State ex rel. Lundeen v. Miday

[Cite as State ex rel. Lundeen v. Miday, 2026-Ohio-1458.]


                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE EX REL. JAMES E. LUNDEEN, :
ET AL.,
                                :
          Relator,
                                :                               No. 115697
          v.
                                :
SHERRIE MIDAY, JUDGE,
                                :
          Respondent.


                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: COMPLAINT DISMISSED
                 DATED: April 21, 2026


                                          Writ of Mandamus
                                          Motion No. 589937
                                          Order No. 594454


                                            Appearances:

                 Ratliff Law Office, and J.C. Ratliff, Rocky Ratliff, and Nick
                 Barons, for relator.

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Michael J. Stewart, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for respondent.


ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:

                   James E. Lundeen, Cynthia M. Lundeen, and Sir Isaac Newton

Enterprises, LLC (“Lundeens”), the relators, seek a writ of mandamus in an effort to
compel Judge Sherrie Miday, the respondent, to vacate an order that dismissed the

relators’ counterclaim that was pending in Troicky v. Lundeen, et al., Cuyahoga C.P.

No. CV-25-116208. Judge Miday has filed a motion to dismiss that is granted for

the following reasons.

                                    I.   BACKGROUND

                                         A. Facts

               The following facts are gleaned from the Lundeens’ complaint for

mandamus, Judge Miday’s motion to dismiss, the Lundeens’ brief in opposition to

the motion to dismiss, and the supplemental brief filed by Judge Miday.

               On January 24, 2025, a complaint for forcible entry and detainer was

filed in the Cleveland Hts. Municipal Court, Troicky v. Lundeen, et al., Cleveland

Hts. M.C. No. CVG-25-00067. The complaint for forcible entry and detainer sought

the eviction of the Lundeens from the residential property located at 2380 Overlook

Road, Cleveland Heights, Ohio 44106. Specifically, the eviction was based upon: 1)

Troicky is the owner of the residential premises located at 2380 Overlook Road,

Cleveland Heights, Ohio 44106; 2) Troicky took title to the premises on or around

August 12, 2024; 3) the property is not a rental and is not registered as such with the

City of Cleveland Heights; 4) the Lundeens are residing at the premises without the

permission of Troicky and without right to possess and/or occupy the same; 5) on

January 15, 2025, Troicky caused to be served upon the Lundeens a written notice

to leave the premises (“3-day notice”) for noncolor of title as required by

R.C. 1923.04; 6) the Lundeens have failed and refused to leave the premises and
have been continuing to unlawfully and forcibly detain from Troicky possession of

the premises; and 7) Troicky is entitled to an order granting restitution of the

premises and ordering the Lundeens to vacate.

              On March 27, 2025, the Lundeens filed a counterclaim for “false light

invasion of property” and prayed for damages in excess of $25,000. On March 28,

2025, the forcible-entry-and-detainer action, as well as the counterclaim, were

certified for transfer to the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court because the

counterclaim exceeded the monetary jurisdiction of the Cleveland Heights

Municipal Court. On April 23, 2025, the forcible-entry-and-detainer action, and the

counterclaim, were filed in the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court and Judge

Miday was assigned as the trial judge. On May 19, 2025, Troicky filed a Civ.R. 12(C)

motion for judgment on the pleadings with regard to the Lundeens’ counterclaim

for false light invasion of privacy. On September 30, 2025, Judge Miday granted the

motion for judgment on the pleadings and held that

      [p]laintiff'’s motion to dismiss defendants’ counterclaim, filed
      05/19/2025, is granted. The court has considered plaintiff’s motion
      filed 05/19/2025 and defendants’ brief in opposition filed 09/11/2025.
      Plaintiff has moved to dismiss the counterclaim pursuant to Civ.R
      12(C). The standard applied under Civ.R.12(C) motion for judgment
      on the pleadings requires a determination that no material factual
      issues exist and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
      law. State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565,
      1996 Ohio 459, 664 N.E. 2d 931 (1996). Pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C),
      dismissal is appropriate where a court (1) construes the material
      allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable inferences to be drawn
      therefrom, in favor of the nonmoving party as true, and (2) finds
      beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of
      his claim that would entitle him to relief. Vinicky v. Pristas, 163 Ohio
      App.3d 508, 2005-Ohio-5196, 839 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 3 (8th Dist.).
      Defendants’ counterclaim is for false light invasion of privacy. “To
      establish false light invasion of privacy, a plaintiff must show: (1) the
      defendant gave publicity to a private matter concerning the plaintiffs;
      (2) the publicity placed the plaintiff in a false light; (3) the false light
      would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (4) the defendant
      had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the
      publicized matter and the false light in which the plaintiff would be
      placed.” Id., citing Welling at syllabus. “To be actionable false light,
      ‘the statement made must be untrue.’” Id., citing Welling at 52; see
      also Murray v. Chagrin Valley Publishing Co., 2014-Ohio-5442, 25
      N.E.3d 1111, 38 (8th Dist.) (finding there must be untruthful statements
      commenting on private matters to be actionable false light).

      Defendants’ counterclaim does not establish the elements of false light
      invasion of privacy. The court finds plaintiff’s motion well taken and
      granted. In construing the material allegations in the complaint, with
      all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in favor of the
      nonmoving party as true, the court finds that no material factual issues
      exist and that the movant George Troicky is entitled to judgment as a
      matter of law under Civ.R. 12(C). Defendants’ counterclaim is
      dismissed with prejudice.

Journal Entry No. 202176894 (Sept. 30, 2025).

               On October 17, 2025, the Lundeens filed their complaint for a writ of

mandamus. On November 21, 2025, Judge Miday filed a motion to dismiss the

complaint for mandamus. On December 5, 2025, the Lundeens filed a brief in

opposition to the motion to dismiss. On December 24, 2025, Judge Miday filed a

supplemental brief in support of the motion to dismiss.

                                 II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

              The Lundeens, in support of their complaint for mandamus, argue

that Judge Miday did not possess the required jurisdiction to grant a Civ.R. 12(C)

motion for judgment on the pleadings to dismiss their counterclaim. Specifically,

the Lundeens argue that Judge Miday possessed no jurisdiction to act on the
Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings because no answer was filed in

response to the counterclaim. Thus, the Lundeens argue that Judge Miday is

required to vacate the judgment that granted the motion for judgment on the

pleadings and dismissed their counterclaim based upon false light invasion of

privacy.

                    A. Standard for Granting Mandamus

               The Ohio Const., art., IV, § 3(B)(1)(b) provides this court with original

jurisdiction over a complaint that seeks a writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus,

however, is an extraordinary remedy that can only be granted in a limited set of

circumstances.    State ex rel. Parisi v. Heck, 2013-Ohio-4948, ¶ 4 (2d Dist.).

Mandamus can only be employed to compel the performance of a present existing

duty to which there is a default. State ex rel. Willis v. Sheboy, 6 Ohio St.3d 167, 168

(1983); State ex rel. Fed. Homes Properties, Inc. v. Singer, 9 Ohio St.2d 95, 96

(1967).

               To be granted mandamus, the Lundeens must establish (1) a clear

legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of Judge Miday,

and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. State ex

rel. Richardson v. Gowdy, 2023-Ohio-976, ¶ 12; State ex rel. Waters v. Spath,

2012-Ohio-69, ¶ 6. The Ohio Supreme Court has held “[t]he availability of an appeal

is an adequate remedy sufficient to preclude a writ.” State ex rel. Luoma v. Russo,

2014-Ohio-4532, ¶ 8; State ex rel. Peoples v. Johnson, 2017-Ohio-9140, ¶ 11. The

availability of an appeal is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law even
if the relator fails to pursue an appeal. Jackson v. Johnson, 2013-Ohio-999, ¶ 11;

State ex rel. Gaydosh v. Twinsburg, 93 Ohio St.3d 576, 578 (2001).

              The Lundeens argue that Judge Miday lacked jurisdiction to issue a

ruling with regard to the Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Absent

a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general jurisdiction of

the subject matter of an action has authority to determine its own jurisdiction. In

addition, a party challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction possesses an adequate

remedy at law through an appeal from the court’s holding that it has jurisdiction.

State ex rel. Rootstown Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Portage Cty. Court of

Common Pleas, 78 Ohio St.3d 489, 492 (1997). Moreover, this court has discretion

in issuing a writ. State ex rel. Gilligan v. Hoddinott, 36 Ohio St.2d 127, 132 (1973).

Herein, Judge Miday is a judge of a common pleas court. A common pleas court is

a court of general jurisdiction with subject-matter jurisdiction that extends to all

matters at law and in equity that are not denied to it. Ohio Const., art. IV, § 4(B).

Ohio High School Athletic Assn. v. Ruehlman, 2019-Ohio-2485, ¶ 7. In addition,

once a case is transferred from a municipal court to a common pleas court, the case

shall proceed as if it had been originally commenced in the common pleas court.

R.C. 1901.22(G); Yousef v. Yousef, 2019-Ohio-3656, ¶ 9 (8th Dist.). Judge Miday

unquestionably possessed subject-matter jurisdiction over the counterclaim and the

Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on the pleadings. Also, “when a specific action is

within a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, any error in the exercise of that

jurisdiction renders the court’s judgment voidable, not void.” State v. Harper,
2020-Ohio-2913, ¶ 26. Any extraordinary relief, such as through an original action,

is not available to attack a voidable judgment. State ex rel. Davic v. Franklin Cty.

Court of Common Pleas, 2023-Ohio-4569, ¶ 15; State v. Harper, ¶ 26. When a court

possesses basic subject-matter jurisdiction to act, and an appeal is available, a writ

will not issue. France v. Celebrezze, 2012-Ohio-5085, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.). Thus, we

find that the Lundeens have failed to establish a right to have the dismissal of their

counterclaim vacated, failed to establish that Judge Miday is required to vacate the

judgment that dismissed their counterclaim, and have failed to establish that an

appeal does not constitute an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.

                   B. Declaration as Vexatious Litigators

              The constitutional right of access to courts guaranteed under Ohio

Const., art. I, § 16, is not unfettered. It does not include the right to impede the

normal functioning of judicial processes. State ex rel. Richard v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd.

of Commrs., 100 Ohio App.3d 592, 598 (8th Dist. 1995). By repeatedly filing

meritless original actions and appeals, the Lundeens have continually taxed the

limited and precious resources of this court and the clerk of courts. Exercising our

inherent power under Loc.App.R. 23, we, sua sponte, declare the Lundeens

vexatious litigators to prevent any further abuse by them of the judicial process. See

State v. Henderson, 2014-Ohio-2274 (8th Dist.); State ex rel. McGrath v.

McClelland, 2012-Ohio-157 (8th Dist.).

              Accordingly, the Lundeens are prohibited from instituting any

appeals or original actions, continuing any appeals or original actions, or filing any
motions in any pending appeals or original actions, pro se, in the Eighth District

Court of Appeals, without first obtaining leave of this court. The Lundeens are

further prohibited from filing any appeals or original actions, pro se, in the Eighth

District Court of Appeals without the filing fee and security for costs required by

Loc.App.R. 3(A). See McGrath. Any request to file an appeal or original action shall

be submitted to the clerk of this court for the court’s review along with any appeal

or original action.

                                  C. Disposition

               Accordingly, we grant Judge Miday’s motion to dismiss. Costs to the

Lundeens. The court directs the clerk of courts to serve all parties with notice of this

judgment and the date of entry upon the journal as required by Civ.R. 58(B).

               Complaint dismissed.


__________________________
ANITA LASTER MAYS, JUDGE

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCUR