In re M.D.

[Cite as In re M.D., 2026-Ohio-1394.]


                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                        CLARK COUNTY

 IN THE MATTER OF M.D., A.A.D.,                      :
 K.A.D.                                              :   C.A. No. 2025-CA-64
                                                     :
                                                     :   Trial Court Case Nos. 20180601,
                                                     :   20218602, 2018603
                                                     :
                                                     :   (Appeal from Common Pleas Court-
                                                     :   Juvenile Division)
                                                     :
                                                     : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY &
                                                       OPINION
                                               ...........

        Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on April 17, 2026, the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed.

        Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.

        Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately

serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.

Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified

copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note

the service on the appellate docket.


                                        For the court,




                                        ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE

LEWIS, P.J., and TUCKER, J., concur.
                                        OPINION
                                 CLARK C.A. No. 2025-CA-64


KELLY M. SCHROEDER, Attorney for Appellant
JOHN M. LINTZ, Attorney for Appellee


HANSEMAN, J.

       {¶ 1} Mother appeals from the judgment of the Clark County Common Pleas Court,

Domestic Relations Division, Juvenile Section, granting permanent custody of her minor

children to the Clark County Department of Job and Family Services (“JFS”), thereby

terminating her parental rights. Mother also appeals from the trial court’s judgment denying

her maternal aunt’s motion for legal custody of the children. For the reasons outlined below,

the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                             Facts and Course of Proceedings

       {¶ 2} Mother and Father are the biological parents of M.D. (age 12), A.A.D. (age 10),

and K.A.D. (age 8) (collectively, “the children”). JFS initially became involved with Mother

and Father due to M.D. and K.A.D. being born testing positive for drugs in their systems.

Approximately a year after K.A.D. was born, JFS filed complaints on July 10, 2018, alleging

that the children were dependent. Mother and Father stipulated to the dependency

allegation, and on September 24, 2018, the trial court adjudicated the children dependent.

       {¶ 3} After adjudicating the children dependent, the trial court granted a protective

order of supervision that was scheduled to expire on July 10, 2019. A month prior to that

expiration date, JFS filed a notice indicating that it was going to let the protective order expire

and then close Mother and Father’s case. As represented, JFS closed Mother and Father’s

case in 2019. Mother and Father were subsequently charged with multiple counts of child

endangerment, so JFS reopened the case on February 15, 2023.


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      {¶ 4} The child endangerment charges arose after employees from Rent-A-Center

delivered a generator to Mother and Father’s home on February 8, 2023, and reported to

the police that the children in the home were residing in deplorable living conditions. Upon

conducting a welfare check, the police discovered that the home had no heat or electricity,

no consumable food, an inoperable refrigerator infested with insects, a large amount of

unclean dishes in the sink, dog feces on the floor, and an abundance of trash inside and

outside the home. After observing these poor conditions, the police removed the children

from Mother and Father’s care.

      {¶ 5} Following the children’s removal, JFS placed the children with a kinship

caregiver. The children remained with the kinship caregiver until May 2023. JFS obtained

ex parte custody of the children on May 23, 2023, and then interim temporary custody on

May 24, 2023, due to the kinship caregiver not keeping in contact with JFS and the caregiver

advising JFS that she was no longer able to care for the children. JFS thereafter received

temporary legal custody of the children on September 7, 2023.

      {¶ 6} After obtaining custody of the children, JFS placed the children with a licensed

foster family. During that time, JFS worked to assist Mother and Father in resolving the

issues that had led to the children’s removal. JFS developed a case plan with various

objectives to help Mother and Father work toward reunifying with the children. Mother and

Father did not cooperate with JFS and made only minimal progress on their case plans.

Thus on July 15, 2024, JFS filed a motion for permanent custody of the children.

      {¶ 7} Approximately one month after JFS filed for permanent custody, Mother’s

maternal aunt M.R. filed a motion to be added as a third-party intervenor and a motion for

legal custody of the children. The trial court granted M.R.’s motion to be added as a third-

party intervenor and scheduled the custody matter for an evidentiary hearing. The


                                             3
evidentiary hearing was broken into eight separate dates between November 18, 2024, and

May 6, 2025. Mother, M.R., the children’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”), and the JFS

caseworker assigned to Mother and Father’s case attended all the hearing dates. Father

was incarcerated, and he attended two of the hearing dates via the web conferencing

platform Zoom. All parties, including Father, were represented by counsel during the

hearings.

       {¶ 8} The following is a summary of the relevant testimony that was elicited during

the evidentiary hearings.

                                     Mother’s Testimony

       {¶ 9} Mother is the biological mother of M.D., A.A.D., and K.A.D. She is also the

biological mother of three older daughters who are half-siblings to the children. At the time

of the evidentiary hearings, the three older daughters were 23, 18, and 17 years old. The

17-year-old daughter was legally emancipated and in the legal custody of her paternal

grandmother. The other two daughters had also been in the legal custody of their paternal

grandmother when they were minors. JFS was not involved in the custody matters pertaining

to Mother’s three older daughters.

       {¶ 10} Mother admitted to being a drug addict and to using methamphetamine a few

days before testifying at the custody hearing. Mother agreed that she was not fit and capable

of caring for the children and expressed that it would be in the children’s best interest for the

trial court to grant M.R. legal custody. Mother did not see M.R. often, and she could not

remember the last time the children were at M.R.’s house. Mother, however, claimed that

M.R. had been involved with the children since their birth and that the children were bonded

to M.R. Mother explained that she did not initially suggest M.R. as a placement option to




                                               4
JFS because M.R. had been in Florida taking care of a sick friend. Mother also did not initially

mention M.R. because she was hoping to reunify with the children.

