Kuchera v. Pfalzgraf

[Cite as Kuchera v. Pfalzgraf, 2026-Ohio-1218.]



                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                    HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO


BENJAMIN JOHN KUCHERA,                            :    APPEAL NO.        C-250453
                                                       TRIAL NO.         DR-1900327
         Plaintiff-Appellee,                      :

   vs.                                            :
                                                            JUDGMENT ENTRY
JESSIE ELLEN PFALZGRAF,                           :

         Defendant-Appellant.                     :



          This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, appellant’s brief, and
appellant’s argument.
          For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
          Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal,
allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24.
          The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the
Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial
court for execution under App.R. 27.



To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on 4/3/2026 per order of the court.


By:_______________________
      Administrative Judge
[Cite as Kuchera v. Pfalzgraf, 2026-Ohio-1218.]



                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                    HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO


BENJAMIN JOHN KUCHERA,                            :   APPEAL NO.   C-250453
                                                      TRIAL NO.    DR-1900327
         Plaintiff-Appellee,                      :

   vs.                                            :
                                                            OPINION
JESSIE ELLEN PFALZGRAF,                           :

         Defendant-Appellant.                     :



Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division

Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: April 3, 2026



Wagner & Bloch, LLC, and Deborah L. McPartlin, for Defendant-Appellant.
                OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


CROUSE, Presiding Judge.

       {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Jessie Pfalzgraf appeals from the trial court’s

judgment overruling her objections to and adopting a magistrate’s decision that

granted plaintiff-appellee Benjamin Kuchera’s motion to modify parenting time and

granted in part Pfalzgraf’s motion for contempt.

       {¶2}   In four assignments of error, Pfalzgraf challenges the trial court’s

modification of the parties’ parenting-time schedule, failure to find Kuchera in

contempt for multiple violations of the parties’ shared-parenting plan, failure to award

her reasonable attorney fees, and order that she pay half of the guardian ad litem’s

(“GAL’s”) outstanding fees.

       {¶3}   Following our review of the record, we find Pfalzgraf’s arguments to be

without merit and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                      I. Factual and Procedural History

       {¶4}   Kuchera and Pfalzgraf were married in 2008 and granted a decree of

divorce in June 2021. The decree incorporated a shared-parenting plan that governed

the parties’ care of their three minor children. The shared-parenting plan provided

that the parents shared physical and legal custody of the children, and it included the

following rotating two-week schedule of parenting time:

       Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
Week 1 Mother Father    Father   Mother Mother Mother Mother
Week 2 Mother Father    Father   Mother Father Father     Father

       {¶5}   The shared-parenting plan further provided a holiday and summer

schedule of parenting time. The summer schedule alternated parenting time between

Kuchera and Pfalzgraf on a weekly basis.

       {¶6}   In August 2023, Pfalzgraf discovered that one of the parties’ minor

children, C.K., had been cutting himself. Then, on October 25, 2023, Kuchera found a


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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


suicide note in C.K.’s room blaming Pfalzgraf for C.K.’s distress. C.K. was admitted to

Cincinnati Children’s Hospital, and then to the Lindner Center. He was subsequently

discharged into Pfalzgraf’s care on November 2, 2023, as this was one of her scheduled

parenting days. Per the terms of the shared-parenting plan, C.K. switched to Kuchera’s

care the following day. Citing concerns for C.K.’s safety, Kuchera refused to return C.K.

to Pfalzgraf’s care from that date on.

       {¶7}   While C.K. was at the Lindner Center, Kuchera filed a motion to modify

the parties’ parenting-time schedule as it pertained to C.K. The motion argued that

there had been a change in circumstances and that it was in C.K.’s best interest to

remain in Kuchera’s full-time care. Kuchera also filed a motion to appoint a GAL for

C.K. The trial court appointed Erinn McKee Hannigan, who had served as the GAL for

C.K. and his siblings during their parents’ divorce.

       {¶8}   In January 2024, while Kuchera’s motion to modify parenting time was

pending, a magistrate issued an order providing for twice-weekly phone calls between

Pfalzgraf and C.K. In March 2024, the magistrate issued an order providing that

Pfalzgraf and C.K. should participate in therapy together, that their phone calls should

continue, and that they should begin having scheduled dinners together, per the GAL’s

recommendation.

       {¶9}   On April 25, 2024, Pfalzgraf filed a “motion for contempt and other

relief.” The motion alleged that Kuchera was in contempt for violating various

provisions of the parties’ shared-parenting plan and court orders by (1) failing to

return C.K. to Pfalzgraf’s custody after November 3, 2023, (2) withholding C.K. from

Pfalzgraf on specific, scheduled parenting days that were listed in an attachment to the

motion, (3) withholding C.K. from Pfalzgraf on her holiday parenting time, (4) failing

to monitor use of the children’s devices and failing to provide Pfalzgraf logins and


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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


passwords to websites used by the children, (5) blocking Pfalzgraf from calling and

texting C.K., (6) failing to pay child support, (7) failing to set up a wage-deduction

order for purposes of child support, (8) unilaterally making all decisions with respect

to C.K.’s physical and mental health since November 2, 2023, (9) discontinuing C.K.’s

mental-health care after six visits following his discharge from the Lindner Center,

and (10) attending C.K.’s telehealth visits with his mental-health-care provider.

       {¶10} Pfalzgraf’s motion also requested, as relevant to this appeal, that she be

relieved from paying any costs associated with the GAL and that the court award her

attorney fees.

       {¶11} The GAL filed several motions for payment of fees. The most recent

motion stated that she had incurred approximately $7,542.50 in outstanding fees, and

that Kuchera had already paid her $3,550.

       {¶12} A hearing was held on the various motions on September 25, 2024, and

January 22, 2025.

                             A. Hearing Testimony

                                      1. Parents

       {¶13} Kuchera testified that, in the fall of 2023, he noticed that C.K. had

become increasingly withdrawn and learned from Pfalzgraf that C.K. had been cutting

himself. Kuchera testified that he subsequently found a suicide note in C.K.’s room

stating that C.K. planned to hurt himself due to stress caused by Pfalzgraf. After

finding the note, Kuchera took C.K. to Children’s Hospital. Kuchera testified that he

notified Pfalzgraf of C.K.’s hospitalization via Our Family Wizard (“OFW”), an

application that the court had previously required the parties use to communicate after

Pfalzgraf obtained a protection order against Kuchera.

