In re J.J.

[Cite as In re J.J., 2026-Ohio-1269.]




                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                 SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      LUCAS COUNTY


 In re J.J.                                  Court of Appeals No. L-25-00257,
                                             L-25-00258


                                             Trial Court No. 25305577


                                             DECISION AND JUDGMENT

                                             Decided: April 8, 2026

                                           *****
        Janna E. Waltz, for appellee.

        Christopher S. Clark, and
        Laurel A. Kendall for appellant.
                                           *****


        DUHART, J.

        {¶ 1} This is a consolidated appeal by appellant, D.S., the mother of J.J., and

appellant, B.J, father of J.J., from the November 12, 2025 judgment of the Lucas County

Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, granting permanent custody of J.J. to
appellee, Lucas County Children’s Services (“LCCS” or “the agency”).1 For the reasons

that follow, we affirm the judgment.

       {¶ 2} Father sets forth one assignment of error:

       The trial court abused its discretion when it found that father had failed to
       provide clear and convincing evidence that, notwithstanding the prior
       termination, that he can provide a legally secure permanent placement and
       adequate care for the health, welfare and safety of the child, when there was
       still significant time left on the case, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D) and
       R.C. 2151.415.

                                       Background

       {¶ 3} J.J. was born on June 11, 2025, to mother and father (collectively “parents”);

parents were not married. Mother has four other children, two of whom are father’s

children. In addition to his children with mother, father has children by other women.

Prior to J.J.’s birth, parents lost permanent custody of their common children, and neither

mother nor father has custody of any of their children. After J.J.’s birth, the agency was

notified and became involved due to parents’ loss of permanent custody of their children

as well as on-going domestic violence (“DV”) and substance use issues.

       {¶ 4} On June 13, 2025, the agency initiated the underlying case with the filing of

its “Complaint in Dependency: Permanent Custody and Motion for Shelter Care Hearing”

in which it alleged that J.J. was a dependent child pursuant to R.C. 2151.04. The

complaint detailed mother’s long history with the agency and set forth concerns that


1
 While mother filed an appeal, her appellate brief was stricken, and she failed to file
another brief. Therefore, only father’s appellate brief is properly before this court.
Mother will be mentioned when pertinent to matters in father’s appeal.


2.
existed in prior cases, including DV, mental health issues and substance abuse, which led

to J.J.’s siblings’ removal. The complaint described the case plan services previously

offered to parents and noted both of them failed to meaningfully engage in those services.

In addition, the complaint set forth that mother lost legal custody of her oldest child and

permanent custody of her other three children. The agency requested that the trial court

do the following: hold an emergency shelter care hearing and find it necessary to place

J.J. in shelter care; schedule and hold an adjudication hearing and find J.J. dependent;

proceed to a dispositional hearing where, pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(4), the parents’

rights would be permanently terminated and permanent custody of J.J. would be awarded

to the agency.

       {¶ 5} Also on June 13, 2025, a shelter care hearing was held. Mother attended the

hearing and was in agreement with the agency receiving interim temporary custody of J.J.

Father did not attend the hearing. Thereafter, the trial court issued an order awarding

interim temporary custody of J.J. to the agency. J.J. was placed in foster care.

       {¶ 6} On June 18, 2025, Attorney Nida Salahuddin-Mohler was appointed as the

guardian ad litem (“GAL”) to protect J.J.’s interests.

       {¶ 7} On October 24, 2025, the trial court conducted an adjudicatory hearing

followed by the dispositional hearing on the agency’s complaint. Parents attended the

court proceedings, but neither parent testified.




3.
Adjudicatory Hearing

       {¶ 8} Makaya Walker, an agency assessment caseworker, testified to the following.

She met with mother at the hospital following J.J.’s birth and mother said she planned to

engage in mental health services. Mother had tested positive for marijuana at the

beginning of her pregnancy but tested negative when J.J. was born. Walker’s concerns

included that mother was not engaged in mental health services, did not have her own

housing, used marijuana and had DV issues with father.

       {¶ 9} Case plan services had been offered to parents in prior cases including

undergoing a dual assessment and following recommendations, as well as DV and

batterers services for father. Father completed his first dual assessment in 2022, and he

was recommended for substance abuse services. He started intensive outpatient services

(“IOP”) but did not complete IOP. Walker believed father completed DV services.

Mother did not successfully complete case plan services in the prior cases.