                                 Foster Mother’s Testimony

       {¶ 11} Foster Mother was married with five children. Foster Mother had three

vehicles, including a 12-passenger van. Since receiving M.D., A.A.D., and K.A.D., Foster

Mother quit her online teaching job to care for the children while her husband continued to

work full time for the Ohio State Highway Patrol. Foster Mother and her husband refurbished

their basement to create extra space for the children.

       {¶ 12} When Foster Mother received the children, they all had behavioral concerns.

M.D. was aggressive and would throw himself on the ground, scream, cry, and flail his hands

when he did not get his way. A.A.D. yelled, lacked communication skills, and was very

scared and anxious, as she was obsessed with small injuries like scuffs on her knee. K.A.D.

cried constantly, was disobedient, and would not listen.

       {¶ 13} While M.D. still had aggression issues when he was angry, Foster Mother

reported that M.D.’s behavior had improved and that he geared his aggression towards his

love of baseball. Foster Mother also reported that A.A.D.’s and K.A.D.’s behavior had

improved. According to Foster Mother, A.A.D. was no longer overly preoccupied with her

health and K.A.D. was no longer disobedient.

       {¶ 14} Academically, the children were all on individual educational plans in the

Springfield school district. Foster Mother reported that the children’s academics had

improved, but that they were still significantly behind. If adoption was possible, Foster Mother

planned to home school the children as she did with her biological children.

       {¶ 15} Foster Mother indicated that the children had multiple health concerns when

she received them. K.A.D. was underweight and had poor vision that required reading


                                               5
glasses. K.A.D. also had an infection in her mouth and had to have 16 decayed teeth pulled.

M.D. was also underweight and had to have 12 teeth pulled and 8 fillings. Similarly, A.A.D.

had to have 8 teeth pulled, 4 fillings, and 2 caps. A.A.D. also suffered from a lazy eye that

required surgery. According to Foster Mother, basic hygiene was a new concept for the

children.

       {¶ 16} When initially placed in Foster Mother’s care, none of the children asked

questions about their parents. The children did not start talking about their parents until about

six months after Foster Mother had received them. The children did, however, ask to see

their older half-sisters. Foster Mother arranged visits with the sisters every two weeks, which

had since turned into infrequent phone calls. The children did not talk about any other

relatives with Foster Mother, but they had mentioned a man named Todd with whom they

claimed they felt safe.

       {¶ 17} Foster Mother placed all three children in counseling around September or

October 2023. Foster Mother suspended counseling for a period of time because after a few

months without visiting Mother and Father, the children were having no behavioral issues

and were thriving. However, when the visits with Mother and Father resumed, their

behavioral issues began to return. For example, M.D. started to have crying episodes,

nightmares, and tantrums after visits with Mother and Father. As a result, Foster Mother

placed the children back in counseling.

       {¶ 18} Foster Mother was first made aware of M.R. in March 2024. Foster Mother

recalled that the children were not familiar with M.R. According to Foster Mother, the children

had their first visit with M.R. at the visitation center in July 2024. Starting November 5, 2024,

the children had visits with M.R. every other week.




                                               6
       {¶ 19} Foster Mother had concerns about the children’s visits with M.R. According to

Foster Mother, the children came home from the visits upset because they wanted to visit

their Mother instead. The children, especially K.A.D., often expressed that they did not want

to visit M.R. The children reported to Foster Mother that M.R. had tried to bribe them with

smartphones to live with her.

       {¶ 20} Foster Mother did not think that M.R. was a safe placement option for the

children. Foster Mother indicated that the children had also expressed their belief that M.R.

was not a safe placement option. Foster Mother questioned M.R.’s mental health due to

several public posts that M.R. had made on Facebook. For example, Foster Mother read a

post by M.R. in which she referred to JFS as a terrorist group. She also claimed that M.R.

wrote a post asking for advice on whether to use an experimental drug for her anxiety and

depression, as well as a post disclosing that she is disabled and a recovered drug addict

who suffers from executive functioning disorder.

       {¶ 21} Foster Mother admitted that she had occasionally made disparaging

comments about Mother and Father out of frustration when the children came home from

visits with them. Foster Mother testified that she had also made the mistake of talking to her

husband about her concerns with M.R.’s mental and physical health within earshot of the

children. Foster Mother expressed remorse about making the disparaging comments and

indicated that she did not want the children to have negative thoughts about their family.

Foster Mother indicated that she had since tried to maintain better control over what she

says when the children are around.

       {¶ 22} Foster Mother explained that while the children love Mother and Father, they

did not feel safe with them, and Foster Mother feared the children would be given back to

them. Foster Mother expressed that she would like to adopt the children. She also testified


                                              7
that if she were permitted to adopt the children, she would facilitate a continued relationship

with the children’s biological family as long as it is a healthy and safe option.

                                JFS Caseworker’s Testimony

       {¶ 23} The JFS caseworker testified that she was assigned to Mother and Father in

March 2023. When the caseworker initially asked Mother for the names of anyone who could

be a kinship caregiver for the children, Mother did not provide her with any names. At a

subsequent court hearing, Mother recommended placing the children with two family

friends—T.L. and A.W. The caseworker contacted T.L. and A.W., but T.L. indicated that he

was unavailable and A.W. never followed through with the required background check and

home study.