       {¶14} Kuchera explained that C.K. was subsequently admitted to the Lindner


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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


Center, where a safety plan was implemented. The plan involved eliminating all

“sharps” and anything that could be a hanging risk from the parties’ homes. Kuchera

testified that he had concerns about releasing C.K. into Pfalzgraf’s care because she

had a history of emotionally, physically, and sexually abusing their children. C.K. was

nonetheless released on one of Pfalzgraf’s scheduled parenting days and into her care.

Kuchera stated that he saw C.K. the day after his release and that C.K. appeared “sunk

deep within himself” and looked worse than he had during inpatient treatment.

       {¶15} Kuchera’s testimony addressed an incident that occurred when

Pfalzgraf attempted to pick C.K. up from school following C.K.’s hospitalization.

According to Kuchera, he received a text from C.K. after C.K. learned that Pfalzgraf

had arrived to pick him up. In response to the text, Kuchera told C.K. that he should

remove himself from the situation if he was in fear of his safety. C.K. then fled the

school. Kuchera explained that C.K. “became a wreck about going to school” because

he was fearful about “being ambushed by his mother.” Kuchera testified that C.K.

began attending school more consistently after the GAL was appointed and they

received a recommendation that C.K. stay in Kuchera’s care.

       {¶16} Kuchera’s testimony addressed his strong belief that C.K. should remain

in his care. He stated that Pfalzgraf viewed her love for the children as “romantic,”

rather than “maternal.” And he stated that “when the children are distressed

[Pfalzgraf’s] lack of boundaries and sexual behavior towards the kids get spiked.”

Kuchera also testified about C.K.’s sleep issues. He stated that the issues largely

resolved after C.K. was diagnosed with ADHD and began taking medication.

       {¶17} The testimony offered by Kuchera addressed various allegations that

Pfalzgraf had made in her motion for contempt. He discussed his monitoring of the

children’s electronic devices and testified that he turns off the internet at his house at


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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


midnight so that the children cannot access it. And he stated that while he does not

monitor C.K.’s text messages, he is aware of what websites C.K. visits and has

conversations with C.K. about internet use. Kuchera acknowledged that there have

been slipups in this regard, but that he believes he handles device- and internet-related

issues responsibly and safely. In response to Pfalzgraf’s allegation that he had blocked

her from calling and texting C.K., Kuchera testified that C.K. had been bothered by

Pfalzgraf’s “micromanaging” of his time while he was under Kuchera’s care. He stated

that he told C.K., “you know, it’s your phone,” and that he believes there were times

when C.K. blocked Pfalzgraf. Kuchera acknowledged that he was in arrearages on his

child-support obligations, explaining that he has experienced periods of

unemployment since the parties’ divorce. On cross-examination, he conceded that he

made no child-support payments from November 28, 2023, until June 17, 2024.

       {¶18} Kuchera’s testimony also addressed the steps taken to reintroduce

Pfalzgraf into C.K.’s life after C.K. began living permanently with Kuchera, including

weekly phone calls and dinners. Kuchera testified that C.K. was not happy when the

phone calls were initiated, but that he was willing to participate. Kuchera testified that

he was not comfortable with Pfalzgraf receiving make-up parenting time for the time

that she had missed with C.K. He also stated that he had filed a petition for a Domestic

Violence Civil Protection Order (“DV CPO”) against Pfalzgraf on November 16, 2023,

but that his request for an ex parte protection order was denied and that he had

subsequently dismissed the petition.

       {¶19} Kuchera was questioned on cross-examination about his use of various

medications. He testified that he takes both ketamine and medical marijuana, which

he stores in a lockbox in his closet. Kuchera stated that he does not take ketamine

when the children are present, and that he takes the medical marijuana in the evening


                                            7
                OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


after they are asleep. He testified that his current mental-health diagnoses were

anxiety, depression, insomnia, and complex PTSD. The cross-examination of Kuchera

also addressed his concerns with how Pfalzgraf transported C.K.’s medications from

one parent’s house to the other’s. He accused Pfalzgraf of forcing C.K. to “smuggle” his

medication through school.

       {¶20} Pfalzgraf also provided extensive testimony. Her testimony, offered on

the second day of the hearing, provided that Kuchera’s child-support arrearage was

$8,934.20 when the hearing began in September 2024. She stated that he had made a

lump-sum payment of approximately $7,000 towards his arrearage after the first

court date, but that he had made no additional payments in the subsequent four

months. Pfalzgraf testified that Kuchera had not set up a wage-deduction order and

explained that she was uncomfortable receiving lump-sum payments because it put

her receipt of food stamps and Medicaid benefits at risk. Pfalzgraf testified that she

was unemployed, that she had no ability to pay attorney fees or the GAL fees, and that

maternal grandfather was paying her attorney fees.

       {¶21} Pfalzgraf testified that C.K. had not experienced mental-health issues

prior to August 2023, when she noticed cuts on his arms for the first time. When she

questioned C.K., he said that he had cut himself with a knife while at Kuchera’s house

and that he had not been trying to kill himself. Pfalzgraf immediately scheduled an

appointment with C.K.’s pediatrician, during which a safety plan was implemented.

Pfalzgraf notified Kuchera about the cutting via OFW. She sent him a photograph of

the safety plan and asked him to remove all “sharps” from his house.

       {¶22} Pfalzgraf testified that C.K. was prescribed Prozac after she discovered

the cutting. When she communicated this to Kuchera, he told her that he did not want

C.K. to take the medication until he spoke to the pediatrician. Pfalzgraf’s testimony


                                           8
                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


established that it took Kuchera approximately six weeks to approve the medication,

and that C.K. went without the medication during that time period. Pfalzgraf testified

that C.K.’s dose was later increased, and that when she notified Kuchera of the

increase, he responded that the change had been made without his consent.

       {¶23} Pfalzgraf explained that Kuchera did not have medication for C.K. at his

house. She stated that she was uncomfortable sending C.K. to school with a bottle of

Prozac on the days that he transitioned to Kuchera’s home, so she packed the requisite

number of pills for his time there and put them in C.K.’s backpack. Pfalzgraf testified

that C.K.’s counselor at the time was aware that he carried medication, but that

Kuchera accused her of placing C.K. at risk both legally and medically by making him

smuggle unlabeled drugs through school. Kuchera messaged Pfalzgraf that he had

obtained a second prescription for the medication to keep at his home. But Pfalzgraf

testified that Kuchera never filled the prescription, and that C.K. had no medication at

Kuchera’s house from mid-October 2023 until the time of his hospitalization.

       {¶24} Pfalzgraf testified that when C.K. was hospitalized, Kuchera told the

hospital that she was a danger to C.K. and she was not allowed to see C.K. until she

spoke to a social worker. Pfalzgraf stated that she was unaware that C.K. did not feel

safe in her home, and she explained that most of her conflict with C.K. concerned his

homework. She testified that she learned from staff at the Lindner Center that Kuchera

had threatened to discharge C.K. against medical advice to prevent him from being

released into her care.

       {¶25} Pfalzgraf testified that Kuchera stopped following the shared-parenting

plan on November 3, 2023, and that he contacted the Hamilton County Department

of Job and Family Services (“HCJFS”) to report her as a danger to C.K. She stated that

she also contacted HCJFS to request an investigation, and that, following the


                                           9
                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


investigation, it was determined that the allegations against her were unsubstantiated.

       {¶26} Pfalzgraf testified that she has seen C.K. a total of 24 hours since

November 3, 2023, and that C.K. missed 32 days of school during the 2023-2024

school year. She stated that she had opposed the appointment of a GAL, while noting

that the GAL’s report did not include any allegations that she was a danger to C.K.

either physically, mentally, or sexually. Pfalzgraf explained that she had agreed to stop

picking C.K. up from school after Kuchera twice alleged that she attempted to abduct

him.

       {¶27} Pfalzgraf testified that, in the time period between the two court

hearings, C.K. has spent time with her and slept at her house. She stated that several

of her scheduled dinners with C.K. had not taken place, and that Kuchera had failed to

consistently bring C.K. to their scheduled drop-off location.

       {¶28} Pfalzgraf testified about additional allegations in her motion for

contempt. With respect to her assertion that Kuchera blocked her from calling and

messaging C.K., she testified that Kuchera sent her an OFW message stating that, to

maintain boundaries between their houses, he was changing the “permissions” on

C.K.’s phone. The message said that if she wanted to speak to C.K., she could reach out

to Kuchera and he would set up a time for her to chat with him. With respect to her

allegation that Kuchera failed to provide her with passwords and login information,

she testified that Kuchera had provided C.K. with a second cell phone for which she

had the passcode, but that she was unable to access C.K.’s gaming laptop. With respect

to her allegation that Kuchera unilaterally made medical decisions for C.K., Pfalzgraf

explained that Kuchera had taken C.K. to be evaluated for ADHD and allowed him to

take medication for that diagnosis without informing her.




                                           10
                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


                                      2. The GAL

       {¶29} Hannigan, the GAL for C.K., testified that she has a very good

relationship with C.K., and that she has known the family since the end of 2019. Her

testimony touched on the inability of Kuchera and Pfalzgraf to communicate. She

stated that both parents had unilaterally scheduled doctor’s appointments for the

children without notifying each other. With respect to C.K.’s questionable school

attendance, Hannigan stated that part of the reason C.K. refused to go to school was

because of Pfalzgraf’s attempts to pick him up. She testified that she spoke to Kuchera

about his failure to send C.K. to school and that she “was not kind” in her conversation

with him. She also stated that Kuchera was reported for educational neglect, but that

it was “unknown if anything came of that.”

       {¶30} Hannigan testified about the report she issued in this case and her

various recommendations. She stated that it was in C.K.’s best interest to gradually

increase contact with Pfalzgraf, rather than place him with her 100 percent of the time

or award Pfalzgraf makeup parenting time. She accordingly recommended a two-

month phase-in period in which C.K. and Pfalzgraf would see each other on a more

consistent basis, with the ultimate goal of Pfalzgraf parenting C.K. each Monday,

including overnight, and every other weekend. She also recommended that Pfalzgraf

and C.K. see a therapist or parenting coach together. Hannigan felt that a return to the

original schedule of parenting time would “send [C.K.] down a rabbit hole” because he

finds his relationship with Pfalzgraf to be intense and triggering.

       {¶31} Hannigan’s additional recommendations included that each parent

have access to a program or application to monitor C.K.’s location; that both parents

have C.K.’s social-media-login information; that, when disciplining C.K., the parents

block smart-phone applications rather than take away the actual phone; that the


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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


parents implement a process for the exchange of medicine; that decisions about C.K.’s

activities on any given day be made by the parent assigned that parenting time; that

C.K. reengage with his therapist; and that a parenting coordinator be appointed. She

also testified that her investigation did not support the accusation that one parent had

blocked the other from C.K.’s phone, and that it was entirely possible that C.K. had

blocked Pfalzgraf’s calls himself.

       {¶32} Hannigan testified that she last spoke to C.K. in late August or early

September 2023, which was within 14 days of when her report was issued. She testified

that she perceived C.K. to be in a much better place emotionally and educationally.

Hannigan last testified about the fees that she had accrued serving as GAL.

                   3. Medical Professionals and School Counselor

       {¶33} Dr. Michael Sorter, a child and adolescent psychiatrist, testified that he

treated C.K. while C.K. was at the Lindner Center. Dr. Sorter stated that C.K. never

disclosed any abuse by Pfalzgraf, and that while C.K. vocalized anger towards her at

the beginning of his hospitalization, he was willing to work with Pfalzgraf towards the

end. At the time of C.K.’s discharge, Dr. Sorter was not worried that Pfalzgraf posed a

danger to him.

       {¶34} Hannah Frey, a social worker at the Lindner Center, testified that she

helped create C.K.’s safety plan. She stated that she was aware that Kuchera had not

wanted C.K. discharged to Pfalzgraf and that Kuchera had asked about discharging

C.K. against medical advice. She testified that C.K.’s triggers were Pfalzgraf and knives.

