State ex rel. Quinn v. Rastatter

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State
ex rel. Quinn v. Rastatter, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1208.]




                                           NOTICE
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      South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
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                          SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-1208
                 THE STATE EX REL . QUINN v. RASTATTER, JUDGE.
  [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
        may be cited as State ex rel. Quinn v. Rastatter, Slip Opinion No.
                                     2026-Ohio-1208.]
Mandamus—Writ sought to compel rulings on motions pending before trial court—
       Request for writ granted to extent relator asks that trial-court judge be
       ordered to rule on motion for leave to file motion for new trial—Request for
       writ denied to extent relator asks that trial-court judge be ordered to rule on
       contemporaneously filed motion for new trial, because the two motions must
       be ruled on sequentially—Because trial-court judge denied the petition for
       postconviction relief after relator filed this mandamus action, that part of
       writ request is denied as moot—Writ granted in part and denied in part.
    (No. 2025-0965—Submitted February 10, 2026—Decided April 7, 2026.)
                                       IN MANDAMUS.
                                   __________________
        The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER,
                              SUPREME COURT OF OHIO




DEWINE, BRUNNER, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ.


       Per Curiam.
       {¶ 1} Relator, James Quinn, was convicted of multiple crimes in the Clark
County Court of Common Pleas in 2014. Respondent, Judge Douglas Rastatter of
the Clark County Court of Common Pleas, presided over Quinn’s criminal case. In
April 2024, Quinn filed in his criminal case a petition for postconviction relief and
a “motion for leave to file motion for new trial instanter and motion for new trial
instanter.” In July 2025, Judge Rastatter had not yet ruled on the petition or
motions, and so Quinn filed this original action in mandamus seeking a writ
ordering Judge Rastatter to rule on the filings.
       {¶ 2} Judge Rastatter has now denied Quinn’s petition for postconviction
relief, so we deny as moot the writ as to the petition for postconviction relief. But
Quinn’s motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial and motion for a new trial
remain pending. We issue a writ of mandamus directing Judge Rastatter to rule on
Quinn’s motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial. We deny the writ as to
the motion for a new trial.
            I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       {¶ 3} In 2014, Quinn was convicted of multiple crimes and sentenced to 20
years in prison. See State v. Quinn, Clark C.P. No. 2013-CR-869. On April 1,
2024, Quinn filed in his criminal case a petition for postconviction relief, see R.C.
2953.21 and 2953.23, and a motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial, which
included a motion for a new trial, see Crim.R. 33. The motion for leave to file a
motion for a new trial and the motion for a new trial were not filed as separate
documents—rather, they were filed as a single “motion for leave to file motion for
new trial instanter and motion for new trial instanter.” The postconviction-relief
petition and the motions allege that the State suppressed and modified exculpatory
evidence related to Quinn’s criminal case.



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       {¶ 4} As of July 24, 2025, the State had not yet responded to Quinn’s
postconviction-relief petition or his motions and Judge Rastatter had not yet ruled
on them. On that day, Quinn filed this action for a writ of mandamus. He seeks a
writ ordering Judge Rastatter to rule on the April 1, 2024 filings. Judge Rastatter
answered and stated that on August 7, 2025, he ordered the State to respond to
Quinn’s filings by September 5. He stated his intention to rule on the filings once
the State had responded. We granted an alternative writ, setting the schedule for
the filing of evidence and briefs. 2025-Ohio-4537.
       {¶ 5} After we granted an alternative writ, the State filed responses to the
petition and motions in the trial court. In December, Judge Rastatter denied
Quinn’s petition for postconviction relief. But Quinn’s motion for leave to file a
motion for a new trial and motion for a new trial remain pending.
                                  II. ANALYSIS
       {¶ 6} As an initial matter, we note that Quinn’s request is akin to a request
for a writ of procedendo—an order directing Judge Rastatter to rule on the pending
filings. “Although mandamus will lie in cases of a court’s undue delay in entering
judgment, procedendo is more appropriate, since ‘[a]n inferior court’s refusal or
failure to timely dispose of a pending action is the ill a writ of procedendo is
designed to remedy.’” State ex rel. Dehler v. Sutula, 1995-Ohio-268, ¶ 7, quoting
State ex rel. Levin v. Sheffield Lake, 1994-Ohio-385, ¶ 22. But mandamus will also
lie in cases of a court’s undue delay in entering judgment. See id.; State ex rel.
Culgan v. Collier, 2013-Ohio-1762, ¶ 10.
                   A. Quinn’s petition for postconviction relief
       {¶ 7} Quinn requested a writ ordering Judge Rastatter to rule on his petition
for postconviction relief. However, Judge Rastatter has now denied that petition.
Quinn filed a motion for judicial notice alerting us to the denial.
       {¶ 8} “An action in procedendo becomes moot when the court performs the
duty requested.”     State ex rel. Roberts v. Hatheway, 2021-Ohio-4097, ¶ 5.



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Similarly, “a ‘writ of mandamus will not issue to compel an act already
performed.’” Id. at ¶ 6, quoting State ex rel. Jerninghan v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court
of Common Pleas, 1996-Ohio-117, ¶ 3. Because Judge Rastatter denied Quinn’s
petition for postconviction relief after Quinn filed his mandamus action, we deny
that part of Quinn’s request as moot. In addition, we grant Quinn’s motion for
judicial notice. See State ex rel. Ames v. Summit Cty. Court of Common Pleas,
2020-Ohio-354, ¶ 6 (court may take judicial notice of trial-court entries when
determining mootness).1
B. Quinn’s motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial and motion for a
                                            new trial
         {¶ 9} Quinn also seeks a writ ordering Judge Rastatter to rule on Quinn’s
Crim.R. 33 motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial and included motion for
a new trial. Quinn filed the motions on April 1, 2024, and Judge Rastatter has not
yet ruled on them.
         {¶ 10} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a relator must establish a clear
legal right to the requested relief, a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to
provide that relief, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
law. Culgan, 2013-Ohio-1762, at ¶ 7. The elements for procedendo are analogous.
See id.; State ex rel. Brown v. Luebbers, 2013-Ohio-5062, ¶ 10. Here, Quinn lacks
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law because he cannot compel
Judge Rastatter to timely rule on his motions, and Judge Rastatter does not argue
otherwise.




1. Quinn’s motion for judicial notice appears to ask that we also issue a writ of mandamus ordering
the trial court to rule on several other motions that Quinn filed in 2025. Quinn’s mandamus petition
sought a writ of mandamus regarding only his April 1, 2024 filings. To the extent Quinn is asking
for a writ ordering the trial court to rule on any other filings, we deny these requests. See
S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.02(B)(3) (In an original action, “[a]ll relief sought . . . shall be set forth in the
complaint”); State ex rel. Gilreath v. Cuyahoga Job & Family Servs., 2024-Ohio-103, ¶ 31.




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        {¶ 11} Although Quinn and Judge Rastatter do not distinguish between
Quinn’s motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial and the included motion
for a new trial, under the Criminal Rules, these motions must be ruled on
sequentially. See Crim.R. 33(B). Because Quinn was found guilty over 120 days
ago, Quinn must first file a motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial based
on newly discovered evidence. See id.; see also State v. Hatton, 2022-Ohio-3991,
¶ 28-30. If Judge Rastatter finds by clear and convincing proof that Quinn was
unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence on which his request relies
and so grants the motion for leave, Quinn must then file a motion for a new trial
within seven days of the court’s ruling on his motion for leave. See Hatton at ¶ 28.
Thus, at this time, Judge Rastatter can consider only Quinn’s motion for leave to
file a motion for a new trial. We therefore deny Quinn’s request for a writ as to his
motion for a new trial. But, as discussed below, we grant the writ as to his motion
for leave to file a motion for a new trial.
        {¶ 12} “‘[M]andamus will lie when a trial court has refused to render, or
unduly delayed rendering, a judgment.’” Culgan at ¶ 10, quoting State ex rel.
Reynolds v. Basinger, 2003-Ohio-3631, ¶ 5. Quinn filed his motion for leave two
years ago. Sup.R. 40(A)(3) provides that motions shall generally be ruled on within
120 days from the date of filing. Sup.R. 40 “does not give rise to an enforceable
right in mandamus or procedendo,” Culgan at ¶ 8, but “the rule does guide this
court in determining whether a trial court has unduly delayed ruling on a motion
for purposes of ruling on a request for an extraordinary writ,” id. at ¶ 11. We have
relied on this 120-day guideline when granting a writ of procedendo ordering a
lower court to rule on a defendant’s postconviction motions. See Luebbers at
¶ 14-16.
        {¶ 13} A court is generally not required to issue findings of fact and
conclusions of law when denying a Crim.R. 33 motion for a new trial. State ex rel.
Collins v. Pokorny, 1999-Ohio-343, ¶ 6. But just as a court must rule on a petition



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for postconviction relief even if the ruling will be a denial without findings of fact
or conclusions of law, see State ex rel. Bunting v. Haas, 2004-Ohio-2055, ¶ 9-11,
so too must a court eventually rule on a Crim.R. 33 motion for leave to file a motion
for a new trial. As we have stated, “a court with general subject-matter jurisdiction
over a matter must eventually rule on motions or risk having a writ of procedendo
granted.” Luebbers, 2013-Ohio-5062, at ¶ 15. Judge Rastatter undisputedly has
general subject-matter jurisdiction over Quinn’s criminal case, and he must
eventually rule on the motion for leave.
        {¶ 14} Judge Rastatter argues that he has not unreasonably delayed in
deciding Quinn’s motion. He states that Quinn has submitted multiple filings
raising complex factual assertions and procedural arguments and that “[n]othing in
Ohio law requires a judge to issue immediate rulings or elevate a single litigant’s
filings over the rest of the court’s docket.” He states that he has taken appropriate
steps to resolve the motion, including ordering the State to respond. There is no
strict rule governing how quickly a court must rule on a motion before a writ of
procedendo or mandamus is justified, see Luebbers at ¶ 15, but the Rules of
Superintendence provide general guidance that motions should be ruled on within
120 days, Sup.R. 40(A)(3). Here, Quinn’s filing that includes his motion for leave
and motion for a new trial totals six pages (excluding exhibits) and has been
pending for two years. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that
Judge Rastatter has unduly delayed in ruling on Quinn’s motion for leave. We grant
a writ of mandamus directing Judge Rastatter to rule on Quinn’s motion for leave
to file a motion for a new trial.
        {¶ 15} Judge Rastatter also argues that Quinn seeks a writ ordering him not
just to rule on the motion but also to grant the motion. We do not view Quinn’s
request as attempting to control the judge’s discretion. But, to avoid confusion, we
order only that Judge Rastatter rule on the motion for leave; we do not direct him
how to rule on that motion.



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                               III. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 16} Quinn filed his motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial in April
2024, and Judge Rastatter has not yet ruled on it. We grant a writ of mandamus
ordering Judge Rastatter to rule on the motion. However, we deny Quinn’s requested
writ ordering Judge Rastatter to rule on the motion for a new trial that accompanied
Quinn’s motion for leave. And because Judge Rastatter has now ruled on Quinn’s
petition for postconviction relief, we deny as moot the requested writ of mandamus
as to that petition. We also grant Quinn’s motion for judicial notice.
                                                                  Writ granted in part
                                                                   and denied in part.
                               __________________
       The Behal Law Group, L.L.C., and John M. Gonzales, for relator.
       Daniel P. Driscoll, Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Louis A.
Zambelli III, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent.
                               __________________




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