In re S.B.

[Cite as In re S.B., 2026-Ohio-1201.]


                                  COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                 EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                   COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA


IN RE S.B.                                     :
                                                                No. 115670
A Minor Child                                  :

[Appeal by M.B., Father]                       :


                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 2, 2026


             Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                    Juvenile Division
                                  Case No. FA25100633


                                        Appearances:

                 M.B., pro se.


KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:

                   M.B. (“Father”), appearing pro se, appeals the trial court’s disposition

of his applications to determine shared parenting and custody of his daughter, S.B.

The child’s mother, I.M. (“Mother”), did not file a responsive brief or appear in this

matter but did appear for oral argument. After a thorough review of the record and

law, we affirm.

                   On January 21, 2025, Father commenced this action when he filed an

application to determine shared parenting of S.B., a minor child, between Mother
and himself. Father filed an application to determine custody in May 2025 and a

motion to request order for shared parenting in June 2025. Because there was no

prior order allocating parental rights and responsibilities, the court issued an

interim order designating parenting time pursuant to the court’s standard parenting

time schedule. Prior to trial, both parties filed proposed shared parenting plans and

Father also filed a motion for custody of S.B. in the event that the parties could not

agree on a shared parenting plan. All filings were considered by a magistrate who

issued a decision that was adopted over Father’s objections by the trial court on

September 24, 2025. The trial court found that the parents were not amenable to a

shared parenting plan and designated Mother as the residential parent and legal

custodian of S.B.

              We briefly summarize the proceedings leading to this appeal.

              On the date of trial, Father appeared pro se and Mother appeared with

counsel. The court noted that the guardian ad litem’s (“GAL”) report suggested that

the parties would be able to negotiate a shared parenting plan, and so the trial court

allocated the parties time to discuss a potential shared parenting plan. The matter

ultimately proceeded to trial.

              Father stated during his case-in-chief that his preference is to share

parenting with Mother. On cross-examination, Father indicated that he did not

want Mother to move with S.B. back to Georgia, the child’s birthplace, because

Cuyahoga County “is where 95 percent of her family resides[.]” (Tr. 15.) Despite

desiring shared parenting, Father indicated that he and Mother do not communicate
well regarding parenting. On cross-examination, Father was asked about a recent

incident where he forfeited his weekend with S.B. because he went on a trip to

Detroit, and he had not secured other childcare for S.B. When asked if Father

believed it was in the child’s best interest to be away from her Mother, he responded:

      I mean, hopefully we can come up to something, but if we can’t, I think
      what’s in the best interest of the child is to be around her family, I mean,
      given that she is a little girl as well I don’t want to have to fight for
      custody because I believe a daughter, especially at that age, she’ll be
      better with her mother, but her father is important as well.

(Tr. 28.) Father was also cross-examined about a recent incident where Mother had

planned a birthday party at the Children’s Museum for S.B. but had to cancel it

because S.B. was in Father’s care and he was unwilling to take her to the party and

took her to Kalahari instead. Father’s testimony about the incident was vague and

evasive:

      [GAL]: But my question to you now is whether or not you told mom
      basically that she can’t have her party because you won’t bring [S.B.] to
      it?

      [FATHER]: I didn’t tell mom she couldn’t have her party.

      [GAL]: Did you tell mom that she wasn’t gonna have [S.B.] during that
      time?

      [FATHER]: Well, given our standard parenting plan —

      [GAL]: It’s a yes or a no question.

      [FATHER]: And also, my party that was planned —

      [THE COURT]: Sir, answer the question she asked.

      ...

      [GAL]: Did you tell mom that you would not be coming to the party?
      [FATHER]: Did I tell mom that I wouldn’t be coming?

      [GAL]: Yes.

      [FATHER]: No.

      [GAL]: You didn’t decline the invitation even like the group email that
      I sent?

      [FATHER]: Well, what was my words?

      [GAL]: Okay. Why did mom cancel her party, and please just be
      straight about it.

      [FATHER]: You will have to ask mom.

      [GAL]: I’m asking you because you’re —

      [FATHER]: I didn’t plan the party.

      [GAL]: What is your understanding of why she cancelled it?

      [FATHER]: I don’t know. That’s for you to ask mom.

      [GAL]: You have no idea?

      [FATHER]: No.

      [GAL]: Is it possible it was because you declined her invitation and said
      that you had no intention of bringing [S.B.] to it?

      [FATHER]: Anything is possible.

(Tr. 35-37.) Father continued to be a difficult witness, and when asked if he had

learned anything from the parenting class that the GAL had sent him and Mother

to, he responded with “Nothing.” (Tr. 43.)

              Mother testified. She indicated that she had relocated to Cleveland

for a one-year employment contract and had intended to move back to Atlanta,

Georgia where S.B. was born. The job offer letter was introduced as an exhibit.
According to her testimony, Father, who is from Cleveland, had moved to Atlanta to

live with Mother and S.B., but eventually decided to move back to Cleveland, leaving

Mother responsible for a mortgage and car payment as well as living expenses.

About a month later, Mother received the job offer and rented an apartment in

Cleveland that happened to be close to Father’s residence. A copy of the lease was

introduced as an exhibit and indicated that the lease was for 14 months, which she

signed because it was a better deal than signing for 12 months. She stated that it was

never her intention to remain in Cleveland and that she had kept her Atlanta home

for this reason.

               Mother testified that the one-year employment contract was

terminated early because “I went viral on TikTok and the Board of Directors just let

me know they were not in movement with where we were taking the school and so

I, along with someone else, was let go.” (Tr. 60.) When asked about the TikTok

incident, Mother explained that “[i]t was about my interactions with families

regarding scholars that were sent to the office since some of the issues at the time in

the school, the Board of Directors didn’t like ‘How young it was.’” (Tr. 61.) Since

then, she worked as an independent contractor with Sherwin-Williams making their

training deployment templates and did some freelance and charity work. She

testified that she had recently received an offer for a job in Atlanta, but it was

rescinded because Mother had to remain in Cleveland as a result of this custody case.

               When Mother was asked whether she believed it was in the child’s

best interest to stay in Cleveland, she disagreed. She felt that S.B. had better
opportunities in Atlanta where she “began modeling as a child for Carter’s and

Gerber[.]” (Tr. 64.) She also stated that in Atlanta, they have a beautiful backyard

and nice community while their Cleveland home is “on the sixth floor of a building

that was once low-income housing. Half of the time our water is off because they’re

doing repairs. The other half of the time there are bugs.” (Tr. 64.)

                Contrary to Father’s testimony, Mother testified that she had received

no financial support from Father to take care of S.B. She elaborated that her sister,

mother, and grandparents had helped her financially and that Father’s father

assisted for about two months. Mother believed that Father filed this action because

she refused to “give him the funds from the home in Atlanta,” because Father’s

money was used to purchase the home even though Mother is listed as the property’s

sole owner and mortgagee. (Tr. 72.) Mother also believed she had better financial

potential outside of Cleveland because the job that she was offered in Atlanta was

for $103,000 while her Cleveland job paid $80,000.

                Mother conceded that she was not against shared parenting but felt

that she and Father could not adequately communicate regarding parenting because

“it’s all-around just very difficult trying to keep the equity in it all, trying to configure

dates around his work schedule.” (Tr. 72.)

                When asked whether S.B. had “derived benefits from living so closely

to [F]ather,” Mother initially disagreed but then clarified that “in the beginning,” it

was beneficial for S.B. who wanted to see her Father at certain times. (Tr. 55.)

Mother felt that things changed when Father was upset with Mother and he
“stopped being as present.” (Tr. 56.) Mother also testified as to how difficult Father

is with attempts to pick up S.B. early, constantly wanting to know where she is

because she is often with different members of Mother’s family. Mother created a

group text message in an attempt to make the process easier for Father, to which he

responded that he wanted to be removed from the group message. Mother was

unsure whether shared parenting was in S.B.’s best interests, stating that S.B. “really

loves her dad and it’s sometimes difficult having to pick up the pieces when she’s

expecting and she knows and I have to provide answers to her as to why, you know,

dad is not getting you or why you can’t go.” (Tr. 88.)