       {¶35} Renita Brooks, C.K.’s school counselor at the time of the hearing,

testified regarding the incident in which C.K. left the school after learning that

Pfalzgraf would pick him up. Brooks testified that she had received emails from

Kuchera stating that Pfalzgraf had tried to abduct C.K. and that he would not send C.K.


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                OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


to school to keep him safe from Pfalzgraf. Brooks stated that, based on her contact with

Pfalzgraf, she found no truth to Kuchera’s allegations and that she had no concern

about Pfalzgraf abusing C.K. Brooks further testified that Pfalzgraf told her that she

would allow Kuchera to pick up C.K. from school on her scheduled parenting days

because she did not want to cause any stress for C.K.

                            B. Magistrate’s Decision

       {¶36} The magistrate issued a decision granting Kuchera’s motion to modify

parenting time. The decision included the magistrate’s findings under the factors in

R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) and her determination that it was in C.K.’s best interest to modify

parenting time in accordance with the GAL’s recommendation. She accordingly

modified the parenting time of C.K. to reflect the following schedule:

       Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
Week 1 Mother Father    Father   Father Mother Mother Mother
Week 2 Mother Father    Father   Father  Father Father    Father

       {¶37} The decision provided that this schedule should be followed year-round

“and shall not change to the week-on, week-off schedule during the summer as they

have done in the past.” It included various additional recommendations that the GAL

had made in her report regarding C.K.’s electronic devices, therapy, and medication.

       {¶38} The magistrate granted Pfalzgraf’s motion for contempt in part and

found Kuchera in contempt for failing to pay child support. The decision stated that

Kuchera could purge himself of contempt by paying $2,000 into the child-support

account, paying all monthly child-support payments from the date of the decision until

the date of a scheduled sentencing hearing on the contempt, setting up a wage-

deduction order, and paying Pfalzgraf $500 towards her attorney fees. The magistrate

stated that she found the remainder of the allegations in the motion for contempt to

be not well-taken and denied them.


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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


       {¶39} The magistrate’s decision also granted the GAL’s motion for payment of

additional fees and provided that Kuchera and Pfalzgraf were to each pay $3,771.25

towards the GAL’s remaining fees.

                             C. Pfalzgraf’s Objections

       {¶40} Pfalzgraf filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. She first

contended that the magistrate’s determination that a modification of parenting time

was in C.K.’s best interest was against the weight of the evidence. In support of this

objection, she argued (1) that the magistrate improperly relied on R.C. 3109.051(D),

instead of R.C. 3109.04(E), when determining C.K.’s best interest, (2) that the

magistrate erred in failing to consider R.C. 3109.04(F)(2) and in finding that R.C.

3109.04(F)(1)(h) and (i) were not applicable, (3) that the magistrate disregarded the

testimony of Dr. Sorter, Hannah Frey, and Renita Brooks, and (4) that the modified

parenting schedule eliminated her vacation parenting time, holiday parenting time,

and C.K.’s time with his siblings.

       {¶41} Pfalzgraf raised three additional objections contending that the

magistrate erred in failing to find Kuchera in contempt for multiple violations of the

shared-parenting plan, that the magistrate abused her discretion by failing to award

Pfalzgraf her reasonable attorney fees, and that the magistrate abused her discretion

in ordering Pfalzgraf to pay half of the GAL’s outstanding fees.

                             D. Trial Court’s Decision

       {¶42} The trial court issued a decision overruling Pfalzgraf’s objections and

adopting the decision of the magistrate.

       {¶43} Pfalzgraf now appeals. Kuchera has not filed an appellate brief or

otherwise participated in this appeal.




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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


                       II. Modification of Parenting Time

       {¶44} In her first assignment of error, Pfalzgraf argues that a modification of

the parenting-time schedule was not in C.K.’s best interest.

       {¶45} A trial court has broad discretion when ruling on a motion to modify

parenting time, and its decision on such a matter will not be reversed absent an abuse

of discretion. Tyra v. Griffith, 2025-Ohio-912, ¶ 40 (1st Dist.). An abuse of discretion

occurs when “a court exercise[s] its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a

matter over which it has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-

3304, ¶ 35. It implies that the trial court’s attitude is arbitrary, unreasonable, or

unconscionable. Gipson v. Mercy Health Sys. of S.W. Ohio, 2025-Ohio-2208, ¶ 12 (1st

Dist.). Under this deferential standard of review, an appellate court may not substitute

its judgment for that of the trial court. Id. When reviewing a trial court’s decision on

parenting time, “we defer ‘to the trial court’s factual findings because it is better

situated to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given the

testimony and evidence.’” Tyra at ¶ 40, quoting Hagan v. Hagan, 2019-Ohio-51, ¶ 45

(5th Dist.).

       {¶46} A motion to modify parenting time shall not be granted unless the court

finds that a change of circumstances has occurred and that a modification is in the best

interest of the child. R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a). In determining whether a modification of

parenting time is in the child’s best interest, the trial court shall consider “all relevant

factors, including, but not limited to,” those set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1).

                                    A. R.C. 3109.04

       {¶47} Pfalzgraf first argues that the magistrate erred as a matter of law by

citing R.C. 3109.051(D) in the decision, rather than R.C. 3109.04(F). The latter statute

applies in the case at bar, as it sets forth factors to be considered “on an original decree


                                            15
                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


allocating parental rights and responsibilities for the care of children or a modification

of a decree allocating those rights and responsibilities.” The former statute sets forth

factors to be considered in determining whether to grant parenting time to a parent or

to grant companionship or visitation rights to a third party.

       {¶48} Pfalzgraf raised this same argument in one of her objections to the

magistrate’s decision. In denying the objection, the trial court found that the

magistrate’s reference to R.C. 3109.051(D) was a clerical error and that the magistrate

had considered the appropriate factors in R.C. 3109.04. We agree, as a reading of the

magistrate’s decision in its entirety demonstrates that the correct statute was

considered.

       {¶49} First, when setting forth her findings of fact, the magistrate made

findings under the factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). Second, when setting forth the

relevant law, the magistrate stated that the factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) must be

considered. The magistrate did, as Pfalzgraf contends, mistakenly state in a later

portion of the opinion that she had considered the factors in R.C. 3109.051(D). But the

magistrate’s actual application of the factors in R.C. 3109.04(F) establishes that this

reference to R.C. 3109.051(D) was nothing more than a clerical error.