       {¶ 24} The caseworker asked the children’s older sisters if they knew of any family

members who would be willing to care for the children, but the sisters could not provide the

caseworker with any names. The caseworker also asked the eldest sister if she would be

willing to be a placement option herself, and the sister indicated that she was unable to

because of personal reasons.

       {¶ 25} In spring 2023, Mother suggested that the children’s maternal grandmother be

a potential placement option. The caseworker attempted to contact maternal grandmother

multiple times and went to her house, but the caseworker was unable to reach her. Father

recommended his sister, but when the caseworker contacted the sister, she indicated that

she was unable to care for the children. Having no other names, the caseworker ran an

“AQUIRANT search” to find potential family members. The caseworker wrote 30 letters to

potential family members obtained from the AQUIRANT search but received no positive

responses.




                                               8
       {¶ 26} Mother did not mention M.R. as a possible placement option until March 2024.

Mother did not know M.R.’s phone number, so the caseworker contacted M.R. via Facebook

Messenger. The caseworker first reached out to M.R. in mid-March 2024. M.R. called the

caseworker back on April 19, 2024, and confirmed that she was Mother’s maternal aunt.

M.R. told the caseworker that she needed to check with her husband about taking the

children. After doing so, M.R. reached back out to the caseworker and indicated that she

was willing to be a placement option. M.R. then began the background check and home

study process, which was approved in August 2024.

       {¶ 27} In July 2024, M.R. had her first visit with the children at the visitation center.

The caseworker recalled that the children were nervous about the visit and that they did not

remember M.R. Following the first visit, the caseworker indicated that the children were

uncomfortable and expressed worries about continuing to visit M.R. The caseworker spoke

with her supervisor, the GAL, and the children’s counselor about the children’s reaction to

the visit. Following that discussion, the consensus was to discontinue the visits until an

upcoming court hearing. At the court hearing, the trial court issued an order for the children

to have visitation with M.R. Following that order, the children visited with M.R. every other

Monday beginning in November 2024.

       {¶ 28} According to the caseworker, M.R. canceled two visits with the children due to

her husband having health issues. The caseworker indicated that M.R. has health issues

herself. She testified that M.R. suffers from vertigo and multiple sclerosis (“MS”). The

caseworker said that she had concerns about M.R. and her husband’s health issues

because the children were very active. The caseworker believed that the health issues of

M.R. and her husband would make it difficult for them to meet the children’s needs. The




                                               9
caseworker also expressed concern that the children would regress in their behaviors and

attitudes if they were removed from their foster home.

       {¶ 29} The caseworker testified that the children cared deeply for Mother and Father,

but that Mother and Father had continued to abuse drugs and failed to comply with their

case plans. Mother’s case plan objectives were to complete a drug and alcohol assessment,

a mental health assessment, follow through with all recommendations from those

assessments, obtain stable housing and income, and comply with JFS and court orders.

Father’s case plan objectives were the same, with the addition of completing an anger

management course. The caseworker advised that Father had been in prison, but he had

been recently released and had last visited the children in July 2024.

       {¶ 30} The caseworker testified that Mother and Father were not capable of caring

for the children. However, the caseworker testified that it would be appropriate for the

children to maintain contact with Mother and Father if Mother and Father were safe and

sober. The caseworker explained that the decision regarding the children’s contact with

Mother and Father would be made by the adoptive parents.

       {¶ 31} The caseworker indicated that the children were bonded to their foster family

and were very comfortable with them. The caseworker also indicated that the children were

thriving in their foster family’s care. The caseworker reported that M.D. had told her that if

he could not reunify with Mother and Father, he wanted to stay with his foster family. The

caseworker also reported that A.A.D. and K.A.D. both indicated that they wanted to stay with

their foster family as opposed to reunifying with Mother and Father. The caseworker opined

that it would be in the best interest of the children for JFS to obtain permanent custody.

                                      M.R.’s Testimony

       {¶ 32} M.R. was 57 years old and married. At the time of the custody hearings, M.R.’s


                                             10
household included her husband and six grandchildren. The grandchildren were 21, 19, 17,

10, 8, and 5 years old. The 5-year-old grandchild is autistic.

       {¶ 33} M.R. had lived on and off with her husband for 35 years. M.R. admitted that

her husband had beaten her on more than one occasion years ago. M.R. indicated that since

November 2024, her husband had experienced serious health issues that caused him to be

bedridden for three months. M.R., however, reported that her husband’s condition had since

improved.

       {¶ 34} M.R. raised two biological children and three stepchildren, who are now adults.

In addition, M.R. raised six of her stepdaughter’s children, as her stepdaughter is in prison.

The six step-grandchildren were all adults, except for the 17-year-old who was living with

M.R.

       {¶ 35} M.R. claimed that before JFS became involved with M.D., A.A.D., and K.A.D.,

she visited the children five or six days a week. M.R. did, however, admit that some distance

grew between her and the children when she stopped driving in 2021 or 2022. M.R. stopped

driving due to her MS, as she felt that it was no longer safe for her to drive since she

occasionally experienced “drop foot.” Tr. 668. M.R. admitted that after she stopped driving,

she did not have any face-to-face interaction with the children for two years. Despite this,

M.R. asserted that she had always maintained a close relationship with the children.