               Father cross-examined Mother. Much of the cross-examination was

duplicative of direct examination. Father’s cross-examination revealed that Father

had paid for several things relating to S.B., contrary to Mother’s direct testimony.

Father questioned Mother regarding losing her job, suggesting that it was because

of a sexual relationship. Mother denied this and instead claimed it was because

Father had posted inappropriate images and videos on Snapchat. Father also

questioned Mother about the condition of her apartment in Cleveland, suggesting

that it had been renovated and that all appliances, floors, and fixtures are new.

Mother responded, “I’m not sure. They appear to be new, but I don’t know if they

were used before me.” (Tr. 153.) The exchange was a tenuous back-and-forth that

demonstrated the strained relationship between Father and Mother, as remarked by

the GAL.
               On redirect examination, Mother admitted that while at first she felt

that shared parenting could be achieved in this case, she no longer does. Because of

this, she had recently filed for child support from Father.

               When the GAL finally testified, she opened by stating that “[i]n that

report I did recommend shared parenting for this family. I would like to update my

report, your Honor. I no longer feel that shared parenting is possible with this

family.” (Tr. 242.) She elaborated that after seeing Mother and Father “lock horns”

after two days of trial, she no longer felt that they were capable of communicating in

the best interest of the child and that the scales tipped slightly in Mother’s favor. She

cited the “birthday fiasco” as an example of the parent’s dynamic and also referenced

an instance where Mother sent extremely inappropriate texts to Father. The GAL

felt that Mother was more open minded to the process while Father, though

sometimes compliant, exhibited much more stubbornness. The GAL felt that

Father’s interfering with Mother’s time with the child on her birthday was “petty”

and that Mother seemed to consider the child’s interests when making decisions, at

least more frequently than Father. She stated, “I do have concerns that they’re

gonna make her a nervous wreck if they can’t figure out how to be civilized and kind

to one another and make things go smoothly for her.” (Tr. 250.) Ultimately, the

GAL concluded that both parents were suitable, cared for, and loved S.B., so an

allocation of parenting time between both would be appropriate, but the plan

remained dependent on whether Mother stayed in Cleveland or relocated to Atlanta

where the child was born.
              Following closing arguments, the court took the matter under

advisement and as indicated, designated Mother as the residential and custodial

parent. Father appealed the trial court’s decision and assigns the following errors

for our review, verbatim:

      I. Court errored in fairness of interpreting the law for the best interest
      of the child and parental rights.

      II. Court errored using gender bias and not recognizing bias in GAL-
      A.B. report.

      III. Court errored in allowing emotional feelings to dictate case and
      views instead of law, logic and facts and no clear reason for decision
      granted.

      IV. Court errored in not taking in account history, previous parenting
      schedule agreements and submitted parenting plan proposals.

      V. Court errored in allowing perjury of I.M. which was proven in trial
      through testimony, questions, responses and presented exhibits.

      VI. Court errored in granting relocating approval causing more
      complications to the case.

      VII. Court errored in verdict to again favor I.M. in pending child
      support case.

              “‘It is well established that pro se litigants are presumed to have

knowledge of the law and legal procedures and that they are held to the same

standard as litigants who are represented by counsel.’” State ex rel. Fuller v.

Mengel, 2003-Ohio-6448, ¶ 10, quoting Sabouri v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family

Servs., 145 Ohio App.3d 651, 654 (10th Dist .2001). Father’s brief does not comply

with App.R. 16(A)(3) that required Father to reference in the record where each

error is reflected. He also has not separately argued each of his assigned errors with
reasons in support of the contentions with citations to the authorities, statutes, and

parts of the record in violation of App.R. 16(A)(7). And Father’s final assignment of

error references child support, which was not determined in the order that Father

appealed from. Pursuant to App.R. 12, we are permitted to disregard all of Father’s

assigned errors.

