In re M.W.H.

[Cite as In re M.W.H., 2026-Ohio-1558.]


                              COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                            EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA


IN RE M.W.H.                                    :
                                                           No. 115498
A Minor Child                                   :

[Appeal by Mother]                              :


                               JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED
                          IN PART
                RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 30, 2026


            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                   Juvenile Division
                                Case No. CU-16101300


                                          Appearances:

                Ann S. Vaughn, for appellant.


EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J.:

                   Appellant Mother (“Mother”) appeals from the decision of the

juvenile court denying her motions to terminate a shared-parenting agreement and

suspend overnight parenting time with Father and the decision holding Mother in

contempt of court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
Factual and Procedural History

              In April 2016, the juvenile court approved and entered an agreed

shared-parenting order executed by the parties. As a result, the juvenile court

designated them both as legal custodians of MWH (the “minor child”) (d.o.b.

4/10/2012), and Mother was designated as the residential parent. Pursuant to the

agreement, Father’s parenting time was weekly from Thursday at 5:30 p.m. to

Sunday at 12:00 p.m.

              In October 2022, Father filed a motion to modify the shared-

parenting agreement, which the juvenile court granted. In January 2023, the

juvenile court accepted the parents’ shared-parenting agreement, which designated

both parents as residential and custodial parents of the minor child. Mother was

designated the residential parent for school purposes only. The juvenile court’s

order also set Mother’s parenting time from Sundays at 3:00 p.m. to Thursdays at

3:00 p.m., and Father’s parenting time from Thursdays at 3:00 p.m., to Sundays at

3:00 p.m.

              On November 17, 2023, Mother simultaneously filed motions to

terminate shared parenting, suspend overnight parenting time with Father, order

Father to submit to drug and alcohol testing, and appoint a guardian ad litem

(“GAL”) for the minor child. Mother asked the court to order supervised visits and

to suspend Father’s parenting time. In her motion to terminate shared parenting,

Mother asked the court to designate her as the minor child’s sole legal custodian.
              Mother attached an affidavit, in which she alleged that she, her

husband, and the minor child had observed Father intoxicated on several occasions

at the minor child’s sporting events. Further, Mother averred that the minor child

told her that he had observed Father drinking and intoxicated. She expressed that

multiple family members had raised concerns that Father was drinking, and she

believed Father was driving the minor child while intoxicated. The minor child also

reported to Mother there was no heat in Father’s home and he was unable to bathe

there because the water was off. Further, per Mother, the minor child reported that

the home was “filthy.” Mother claimed she saw the conditions of the home in the

background during FaceTime calls with the minor child. Finally, Mother averred

that the minor child wanted to discontinue visits because Father’s home was “dirty,

his dad drinks, and it’s depressing.”

              On November 27, 2023, Father filed a motion to show cause alleging

that Mother had violated the shared-parenting agreement by interfering with his

parenting time with the minor child during the month of November.

              The juvenile court appointed a GAL, and over the next several months

conducted several pretrials. The juvenile court granted Mother’s request for drug

and alcohol testing and ordered Father to obtain the same within 30 days of the

journalization of its March 4, 2024 order.

              In May 2024, the GAL issued her initial report. She noted that she

had reviewed the court’s records; the minor child’s school attendance and report

card from the past two years; and Father’s bill payments for heat, water, and sewer.
She was able to speak to relevant parties and determined that the minor child had a

decent relationship with both parents.       However, the minor child expressed

concerns about Father’s living conditions and his drinking. The GAL attempted to

schedule a visit to Father’s home to assess the conditions, providing dates and times;

however, at the time of her report, Father had not responded to her request.

              The GAL spoke to both Mother and Father. Mother reiterated her

concerns as expressed in her affidavit.      She also alleged that multiple family

members of hers and Father’s had reported concerns regarding Father’s drinking.

Finally, she alleged that Father’s home had been foreclosed and sold.

              Father denied drinking, claiming he had a medical condition that

prevented him from drinking. Father expressed concerns for the minor child’s

school attendance, calling it “atrocious” and alleging that the minor child had been

reported to the state for truancy twice. When asked about the heating in his home,

Father alleged that a thermocouple on his heater “went bad” and that the situation

lasted for a little over a week. Subsequently, Mother took the minor child for a

Halloween event. Shortly thereafter, the Cuyahoga County Department of Children

and Family Services (“CCDCFS”) began an investigation.             Per Father, they

conducted a home inspection and checked the gas, hot water, and living conditions

and found the allegations “unsubstantiated.” Two days later, Father went to get the

minor child at school and was told Mother had pulled the minor child out of school

early. He called the next day and was told the minor child was not in attendance.

Subsequently, Father alleged that Mother interfered with his ability to attend
parent/teacher conferences, telling the school that they were to deal exclusively with

her and no longer interact with Father.

                Based on the circumstances at the time, the GAL withheld her

recommendation, indicating that she would reserve her conclusions until she had

obtained additional information.