       {¶ 36} Although M.R. did not drive, she claimed that transporting the children would

not be an issue because her husband and several other people in her household drove.

M.R. explained that the children would get to school via a bus driver she knew. M.R. also

claimed that the children’s adult siblings would be able to drive them around.

       {¶ 37} M.R. indicated that her MS caused her to suffer from short-term memory loss,

which required her to use several calendars, journals, and Post-it notes to help her


                                              11
remember things. Her grandchildren’s school was aware of her condition and sent her

multiple notices about school activities. M.R. also suffered from vertigo on a daily basis.

According to M.R., the condition caused her to have constant numbness and tingling and a

lack of coordination. M.R. also occasionally suffered from temporary blindness, blurry vision,

slurred speech, and fatigue. In addition, M.R. reported having problems with her gait, which

affected her mobility. M.R. also reported suffering from seasonal depression and a two-year

opioid addiction, which started when she was diagnosed with MS in 2016. M.R. indicated

that she was no longer addicted to opioids, but she testified to using marijuana to self-

medicate.

       {¶ 38} M.R. claimed that her medical issues would not impact her ability to provide

for the children’s daily needs. M.R., however, indicated that in 2017, she relinquished legal

custody of a step-grandchild because her medical issues prevented her from caring for the

child. Specifically, M.R. claimed that the child, who was 15 years old, was violent and that

she was unable to protect herself. M.R. added that the 15-year-old child had a baby and that

M.R. relinquished legal custody of that child as well because she could not keep up with a

toddler.

       {¶ 39} In 2018, M.R. was previously involved with JFS when she served as a

chaperone for Mother and Father due to their substance abuse issues. During that time,

M.R. moved in with Mother and Father and helped them with their daily routine. According

to M.R., it did not take long for Mother and Father to close their case with JFS.

       {¶ 40} M.R. learned about the children’s removal from Mother and Father’s care in

2023 while she was taking care of her sick friend in Florida. Approximately a year later in

March 2024, M.R. received a Facebook message from the caseworker, who asked M.R.

whether she would be able to take care of the children. This shocked M.R. because Mother


                                             12
had led her to believe that she and Father had been completing their case plans and that

they were on track to get the children back. However, M.R. learned from the caseworker that

Mother had “done nothing on her case plan.” Tr. 677. M.R. claimed that she did not know

the children were living in deplorable conditions and that she did not realize how dire the

situation was until she spoke with the caseworker.

       {¶ 41} After discussing the situation with her husband and her adult children, M.R.

contacted the caseworker and told her that she would be able to care for the children and

that she was ready to move forward with the required background check and home study.

M.R. passed both the background check and home study and later had visits with the

children. M.R. described her visits with the children as “awkward” and “unnatural.” Tr. 682.

During one visit, M.R. recalled A.A.D. and K.A.D. walking her around the visitation center

and making her aware of every camera and recording device. According to M.R., the children

spent the entire time telling her that they were being watched. M.R., however, claimed that

the children were more relaxed when they went outside to play. M.R. expressed her opinion

that the children had been coached on how to act around her. M.R. claimed that her visits

with the children were overall “really good” and that the children remembered her. Tr. 683.

       {¶ 42} M.R. admitted that in September 2024, she made a Facebook post that vented

her frustrations about JFS and referred to the agency as a “government-sanctioned

trafficking ring.” Tr. 753. M.R. claimed that it was an emotional response and that she

regretted making the post. She also claimed that she would never vent her frustrations

directly in front of the children. She denied bribing the children during her visits with them.

       {¶ 43} Financially, M.R. indicated that she would provide for the children “as best as

[she could].” Tr. 700. M.R. acknowledged having financial problems. She indicated that her

husband was in physical therapy and retired but that he planned on returning to work. She


                                              13
indicated that her husband had worked as a self-employed carpenter and that he received

$1,200 per month in social security benefits. M.R. received $1,100 per month in disability

benefits. M.R. said that she was working on opening up a small boutique in downtown

Springfield because her disability benefits would not be enough financial support. M.R. had

four bedrooms in her home plus three more that would have to be refinished before anyone

could move into them.

       {¶ 44} M.R. explained that she was asking for legal custody of the children because

she loves them and because their family has a lot of heritage. She feared that if the children

remained with their foster family, their older siblings would not be able to visit them anymore

and that the children would lose their connection to their biological family. M.R. also claimed

that she was bonded to the children, but she did not know if the children were bonded to

her.

                                  GAL’s Recommendation

       {¶ 45} The GAL recommended that the children be placed in the permanent custody

of JFS due to Mother and Father not progressing on their case plans. The GAL expressed

concerns that Mother and Father would never be able to provide a safe and stable home for

the children. The GAL did not recommend the court grant legal custody to M.R. The GAL

had several concerns with M.R.’s ability to care for the children. Specifically, he was

concerned about M.R.’s health condition, Facebook posts, failure to intervene while knowing

the children were not living in a safe environment, history of drug use, and current caregiving

responsibilities to other children. The GAL also testified that he believed M.R. would allow

Mother to see the children in violation of court orders. The GAL further noted that if legal

custody were granted to M.R., the children would have to change school districts, which the

GAL did not think was in the best interest of the children. However, the GAL did recommend


                                              14
that the children continue to have visitation with their biological family, particularly their older

half-siblings.

       {¶ 46} Father did not provide any testimony during the evidentiary hearings he

attended. Father’s counsel advised the trial court that he wanted M.R. to have legal custody

if he could not have custody of the children.

