother concedes she did not
comply with her case plan and expressly stated she was not seeking custody of A.S. The
FCCS caseworker, the guardian ad litem, and the kinship caregiver all expressed concerns
about mother’s ongoing stability and mental health.
       {¶ 46} We are sympathetic to mother’s desire to maintain contact with A.S. despite
her acknowledgment that A.S. should not be returned to her care, but we are mindful of the
procedural posture of the case as a motion for permanent custody. Although mother
advocated for legal custody to V.C. instead of permanent custody to FCCS, no party filed a
motion for legal custody to V.C., and V.C. repeatedly stated she was not open to legal
custody. See R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) (“If a child is adjudicated an abused, neglected, or
dependent child, the court may . . . [a]ward legal custody of the child to either parent or to
any other person who, prior to the dispositional hearing, files a motion requesting
legal custody of the child or is identified as a proposed legal custodian in a complaint or
motion filed prior to the dispositional hearing by any party to the proceedings. A person
identified . . . as a proposed legal custodian shall be awarded legal custody of the child only
if the person identified signs a statement of understanding for legal custody” containing
specific provisions.). (Emphasis added.) While mother speculates assigned counsel may
have presented convincing arguments to the court had he attended the first day of trial,
No. 25AP-582                                                                            16



mother simply makes no argument that the result of the proceeding would have been
different had assigned counsel been present at the March 3, 2025 hearing.
       {¶ 47} Upon our review of the entire record—and in light of mother’s inability to
articulate any prejudice under the second prong of Strickland—we must conclude mother
cannot establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Williams, 2025-
Ohio-1151, ¶ 57 (10th Dist.) (without a demonstration of prejudice, we need not consider
trial counsel’s performance under the first prong of the Strickland analysis). We overrule
mother’s second and final assignment of error.
VI. Disposition

       {¶ 48} Based on the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying mother’s request for a continuance on the first day of trial, and mother did not
receive ineffective assistance of counsel. Having overruled mother’s two assignments of
error, we affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of
Domestic Relations, Juvenile Branch.
                                                                       Judgment affirmed.

                       BEATTY BLUNT and MENTEL, JJ., concur.