               Later that month, May 2024, the juvenile court determined that

Father had not complied with its order to obtain a drug and alcohol assessment. The

juvenile court reissued the order and gave Father another 30 days to comply. The

juvenile court also granted the motion to suspend overnight visits at Father’s home.

In the alternative, the juvenile court noted that the parties could arrange for Father’s

parenting time to occur in the community, under supervision at a visitation center,

or at the home of an appropriate adult known to the child.

               In January 2025, the GAL issued a second report. On speaking to the

minor child this time, the minor child reported that he regularly visits with Father

on the weekends and enjoys those visits. He did not report any present concerns

regarding Father; however, he had not been to Father’s home in “a long time” and

did not know the current condition of the home.

               Mother reported to the GAL that she was aware that recent visits

between Father and the minor child were appropriate. She acknowledged that they

loved each other. She also noted that Father had been driving the minor child to

various locations and there were no concerns. However, she disapproved of the

minor child resuming overnight visits until Father proved he had appropriate and
stable housing. She reported that she had not received any recent reports from

family members regarding Father’s substance use or abuse.

              The GAL and Father corresponded by phone and email. Father

emailed her a copy of a notice of bankruptcy dated September 2023, a copy of his

drug screen results in May 2024, and results of a urine and toxicology screen

conducted by the Cleveland Veteran Affairs Medical Center (the “VA”) from August

2024.   The VA reported negative results and did not recommend treatment.

Although the GAL provided multiple days and times for a prospective home visit,

Father did not make his home available to the GAL and she was unable to report on

Father’s living conditions. The GAL recommended that it was in the best interest of

the minor child to continue visits with his Father “as ordered by the Court.” The

GAL reserved any additional recommendations until after the trial of the matter.

              Trial commenced in May 2025. The issues remaining were Father’s

motion to show cause and Mother’s motion to terminate shared parenting.

Additionally, Mother asked the court to continue its order forbidding overnight

visits until Father addressed his housing issues.

              Father proceeded pro se and presented narrative testimony. He

testified that after Mother picked up the minor child to take him to a Halloween

event in 2023, Mother did not return him to Father’s care. After that, Father alleged

that Mother kept the minor child from him. In early November, Father filed a police

report regarding the matter. Subsequently, Father and Mother were at the school

for parent/teacher conferences and had to be separated. Father testified that school
officials were told he was no longer in the minor child’s life and all communication

was to go through Mother. Father had to bring copies of the custody orders to the

school in order to rectify the matter. Ultimately, Father alleged that his parenting

time was interrupted from October 26, 2023, through May 2024.

              Father also challenged Mother’s claims that he had alcohol, drug, and

mental-health issues when he had never been convicted of operating a vehicle while

intoxicated (“OVI”) or disorderly conduct or had any other legal issues in that vein.

Nevertheless, Father acknowledged he was charged with a misdemeanor for

growing marijuana in 2007. For reasons that Father did not explain, Father was

ultimately convicted of arson.

              Father did not go into detail about his relationship with the minor

child but noted that he was concerned about the minor child’s grades and school

attendance and had hired a tutor to help him. Finally, Father sought to introduce

five exhibits: three affidavits from family members to attest to his character and the

minor child’s attendance records and test scores.

              On cross-examination, Father claimed that the minor child was

unable to bathe for one day because a thermocouple in the water heater went out.

Father explained that CCDCFS investigated his home and found everything

acceptable.   He also claimed that Mother was aware of the results of the

investigation. Father admitted that he did not allow the GAL to inspect his home.

He claimed that there was a scheduling conflict.
               Father further admitted that he had lived in the same home since

2004, but that it was foreclosed and sold in a sheriff’s sale in September 2023.

Nevertheless, Father claimed he was still the owner of the home. He acknowledged,

however, that the county lists a different owner and that listed person is the legal

owner. When asked if Mother should be concerned about the minor child staying

with Father at a home owned by another person, Father replied “no” and indicated

there was still a “process” pending. He pointed out that he has lived in the home for

the past two years since the foreclosure, and he stated that “we” were in the process

of figuring something out with respect to the house.

               Father then sought to call his fiancée, Ericka Reynolds (“Reynolds”)

to the stand. Mother objected, noting Father failed to file a witness list. The juvenile

court overruled the objection and allowed the testimony.

               Reynolds testified that she had known Father for over 30 years and

they began dating in March 2023 and became engaged in February 2025. She

described the relationship between Father and the minor child as “best friends” and

said that they have a relationship she admires. Reynolds testified that she owned

her own home and had been to Father’s home several times. They were discussing

consolidating their lives to accommodate themselves, the minor child, and

Reynolds’ six-year-old son.

               With respect to Father’s lifestyle, she testified that she would not

describe him as someone with mental-health issues. She noted that Father did drink

alcohol, but was imbibing less since he was prescribed blood pressure medication,
usually drinking nonalcoholic beer. She further noted that she had never seen

Father smoke marijuana; however, she noted that she hated the smell and he would

not smoke around her.