                                        Custody Decision

       {¶ 47} After considering the testimony and evidence presented at the evidentiary

hearings, on August 6, 2025, the trial court issued a decision finding that it was in the

children’s best interest to grant JFS permanent custody. The trial court granted JFS’s motion

for permanent custody, thereby terminating Mother and Father’s parental rights. The trial

court further denied M.R.’s motion for legal custody. Mother now appeals from that judgment

and raises two assignments of error for review.

                                  First Assignment of Error

       {¶ 48} Under her first assignment of error, Mother claims that the trial court’s

judgment granting JFS permanent custody should be reversed because Father was not

properly served with notice of the evidentiary hearings. For the reasons outlined below,

Mother’s argument is not well taken.

       {¶ 49} As a preliminary matter, we note that “[i]n permanent custody proceedings,

when service of process upon a parent is defective, the juvenile court fails to acquire

jurisdiction over that parent as required to terminate the parent’s parental rights with respect

to his or her children.” In re Holloway, 1996 WL 227481, *2 (12th Dist. May 6, 1996); State

ex rel. Ballard v. O’Donnell, 50 Ohio St.3d 182, 183 (1990) (“‘It is axiomatic that . . . a

judgment rendered without proper service or entry of appearance is a nullity and void.’”),

quoting Lincoln Tavern, Inc. v. Snader, 165 Ohio St. 61, 64 (1956).


                                                15
       {¶ 50} “R.C. 2151.414(A)(1) provides, in relevant part, that when a motion for

permanent custody is filed, ‘the court shall schedule a hearing and give notice of the filing of

the motion and of the hearing, in accordance with section 2151.29 of the Revised Code, to

all parties to the action and to the child’s guardian ad litem.’” In re J.C.S., 2023-Ohio-1511,

¶ 53 (2d Dist.), quoting R.C. 2151.414(A)(1). “‘For proper service [under R.C. 2151.29], the

parents must be notified of the permanent custody motion and the initial permanent custody

hearing by one of three methods: personal service, service by certified or registered mail

. . . , or—if both those methods fail—by publication.’” (Bracketed text in original.) Id. at ¶ 54,

quoting In re Keith Lee P., 2004-Ohio-1976, ¶ 8 (6th Dist.), citing R.C. 2151.29 and

Juv.R. 16.

       {¶ 51} “Service by publication ‘“is reserved for those cases in which the residence of

the parent is unknown and is not ascertainable with reasonable diligence.”’” Id., quoting In re

J.T., 2019-Ohio-465, ¶ 38 (4th Dist.), quoting In re R.P., 2012-Ohio-4799, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.).

“It has been described as ‘“a method of last resort.”’” Id., quoting J.T. at ¶ 38, quoting In re

Miller, 33 Ohio App.3d 224, 226, (8th Dist. 1986). With regard to service by publication,

Juv.R. 16(A) provides, in relevant part, that “[b]efore service by publication can be made, an

affidavit of a party or party’s counsel shall be filed with the court. The affidavit shall aver that

service of summons cannot be made because the residence of the person is unknown to

the affiant and cannot be ascertained with reasonable diligence and shall set forth the last

known address of the party to be served.”

       {¶ 52} In this case, the record indicates that personal service was attempted at

Father’s residence on July 17, 2024, and that service could not be perfected due to Father’s

residence being boarded up and empty. On July 30, 2024, JFS filed a motion to serve Father

by publication. The motion included an affidavit averring that Father’s whereabouts were


                                                16
unknown. Service by publication was thereafter effectuated between August 1, 2024, and

August 8, 2024. Service on Father was never challenged or objected to during the court

proceedings. Mother, however, is now challenging it for the first time in this appeal.

       {¶ 53} Initially, we note that Mother complains of an alleged service error against

Father, not herself. We recently addressed the same scenario in In re A.W., 2025-Ohio-5657

(2d Dist.). The father in A.W. argued that the mother had not been properly served, and we

stated the following in response:

       “‘Generally, an appellant does not have standing to argue issues affecting

       another person.’” Dayton Lodge, L.L.C. v. Hoffman, 2013-Ohio-5755, ¶ 35

       (2d Dist.), quoting Benjamin v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 2006-Ohio-2739, ¶ 4

       (10th Dist.). “‘However, an appellant may “complain of an error committed

       against a nonappealing party when the error is prejudicial to the rights of the

       appellant.”’” Id., quoting Benjamin at ¶ 4, quoting In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d

       1, 13 (6th Dist. 1991).

              This court has addressed a situation where a mother claimed that a

       children services agency did not complete a diligent search before serving

       notice of the permanent custody hearing on the father by publication. In re

       Shackelford, 1990 WL 68954, *5 (2d Dist. May 22, 1990). The mother argued

       that had the father received proper notice of the permanent custody hearing

       and attended the hearing, there may have been a chance that the father or

       one of his relatives would have received custody of the child, which would have

       allowed her to see the child more often. Id.

              The record in Shackelford indicated that the father had seen the child

       only three or four times before the child was removed from the mother’s care,


                                             17
      had no contact with the children services agency, and had never made an

      effort to legally establish his paternity. Id. at *2-4. Under these circumstances,

      this court found that the possibility of the child being placed with the father or

      one of the father’s relatives “was remote in the extreme.” Id. at *6. The court

      also found that even if it were to assume that the children services agency

      could have made a greater effort to locate the father, the mother had failed to

      establish that she was prejudiced by the father being served by publication. Id.