              B. Failure to Properly Consider Domestic Violence

       {¶50} Pfalzgraf contends that the magistrate failed to properly consider the

domestic violence committed by Kuchera when determining whether a modification

of the parenting-time schedule was in C.K.’s best interest. In support of this argument,

she argues that the magistrate erred in failing to consider R.C. 3109.04(F)(2) and in

finding that R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(h) was not applicable.

       {¶51} R.C. 3109.04(F)(2) provides that, when “determining whether shared

parenting is in the best interest of the children,” the factors set forth in subdivision


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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


(F)(2)(a) through (e) shall be considered. Specifically, R.C. 3109.04(F)(2)(c) provides

that the court shall consider “[a]ny history of, or potential for, child abuse, spouse

abuse, other domestic violence, or parental kidnapping by either parent.” It is this

particular factor that Pfalzgraf believes should have been considered.

       {¶52} R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(h) also addresses domestic violence, providing that

the trial court shall consider

       [w]hether either parent or any member of the household of either

       parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any

       criminal offense involving any act that resulted in a child being an

       abused child or a neglected child; whether either parent, in a case in

       which a child has been adjudicated an abused child or a neglected child,

       previously has been determined to be the perpetrator of the abusive or

       neglectful act that is the basis of an adjudication; whether either parent

       or any member of the household of either parent previously has been

       convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of section 2919.25 of the

       Revised Code or a sexually oriented offense involving a victim who at

       the time of the commission of the offense was a member of the family

       or household that is the subject of the current proceeding; whether

       either parent or any member of the household of either parent

       previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any offense

       involving a victim who at the time of the commission of the offense was

       a member of the family or household that is the subject of the current

       proceeding and caused physical harm to the victim in the commission

       of the offense; and whether there is reason to believe that either parent

       has acted in a manner resulting in a child being an abused child or a


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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


       neglected child . . . .

       {¶53} In overruling Pfalzgraf’s objection on these grounds, the trial court

found no error in the magistrate’s failure to apply the factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(2)

because that section of the statute only applied when a magistrate was determining

whether shared parenting was in a child’s best interest. The trial court was correct.

Because the magistrate was determining whether the parties’ parenting-time schedule

should be modified, and not whether shared parenting was in C.K.’s best interest, R.C.

3109.04(F)(2) was not applicable.

       {¶54} With respect to Pfalzgraf’s argument regarding R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(h),

the trial court found no error in the magistrate’s determination that this factor was not

applicable because no evidence was presented that either parent had been convicted

of or pled guilty to a criminal offense committed against the other parent or a child.

We ultimately agree that magistrate did not err in failing to consider this factor,

although we find the trial court’s analysis to be incomplete.

       {¶55}    R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(h) required the magistrate to consider not only

whether a parent had been convicted of or pled guilty to certain offenses, but also

whether “either parent has acted in a manner resulting in a child being an abused child

or a neglected child.” Testimony from Hannigan established that Pfalzgraf had

previously obtained a DV CPO against Kuchera and that the parties’ children had been

listed as protected parties in the order. This information was certainly relevant to

determining whether Kuchera had acted in a manner that resulted in C.K. being an

abused or neglected child. However, the DV CPO was not admitted into evidence and

no testimony was offered regarding the specific behavior by Kuchera that resulted in




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                   OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


the order.1 Hannigan further testified that the abuse that occurred in the parties’ home

around the time of their divorce and the time that the DV CPO was obtained, was “not

applicable to what we’re dealing with now.”

          {¶56} Given the dearth of evidence in the record shedding light on Kuchera’s

history of domestic violence and its impact on C.K., as well as the fact that Kuchera

had not been convicted of or pled guilty to any of the offenses described or listed in

R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(h), we find no error in the magistrate’s determination that this

factor was not applicable. We accordingly find no merit to Pfalzgraf’s argument that

the magistrate failed to properly consider domestic violence committed by Kuchera

when determining whether a modification of parenting time was in C.K.’s best interest.

                C. Withholding of Court-Ordered Parenting Time

          {¶57} Pfalzgraf next argues that the magistrate and trial court failed to

properly consider Kuchera’s withholding of court-ordered parenting time from

Pfalzgraf in accordance with R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(f) and (i).

          {¶58} R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(f) provides that the court shall consider which

parent is “more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved parenting time rights or

visitation and companionship rights.” And R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(i) provides that it shall

consider “[w]hether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to a shared

parenting decree has continuously and willfully denied the other parent’s right to

parenting time in accordance with an order of the court.”

          {¶59} When discussing the factor set forth in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(f), the

magistrate noted the GAL’s belief that it was C.K.’s own desire, rather than Kuchera’s

influence, that C.K. reside with Kuchera and not return to Pfalzgraf’s care. The trial



1 While  Pfalzgraf’s written closing arguments discussed the domestic violence in more detail,
closing arguments are not evidence. See State v. Rodriguez, 2025-Ohio-53, ¶ 48 (1st Dist.).


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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


court elaborated on this finding when discussing whether Kuchera should be found in

contempt for withholding parenting time. The court found that that Pfalzgraf had been

identified as a “trigger” for C.K., that she and C.K. have a “challenging dynamic,” and

that “it was C.K. [and] not father who was choosing to avoid mother.”

       {¶60} On this record, we cannot find that either the magistrate or the trial

court failed to properly consider whether Kuchera had withheld parenting time from

Pfalzgraf.

                 D. Reliance on the GAL’s Recommendation

       {¶61} Pfalzgraf additionally contends that the trial court improperly relied on

the GAL’s recommendation without statutory authority. She argues that R.C.

3109.04(F)(1)(b) provides that the “wishes and concerns” of the child may only be

considered if the court conducts an in camera interview, and not through a GAL’s

recommendation. Pfalzgraf correctly notes that R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(b) allows the trial

court to consider the wishes and concerns of a child expressed to the court during an

in camera interview. But it does not expressly limit the trial court’s consideration of a

child’s wishes to only those circumstances.

       {¶62} R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) provides that, when determining what is in a child’s

best interest, the court shall consider “all relevant factors, including, but not limited

to,” those specified in (F)(1)(a) through (j). (Emphasis added.) The trial court was

therefore within its authority to consider the report and recommendation of the GAL,

which was undeniably relevant, particularly given the GAL’s longstanding

involvement with the family.

         E. Impact of Modification on Extended and Holiday Time

       {¶63} Pfalzgraf’s next argument pertains to the best-interest factor set forth in

R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(c), which provides that the court shall consider “[t]he child’s


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                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


interaction and interrelationship with the child’s parents, siblings, and any other

person who may significantly affect the child’s best interest.” She argues that the trial

court’s modification of the parenting-time schedule for C.K. was not in his best interest

because the modification of the parties’ summer schedule eliminated her holiday,

extended, and vacation time with him, as well as her ability to vacation with all her

children together. We address each contention in turn.

       {¶64} As the trial court correctly found when ruling on Pfalzgraf’s objection to

the magistrate’s decision, the modification of the parenting-time schedule with respect

to C.K. did not impact either parent’s holiday time with him. The shared-parenting

plan provided that, in determining the precedence for parenting time, holiday time

took priority. Therefore, Pfalzgraf’s holiday time will not be eliminated by the

modification to the parties’ schedule.

       {¶65} The trial court likewise found Pfalzgraf’s argument about the impact of

the parenting-time modification on her vacation and extended time with C.K. to be

without merit. It stated,

                As for extended time, the parties’ Shared Parenting Plan does not

       have any provisions for specific extended time. The Court declines to

       order an extended parenting time provision at this time given the need

       to monitor the child’s progress in therapy with Mother and Mother’s

       parenting time. The parties are free to incorporate a provision for

       extended time by agreement or by filing a motion and requesting a Court

       Order.

Given the language of the parties’ shared-parenting plan, we agree with the trial court’s

explanation and resolution of Pfalzgraf’s objection.

       {¶66} The shared-parenting plan provided that “[t]he parents do not have any


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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


specific extended time. The parents agree to travel with the children during his or her

regular parenting time schedule.” The plan did not specifically provide for vacation

time. A vacation with all children was feasible under the original shared-parenting

plan, when the parties employed a week-on/week-off schedule in the summer. But

under the modified parenting-time schedule, while Pfalzgraf will continue to parent

the other two minor children on this week-on/week-off schedule, she will only parent

C.K. on Mondays and every other weekend. As Pfalzgraf argues, this likely eliminates

her ability to take C.K. on vacation with his siblings.

       {¶67} The trial court was not unsympathetic to Pfalzgraf’s argument, but it

recognized that it was necessary to monitor C.K.’s progress during parenting time with

Pfalzgraf before awarding her vacation or extended time. And it explained that

Pfalzgraf could always seek a modification of the shared-parenting plan to be awarded

such time. We find no error in the trial court’s determination, and we hold that the

modification to the parenting-time schedule was not against C.K.’s best interest

because of its impact on any extended or vacation time with Pfalzgraf.

                  F. Failure to Properly Weigh the Evidence

       {¶68} Pfalzgraf’s remaining two challenges to the trial court’s best-interest

determination concern the weight of the evidence. She argues that the trial court

disregarded the testimony of Dr. Sorter, social worker Frey, and school counselor

Brooks, and that the court did not properly weigh the evidence.

       {¶69} The trial court found Pfalzgraf’s objection to the magistrate’s failure to

consider the testimony of these three witnesses to be without merit. It first noted that

the magistrate was in the best position to determine the credibility of the witnesses

and weigh the evidence. It then found that the interactions of these three witnesses

with C.K. and his parents was limited.


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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


       {¶70} Pfalzgraf’s assertion that the testimony of these witnesses was

“disregarded” is not accurate. The magistrate’s findings of fact noted Dr. Sorter’s

testimony that Pfalzgraf was not a danger to C.K. and referred to Brooks’s testimony

regarding C.K.’s academic performance. The magistrate did not refer to or discuss

Frey’s testimony. But our review of the record reveals that Frey offered little testimony

that was not also offered by other witnesses, and that she also could not recall the

answer to several of the questions that she was asked.

       {¶71} We agree with the trial court’s assessment that these three witnesses

had limited interaction with C.K. and his family, and we find no error in either the

magistrate or the trial court’s failure to accord more weight to their testimony.

       {¶72} The evidence presented at the hearing established that C.K., a teenager

able to express his own wishes and desires, suffered mental distress and that Pfalzgraf

was a trigger for his behavior. C.K. went to great lengths to avoid time with Pfalzgraf,

including running away from school and blocking her from messaging him. The

record, however, also establishes that Pfalzgraf clearly loves C.K. and has a strong

desire to protect his health and interests.

       {¶73} In determining whether a modification of the parenting-time schedule

was in C.K.’s best interest, the magistrate considered the relevant factors under R.C.

3109.04(F)(1). As the magistrate was in the best position to assess the credibility of

the witnesses and the weight of the evidence, we defer to her factual findings absent

an abuse of discretion. See Tyra, 2025-Ohio-912, at ¶ 40 (1st Dist.). And on this record,

particularly given the complex relationship between C.K. and Pfalzgraf, we find no

abuse of discretion in the determination that a modification of the parenting-time

schedule was in C.K.’s best interest.

       {¶74} Pfalzgraf’s first assignment of error is overruled.


                                              23
                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


                            III. Motion for Contempt

       {¶75} In her second assignment of error, Pfalzgraf argues that the trial court

abused its discretion when it failed to properly consider and rule upon her motion for

contempt and failed to find Kuchera in contempt of court for multiple violations of the

parties’ shared-parenting plan.

       {¶76} We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for contempt for an abuse

of discretion. Dexter v. Fairchild, 2024-Ohio-6080, ¶ 31 (1st Dist.). A finding of civil

contempt is intended to “‘coerce compliance with a court order or to compensate a

party damaged by noncompliance with a court order.’” Edelstein v Edelstein, 2025-

Ohio-1514, ¶ 87 (1st Dist.), quoting Heekin v. Silver Rule Masonry, Inc., 2011-Ohio-

2775, ¶ 13 (1st Dist.).

       {¶77} Pfalzgraf’s motion for contempt argued that Kuchera should be found

in contempt for ten separate violations of the parties’ shared-parenting plan and

various court orders. Kuchera was found in contempt for one of the alleged

violations—failing to pay child support. Pfalzgraf now argues that the trial court erred

in failing to find Kuchera in contempt for her remaining nine alleged violations.

A. Contempt Allegations Regarding the Withholding of Parenting Time

       {¶78} Pfalzgraf’s first three allegations of contempt pertained to Kuchera’s

withholding of parenting time. When ruling on Pfalzgraf’s objections, the trial court

found no error in the magistrate’s failure to find Kuchera in contempt on this ground

because the evidence presented established that it was C.K., and not Kuchera, who

chose to avoid parenting time with Pfalzgraf.

       {¶79} The evidence presented at the hearing established that Pfalzgraf was a

known trigger for C.K. and that C.K. purposely avoided parenting time with her.

Kuchera certainly made no effort to encourage C.K. to spend time with Pfalzgraf or to


                                          24
                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


foster a mother-and-son relationship. And the advice that Kuchera imparted to C.K.

regarding his relationship with Pfalzgraf was questionable at times. The most

egregious example of this was his advice that if C.K. feared for his safety because

Pfalzgraf had arrived to pick him from school, he should remove himself from the

situation. This advice essentially encouraged C.K. to flee the school.

       {¶80} Regardless of Kuchera’s at-times questionable parenting tactics, the

record supported the trial court’s determination that C.K. chose to avoid parenting

time with Pfalzgraf. Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the

trial court’s failure to find Kuchera in contempt for withholding parenting time from

Pfalzgraf.

             B. Contempt Allegations Regarding C.K.’s Devices

       {¶81} We next address Pfalzgraf’s contentions that the trial court erred in

failing to find Kuchera in contempt for not providing her with login information for

C.K.’s devices and for blocking her from contacting C.K.

       {¶82} The trial court found that the record contained no convincing testimony

or evidence that Kuchera failed to provide Pfalzgraf with login access to those devices

or was responsible for blocking Pfalzgraf’s number on C.K.’s phone. The court referred

to Kuchera’s testimony that he could not recall specific requests from Pfalzgraf for

login information and found that “each parent has had issues with this in the past and

communication overall could use improvement.” The court further relied on the

testimony offered by both Kuchera and the GAL that C.K. may have blocked Pfalzgraf

from his phone.

       {¶83} We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s failure to find Kuchera

in contempt on these grounds. While the record contained an OFW message from

Kuchera to Pfalzgraf stating that he was going to change the “permissions” on C.K.’s


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                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


phone, no evidence was presented to establish that he followed through on that

intention. To the contrary, the GAL, a neutral party, testified that it was entirely

possible that C.K. himself had blocked Pfalzgraf. The trial court was well within its

discretion to rely on the GAL’s testimony when determining that Pfalzgraf’s allegations

were without merit.

              C. Allegation Regarding Wage-Deduction Order

       {¶84} Pfalzgraf next argues that the trial court erred in failing to find Kuchera

in contempt for failing to set up a wage-deduction order. She contends that Kuchera

was court-ordered to set up a wage-deduction order in April 2022. As Pfalzgraf notes,

the trial court failed to explicitly rule on her objection on this ground.

       {¶85} While our record affirmatively establishes that Kuchera failed to set up

a wage-deduction order, it contains no court order expressly requiring him to do so.

       {¶86} Although Pfalzgraf argues in her appellate brief that the court order

requiring Kuchera to set up a wage-deduction order was issued in April 2022, her

motion for contempt alleged that the order was issued June 22, 2022. The record

contains no court order requiring Kuchera to set up a wage-deduction order on that

date. The record does contain an “agreed entry to modify child support” dated April

22, 2022. This entry states that, effective April 1, 2022, Kuchera agreed to pay Pfalzgraf

a specified amount of child support through the Office of Child Support of the

Department of Job and Family Services. The entry further states that Kuchera was

responsible for making payments to the Office of Child Support “until such time as a

deduction order takes effect.” This entry addresses child support, but it contains no

affirmative court order requiring Kuchera to set up a wage-deduction order.

       {¶87} Further, although the trial court did not find Kuchera in contempt for

failing to set up a wage-deduction order, it did find him in contempt for failing to pay


                                            26
                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


child support and held that the contempt could not be purged until Kuchera set up a

wage-deduction order. The trial court thus accorded relief to Pfalzgraf regarding issues

with the wage-deduction order. We accordingly find no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s failure to find Kuchera in contempt on this ground.

           D. Allegations Regarding Unilateral Decision Making

       {¶88} We last consider Pfalzgraf’s argument that the trial court failed to find

Kuchera in contempt for unilaterally making decisions regarding C.K. In overruling

Pfalzgraf’s objection on these same grounds, the trial court found that Kuchera’s

alleged unilateral decision-making did not rise to the level of contempt. It stated,

               Regarding the medication, Father was attempting to discuss

       these medications with the prescribing physician, not withhold his

       consent. As for school attendance, C.K. was refusing to go to school. The

       GAL testified that she had a stern conversation with Father about this

       and the issue was resolved. Overall, both parents struggle with

       communication related to their children as evidenced by the OFW

       messages in Exhibit O.

       {¶89} The record supports the trial court’s findings. The court was not blind

to Kuchera’s shortcomings, as evinced in its reference to the conversation that the GAL

felt it necessary to have with Kuchera about C.K.’s school attendance. But the court

also—appropriately—considered C.K.’s involvement in and impact on the decisions

about his life that Pfalzgraf alleges were unilaterally made by Kuchera. We find no

abuse of discretion in the trial court’s determination that Kuchera’s actions did not

rise to the level of contempt.

       {¶90} Having found Pfalzgraf’s argument that the trial court erred in failing to

find Kuchera in contempt for additional violations of the parties’ shared-parenting


                                           27
                OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


plan and court orders to be without merit, we overrule the second assignment of error.

                                 IV. Attorney Fees

       {¶91} In her third assignment of error, Pfalzgraf argues that “[i]t was

arbitrary, unreasonable, and against the manifest weight of the evidence for the Trial

Court to fail to award Mother’s reasonable attorney fees.”

       {¶92} A trial court’s award of attorney fees is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion. In re Q.R., 2026-Ohio-341, ¶ 28 (1st Dist.). We will not interfere with the

court’s award of fees unless the amount awarded is either so high or so low that it

shocks the conscience. Id. at ¶ 30.

       {¶93} Pursuant to R.C. 3105.73(B),

              In any post-decree motion or proceeding that arises out of an

       action for divorce . . . , the court may award all or part of reasonable

       attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to either party if the court finds

       the award equitable. In determining whether an award is equitable, the

       court may consider the parties’ income, the conduct of the parties, and

       any other relevant factors the court deems appropriate, but it may not

       consider the parties’ assets.

       {¶94} At the hearing, counsel for Pfalzgraf testified about her experience, her

hourly rate, and the $21,764.50 in fees she had incurred representing Pfalzgraf. The

magistrate ordered Kuchera to pay Pfalzgraf $500 toward her attorney fees as a

condition to purge his contempt, but did not otherwise award attorney fees. In

overruling Pfalzgraf’s objection concerning attorney fees, the trial court noted

Pfalzgraf’s testimony that maternal grandfather was paying her attorney fees and

found that the $500 award was equitable and attributable to the finding that Kuchera

was in contempt for failing to pay child support.


                                          28
                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


        {¶95} Although the amount of attorney fees awarded was much less than had

been requested, we cannot find that the award of $500 in attorney fees was so low as

to shock the conscience. See In re Q.R., 2026-Ohio-341, at ¶ 30 (1st Dist.). Kuchera

was successful in his motion to modify parenting time. And he prevailed on all but one

of Pfalzgraf’s allegations of contempt. Under these circumstances, the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in failing to award Pfalzgraf additional attorney fees.

        {¶96} The third assignment of error is overruled.

                                     V. GAL Fees

        {¶97}   Pfalzgraf’s fourth assignment of error challenges the trial court’s order

that she pay half of the GAL’s outstanding fees.

        {¶98} We review a trial court’s award of GAL fees for an abuse of discretion.

Ho v. Co., 2024-Ohio-2424, ¶ 12 (1st Dist.).

        {¶99} Hannigan filed a motion on January 22, 2025, requesting payment of

outstanding fees in the amount of $7,542.50. An itemized statement of the incurred

fees was attached to the motion. Hannigan testified that the fees incurred were

reasonable in light of the case and the complexity of the issues involved. Counsel for

Kuchera and Pfalzgraf were given the opportunity to cross-examine Hannigan on her

requested fees.

        {¶100} Pfalzgraf first contends that the trial court violated her due-process

rights by hearing the GAL’s motion for fees on the same date that the motion was filed

in violation of Sup.R. 48.02(H)(4) and Hamilton C.P., Domestic Relations Div., Loc.R.

10.5.

        {¶101} Sup.R. 48.02(H)(4) provides, “Unless a hearing is requested by a party

or the court within fourteen days after a motion for payment is filed, a court shall issue

an order regarding payment of guardian ad litem fees and expenses approving or


                                           29
                 OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


denying any portion of the requested fees and expenses and allocating payment to one

or more of the parties as appropriate.” Hamilton C.P., Domestic Relations Div., Loc.R.

10.5(A)(5) contains similar language.

       {¶102} First, we note that the Rules of Superintendence and the local rules

serve as administrative guidelines and do not have the force of law or provide

substantive rights. In re Guardianship of Hyde, 2024-Ohio-1878, ¶ 24 (1st Dist.) (the

Rules of Superintendence contain administrative directives, do not have the force of

law, and do not provide grounds for reversal); Morgan v. Jones, 2022-Ohio-1831, ¶ 20

(1st Dist.) (a court’s local rules are designed to facilitate case management and do not

set forth substantive principles of law or implicate constitutional rights).

       {¶103} Second, a hearing was held on Hannigan’s request for fees on the date

the motion was filed and both parties were given an opportunity to question her on

the fees incurred. Pfalzgraf’s argument that her right to request a hearing was violated

is somewhat insincere, given that a hearing was, in fact, held. Further, a decision was

not issued until approximately two months after the hearing. At no time in the two-

week period after Hannigan’s motion was filed did Pfalzgraf request an additional

hearing on the GAL’s fees.

       {¶104} Pfalzgraf further argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

failing to consider Sup.R. 48.02(H)(3) and ordering her to pay half of the fees when

the appointment was at Kuchera’s request, he failed to pay child support, and she was

unemployed. Sup.R. 48.02(H)(3) sets forth various factors for a trial court to consider

when determining how to allocate GAL fees. These factors include the GAL’s hourly

rate; the parties’ incomes, assets, and financial circumstances; and the conduct of the

parties. See Sup.R. 48.02(H)(3)(a)-(e).

       {¶105} Neither the magistrate, nor the trial court when reviewing Pfalzgraf’s


                                           30
                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS


objections, specifically referenced Sup.R. 48.02(H)(3). But the magistrate did discuss

the parties’ financial circumstances. With respect to Kuchera, she found that he “has

been unemployed on and off for the last 18 months but testified that he has a new job

and is currently working.” With respect to Pfalzgraf, the magistrate found that she “is

not currently employed and testified that she receives an exemption for the work-

requirement to receive SNAP benefits [although] she is not currently receiving any

type of disability.”

       {¶106} The trial court found that Kuchera had already paid $3,500 towards the

GAL fees, and that with the magistrate’s equitable division of the remaining fees,

Kuchera was responsible for $7,321.25 of the total fees and Pfalzgraf $3,771.25. The

court found that this division was equitable. We agree. Kuchera ultimately was found

responsible for nearly two thirds of the fees incurred. In light of his greater earning

capacity and income, this was reasonable and not an abuse of discretion.

       {¶107} Pfalzgraf’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.

                                  VI. Conclusion

       {¶108} Having found no error in the trial court’s modification of the parenting

schedule for C.K., denial of the remaining alleged violations in Pfalzgraf’s motion for

contempt, award of attorney fees, or division of GAL fees, we affirm the court’s

judgment.

                                                                     Judgment affirmed.

NESTOR and MOORE, JJ., concur.




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