               Reynolds testified that she has spent time with the minor child.

Specifically, he attended a family day celebration at her job. Later she was with

Father when he bought the minor child a suit for his junior prom. Reynolds helped

by hemming the minor child’s pants. At the conclusion of her testimony, Father

rested his case.

               Mother then took the stand. She testified that the minor child had

just turned 13 years old. She and the minor child lived with her husband, Darren

Wilder (“Wilder”), and her daughter. Mother admitted that the shared-parenting

agreement had existed since 2016 and was modified in 2023. Although she had

concerns about parenting time with Father, she did not act until October 2023, when

the minor child raised some concerns.

               In October 2023, Mother picked up the minor child to take him to a

Halloween event downtown and the minor child smelled “horrendous.”               She

described the minor child smelling as if he had not bathed in days. She called Father

to address the minor child’s cleanliness and his drinking, which had been mentioned

by the minor child and other members of both her and Father’s families. She also

tried to talk to him about not having hot water or gas and the home being in disarray

and filthy. Finally, she told Father that because of those conditions, she would not

bring the minor child back to his home. Father demanded that she return the minor
child, and she declined. She later texted Father, telling him that she was not taking

the minor child to his home given the conditions and he could contact her lawyer if

he had questions. The texts were entered as an exhibit during Mother’s case-in-

chief.

              Mother did not find out about the foreclosure of Father’s house until

later. Father did not respond to her questions about the foreclosure. Mother

testified that the only thing that would satisfy her and alleviate her concerns about

overnight visits was if he allowed the GAL to complete a home inspection. She also

expressed concern about what might happen if the new owner attempted to evict

Father from the home while the minor child was present.

              Mother testified that Father did not communicate with her about the

minor child or ask her about his well-being. Further, Mother indicated that Father

had not engaged in coparenting with her in the prior six months. On the current

visitation schedule, Mother complained that Father was usually late. Father would

communicate when he needed to cancel a visit, however.

              Finally, although Mother had indicated recent interactions with

Father had been fine, she testified that he was noticeably intoxicated at the minor

child’s junior prom a week prior to trial. She noted that he was in a “wobbly state,”

could not get up or stand-up straight, and was moving slow and slurring his words.

These new observations left her with renewed concern about allowing Father to

drive with the minor child. Nevertheless, she testified that she would be agreeable

to overnight visits as long as they did not occur at “that house.” While she wanted
the minor child to have a relationship with Father, she wanted Father to be a good

role model, sort out his housing “situation,” and take care of his health.

               Next, Wilder testified and agreed that Father was inebriated at the

junior prom the week prior. He described Father as sluggish and aggressive. The

last time he was at Father’s house was in 2022 or 2023. At that time, Wilder claimed

that Father asked him to install a straight pipe for his gas line; he claimed it was a

way to illegally access gas. Wilder testified he could not do it. At that time, Wilder

entered the home and noticed that it was very cold. He also observed a vodka bottle

in the middle of the basement floor and that the gas meter had been removed. On

cross-examination, Wilder testified that he smelled alcohol on Father while at the

junior prom. Further he acknowledged that he did not see Father drink from the

vodka bottle and that it could belong to someone other than Father.

               At the close of testimony, the juvenile court addressed exhibits and

asked Mother if she objected to the affidavits and records Father sought to admit.

Mother objected to all of Father’s exhibits.      The juvenile court sustained the

objections as to the affidavits Father obtained and the minor child’s test scores but

overruled the objection as to the minor child’s attendance records. Father also

objected to Mother’s exhibits, which included the text messages she exchanged with

Father about his living conditions and the docket of Father’s foreclosure. The

juvenile court overruled Father’s objections.

               The GAL then gave her recommendation. She testified that it was in

the best interest of the minor child for Father’s motion for parenting time to be
denied.1 With respect to shared parenting, she indicated that “this parent” cannot

coparent. The GAL did not give a recommendation but stated that she did not

believe shared parenting was working.

               When questioned by the parties, the GAL acknowledged that Father

had completed the court-ordered drug and alcohol testing although he did so outside

of the juvenile court’s deadline. With regard to overnight visits, she believed that

Father should have a home or lease in his name and the minor child should not stay

in a home that does not legally belong to Father. Nevertheless, she admitted that in

May 2024, Father provided her with water and sewer bills and receipts that he paid

them.

               The juvenile court denied Mother’s motions to terminate the shared-

parenting agreement and suspend overnight visits and granted Father’s motion to

show cause, finding Mother in contempt of court. The juvenile court ordered that

Mother serve three days in jail; however, the sentence was suspended and could be

purged “by strictly complying with the terms of the shared-parenting plan of

January 12, 2023 as ordered, and with daily school attendance, including

educational supports such as tutoring and other extracurricular activities in the

[minor child’s] best interest.”

               Mother appeals raising the following assignments of error for our

review.



        1 The record reflects that the motion the GAL referenced was granted by the

juvenile court in January 2023 and was not the subject of the hearing.
                           Assignment of Error No. 1

      The [juvenile] court erred in finding that no substantial change of
      circumstances had occurred in the life of a child, the child’s residential
      parent, or either of the parents subject to a parenting decree.

                          Assignment of Error No. 2

      The [juvenile] court erred in finding that a modification was not
      necessary to serve the best interests of a minor child.

                          Assignment of Error No. 3

      The [juvenile] court erred in denying [Mother’s] motion to terminate
      the parties’ shared-parenting [agreement].

                          Assignment of Error No. 4

      The [juvenile] court abused its discretion in disregarding the
      recommendations of a [GAL] appointed to conduct an investigation
      and make recommendations about a minor child’s best interest.

                          Assignment of Error No. 5

      The [juvenile] court abused its discretion in finding by clear and
      convincing evidence that Mother was in contempt of court (pursuant to
      [Father’s] motion to show cause).

                          Assignment of Error No. 6

      The [juvenile] court erred in finding that Mother was in contempt of
      court (pursuant to [Father’s] motion to show cause).

                          Assignment of Error No. 7

      The [juvenile] court abused its discretion when giving self-represented
      Father leniency in overlooking his failure to meet the standards held to
      an attorney.

              For ease of analysis, we will address the assignments of error in

combination or out of order.
Law and Analysis

Termination of the Shared-Parenting Agreement

              In the third assignment of error, Mother argues that the juvenile court

abused its discretion when it denied her motion to terminate the shared-parenting

agreement. Mother argues that she established that she and Father were unable to

effectively communicate regarding joint parenting decisions, primarily because of

Father’s unwillingness to converse with her, and therefore the trial court abused its

discretion when it denied her motion. We disagree.

              We review a trial court’s best-interest determination for an abuse of

discretion. In re J.R.P., 2026-Ohio-827, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.). An abuse of discretion

occurs when the court’s conduct is “‘unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.’”

State v. Hill, 2022-Ohio-4544, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Beasley, 2018-Ohio-16, ¶ 12,

citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). Furthermore,

      “[t]his highly deferential standard of review rests on the premise that
      the trial judge is in the best position to determine the credibility of
      witnesses because he or she is able to observe their demeanor, gestures
      and attitude.”

J.R.P. at id., quoting In re L.S., 2003-Ohio-2045, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.), citing Seasons

Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984).

              A court of appeals is not permitted to substitute its judgment for the

judgment of the trial court, where that judgment is supported by competent,

credible evidence. Bertalan v. Bertalan, 2025-Ohio-1443, ¶ 70 (8th Dist.), citing

Hunter v. Troutman, 2025-Ohio-366, ¶ 64 (8th Dist.).
                 Our review of a motion to terminate a shared-parenting agreement is

governed by R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(c), which states:

       The court may terminate a prior final shared parenting decree that
       includes a shared parenting plan . . . upon the request of one or both of
       the parents or whenever it determines that shared parenting is not in
       the best interest of the children . . . .

                 In making the decision whether to terminate a shared-parenting

agreement, the sole concern of the trial court is the best interest of the child. Bruns

v. Green, 2020-Ohio-4787, ¶ 20. The trial court need not find that there was a

change of circumstances in order to make a ruling under R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(c). In

re J.R.P., 2026-Ohio-827 at ¶ 14 (8th Dist.), citing Bruns at id.

                 In examining whether shared parenting is in the best interest of the

child, R.C. 3109.04(F)(2) instructs the juvenile court to consider “all relevant

factors, including, but not limited to,” the factors enumerated in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1),

the factors enumerated in R.C. 3119.23, and all of the following: 2

       (a) The ability of the parents to cooperate and make decisions jointly,
       with respect to the children;

       (b) The ability of each parent to encourage the sharing of love, affection,
       and contact between the child and the other parent;

       (c) Any history of, or potential for, child abuse, spouse abuse, other
       domestic violence, or parental kidnapping by either parent;

       (d) The geographic proximity of the parents to each other, as the
       proximity relates to the practical considerations of shared parenting;




       2 R.C. 3119.23 applies to deviations in child-support orders and does not apply to

the facts of this case.
      (e) The recommendation of the guardian ad litem of the child, if the
      child has a guardian ad litem.

R.C. 3109.04(F)(2).