      As a result, the court concluded that the mother lacked standing to argue that

      the father was improperly served with notice of the permanent custody hearing.

      Id.

             Other appellate courts of this state have reached the same conclusion

      as Shackelford regarding standing. See, e.g., In re Sours, 1988 WL 81057, *2

      (3d Dist. Sept. 27, 1988) (appellant mother lacked standing to object to a

      purported defect in service upon father where mother failed to point to any

      realistic possibility of prejudice to herself from the procedure followed by the

      juvenile court); In re Jordan, 2002 WL 121211, *7 (9th Dist. Jan. 30, 2002)

      (appellant mother lacked standing to raise alleged failure of service on father

      where mother failed to demonstrate that she was actually prejudiced by the

      alleged error); In re Kincaid, 2000 WL 1683456, *4 (4th Dist. Oct. 27, 2000);

      (appellant mother had no standing to raise the issue of the trial court’s personal

      jurisdiction over the father when there is no evidence that her defense was

      prejudiced by the absence of the father from the proceedings).

A.W., 2025-Ohio-5657, at ¶ 74-77 (2d Dist.).




                                             18
       {¶ 54} Based on the foregoing case law, this court found in A.W. that the father lacked

standing to challenge the service on mother because he had failed to argue how he was

prejudiced by the alleged service error and because the record did not otherwise establish

any resulting prejudice. Id. at ¶ 78. Significantly, the record in A.W. indicated that the mother

was aware of the hearing date and simply chose not to attend. Id.

       {¶ 55} The present case is similar to A.W. Here, Mother does not argue how she was

prejudiced by the alleged service error on Father. The record indicates that Father was

aware of the custody matter, was represented by counsel at all of the hearing dates, and

remotely attended two of the hearing dates himself. Father chose not to testify, and his

counsel expressed Father’s wishes to have the children placed in the legal custody of M.R.

Under these circumstances, we fail to see how the alleged service error on Father could

have prejudiced Mother or even Father for that matter. Because Mother has failed to make

any argument regarding how she was prejudiced by the alleged service error and because

the record does not otherwise establish any prejudice, Mother lacks standing to raise the

alleged service error in this appeal.

       {¶ 56} Mother’s first assignment of error is overruled.

                                Second Assignment of Error

       {¶ 57} Under her second assignment of error, Mother claims that the trial court’s

judgment granting permanent custody to JFS should be reversed because M.R. was a

suitable relative who was ready, willing, and able to take legal custody of the children.

According to Mother, the children’s best interest would have been served by granting M.R.

legal custody. Mother, therefore, is essentially challenging the trial court’s denial of M.R.’s

motion for legal custody. Alternatively, Mother argues that the trial court should have granted




                                               19
an extension of temporary custody as opposed to awarding JFS permanent custody. For the

reasons outlined below, Mother’s arguments are not well taken.

                                         Legal Custody

       {¶ 58} “If a child is adjudicated a ‘dependent child,’ the court may grant legal custody

of the child ‘to either parent or to any other person who, prior to the dispositional hearing,

files a motion requesting legal custody of the child.’” In re D.P., 2024-Ohio-480, ¶ 11

(2d Dist.), quoting R.C. 2151.353(A)(3). “An award of legal custody gives the custodian the

right to have physical care and control of the child, to determine where the child lives, ‘and

the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline the child and to provide the child with food,

shelter, education, and medical care, all subject to any residual parental rights, privileges,

and responsibilities.’” Id., quoting R.C. 2151.011(B)(21). “A juvenile court may award legal

custody of a child to an individual if the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that

legal custody is in the best interest of the child.” In re C.B., 2019-Ohio-890, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.),

citing In re M.O., 2015-Ohio-2430, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.).

       {¶ 59} “The custody determination under R.C. 2151.353 must be made in accordance

with the ‘best interest of the child’ standard described in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1).” D.P. at ¶ 12.

“The factors which must be considered include things like the ‘parents’ wishes; the child’s

wishes, if the court has interviewed the child; the child’s interaction with parents, siblings,

and other who may significantly affect the child’s best interest; adjustment of the child to

home, school, and community; and the mental and physical health of all involved persons.’”

Id., quoting R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). (Other citation omitted.).

       {¶ 60} This court applies an abuse of discretion standard of review to a trial court’s

judgment on a motion for legal custody and will not reverse it absent an abuse of that

discretion. In re G.D., 2023-Ohio-1913, ¶ 10 (2d Dist.). “‘Abuse of discretion’ has been


                                               20
defined as an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” AAAA Ents., Inc.

v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990).

“[M]ost instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply unreasonable.”

Id. “A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning process that would support

that decision.” Id.

                  Standing to Challenge Denial of Motion for Legal Custody

       {¶ 61} “‘A parent has no standing to assert that the court abused its discretion by

failing to give the [third-party relative] legal custody; rather, the challenge is limited to

whether the court’s decision to terminate parental rights was proper.’” In re L.W., 2017-Ohio-

657, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.), quoting In re S.G., 2016-Ohio-8403, ¶ 52 (3d Dist.), citing In re Pittman,

2002-Ohio-2208, ¶ 70 (9th Dist.). Therefore, “a parent who does not challenge the

termination of her or his own parental rights may not instead assert the rights of a relative

who has not appealed the denial of her or his petition for legal custody.” In re K.C., 2017-

Ohio-8383, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.); see In re S.F., 2020-Ohio-693, ¶ 51 (2d Dist.) (contrasting a

scenario where a parent appeals from the parent’s own motion asking for a relative to be

granted legal custody). In other words, a parent may appeal the termination of only his or

her own parental rights, not the denial of a motion by a third party.

       {¶ 62} In this case, M.R. is not a party to this appeal, yet Mother is challenging the

trial court’s denial of M.R.’s motion for legal custody. Without M.R. appealing from the trial

court’s denial of her motion for legal custody, there is no remedy we can provide, as we

cannot assume that M.R. still desires to be awarded legal custody of the children. Stated

simply, Mother does not have standing to argue for legal custody in favor of M.R. Her

challenge on appeal is limited to whether the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental

rights was proper.


                                               21
       {¶ 63} Even if Mother had standing to challenge the denial of M.R.’s legal custody

motion, we would not find that the trial court abused its discretion by denying it. Indeed, it

was reasonable for the trial court to deny the motion given M.R.’s serious health concerns,

her responsibilities to several other children in her household, her negative social media

posts about JFS, her finances, her past history with drug addiction and domestic violence,

and her lack of any bond with the children.

                                      Permanent Custody

       {¶ 64} Because Mother alternatively argued that the trial court should have extended

JFS’s temporary custody, as opposed to awarding it permanent custody, we also review the

trial court’s permanent custody decision.

       {¶ 65} Initially, we note that “[i]t is well recognized that the right to raise one’s own

child is an ‘essential’ and ‘basic’ civil right.” In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48 (1997), quoting

In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990), quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651

(1972). That right, however, is “‘always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is

the polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’” In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100,

106 (1979), quoting In re R.J.C., 300 So.2d 54, 58 (Fla.App. 1974). “Severing the parent-

child relationship in a permanent custody case ‘has been described as “the family law

equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case.”’” In re N.R., 2025-Ohio-2896, ¶ 56

(2d Dist.), quoting Hayes at 48, quoting In re Smith, 77 Ohio App.3d 1, 16 (6th Dist. 1991).

“The termination of parental rights should be an alternative of ‘last resort.’” In re D.A., 2007-

Ohio-1105, ¶ 11, quoting Cunningham at 105. “Though an award of legal custody is intended

to be permanent, an award of legal custody is not equivalent to, or as drastic as, a permanent

custody award, because legal custody ‘does not divest a parent of residual parental rights,

privileges, and responsibilities.’” N.R. at ¶ 56, quoting In re C.R., 2006-Ohio-1191, ¶ 17; see


                                                22
R.C. 2151.011(B)(21) (defining “legal custody”). “Accordingly, termination of parental rights

requires a higher burden of proof than a grant of legal custody.” Id.

       {¶ 66} Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), a juvenile court may grant permanent custody of

a child to the agency that moved for permanent custody if the court finds “by clear and

convincing evidence (1) that one or more of the conditions in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) through

(e) applies and (2) that a grant of permanent custody is in the child’s best interest.” In re

A.M., 2020-Ohio-5102, ¶ 18, citing R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).

       {¶ 67} With regard to the factors under (a) through (d) of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), “the

court must find by clear and convincing evidence that the child either (a) cannot or should

not be placed with either parent within a reasonable period of time; (b) is abandoned; (c) is

orphaned and no relatives are able to take permanent custody of the child; or (d) has been

in the temporary custody of one or more public or private children services agencies for 12

or more months of a consecutive 22-month period.” (Citations omitted.) In re J.N., 2020-

Ohio-4157, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.). Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e), the court must find that “[t]he child

or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from whose custody the child has

been removed has been adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child on three

separate occasions by any court in this state or another state.” R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e). “If

any of the aforementioned factors are satisfied, then the court must determine whether

granting permanent custody is in the best interest of the child.” In re A.W., 2025-Ohio-5657,

¶ 51 (2d Dist.), citing J.N. at ¶ 26 and R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).

       {¶ 68} When making the best-interest determination, R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) provides

the following non-exhaustive list of factors for the trial court to consider:

       (a)    The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s

              parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home


                                               23
              providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the

              child;

       (b)    The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through

              the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the

              child;

       (c)    The custodial history of the child;

       (d)    The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and

              whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of

              permanent custody to the agency;

       (e)    Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of R.C. 2151.414

              apply in relation to the parents and child.

       {¶ 69} “[A] court must consider ‘all relevant factors,’ including five enumerated

statutory factors . . . . No one element is given greater weight or heightened significance.” In

re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 57, quoting In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 56. “Juvenile

courts need not ‘expressly discuss each of the best-interest factors,’ and ‘[c]onsideration is

all the statute requires.’” (Bracketed text in original.) In re H.V.F., 2024-Ohio-5838, ¶ 41

(2d Dist.), quoting A.M., 2020-Ohio-5102, at ¶ 31.

       {¶ 70} The standards that apply in reviewing decisions on the permanent custody of

children and the termination of parental rights are sufficiency of the evidence and manifest

weight of the evidence. In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 1. “When reviewing for manifest

weight, the appellate court must weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider

the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence,

the finder of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that

the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Id. at ¶ 14, citing Eastley v.


                                              24
Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20. “In weighing the evidence, the court of appeals must

always be mindful of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” Eastley at ¶ 21.

       {¶ 71} In contrast, a review for the sufficiency of the evidence involves testing the

adequacy of the evidence and determining, as a matter of law, whether the evidence is

legally sufficient to sustain a judgment. Z.C. at ¶ 13, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d

380, 386 (1997). “When applying a sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard, a court of appeals

should affirm a trial court when ‘“the evidence is legally sufficient to support the [judgment]

as a matter of law.”’” Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko, 2007-Ohio-4918, ¶ 3, quoting Thompkins

at 386, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990).

       {¶ 72} As to the first finding required for JFS to receive permanent custody, the trial

court found under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) that the children could not be safely placed with

Mother or Father within a reasonable period of time. This finding is supported by sufficient

evidence and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The record indicates that

at the time of the hearing, Mother and Father had a longstanding history of substance abuse

and that they had failed to make any progress on their case plan objectives for over a year,

despite receiving assistance from JFS. The record also includes the GAL’s reported concern

that Mother and Father would never be able to provide a safe and stable home for the

children. Additionally, Mother testified that she was a drug addict and not capable of caring

for the children.

       {¶ 73} The trial court also found under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b) that Father had

abandoned the children. That finding is also supported by sufficient evidence and is not

against the manifest weight of the evidence. A child is presumed abandoned when a parent

has failed to visit or maintain contact with the child for more than 90 days. R.C. 2151.011(C).

Here, the record indicates that Father had not contacted the children since July 2024, which


                                              25
was well over 90 days prior to the commencement of the permanent custody hearing in

November 2024.

          {¶ 74} As for the best-interest finding, the trial court considered the relevant factors

under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and determined that permanent custody in favor of JFS was in

the children’s best interest. In reviewing that decision, we consider each of the applicable

factors.

               a.   Children’s Interactions and Interrelationships with Others

          {¶ 75} The record establishes that the children were very bonded to their foster family

and to each other. While the children were also very bonded to their adult half-siblings and

Mother, those parties expressed that they were unable to care for the children. The foster

family provided a safe, stable, and loving home for the children and wished to adopt the

children. Foster Mother permitted the children’s half-siblings to visit the children, and she

indicated that if she were to adopt the children, she would continue to allow the children to

visit their half-siblings. While some of the half-siblings expressed that they were

uncomfortable around Foster Mother due to her religious beliefs, nothing in the record

indicates that Foster Mother ever prohibited the half-siblings from having contact with the

children. The record indicates that it was the half-siblings’ choice to stop communicating

regularly with Foster Mother and the children. Foster Mother also indicated that she would

allow Mother and Father to have contact with the children as long as it was a safe and

healthy option.

          b.        Children’s Wishes

          {¶ 76} The record establishes that the children were interviewed in camera

individually and that they each expressed a desire to be safe and to remain with their foster

family.


                                                   26
       c.     Custodial History

       {¶ 77} The record establishes that the children have had a longstanding history with

JFS. In 2018, the children were adjudicated dependent and placed under an order of

supervision due to Mother’s and Father’s drug abuse issues. Thereafter, in February 2023,

the children were removed from Mother and Father’s care due to deplorable living

conditions, and the children were once again adjudicated dependent. The children were

initially placed with a kinship caregiver, but JFS eventually received temporary custody of

the children in May 2023 and placed them with their foster family. The children have lived

with their foster family ever since.

       d.     Children’s Need for Legally Secure Placement

       {¶ 78} “While the Ohio Revised Code does not define a ‘legally secure permanent

placement,’ Ohio courts have held that the phrase means ‘a safe, stable, consistent

environment where a child’s needs will be met.’” In re Z.A., 2025-Ohio-5247, ¶ 23 (2d Dist.),

quoting In re K.M., 2023-Ohio-3203, ¶ 35 (4th Dist.).

       {¶ 79} The record indicates that Mother and Father failed to rectify the issues that

caused the children to be removed from their care despite JFS’s reasonable efforts to assist

them. Specifically, Mother and Father continued to use drugs, did not gain meaningful

employment, and did not obtain appropriate housing. It was not viable to return the children

to Mother or Father. Mother herself admitted that she was not capable of caring for the

children. Also, the GAL expressed doubts as to whether Mother and Father would ever be

able to provide a safe and stable home for the children.

       {¶ 80} The record indicates that the children’s eldest half-sibling told JFS that she

was unable to care for the children, as she was young with personal issues of her own. The

record also indicates that M.R. was not a viable placement option because she had severe


                                             27
health concerns, was responsible for several other children, posted negative comments

about JFS on social media, had financial issues, had a past history of addiction and domestic

violence, and acknowledged that the children were not bonded to her.

       {¶ 81} Despite much effort, JFS could not find an appropriate relative who was willing

and capable of caring for the children. Accordingly, the record supports finding that the

children were in need of a legally secure placement that could not have been achieved

without granting permanent custody to JFS.

       {¶ 82} When considering all the aforementioned factors, we find that sufficient

evidence supports the trial court’s determination that it was in the children’s best interest to

grant JFS permanent custody. We also find that the trial court’s best-interest determination

is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we cannot say that the trial

court erred by granting JFS’s motion for permanent custody and terminating the parental

rights of Mother and Father. Accordingly, Mother’s alternative argument that the trial court

should have instead extended temporary custody to JFS is not well taken.

       {¶ 83} Mother’s second assignment of error is overruled.

                                         Conclusion

       {¶ 84} Having overruled both assignments of error raised by Mother, the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

                                       .............

LEWIS, P.J., and TUCKER, J., concur.




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