       {¶ 10} After J.J. was born, Walker met with father at mother’s home and tried to

give him information about the staffing and court hearing, but he said he would not

participate until DNA had been completed. DNA testing was completed, and father was

found to be J.J.’s biological father.

       {¶ 11} The agency offered an exhibit consisting of certified Lucas County Juvenile

Court documents, which exhibit was admitted into evidence without objection from

father’s attorney. The exhibit included complaints, judgment entries and other documents

from cases concerning the custody of mother’s four other children, two of whom are

father’s children, and case plan services previously offered to parents.

4.
       {¶ 12} The trial court adjudicated J.J. dependent.

Dispositional Hearing

       {¶ 13} Hannah Jerik, an ongoing caseworker for the agency, and the GAL testified

and various exhibits were admitted, without objection from father’s lawyer. The exhibits

included certified Toledo Police Department criminal records for parents, certified Toledo

Municipal Court criminal and traffic case records for parents and the GAL’s report.

       {¶ 14} Jerik testified that the agency did not offer case plan services to parents, but

parents were encouraged to engage in services, which would include agency issued

referrals if requested. Jerik noted the agency’s concerns, that father was using

substances, he was not surrounding himself with safe people and it was unknown if his

house would be appropriate for a child, and recommendations, that the agency was

requesting permanent custody of J.J. based on a belief that it would be in J.J.’s best

interest because parents had not remedied the situations that had arisen in prior cases.

Jerik testified, regarding father’s substance use, that she “would not be opposed at all to

referring father to services, he just hasn’t asked and [she hasn’t] pursued.” Jerik

acknowledged father visited J.J., and no concerns were reported.

       {¶ 15} The GAL testified she was familiar with the family and was involved in

prior cases. She was appointed to this case in June 2025, and performed an independent

investigation which consisted mostly of examining notes related to the history of the case

and reviewing documents filed with the court. She saw J.J. and spoke with father, but not

mother. The GAL told father to make sure he completed prior case plan services so he


5.
and mother would have a chance to get J.J. back. The GAL did not have the opportunity

to observe either parent with J.J., but she did observe J.J. in her placement, where J.J. is

“doing great, don’t have any concerns for her.” J.J. was meeting all of her milestones,

was bonded to the placement and others in the home and the placement was willing to

adopt J.J.

       {¶ 16} The GAL opined neither parent was able to provide a safe, stable, and

permanent environment for the child due to parents’ DV history, past substance abuse

issues and housing issues, none of which had been resolved.

       {¶ 17} In her report, which was admitted into evidence without objection, the GAL

detailed the agency’s history with the family, starting in 2017, with mother’s first child,

and progressing through each subsequent child. Father’s first child with mother was born

in 2022, and there were concerns with mother and father using drugs. Father’s second

child with mother was born in 2023, then J.J. was born in 2025. Case plan services were

offered to parents, including a dual diagnostic assessment, housing and batterers

intervention for father; neither parent made significant progress. There were on-going

concerns of substance abuse by father since he did not complete services.

       {¶ 18} The GAL recommended permanent custody of J.J. be given to the agency

because she did not believe parents did the case plan services they need to have J.J.

placed with them, citing concerns about prior DV and substance abuse issues. The GAL

was asked if she believed parents would complete services if they were given more time,

and the GAL replied that she “struggled with this one because if you’re provided an

opportunity anything is possible; however, the past shows us that they haven’t.”

6.
       {¶ 19} Following the witnesses’ testimony and the admission of exhibits, the trial

court found the agency proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that permanent custody

of J.J. should be awarded to the agency, as it was in J.J.’s best interest given that parents

did not reach their burden of proving that changes from prior cases warranted them

receiving custody of J.J.

       {¶ 20} In its November 12, 2025 judgment entry, the trial court found J.J. was

dependent as the agency established by clear and convincing evidence that parents are

unable to care for J.J. The court further found that J.J. cannot or should not be placed

with either parent within reasonable time based on R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (2), (4) and (11).

The court also found that the agency met its burden by providing clear and convincing

evidence that a grant of permanent custody is in J.J.’s best interest, in accordance with

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).

       {¶ 21} Appeals were filed, but only father’s appeal will be considered.

                            Applicable Permanent Custody Law

R.C. 2151.353(A)(4)

       {¶ 22} R.C. 2151.353(A)(4) allows a children services agency to seek a

disposition of permanent custody of a child when the agency files a complaint alleging

that a child is dependent, without first offering case plan services to parents or a path

toward reunification. In re L.K., 2022-Ohio-1857, ¶ 104 (6th Dist.); In re T.H., 2025-

Ohio-344, ¶ 34 (6th Dist.), citing In re S.J., 2024-Ohio-5137, ¶ 23 (6th Dist.). See also In

re Baby Girl Baxter, 17 Ohio St.3d 229, 234 (1985) (“R.C. 2151.412 [concerning case


7.
plans] does not require that a court order a reunification plan when it makes disposition

pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(4).”).

       {¶ 23} Pursuant to R.C. 2151.353(A)(4), when a trial court adjudicates a child

dependent, the court can only grant permanent custody of the child to an agency if the

court makes a two-prong determination: (1) at least one factor in R.C. 2151.414(E) is

present, indicating that the child cannot or should not be placed with a parent within a

reasonable time; and (2) the factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) show that granting permanent

custody of the child to the agency is in the child’s best interest. In re L.K. at ¶ 104.

R.C. 2151.414(E)

       {¶ 24} Here, the trial court found R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (2), (4) and (11) applied,

although only finding one (E) factor exists is sufficient to support an award of permanent

custody to the agency. In re S.J. at ¶ 29. We will confine our examination to only one

factor, R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), as it relates to father.

       {¶ 25} R.C. 2151.414(E) states:

       In determining at a hearing . . . whether a child cannot be placed with either
       parent within a reasonable period of time or should not be placed with the
       parents, the court shall consider all relevant evidence. If the court
       determines, by clear and convincing evidence, at a hearing . . . that one or
       more of the following exist as to each of the child’s parents, the court shall
       enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a
       reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent:
       ...

       (11) The parent has had parental rights involuntarily terminated with
       respect to a sibling of the child . . . and the parent has failed to provide clear
       and convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior
       termination, the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement
       and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.
8.
       {¶ 26} The trial court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414 must be based on clear and

convincing evidence. In re J.S., 2025-Ohio-17, ¶ 34 (6th Dist.). “Clear and convincing

evidence” is evidence sufficient for the trier of fact to form a firm conviction or belief

that the essential statutory elements for a termination of parental rights have been

established. Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

       {¶ 27} A finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) places the burden on father to

present clear and convincing evidence proving that he can provide a legally secure

permanent placement and adequate care for the child’s health, welfare, and safety. In re

N.J., 2023-Ohio-3190, ¶ 44 (6th Dist.). Hence, father must essentially rebut a

presumption that, because his parental rights were involuntarily terminated as to other

children, he is not a suitable parent for additional children. In re M.M., 2023-Ohio-3963,

¶ 51 (6th Dist.), citing In re E.A., 2012-Ohio-5925, ¶ 14 (9th Dist.).

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)

       {¶ 28} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) provides:


       In determining the best interest of a child at a hearing . . . the court shall
       consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following:

       (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
       parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and
       any other person who may significantly affect the child;

       (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed . . . through the child’s guardian
       ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the child;

       (c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been
       in the temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies .
       . . for [12] or more months of a consecutive [22]-month period . . .;
9.
       (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether
       that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent
       custody to the agency;

       (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section
       apply in relation to the parents and child.

R.C. 2151.414 and R.C. 2151.414(D)

       {¶ 29} A trial court’s finding that a parent has lost parental rights to another child

applies to both prongs of the permanent custody analysis as to (1) whether a child cannot

or should not be placed with a parent, R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), and (2) whether permanent

custody is in the child’s best interest, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e). In re N.J. at ¶ 44.

                              Trial Court’s Judgment Entry

       {¶ 30} In its judgment, the trial court set forth the following relevant information:


       On October 24, 2025, this Court conducted a hearing on the Complaint for
       Permanent Custody. Present for this hearing were Makaya Walker,
       assessment caseworker for LCCS; Hannah Jerik, ongoing caseworker for
       LCCS; Janna E. Waltz, attorney for LCCS; . . . Mother;[]Peter Field,
       attorney for Mother; . . . Father [;] John Zima, attorney for Father; and Nida
       Salahuddin-Mohler, . . . GAL for the above-captioned child.
       ...

       I. FINDINGS OF FACT

       On June 11, 2025, LCCS received a referral alleging that Mother gave birth
       to this child at Toledo Hospital. . . [and] Mother had been positive for THC
       during her pregnancy but was negative at delivery. Mother was flagged
       due to concerns for a previous history with LCCS and other children.

       Both LCCS and Lucas County Juvenile Court have a long history with this
       family. Mother has four other children. She does not hold custody of any
       of them. Legal custody of a half-sibling to this child was awarded to his
       father. . . Permanent custody of another half-sibling to this child was

10.
      awarded to LCCS in April 2022. . . Permanent custody of [parents’] two
      other children was awarded to LCCS on February 12, 2024. . .

      Concerns that initially led to the sibling[]s[’] removals included. . . Father’s
      substance use, lack of appropriate housing, and prior involvement with
      LCCS.

      Both parents were offered case plan services in prior cases. Mother was
      offered a dual assessment and to follow recommendations, [DV], anger
      management, and parenting. Mother did not successfully complete case
      plan services in any of her prior cases.

      Father’s case plan services included a dual assessment, to follow all
      recommendations, and [DV] services. Father failed to successfully
      complete substance abuse services. Father has a prior history of cocaine
      and marijuana use. There are ongoing concerns that [he] is still using
      substances.

      Case[]worker Makaya Walker was assigned to investigate the referral in
      this matter. Ms. Walker testified that she met with Mother at the hospital . .
      . Mother reported that she and Father have a history of [DV], but they are
      no longer in a relationship. . .
      Ms. Walker met with Father to discuss the referral. . . [but he] did not want
      to discuss the referral until genetic testing had been completed. Genetic
      testing was completed, and [he] was found to be the biological father . . .

      LCCS continues to have concerns with both parents due to their failure to
      successfully complete case plan services and remedy the prior concerns.
      LCCS continues to have the same or similar concerns for the parents that
      were present in their prior cases.

      A Complaint in Dependency: Permanent Custody was filed on June 13,
      2025. A shelter care hearing was held on that same date, and interim
      temporary custody of the child was awarded to LCCS.

      Hannah Jerik, the ongoing caseworker testified that a case plan was
      established for this family and the original case plan goal was reunification.
      She testified that because the case was filed as an original permanent
      custody case, parents were not formally offered case plan services, but they
      were encouraged to engage.

      Ms. Jerik testified that if Mother were to be offered case plan services, she
      would be requested to complete a dual assessment and follow all

11.
      recommendations, [DV] batterers and [DV] survivors, parenting, and
      housing. Ms. Jerik testified that she sent a referral for a dual assessment to
      Unison in July 2025 at Mother’s request. . . [but] Mother was [a] no show
      for the scheduled appointment with Unison on August 18, 2025, and
      cancelled her appointment on August 25, 2025. . .

      . . . Ms. Jerik testified that Mother provided one urine screen during this
      case, and she was positive for THC. Mother is not currently engaged in
      substance abuse treatment and there is no record that she has ever
      successfully completed a substance abuse program.

      Ms. Jerik testified that LCCS has ongoing concerns for Mother regarding
      [DV]. Mother was recently charged with [DV] due to an incident between
      her and Father on June 28, 2025. It is reported that [she] struck [him] in the
      face with a sock full of rocks and attempted to stab him with a knife. . . The
      charges were dismissed at Father’s request. Mother has a long history of
      violent behavior. She spent approximately six months in jail in 2023 for
      assault on a peace officer. . .
      ...

      Ms. Jerik testified that due to the original permanent custody filing, Father
      is also not on the case plan. She testified that historical concerns for [him]
      included substance abuse, [DV] and housing. [He] failed to successfully
      complete case plan services in the prior cases.

      Ms. Jerik testified that there are ongoing concerns relating to Father’s
      substance use as he has not previously completed substance abuse services
      and is not currently engaged in substance abuse services.

      Ms. Jerek [sic] testified that there are ongoing concerns for Father
      regarding [DV] even though there are no recent charges. She testified that
      along with the incident with Mother in June 2025, [he] was involved in
      another incident in July 2025 where [he] was intentionally run over by a
      car. Ms. Jerik testified that these incidents call into question the company
      that Father is surrounding himself with and his decision making.

      It is reported that Father does have independent stable housing, however it
      is unknown if that housing is appropriate for a child.

      Ms. Jerik testified that the child has completed a developmental assessment
      and has an upcoming appointment with early intervention. She has been
      referred to occupational therapy and is on a waitlist. There are no other
      special needs for the child.

12.
      As to the child’s placement, Ms. Jerik testified that the child is placed in a
      foster home and doing well in her placement. All her needs are being met
      by the foster parents. She further testified that the child is extremely
      bonded to both the foster parents and the other children in the home.
      The foster parents are willing to adopt the child. She believes that it would
      be in the best interest of the child for permanent custody to be awarded to
      LCCS.

      Ms. Jerik testified that LCCS has attempted to locate family for potential
      placement of the child, however at this time no appropriate relatives have
      been identified for placement. LCCS conducted a home study on a free
      [sic] home placement, however that home study was denied. Paternal
      Grandmother indicated an interest in being considered for placement and
      was scheduled to complete a home study however [she] cancelled the
      scheduled home study and has failed to reschedule . . .

      The [GAL] . . . testified that she performed an independent investigation in
      her role as GAL. She testified that she was also the GAL in previous cases
      and has a familiarity with this family. She testified that as part of her
      investigation, she spoke with Father, attempted to contact Mother, observed
      the child in [her] placement and reviewed various documents. She testified
      that despite her efforts, she could not observe the child with either of the
      parents. She testified that she has observed the child in her placement, and
      she is doing great with no concerns. All the child’s needs are met and she
      appears to be bonded to the foster parents and the other children in the
      home. She further testified that foster parents are willing to adopt should
      permanent custody be granted. She testified that the child is an infant, so
      she is unable to voice her wishes concerning this matter, but she appears to
      be happy and comfortable in her placement. Finally, she testified that she
      believes it to be in the best interest of the child for permanent custody to be
      awarded to LCCS.

      II. СONCLUSIONS OF LAW

      A. THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED CHILD IS A
      DEPENDENT CHILD. . . pursuant to R.C. 2151.04.
      ...

      LCCS established by clear and convincing evidence that [parents] are
      unable to care for the child. Ms. Jerik testified that [parents] have a long
      history with the agency and with this Court. Both [parents] have been
      offered case plan services in prior cases and have failed to successfully

13.
      complete those services and demonstrate the necessary changes in order to
      reunify. LCCS continues to have concerns for mental health, substance
      abuse, [DV], and housing. Neither parent has engaged in services or
      demonstrated that they have made the appropriate changes necessary for
      reunification.

      B. [J.J.] CANNOT BE PLACED WITH EITHER PARENT WITHIN A
      REASONABLE TIME OR SHOULD NOT BE PLACED WITH EITHER
      PARENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH R.C. 2151.414(E).
      ...

      iv. R.C. 2151.414(E)(11).

      . . . [T]his Court finds under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), that both [parents] have
      had parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to the child’s
      sibling . . . and the parent has failed to provide clear and convincing
      evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, the parent can
      provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the
      health, welfare, and safety of the child.

      . . . Father has lost permanent custody of two other children. . . Neither
      parent successfully completed case plan services in the sibling cases.

      Furthermore, neither parent has engaged in services to remedy the concerns
      in prior cases. LCCS’ concerns for the parents are the same in this case as
      they were in the prior cases. Parents have failed to provide any evidence
      that despite the prior termination they are able to provide a safe, stable, and
      permanent environment for this child.

      Accordingly, this Court finds that LCCS has presented clear and
      convincing evidence that [J.J.] cannot be placed with either parent within a
      reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent for the reasons
      set forth above.

      C. A GRANT OF PERMANENT CUSTODY TO LCCS IS IN THE
      CHILD’S BEST INTEREST, IN ACCORDANCE WITH R.C.
      2151.414(D)(1).
      ...

      In arriving at this determination, the Court has considered the interaction
      and interrelationship of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives,
      foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and any other person who may
      significantly affect the child; the wishes of the child, as expressed . . .

14.
      through the child’s [GAL] . . .; the custodial history of the child; the child’s
      need for a legally secure permanent placement and whether that type of
      placement can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the
      agency; and/or whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) . . .
      apply in relation to the parents and child.
      ...

      The child has been in substitute care since her release from the hospital.
      Both the caseworker and GAL testified that the child is very bonded to the
      foster parents and the other children in the home. She is doing well in the
      home, and all of her needs are met. The GAL further testified that she
      believes it would be in the best interest of the child for permanent custody
      to be awarded to LCCS.
      ...

      The GAL testified . . . that based upon her observations of the child, the
      child appears to be happy in the home of the foster parents.
      ...

      Ms. Jerik testified that the agency conducted a search for relatives. A home
      study was completed for a family friend but was denied. Paternal
      Grandmother was offered a home study but cancelled it and failed to
      reschedule. . . [N]o other appropriate relatives have been identified for
      placement of the child. The child’s foster family is willing to
      adopt should that option become available.
      ...

      This Court has found that [R.C.] 2151.414(E)(11) applies to this family in
      that both [parents] have lost permanent custody of other children and have
      failed to demonstrate that despite the prior termination of parental rights
      they are able to provide a safe, stable, and permanent home for the child.

      III. JUDGMENT

      The Court finds that the GAL conducted an independent investigation, and
      that investigation supports her conclusion that permanent custody is in the
      best interest of the child.

      The Court finds that LCCS made reasonable efforts to implement and
      finalize a permanent plan by finding an alternative placement for the child.
      The Court finds that LCCS made reasonable efforts to remedy the issues
      that lead to the child’s removal and reunify the family. The agency also


15.
       made reasonable efforts by identifying an alternative permanent plan of
       permanent custody and adoption for the child.

       The Court finds that LCCS made intensive efforts to identify and engage an
       appropriate and willing kinship caregiver. However, despite LCCS’
       intensive efforts, no appropriate and willing kinship caregiver was
       identified and/or willing to provide a permanent home for the . . . child.

       IT IS THEREFORE HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
       that permanent custody of [J.J.] . . . is awarded to [LCCS] for adoptive
       placement and planning. All parental rights in and to the child are hereby
       terminated.

                                    Standard of Review

       {¶ 31} In In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, the Supreme Court of Ohio clarified the

standard of review in permanent custody cases, and held:

       Given that R.C. 2151.414 requires that a juvenile court find by clear and
       convincing evidence that the statutory requirements are met, we agree with
       those appellate courts that have determined that the sufficiency-of-the-
       evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standards of review are
       the proper appellate standards of review of a juvenile court's permanent-
       custody determination, as appropriate, depending on the nature of the
       arguments that are presented by the parties.

Id. at ¶ 11. Notably, the Supreme Court rejected the abuse of discretion standard of

review. Id. at ¶ 18.

       {¶ 32} Sufficiency of the evidence and manifest weight of the evidence are

“distinct concepts and are ‘both quantitatively and qualitatively different.’” Id. at ¶ 13,

quoting Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio

St.3d 380 (1997), paragraph two of the syllabus. “We have stated that ‘sufficiency is a

test of adequacy,’ . . . while weight of the evidence ‘is not a question of mathematics, but



16.
depends on its effect in inducing belief.’” (Emphasis sic.) Id., quoting Thompkins at

387, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990).

       {¶ 33} In a manifest weight review, we must weigh the evidence and all

reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether

the trier of fact clearly lost its way in resolving evidentiary conflicts so as to create such a

manifest miscarriage of justice that the decision must be reversed. In re Z.C. at ¶ 14,

citing Eastley at ¶ 20. “The discretion which the juvenile court enjoys in determining

whether an order of permanent custody is in the best interest of a child should be

accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court’s

determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned.” In re Awkal, 95 Ohio

App.3d 309, 316 (8th Dist. 1994). Thus, “[a] judgment on permanent custody supported

in the record by some competent, credible evidence by which the court could have

formed a firm belief as to all the essential elements will not be reversed on appeal as

being against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re I.H., 2020-Ohio-4853, ¶ 34 (6th

Dist.), citing In re Denzel M., 2004-Ohio-3982, ¶ 8 (6th Dist.).

                               Father’s Assignment of Error

       {¶ 34} Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that he

failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that, notwithstanding the prior

termination, he can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for

the health, welfare and safety of J.J. when there was still significant time left on the case,

pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D).


17.
       {¶ 35} Father cites In re Т.W., 2014-Ohio-5753 (12th Dist.), claiming it is

distinguishable. There, the court set forth that “[p]arents in permanent custody actions

‘must be afforded every procedural and substantive protection that the law allows.’ In re

Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48 (1997).”2 Id. at ¶ 19. The trial court found that mother, “a

drug abuser, had continuously and repeatedly failed to remedy the conditions that led to

the removal of the children. The mother also had previously lost custody of another

child, a second child died, and the current case was the third case within four years

involving T.W.” Id. at ¶ 3. Father submits the argument centered on the content and form

of various pleadings, and the trial court’s termination of mother’s rights was affirmed.

       {¶ 36} Father asserts he was arguably unable to participate in services until a few

weeks before the October 24, 2025 hearing because after his vehicle accident in the

summer of 2025, he appeared in court for the first time in early October 2025. He

contends that R.C. 2151.414(D) allows a child to remain in the temporary custody of the

agency for up to two years, but here, the agency filed a complaint in dependency, for

permanent custody and shelter care on June 13, 2025, two days after J.J. was born.

Father claims the matter proceeded to adjudication on August 12, 2025,3 and final hearing

on October 24, 2025.


2
  The next sentence in In re T.W. is “[h]owever, courts must liberally construe and
interpret the sections of R.C. Chapter 2151, ‘so as to provide for the care and protection
of children and their constitutional and legal rights.’ In re Shumate, . . . 2003-Ohio-2509
[(5th Dist.)], quoting In re Baby Boy Blackshear, 90 Ohio St.3d 197 (2000), fn. 2.” Id. at
¶ 19.
3
 While a hearing was held on this date, there is no indication in the record that it was an
adjudicatory hearing.
18.
        {¶ 37} Father argues that no case plan services were offered to either parent

throughout the case, yet he undisputedly had stable housing and was the victim of DV by

mother, with no evidence in the record of retribution or retaliation. He submits he went

to court and stated he was not fearful of mother and requested that the charges against her

be dropped, presumptively in an attempt to support her efforts to be reunited with J.J.

        {¶ 38} Father also contends that he was seriously injured by a vehicle in the

summer of 2025, but there was no evidence as to any specific party being found

responsible for that injury. He claims the injury was serious enough to prevent him from

coming to court for a period of time, although he notes he successfully went to supervised

visits with J.J. enough times that the agency said there were no issues with his visits. He

further asserts there were no urine screens and no testimony that he was difficult to find,

uncooperative or unavailable for screens had the agency or GAL attempted to do so. In

addition, he argues that no charges were filed against him during the pendency of the

case.

        {¶ 39} Father submits that this court should find it was unreasonable of the agency

and the court to deprive him of the ability to pursue case plan services in this case on

such an aggressive and abbreviated timeline, as he only had a matter of weeks to

demonstrate any rebuttable presumptions. He maintains that, assuming arguendo, he did

not complete services in earlier cases, he was undisputedly unable to pursue services here

in order to attempt to rebut the presumption against his loss of custody, based on the

undescribed injuries associated with the “rock in a sock” attack by mother in June or July

2025, and having been run over by a vehicle. He notes there was no evidence presented

19.
as to the type and/or severity of his injuries, beyond the fact that he was “laid up” for a

“significant amount of time” following the accident. He also observes that he cooperated

with paternity testing, which results were available in mid-August 2025. He claims, as a

practical matter, if there was a question as to paternity, he was not obligated to participate

in anything, or rebut anything, until paternity results were received.

         {¶ 40} Father argues this court should find the foregoing events effectively

prevented him from participating in any kind of self-directed case plan services from the

time of J.J.’s birth through about the end of September 2025, based on his appearance for

a pretrial in early October 2025. He claims he only had about two weeks between the

pretrial and the date of trial to actually participate in any case plan services.

         {¶ 41} Father also asserts there were no injuries to the child, as she was not

positive for illegal substances at birth and there was no evidence that she was

developmentally delayed, was considered special needs, or required any extraordinary

care or services. Father submits this court should find there was no reason why the case

needed to be rushed to judgment, as it could have been extended a few months so he

could have had a reasonable chance, after his recovery from the car accident, to pursue

and participate in services sufficient to demonstrate that he was capable of caring for the

child.

                                           Analysis




20.
       {¶ 42} Based on father’s arguments, we will review the trial court’s determination

of permanent custody under both a sufficiency of the evidence standard and a manifest-

weight-of-the-evidence standard.

       {¶ 43} The record shows the agency presented undisputed evidence that father’s

parental rights were terminated regarding two children, J.J.’s siblings. The agency also

offered uncontested evidence that J.J.’s needs are currently being met in her placement,

she is bonded with the family, and her placement is willing to adopt.

       {¶ 44} In the trial court’s thorough and comprehensive judgment, the court found,

by clear and convincing evidence, that J.J. cannot or should not be placed with father

within a reasonable time, under R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), as he had his parental rights

involuntarily terminated with respect to J.J.’s siblings, and a grant of permanent custody

to the agency is in J.J.’s best interest, in accordance with R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), as R.C.

2151.414(E)(11) applies. The court also found that father failed to provide clear and

convincing evidence to prove that despite the prior parental rights terminations, he can

provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare,

and safety of J.J.

       {¶ 45} We find, as did the trial court, that father did not provide clear and

convincing evidence that he can adequately care for J.J.

       {¶ 46} As noted above, father did not testify, but there was evidence presented, in

caseworker Jerik’s testimony, that in prior cases, concerns for father were unstable

housing, DV and substance use for cocaine, marijuana and THC. When J.J.’s case

originated, father lived with paternal grandmother. Later, he indicated he had housing, a

21.
few doors down the street from paternal grandmother’s house, but no evidence was

presented as to the condition of father’s house. Jerik believed father completed DV

services and she did not believe that he had any violent charges in the last several years,

but father did not complete substance use services and Jerik was unaware of his current

substance use because there has not been a dual assessment in this case.

       {¶ 47} Jerik testified that in June or July 2025, mother hit father with a rock in a

sock. Mother was charged with DV, but father went to court and asked for the charge to

be dropped, and it was. Then in July 2025, a large group of people gathered, including

mother, and father was involved in an argument and run over by a car. No evidence was

offered as to who ran over father or what injuries he sustained.

       {¶ 48} Jerik testified that J.J. was referred to occupational therapy and was on a

waitlist, but she had no other special needs. Father has level two supervised visits with

J.J. on Fridays, he consistently visited with J.J. and there were no concerns.

       {¶ 49} There was also evidence presented, via caseworker Walker’s testimony, that

when J.J. was born, mother did not test positive for marijuana, but at the beginning of her

pregnancy, mother tested positive for marijuana.

       {¶ 50} And even though it is not supported by evidence, father takes issue with the

abbreviated timeline of J.J.’s case, claiming he was deprived of the ability to pursue case

plan services. He blames his failure to participate in services in this case on the injuries

he sustained when he was hit with a rock in a sock and run over by a car, and the fact that

he was waiting on the result of the paternity testing, which was only available in mid-

August 2025. Yet, there was no evidence of what injuries or the extent of the injuries he

22.
sustained such that he could establish he was prevented from participating in services,

and his explanation that he was waiting on the paternity results does not excuse his

failure to engage in services, as he undoubtedly knew it was possible that he was J.J.’s

father and he could have participated in services pending the DNA test results, but he

chose not to do so. Moreover, father was provided with ample opportunity to take part in

services over the past years, and he has been unable or unwilling to partake in services

and improve his situation.

       {¶ 51} We find that although there was evidence in the record that father visited

J.J., he indicated he had a house, and he had no recent criminal charges for violence, this

is not enough to show that he can meet the standard of R.C. 2151.414(E)(11), as it was

his burden to show that he is capable of providing a legally secure placement and

adequate care for J.J.’s health, welfare, and safety, and he failed to do so. Therefore, we

find the trial court’s R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) finding is supported by sufficient evidence.

       {¶ 52} We further find that the trial court’s R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) finding is not

against the weight of the evidence. The trial court found that father failed to provide

clear and convincing evidence to prove that he can provide a legally secure permanent

placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of J.J. The court was in

the best position to evaluate the testimony and evidence, and we are bound to construe

any evidence which is susceptible to more than one interpretation in a manner consistent

with the trial court’s judgment. Since the trial court’s conclusion that father did not rebut

the presumption in R.C. 2151.414(E)(11) is supported by some competent, credible

evidence, the judgment is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

23.
         {¶ 53} In light of the foregoing, father’s assignment of error is found not-well

taken.

         {¶ 54} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Lucas County Court of

Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. Father is ordered to pay the court costs of

this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.

                                                                          Judgment affirmed.

       A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.


 Thomas J. Osowik, J.
                                                                    JUDGE

 Gene A. Zmuda, J.
                                                                    JUDGE

 Myron C. Duhart, J.
 CONCUR.                                                            JUDGE

       This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
  Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
       version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
                http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.




24.