               We are, however, mindful that cases are best resolved on their merits,

especially family matters that concern fundamental parental rights. Moreover,

Father took the time to file this appeal and appear for oral argument. Though

Mother did not file a responsive brief, she also appeared for oral argument.

Accordingly, we elect to address Father’s first and sixth assigned errors that contest

the trial court’s decision determining that shared parenting was not in the best

interest of the child and designating Mother as the residential parent and legal

custodian.

               “‘It has long been a recognized rule of law that for a reviewing court

to overturn a trial court’s determination of custody, the appellate court must find

that the trial court abused its discretion.’” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 12, quoting

Masters v. Masters, 69 Ohio St.3d 83, 85 (1994) (distinguishing the R.C. 3109.04

standard of review from the standard of review under R.C. 2151.414). “The

discretion which a trial court enjoys in custody matters should be accorded the

utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the court’s

determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned.” Miller v. Miller, 37

Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1988). This is because “[t]he knowledge a trial court gains through
observing the witnesses and the parties in a custody proceeding cannot be conveyed

to a reviewing court by a printed record.” Id., citing Trickey v. Trickey, 158 Ohio St.

9, 13 (1952).

                R.C. 3109.04 establishes the process for allocating parental rights

and responsibilities. When allocating parental rights and responsibilities, the trial

court is required to “take into account that which would be in the best interest of the

child[.]” R.C. 3109.04(B)(1). Relevant herein,

      if at least one parent files both a pleading or motion and a shared
      parenting plan under [subsection (G)] but no plan for shared parenting
      is in the best interest of the children, the court, in a manner consistent
      with the best interest of the children, shall allocate the parental rights
      and responsibilities for the care of the children primarily to one of the
      parents, designate that parent as the residential parent and legal
      custodian of the child, and divide between the parents the other rights
      responsibilities for the care of the children[.]

R.C. 3109.04(A)(1). In making a custody determination, subsection (F)(1) provides

a nonexhaustive list of factors that the court shall consider in determining the best

interests of the child. In determining whether a shared parenting plan is in the best

interest of the children, subsection (F)(2) requires the court to consider all factors

in (F)(1) and includes five more factors to consider. Here, the trial court’s judgment

indicated that it considered all relevant factors. But Father has not specifically

contested any of these factors or presented arguments relating to these factors, nor

has he demonstrated how the court’s decision constituted an abuse of discretion.

                The testimony received as summarized above indicates that both

Father and Mother felt that a shared parenting plan would be in the child’s best
interest, but could not come to an agreement regarding shared parenting and were

unable to set aside their ill will for the sake of the child. Mother and Father

demonstrated their inability to communicate with each other even when their

communication concerns parenting S.B. Since the parents could not communicate

effectively, they used an app called OurFamilyWizard to communicate with each

other to make custodial arrangements. Many of the primary issues in this case

concerned disputes that occurred while attempting to co-parent the child, and

several of the cited disputes only related to Father and Mother and were unrelated

to parenting the child. It is also telling that the trial judge had to constantly remind

all parties that the child and her best interests were the subject of this hearing,

because both parties were disparaging and accusatory towards the other.

               Based on their inability to handle shared parenting during the

pendency of this action, it is unlikely that this situation would improve if a shared

parenting agreement was implemented. The GAL made strong points about the

parents prioritizing their personal issues over their child. The GAL even noted that

when both parents are around and getting along, S.B. is happy. For this reason, the

GAL had initially recommended shared parenting but changed her mind after

observing the parties interact at trial.

               It is clear from the record that both parents are suitable, loving,

involved, and care deeply for S.B. It is also clear that shared parenting was difficult

for the parents because they cannot communicate with each other in a consistently

respectful manner and because deviations from the shared parenting agreement
could not be resolved. Accordingly, we cannot say that the trial court abused its

discretion in selecting Mother as the residential parent and legal custodian.

              Father’s first and sixth assignments of error are overruled. All other

assignments of error are disregarded for noncompliance with App.R. 12(A)(2) and

(16)(A).

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.



KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J., and
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR