Jones v. Galloway

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Jones v. Galloway, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1250.]




                                           NOTICE
      This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
      advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
      promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
      formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
      the opinion is published.




                           SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-1250
            JONES, APPELLANT, v. GALLOWAY, WARDEN, APPELLEE.1
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
     may be cited as Jones v. Galloway, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1250.]
Habeas corpus—Court of appeals correctly concluded that inmate’s petition failed
        to comply with R.C. 2969.25 and failed to state a cognizable habeas claim—
        Dismissal affirmed.
      (No. 2025-1095—Submitted January 6, 2026—Decided April 9, 2026.)
         APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Ross County, No. 25CA12.
                                    __________________
        The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER,
DEWINE, BRUNNER, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ.




1. Jones named Timothy Shoop, who was then the warden of the Chillicothe Correctional Institution,
as the respondent in this action. Garry Galloway has succeeded Shoop as warden of that institution.
We therefore automatically substitute Galloway for Shoop as the appellee in this appeal. See
S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.06(B).
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       Per Curiam.
       {¶ 1} Appellant, Nikko N. Jones, appeals from the Fourth District Court of
Appeals’ judgment dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus against
appellee, the warden of the Chillicothe Correctional Institution, where Jones is
confined. Because the Fourth District correctly concluded that Jones’s petition was
procedurally defective and failed to state a claim cognizable in habeas corpus, we
affirm its judgment.
                   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       {¶ 2} In 2021, Jones was indicted by a Cuyahoga County grand jury on two
counts of attempted murder, two counts of felonious assault, and one count each of
having weapons while under a disability, discharge of a firearm on or near
prohibited premises, improper handling firearms in a motor vehicle, carrying a
concealed weapon, receiving stolen property, and domestic violence.
       {¶ 3} Jones alleged that although his criminal case was initially assigned to
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Judge Nancy R. McDowell, other
judges presided over the case during subsequent periods without having been
properly assigned. Jones focuses on his October 3, 2022 plea hearing, at which he
pleaded guilty to both felonious-assault charges and the domestic-violence charge.
Judge Kenneth Callahan—not Judge McDowell—accepted Jones’s pleas at that
hearing and sentenced him to 17 to 20.5 years in prison. Jones alleged that he
moved for leave to file a delayed appeal; however, the resolution of that motion is
unclear from his petition.
       {¶ 4} According to Jones, Judge Callahan lacked the “legal authority and
jurisdiction” to accept his pleas and to sentence him, because no journalized order
had formally assigned Judge Callahan to Jones’s case. Based on these allegations,
Jones asserted that he is entitled to immediate release.
       {¶ 5} Along with his petition, Jones filed an affidavit under R.C. 2969.25,
in which he attested that he had “filed one (1) civil action within the past five



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(5) years.” The affidavit does not provide any other information regarding the civil
action Jones referred to.
        {¶ 6} The warden filed a motion to dismiss Jones’s petition, on both
procedural and substantive grounds, under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Procedurally, the
warden argued that Jones’s petition was fatally deficient for failing to comply with
R.C. 2969.25. Substantively, the warden argued that Jones’s petition failed to state
a claim in habeas corpus because Jones possessed an adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of the law and because his maximum sentence has not yet expired.
        {¶ 7} The Fourth District agreed with the warden on both grounds, granted
the warden’s motion, and dismissed Jones’s petition. Jones has appealed as of right
to this court.
                                     ANALYSIS
        {¶ 8} A motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is “procedural and tests
the sufficiency of the complaint.” State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of
Commrs., 1992-Ohio-73, ¶ 9. When a court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint,
the material allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, reasonable
inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, and the motion may be
granted only if it appears beyond doubt from the complaint that the relator cannot
prove a set of facts entitling him to recovery. Id. at ¶ 10. “We review de novo a
decision granting a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6).” State ex rel. Sands
v. Coulson, 2021-Ohio-671, ¶ 6.
        {¶ 9} In his merit brief, Jones raises a single proposition of law, which
asserts that any judgment rendered by an improperly assigned judge is “void.”
Jones does not attack the Fourth District’s conclusion that his petition was subject
to dismissal for failing to comply with R.C. 2969.25(A). Even if he had, however,
the Fourth District did not err in this regard.
        {¶ 10} R.C. 2969.25(A) prescribes certain procedural requirements that
apply to inmates who commence a civil action against a government entity or



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employee. “Compliance with R.C. 2969.25(A) is mandatory, and failure to comply
will warrant dismissal.” State v. Henton, 2016-Ohio-1518, ¶ 3, citing State ex rel.
McGrath v. McDonnell, 2010-Ohio-4726, ¶ 1.
       {¶ 11} Here, although Jones filed an affidavit attesting that he filed one civil
action against a government entity or employee within the previous five years, he
failed to set forth any description of that action, much less all of the information
required by R.C. 2969.25(A)—i.e., a brief description of the nature of the action,
the name and number of the action and the court in which it was brought, the name
of each party to the action, and the outcome of the action. The Fourth District was
therefore right to dismiss Jones’s petition for failing to comply with R.C. 2969.25.
See State ex rel. Russell v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2020-Ohio-4788, ¶ 7-8
(affirming dismissal of habeas petition because inmate’s affidavit had listed several
civil actions he filed within the previous five years but had failed to “identify the
courts in which the cases were brought, the names of all the parties, or the outcomes
of the cases”).
       {¶ 12} The Fourth District also correctly concluded that Jones’s petition
failed to state a claim cognizable in habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus is
generally available only when the petitioner’s maximum sentence has expired or
when the sentencing court patently and unambiguously lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction. State ex rel. King v. Watson, 2023-Ohio-4189, ¶ 13. Jones does not
allege that his maximum sentence of 20.5 years, which was imposed in 2021, has
expired. Thus, the pertinent question is whether the trial court patently and
unambiguously lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
       {¶ 13} In his merit brief, Jones reiterates the argument he made below: that
Judge Callahan lacked jurisdiction to decide Jones’s case because Judge Callahan
had not been assigned to the case in accordance with the procedures set forth in the
Rules of Superintendence. But even accepting as true that the trial court failed to




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adhere to some procedure prescribed by the Rules of Superintendence, that failure
would not divest the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
       {¶ 14} Contrary to Jones’s argument, any “‘procedural irregularit[y]’” in
the assignment of his case to a different judge would not disturb the trial court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction, State ex rel. Harris v. Turner, 2020-Ohio-2901, ¶ 13,
quoting In re J.J., 2006-Ohio-5484, paragraph one of the syllabus. Improper
assignment affects only a court’s “‘jurisdiction over the particular case and
render[s] the judgment voidable, not void.’” Id., quoting J.J. at paragraph one of
the syllabus. Therefore, a claim that a judge was improperly assigned to a case
“can generally be adequately raised by way of appeal.” State ex rel. Key v. Spicer,
2001-Ohio-98, ¶ 5.
       {¶ 15} Because the Fourth District correctly concluded that Jones’s petition
failed comply with R.C. 2969.25 and failed to state a claim cognizable in habeas
corpus, we affirm the court’s judgment dismissing the petition.
                                  CONCLUSION
       {¶ 16} We affirm the judgment of the Fourth District Court of Appeals
dismissing Jones’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
                                                                   Judgment affirmed.
                               __________________
       Nikko N. Jones, pro se.
       Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Jerri L. Fosnaught, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
                               __________________




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