              The factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) include:

      (a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care;

      (b) If the court has interviewed the child in chambers pursuant to
      division (B) of this section regarding the child’s wishes and concerns as
      to the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities concerning the
      child, the wishes and concerns of the child, as expressed to the court;

      (c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s
      parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the
      child’s best interest;

      (d) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and community;

      (e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the
      situation;

      (f) The parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved
      parenting time rights or visitation and companionship rights;

      (g) Whether either parent has failed to make all child support
      payments, including all arrearages, that are required of that parent
      pursuant to a child support order under which that parent is an obligor;

      (h) Whether either parent or any member of the household of either
      parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any
      criminal offense involving any act that resulted in a child being an
      abused child or a neglected child; whether either parent, in a case in
      which a child has been adjudicated an abused child or a neglected child,
      previously has been determined to be the perpetrator of the abusive or
      neglectful act that is the basis of an adjudication; whether either parent
      or any member of the household of either parent previously has been
      convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of section 2919.25 of the
      Revised Code or a sexually oriented offense involving a victim who at
      the time of the commission of the offense was a member of the family
      or household that is the subject of the current proceeding; whether
      either parent or any member of the household of either parent
      previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any offense
      involving a victim who at the time of the commission of the offense was
      a member of the family or household that is the subject of the current
      proceeding and caused physical harm to the victim in the commission
      of the offense; and whether there is reason to believe that either parent
      has acted in a manner resulting in a child being an abused child or a
      neglected child;

      (i) Whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to a
      shared parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied the
      other parent’s right to parenting time in accordance with an order of
      the court;

      (j) Whether either parent has established a residence, or is planning to
      establish a residence, outside this state.

              The sole factor Mother raises in this assignment of error is the

inability of Father and Mother to communicate effectively and make joint decisions

regarding the minor child under R.C. 3109.04(F)(2)(a). Nevertheless, the juvenile

court’s entry reflects that it considered all the factors listed in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)

and (2). Additionally, the GAL’s final report noted that

      [Mother] indicated that she is aware that her son has been having
      appropriate visits with his father. She said that her son loves [his]
      father and father loves the child. She said that the father has been
      driving the child around and no concerns were reported.

              Mother’s only concern, as discussed with the GAL, was her desire to

continue the suspension of overnight visits at Father’s home until he establishes

appropriate and stable housing.

              With respect to the remaining factors under R.C. 3109.04(F)(2), i.e.,

the ability of each parent to encourage the sharing of love, affection and contact

between the child and the other parent; any history of abuse; and the geographic

proximity of the parents to one another; neither party alleged that the other parent
interfered with their having a loving relationship with the minor child; there was no

history of child abuse, parental abuse, domestic violence, or parental kidnapping;

and   the   parents    both    resided   within    the   Cuyahoga     County    area.

R.C. 3109.04(F)(2)(b)-(d). Finally, the GAL encouraged a continued relationship

between Father and the minor child but noted that there was no communication

between the parents and that she did not believe “this parent” could coparent. The

GAL did not believe shared parenting was working. However, neither in her report

nor during her testimony did the GAL give examples of the parents’ lack of

communication and inability to make joint decisions regarding the minor child.

Rather, the GAL offered testimony about the lack of communication between the

GAL and Father. R.C. 3109.04(F)(2)(e).

              Regarding the R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) factors, at the trial Father indicated

he wanted to continue the shared-parenting agreement. Mother indicated that she

was satisfied with the juvenile court’s decision to suspend overnight visits and would

leave the determination regarding her motion to terminate shared parenting to the

court. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(a). The GAL represented that the minor child wished to

continue visiting with Father and loved Father; however, the GAL did not make any

representation regarding how the minor child felt about the shared-parenting

agreement. The court did not independently interview the minor child. R.C.

3109.04(F)(1)(b). The GAL reported that the minor child is well adjusted and seems

to get along with Mother and Father. The GAL did not opine about the minor child’s
relationship with Father’s fiancée, her son, or the minor child’s stepfather or

siblings. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(c) and (d).

              Finally, with respect to R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(e), the GAL did not report

any issues with Mother’s mental or physical health. The GAL noted that she had

received documents from Father, establishing that he had completed drug and

alcohol assessments, and no further treatment was recommended. Relating to

either parent honoring the juvenile court’s parenting order, the testimony

established that Mother claimed Father failed to inform her if he could not get the

minor child on time. Father testified that Mother withheld the minor child from his

parenting time during November 2023. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(f). Neither party raised

issues with child-support obligations. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(g). Neither party raised

issues regarding prior criminal history nor claimed that either had acted in a manner

that resulted in a child being an abused or a neglected child.3 R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(h).

With respect to interference with parenting time, Father alleged that Mother

interfered with his parenting time between October 2023 and May 2024. Mother

did not make similar accusations. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(i). Neither party indicated

they intended to establish a residence outside of this state. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(j).

              It was clear from the record that Father did not always respond to

Mother’s questions about conditions at his home, refusing to answer questions

about the gas service per Mother’s testimony. However, Wilder testified that Father


      3 Arguably, Mother alleged that Father’s failure to have working utilities caused the

minor child to be dependent while in his care; however, the GAL testified that Father
showed bills and established he had working utilities as of May 2024.
sought his help with that issue and he visited the home. While Father was not

forthcoming with Mother, he did not hide the condition of his home. Additionally,

it was readily apparent from the record that visitation was going well since the

juvenile court suspended overnight visits and the parties jointly attended the minor

child’s sporting events and major social events, like the minor child’s junior prom.

Mother testified that at the time of trial Father had not cooperated with her in any

joint decisions in the prior six months but did not indicate what those decisions were

and how they impacted the minor child.

               Based on the foregoing, we cannot find that the trial court abused its

discretion when it denied the motion to terminate shared parenting. The third

assignment of error is overruled.

Modification of the Shared-Parenting Agreement

               Next, we consider Mother’s first, second, and fourth assignments of

error, which challenge the juvenile court’s denial of her motions to suspend Father’s

parenting time. Mother initially requested the juvenile court suspend parenting

time, or in the alternative, allow supervised visits until Father addressed her claims

regarding drug and alcohol abuse and lack of utilities in his home. After the trial

court suspended overnight visits, Mother requested that the juvenile court continue

suspending overnight visits until Father established that he had a safe and

appropriate place to live.

               Changes to the terms of a shared-parenting order are governed under

R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b), which provides, in pertinent part:
      The court may modify the terms of the plan for shared parenting
      approved by the court and incorporated by it into the shared parenting
      decree upon its own motion at any time if the court determines that the
      modifications are in the best interest of the children or upon the request
      of one or both of the parents under the decree. Modifications under
      this division may be made at any time. The court shall not make any
      modification to the plan under this division, unless the modification is
      in the best interest of the children.[4]

               Similar to a ruling regarding the termination of shared parenting, the

juvenile court bases the decision to modify a shared-parenting agreement on

whether the modification is in the best interest of the child. In re G.B., 2022-Ohio-

382, ¶ 55 (8th Dist.). The court is not required to find that there was a change in

circumstances.      Id.    See Bruns, 2020-Ohio-4787, ¶ 11 (Comparing R.C.

3109.04(E)(2)(a) and (b) with R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(c) and stating, “Subsection

(E)(2)(b) authorizes the trial court — on its own initiative or at the request of one or

both parents—to modify the terms of the shared-parenting agreement when

modification is found to be in the best interest of the child.”).

               In her first assignment of error, Mother argues that the juvenile court

erred when it found that there was no substantial change in circumstances in the

lives of the child, the child’s residential parent, or either of the parents subject to the

parenting decree. However, whether there was a change in circumstances is only

relevant when there is a request to change the residential parent under

R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(a). In this case, where Mother is the residential parent and she

is making a request to modify the terms of the shared-parenting agreement under


      4 Ramsey v. Ramsey, 2014-Ohio-1921, ¶ 37 (10th Dist.) (finding that a request to

modify parenting time is a request to modify the terms of a shared-parenting order).
R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b), the juvenile court was not required to consider changed

circumstances. G.B. at ¶ 55. We are mindful that Mother’s argument is based on

the juvenile court’s finding, that

      based on facts that have arisen since the prior decree, that a change in
      circumstances has not occurred in the [minor child’s], the [minor
      child’s] residential parent, or either of the parents subject to a
      parenting decree . . . .

(July 30, 2025 Journal Entry.)

               However, the juvenile court was not required to make this finding

under R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(b). Accordingly, Mother’s first assignment of error is

overruled.

               In the second assignment of error, Mother argues that the juvenile

court’s ruling was not in the best interest of the minor child. Specifically, she argues

that the juvenile court’s decision to “overlook” Father’s failure to cooperate with the

GAL’s investigation was an abuse of discretion. Mother also alleges her request was

reasonable, and the juvenile court erred when it denied the motion. In the fourth

assignment of error, Mother claims that the trial court erred in disregarding the

GAL’s recommendations regarding what would be in the minor child’s best interest.

               Again, our review of a trial court’s best-interest determination is for

an abuse of discretion. J.R.P., 2026-Ohio-827 at ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), citing In re N.J.V.,

2025-Ohio-375, ¶ 35 (8th Dist.). The party seeking a modification of the parenting

time schedule has the burden of establishing that the change is in the best interest
of the child. Nungester v. Nungester, 2017-Ohio-6935, ¶ 6 (3d Dist.); Rankin v.

Rankin, 2021-Ohio-1967, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.)

              For the motion to modify, the question was whether it was in the best

interest of the child to allow overnight visits based on Father’s living conditions.

During the trial, Mother submitted evidence that Father’s home had been foreclosed

and sold to a third party. Father admitted as much but alleged that the proceedings

were “illegal” and that there were other legal proceedings pending to address the

issue. Father did not submit any evidence to support these contentions.

              The GAL reported that Father impeded her ability to investigate his

living conditions. She emailed Father on two occasions for a potential home visit.

Father did not respond to the first email. With respect to the second, Father emailed

the GAL a list of dates and times that he would be available. The GAL went to

Father’s home on one of those dates during a time Father said he would be available.

Father was not home and he did not respond to the GAL’s phone calls. When the

GAL emailed Father to inquire about what happened, she did not get a response.

The GAL noted that she did not know Father’s living conditions inside the house,

and testified that “outside, the grass and objects were around, so it didn’t look like

somebody was living there.” Nevertheless, the GAL acknowledged that Father

showed her utilities bills in his name as of May 2024, which was after the home’s

foreclosure and sale.

              There was no testimony presented regarding the current condition of

Father’s home. The minor child had regular visits after juvenile court suspended
overnight visits but informed the GAL that he had not been to Father’s home in

several months. Mother did not testify about the current conditions. She testified

regarding what she observed while on FaceTime calls with the minor child during

Father’s parenting time. Those observations occurred prior to and in October 2023.

Mother testified that the minor child would wander around the house when they

talked and the house was “dirty.” Nevertheless, Mother also testified that her main

objection to overnight visits was that Father no longer owned the home. She was

worried that the minor child would witness or experience an eviction or some action

to remove Father from the home.

              Despite concerns about Father’s drinking, Mother testified that she

would be comfortable with overnight visits if they occurred in someone else’s home,

such as Father’s cousin’s home. Father’s fiancée, Reynolds, testified that she had

been to Father’s home several times, but she did not address the conditions. She

informed the court that she owned her own home, and she and Father were talking

about how to consolidate their lives now that they were engaged to be married.

Father attempted to ask Reynolds about the conditions of his home on redirect

examination, but the juvenile court stopped him, explaining that he could not raise

new issues on redirect examination.

              While we understand Mother’s concerns about Father’s living

conditions, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied

her motion. Mother did not object to overnight visits with Father; she objected to

the location. Further, Mother’s fears stemmed from speculation about what might
happen at Father’s residence. Mother did not have any specific concerns except

events that had happened prior to October 2023. While Mother had present

concerns about Father’s drinking, the GAL noted that the VA report indicated

substance-abuse treatment was not recommended.

               Finally, a trial court is not bound by a GAL’s recommendation. In re

A.B.M., 2019-Ohio-3183, ¶ 48 (8th Dist.) (finding “a trial court determines the

guardian ad litem’s credibility and the weight to be given to any report”). The

juvenile court was free to accept, reject, or modify the GAL’s recommendation and,

like any other witness, was in the best position to determine the credibility of the

GAL because of its ability to observe her demeanor, gestures, and attitude. Id., citing

In re A.M.S., 2012-Ohio-5078, ¶ 18, citing Seasons Coal Co., 10 Ohio St.3d at 80

(1984). Accordingly, the second and fourth assignments of error are overruled.

Pro Se Practice

               In her seventh assignment of error, Mother argues that the juvenile

court did not hold Father to the same standard as an attorney because it did not

apply the juvenile rules and court’s standing rules to Father. Specifically, she argues

that the juvenile court should have granted her motion to deny Father’s motion to

show cause because Father failed to attach a copy of the order he alleged Mother

violated. Further, Mother alleges that the juvenile court erred when it allowed

Father to present Reynolds’ testimony despite the fact that he had failed to file a

witness list or otherwise notify Mother that he intended to present her testimony.
              While Mother cites the Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure and the

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Standing Orders to support her

argument, she does not cite any cases that support her argument that the failure of

a court to enforce these rules is an abuse of discretion. Further, she does not cite

any case law to support her argument that these acts, if improper, would warrant a

reversal of the juvenile court’s decision. “An appellant has the duty to construct the

arguments necessary to support the assignments of error; an appellate court will not

construct those arguments for the appellant.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Kessler,

2015-Ohio-5085, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.).

              Accordingly, Mother’s seventh assignment of error is overruled.

Contempt Finding

              Finally, in the sixth assignment of error, Mother argues that the

juvenile court erred in finding her in contempt of court. Although the assignment

of error states that the juvenile court’s finding was not supported by clear and

convincing evidence, Mother admits that she interfered with Father’s parenting

time. Instead, she alleges that she was justified in preventing Father’s parenting

time because of the conditions at Father’s home and because Father failed to

communicate with her. Mother’s arguments are well taken.

              An appellate court reviews a trial court’s finding of contempt for an

abuse of discretion. In re J.A.P., 2022-Ohio-613, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), citing In re

Contempt of Morris, 110 Ohio App.3d 475, 479 (8th Dist. 1996), citing Dozer v.

Dozer, 88 Ohio App.3d 296 (4th Dist. 1993). A juvenile court’s authority to impose
contempt stems from R.C. 2151.21 and 2705.031(B). The moving party must

establish (1) the existence of a court order, (2) that the party was aware of the order,

and (3) that the party violated the order. In re K.B., 2012-Ohio-5507, ¶ 11 (8th Dist.),

citing Arthur Young & Co. v. Kelly, 68 Ohio App.3d 287, 295 (10th Dist. 1990);

Pendergraft v. Watts, 2011-Ohio-5649.

               A party establishes a prima facie case for contempt where the order is

before the court along with proof of the nonmoving party’s failure to comply with it.

Bridgeland v. Bridgeland, 2021-Ohio-2587, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.), citing DeMarco v.

DeMarco, 2010-Ohio-445, ¶ 25 (10th Dist.), citing Dzina v. Dzina, 2004-Ohio-4497,

¶ 63 (8th Dist.). “Proof of a purposeful, willful or intentional violation of a court

order is not a prerequisite to a finding of contempt.” Id., citing Collins v. Collins,

2018-Ohio-1512, ¶ 26 (8th Dist.), citing Pugh v. Pugh, 15 Ohio St.3d 136, 142 (1984).

Once the prima facie case of contempt is established, the burden shifts to the

contemnor to “either rebut the initial contempt showing or establish an affirmative

defense by a preponderance of the evidence.” Combs v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,

2026-Ohio-562, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.), citing S.R. v. S.R., 2023-Ohio-531, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.).

               Courts have found that an affirmative defense may exist in a contempt

proceeding when a residential parent interferes with parenting time when the parent

establishes they had a reasonable, good-faith belief that they must deny visitation to

protect the safety of the child. Thompson v. Thompson, 2023-Ohio-667, ¶ 57 (12th

Dist.), citing Brennan v. Brennan, 2021-Ohio-1865, ¶ 37 (5th Dist.); Steele v. Steele,

2013-Ohio-3655, ¶ 20 (2d Dist.). The “‘trial court does not abuse its discretion in
denying the good-faith defense when the trial court properly exercises its discretion

to consider all surrounding circumstances and weigh all factors in deciding whether

a parent is in contempt.’” Id., quoting In re J.H.P., 2015-Ohio-548, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.);

Hensley v. Hensley, 2009-Ohio-1738, ¶ 26 (6th Dist.).           In determining the

reasonableness of the parent’s good-faith belief, courts often look at the residential

parent’s attempts to access remedies. Hensley at ¶ 28. For example, in one case,

the court found the parent’s decision to immediately terminate visits based on

accusations of sexual abuse unreasonable where they waited two months to file a

motion in court to terminate visits. Id., citing Bardenhagen v. Bardenhagen, 1990

Ohio App. LEXIS 3703 (12th Dist. Aug. 27, 1990). In another case, the court of

appeals found that the trial court, who was the sole arbiter of the credibility of the

witnesses, properly weighed testimony regarding the child’s trauma by noting that

the parent’s expert witness only interviewed the custodial parent and the child, but

did not interview the noncustodial parent and there was competent credible

evidence to support the trial court’s finding that the custodial parent did not have a

good-faith basis for suspending visits. Brennan at ¶ 38 (5th Dist.).

              In the instant case, Mother testified that the shared-parenting

agreement had been in place since 2016 and was modified in 2023 to allow Father

to get the minor child directly from school rather than from Mother’s home. On

Friday, October 27, 2023, Mother got the minor child from Father to take him to a

Halloween event. We can infer from the testimony that because it was Father’s

parenting time, the plan was to go to the event and return the minor child to Father’s
care. When Mother got the minor child, she noticed that he smelled “horrendous.”

Mother testified that the minor child told her that Father did not have water or gas,

so he could not bathe and it was cold in Father’s home. Mother called Father to

discuss the issues, but he refused to talk to her about the conditions of his house.

Based on what she learned, Mother refused to return the minor child to his custody.

Mother admitted into evidence text messages between herself and Father where she

refused to return the minor child and informed Father to contact her attorney if he

had any questions.      Mother filed her motion to suspend parenting time

approximately three weeks later at which time she also raised concerns about

Father’s alcohol and substance use.

              Father testified that Mother withheld parenting time until May 2024.

Additionally, Father admitted that his gas was off, though he claimed the outage

lasted for one week. Nevertheless, he did not provide any proof to Mother and he

did not submit proof to the GAL regarding the utilities until May 2024. Further,

Father did not submit a substance-abuse assessment to the GAL until May 2024, as

well. Mother learned of the foreclosure and sale later. Father admitted his home

had been sold. While Father claimed that there were further proceedings, he did not

support his contentions beyond his testimony. There was no testimony regarding

the present conditions of Father’s home at trial, and Father never allowed the GAL

to inspect his home to determine the conditions.

              The juvenile court did not address its findings on Mother’s contempt

during the trial or in its entry. The record establishes by a preponderance of the
evidence that Mother had a good-faith basis for suspending visits. She had multiple

concerns and attempted to address them with Father, but he refused to address

them with her. She immediately filed motions to allow the juvenile court to review

her concerns. Throughout the proceedings, Mother noted that she wanted the

minor child to have time with his Father and she only wanted confirmation that his

living conditions were safe before returning the minor child to his care.

               Based on the foregoing, we find that Father established a prima facie

case for contempt.     However, Mother also met her burden, establishing by a

preponderance of the evidence an affirmative defense to the charge of contempt.

Therefore, the portion of the juvenile court’s July 30, 2025 entry that found Mother

in contempt of court is unenforceable. Accordingly, we sustain the sixth assignment

of error.

               Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Mother’s first

through fifth, and seventh assignments of error are overruled and her sixth

assignment of error is sustained.

       It is ordered that appellee and appellant split the costs herein taxed.

       The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.


                            ________
EMANUELLA D. GROVES, PRESIDING JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., and
TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR