J.M.I. v. State

FILE                                                  THIS OPINION WAS FILED
                                                                       FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
        IN CLERK’S OFFICE                                                    APRIL 30, 2026
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON
         APRIL 30, 2026
                                                                        SARAH R. PENDLETON
                                                                       SUPREME COURT CLERK




                   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

        J.M.I.,                                No. 104167-5
                         Respondent,
        v.
        STATE OF WASHINGTON,                   En Banc
                         Petitioner.
                                               Filed: April 30, 2026

        S.P., a minor, by BRUCE A. WOLF, her
        guardian ad litem,
                         Respondent,
        v.
        STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                         Petitioner.

        TACI MARSON, by and through
        Northstar Case Management, her
        Guardian and Conservator,
                         Respondent,
        v.
        STATE OF WASHINGTON,
        DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL &
        HEALTH SERVICES, DEPARTMENT
        OF CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILIES,
                         Petitioner.
J.M.I. v. State, No. 104167-5



    DAREL MAXFIELD, as guardian for
    F.H., a minor; N.H., individually,
                   Respondents,
    v.
    STATE OF WASHINGTON,
    DEPARTMENT of SOCIAL and
    HEALTH SERVICES; DEPARTMENT
    of CHILDREN, YOUTH, & FAMILIES;
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILD
    PROTECTIVE SERVICES, governmental
    entities; and DOES 1-5, individuals or
    entities,
                   Petitioner.



         MUNGIA, J.—The State is required to protect and promote the welfare of foster

children and investigate complaints of abuse. Ch. 74.13 RCW. The plaintiffs 1 allege that

the State failed to carry out its duty and, as a result, each of them was sexually or

physically abused.

         The plaintiffs have filed lawsuits against the State. In each lawsuit, the plaintiffs

seek discovery from the State that not only includes their case files but also other

documents relevant to proving that the State breached the duty it owed to each of them.

         The State does not dispute that under CR 26, the plaintiffs would be entitled to

these documents. Indeed, up until these cases, the State complied with these types of



1
 We use the term plaintiffs throughout this opinion to refer collectively to J.M.I., S.P., Taci
Marson, F.H., and N.H., the respondents in this action.
                                                 2
J.M.I. v. State, No. 104167-5



discovery requests so long as protective orders limiting their use were in place. However,

the State now takes the position that these documents are protected by a statutory

privilege and are not discoverable. The trial courts, in these consolidated cases for

appeal, ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor, ordering the State to produce the requested records.

The State sought direct review in this court, which was granted.

       We hold that the types of documents plaintiffs are seeking here are privileged

under RCW 74.04.060(1)(a). However, we further hold that RCW 74.04.060(1)’s

statutory exception applies in these cases, allowing the plaintiffs to obtain the requested

discovery. We also hold that RCW 13.50.100’s confidentiality and nondisclosure

requirements do not prevent the disclosure of the requested documents. 2

       Accordingly, we affirm the trial courts’ orders compelling the State to comply

with the plaintiffs’ discovery requests.

                                                  I
 FORMER FOSTER CHILDREN BROUGHT NEGLIGENCE SUITS AGAINST THE STATE FOR
  FAILING TO PROTECT THEM FROM ABUSE IN FOSTER CARE. THEY SOUGHT CHILD
WELFARE RECORDS TO SUPPORT THEIR CLAIMS, AND THE TRIAL COURTS ORDERED THE
                            RECORDS PRODUCED

       J.M.I., S.P., Taci Marson, F.H., and N.H. are former foster children who each sued

the State, alleging that the State negligently placed them in foster homes where they were

abused and that it failed to adequately investigate reports of abuse. In their lawsuits, the




2
 Because we find that the statutory privilege does not apply and that the plaintiffs are entitled to
discover the information under RCW 13.50.100, we do not address the plaintiffs’ other
arguments involving estoppel and constitutional claims.
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J.M.I. v. State, No. 104167-5



plaintiffs propounded discovery to the State, seeking Department of Children, Youth, and

Families (DCYF) records that sought the following categories of information:

   • Information the State used to remove the children from their biological parents;

   • Information the State used to vet and license the foster homes; and

   • Reports of abuse the State received about those foster homes.

They requested the following records:

   • Their own child welfare records;

   • Records relating to biological family members;

   • Records relating to any allegations received or investigations conducted by the

State regarding their foster parents and the children in their care;

   •     Records relating to their foster parents, from the time they were licensed to the

present;

   • The identity of and records for every dependent child ever placed in the care of the

same foster parents; and

   • Investigation files concerning other state-licensed foster homes controlled by the

State.

         In prior lawsuits, when similarly situated plaintiffs propounded similar discovery

to the State, the State agreed that the information was discoverable and produced the

requested records subject to a protective order. The State has now changed its position.

The State asserts that the requested information is privileged and thus not subject to

discovery. The State moved for protective orders asserting that RCW 74.04.060(1)(a) and
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J.M.I. v. State, No. 104167-5



RCW 13.50.100 barred it from producing nonparty child welfare records. The trial courts

denied the State’s motions, finding the statutes did not prevent the production of the records.

The trial courts ordered production of the requested records, requiring redaction of

employee personnel information, Social Security numbers, financial information, health

care information, and attorney-client and work product privileged documents.

       The courts also limited how the plaintiffs could use the information. The courts

ordered that the parties could not use the records for any purpose other than the present

litigation, prohibiting their dissemination beyond what was reasonably needed for the case.

In J.M.I.’s and S.P.’s cases, the trial courts ordered that any copies or summaries of the

documents must be returned to counsel at the conclusion of the proceedings. The courts

required a party that filed, discussed, or referenced confidential material to consider filing a

motion to seal or redact pursuant to GR 15. The orders specified that the court would hold a

hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the admissibility of the confidential

evidence prior to introducing or otherwise disclosing the existence of such evidence at trial.

       The State sought discretionary review of the discovery orders. This court granted

review of the cases of J.M.I., S.P., Marson, and Maxfield, consolidated the cases, 3 and

stayed the orders to compel pending our review. 4 This court stayed several other similar

cases pending this decision. 5


3
  See Am. Comm’r’s Ruling Granting Mot. to Transfer (Wash. July 30, 2025).
4
  Notation ruling, Marson v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., No. 60059-5-II (Wash. Ct. App. Oct.
15, 2024); Notation ruling, Maxfield v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., No. 60162-1-II (Wash. Ct.
App. Nov. 19, 2024).
5
  Am. Comm’r’s Ruling, supra.
                                               5
J.M.I. v. State, No. 104167-5



                                              II
  RCW 74.04.060(1)(a)’S PRIVILEGE PROTECTS CHILD WELFARE RECORDS IN DCYF’S
                                   POSSESSION

       We review a trial court’s discovery rulings under an abuse of discretion standard.

Magney v. Truc Pham, 195 Wn.2d 795, 801, 466 P.3d 1077 (2020). However, we review

a trial court’s interpretation of the law de novo. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn,

LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). Because we are reviewing the trial court’s

interpretation of the privilege and confidentiality statutes, our review is de novo.

       CR 26(b)(1) allows parties to obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter

that is relevant to the lawsuit. The question here is whether RCW 74.04.060(1)(a)

provides a privilege that prevents the State from producing the requested materials.

Because privileges impede the truth-finding process, we strictly and narrowly construe

them to exclude the least amount of relevant evidence. State v. Burden, 120 Wn.2d 371,

376, 841 P.2d 758 (1992); see, e.g., Lowy v. PeaceHealth, 174 Wn.2d 769, 777-78, 280

P.3d 1078 (2012).

       In construing RCW 74.04.060(1)(a), we interpret the statute to ascertain and carry

out the legislature’s intent, giving effect to plain meaning. Campbell & Gwinn, 146

Wn.2d at 9-10. To discern a statute’s meaning, we first look to its plain text. State v.

Watson, 146 Wn.2d 947, 954, 51 P.3d 66 (2002). Legislative definitions in the statute are

controlling. Id. In the absence of a definition, we look to the dictionary for a term’s

ordinary meaning. Id. We may also discern legislative intent by looking at the context of

the statute, related provisions, and the entire statutory scheme. Id. If the meaning of the

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J.M.I. v. State, No. 104167-5



statute is plain on its face, the inquiry ends there. Id. If the statute remains susceptible to

more than one reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous. Id. at 955. However, a statute

is not ambiguous merely because different interpretations are conceivable. Id.

       RCW 74.04.060(1)(a) provides:

       For the protection of applicants and recipients, the department, the
       authority, and the county offices and their respective officers and
       employees are prohibited, except as hereinafter provided, from disclosing
       the contents of any records, files, papers and communications, except for
       purposes directly connected with the administration of the programs of this
       title. In any judicial proceeding, except such proceeding as is directly
       concerned with the administration of these programs, such records, files,
       papers and communications, and their contents, shall be deemed privileged
       communications and except for the right of any individual to inquire of the
       office whether a named individual is a recipient of welfare assistance and
       such person shall be entitled to an affirmative or negative answer.

       The plaintiffs argue that this privilege provision does not apply to child welfare

records in DCYF’s possession. The plaintiffs assert that the statute is intended to protect

recipients of “traditional welfare services like medical services, assistance grants, work

relief and the like,” not recipients of child welfare services. Br. of Resp’ts J.M.I./S.P.

(J.M.I.) at 52. In addition, the plaintiffs argue that “department” strictly refers to the

Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS), not DCYF, and therefore only DSHS

records are discoverable. We disagree.




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J.M.I. v. State, No. 104167-5



   1. Foster Children and Families Are Recipients of Assistance Protected by the
      Privilege Statute, RCW 74.04.060(1)(a)
       The privilege in RCW 74.04.060(1)(a) is for the protection of “applicants and

recipients.” Based on the definitions in the statutory scheme, foster children and their

families are “recipients” of assistance covered by the statute.

       The chapter defines “recipient” as “any person receiving assistance and in addition

those dependents whose needs are included in the recipient’s assistance.” RCW

74.04.005(12). “Assistance” is defined as “public aid to persons in need thereof for any

cause, including services.” RCW 74.04.005(11). Assistance specifically encompasses

“[c]hild welfare services.” RCW 74.04.050(1)(b). See also RCW 74.13.020(5) (“[c]hild

welfare servicesˮ include “voluntary and in-home services, out-of-home care, case

management, and adoption services”).

       Here, foster children and their families received child welfare services from the

State that included foster care placement and caretaking functions. See, e.g., RCW

74.13.010, .020(5); WAC XXX-XX-XXXX. As such, they were the recipients of state

assistance and are protected by the privilege in RCW 74.04.060(1)(a).

   2. “The Department” Includes DCYF

       RCW 74.04.060(1)(a) prohibits “the department . . . from disclosing the contents

of any records, files, papers and communications.” The plaintiffs contend RCW

74.04.060(1)(a) applies to records maintained by DSHS, not the records maintained by

DCYF. We disagree.



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J.M.I. v. State, No. 104167-5



       The plaintiffs are correct that “department” under Title 74 RCW “means the

department of social and health services.” RCW 74.04.005(5). However, that definition

applies “unless the context indicates otherwise.” RCW 74.04.005. Here, the context

indicates that records in the custody of “the department” are not limited to records

maintained by DSHS but also include those maintained by DCYF in providing child

welfare services.

       When the legislature created DCYF in 2017, it provided that all references to

DSHS in the RCW shall be construed to mean DCYF “when referring to the functions

transferred in this section.” RCW 43.216.906(1), .907(1). The powers, duties, and

functions transferred from DSHS to DCYF include child welfare services, adoption

support, children and family services, family preservation services, and care of children.

See id.; chs. 74.13-74.15 RCW. Importantly, the legislature transferred “[a]ll reports,

documents, surveys, books, records, files, papers, or written material in the possession of

[DSHS] pertaining to the powers, duties, and functions” to DCYF. RCW

43.216.906(2)(a), .907(2)(a). Accordingly, in construing RCW 74.04.005, the

“department” encompasses DCYF.

       Thus, RCW 74.04.060(1)(a)’s privilege applies to DCYF records of foster children

and their families. The next question is whether the exception allowing the production of

documents applies here.




                                             9
J.M.I. v. State, No. 104167-5



                                      III
RCW 74.04.060(1)(a)’S PRIVILEGE AGAINST DISCLOSURE HAS AN EXCEPTION: RECORDS
    THAT ARE NEEDED IN A JUDICIAL PROCEEDING DIRECTLY CONCERNING THE
          ADMINISTRATION OF THE STATE PROGRAM ARE DISCOVERABLE

       RCW 74.04.060(1)(a) contains an exception to its nondisclosure rule: documents

may be produced if they are needed in a judicial proceeding directly concerned with the

administration of the state program.

       We hold that under RCW 74.04.060(1)(a), the requested documents fall within the

exception. Judicial proceedings involving allegations that the State negligently failed to

fulfill its duties to a foster child are proceedings directly concerned with the State’s

administration of its foster care program. Therefore, the exception to the privilege

applies.

       The State contends that these records do not go directly to the administration of

the State’s foster care program. We disagree.

       Whether the State negligently failed to protect a foster child from foreseeable

harm in their foster care placements directly concerns the administration of the State’s

program. The State is required to “develop, administer, supervise, and monitor a

coordinated and comprehensive plan that establishes, aids, and strengthens services for

the protection and care of runaway, dependent, or neglected children.” RCW

74.13.031(1). As part of coordinating its child welfare services, the State is charged with

the following:

   • Recruiting prospective foster homes;


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J.M.I. v. State, No. 104167-5



   • Investigating complaints of caretakers causing a child serious physical or

emotional harm, sexual abuse or exploitation, or imminent risk of serious harm, and

responding with appropriate services, reporting, or moving the child;

   • Monitoring the placement of children in foster care to assure their safety, well-

being, and quality of care.

See RCW 74.13.031(2), (3), (8).

       These are just a few of the State’s responsibilities in administering its child

welfare program for foster children.

       The State’s goal in administering the foster care program is to provide safe

environments for foster children, free from abuse and exploitation. These lawsuits go

directly to the State’s administration, or more precisely, alleged negligent administration,

of the program. The records the plaintiffs are seeking go directly to their allegations of

mismanagement of the foster care program. As such, the discovery requests fall within

the statute’s exception, allowing disclosure.

                                     IV
  RCW 13.50.100 ALLOWS THE PLAINTIFFS TO OBTAIN THEIR REQUESTED DISCOVERY

       Having determined the privilege in RCW 74.04.060(1)(a) does not prevent the

State from producing the requested discovery, we next address whether the plaintiffs are

entitled to the requested discovery under RCW 13.50.100.




                                                11
J.M.I. v. State, No. 104167-5



       The plaintiffs and the State agree that RCW 13.50.100 allows the State to disclose

records that “pertain” to the plaintiffs. They disagree, however, on what the term

“pertain” means.

       RCW 13.50.100 provides that records retained or produced by any juvenile care

agency shall be confidential and released only in limited circumstances. RCW

13.50.100(2), (3). One circumstance is that a juvenile, their parents, their attorney, or

their parents’ attorney “shall, upon request, be given access to all records and information

collected or retained by a juvenile justice or care agency which pertain to the juvenile.”

RCW 13.50.100(7). The statute does not limit the juvenile to obtaining only their own

file. Nor does the statute limit the juvenile to obtaining only information that refers to

them. Instead, the juvenile is entitled to the information that “pertain[s]” to them.

       The information the plaintiffs seek pertains to them because it directly relates to

and concerns them. The State had the duty to ensure the plaintiffs’ well-being and safety.

The information they seek goes directly to the issue of whether the State breached that

duty. Thus, the information pertains to the plaintiffs, and RCW 13.50.100 does not bar

the State from producing it. 6




6
  Although RCW 13.50.100 does not bar the production of the nonparty child welfare records
here, the statute still requires that child welfare records are treated with strict confidentiality
to prevent against unauthorized disclosure. RCW 13.50.100(2), (5). This is in line with
federal law conditioning the receipt of federal funds for state child abuse and neglect and foster
care programs on states safeguarding the privacy of affected children. 42 U.S.C. §§
5106a(b)(2)(B)(viii)(I)-(VI), 671(a)(8).
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J.M.I. v. State, No. 104167-5



                                         V
                 THE PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES

       The plaintiffs request an award of attorney fees and costs under RCW 13.50.100(10)

if they prevail in this appeal. We hold that the statute does not allow them to recover their

attorney fees and costs.

       RCW 13.50.100(10) provides:

       Subject to the rules of discovery in civil cases, any party to a proceeding
       seeking a declaration of dependency or a termination of the parent-child
       relationship and any party’s counsel and the guardian ad litem of any party,
       shall have access to the records of any natural or adoptive child of the parent,
       subject to the limitations in subsection (7) of this section. A party denied
       access to records may request judicial review of the denial. If the party
       prevails, he or she shall be awarded attorneys’ fees, costs, and an amount not
       less than five dollars and not more than one hundred dollars for each day the
       records were wrongfully denied.

       The statute allows the recovery of attorney fees and costs only for parties involved in

a dependency or termination proceeding. This is not a dependency or termination

proceeding. Accordingly, the plaintiffs are not entitled to an award of fees and costs under

RCW 13.50.100(10).

       The plaintiffs also make a general request under RAP 18.1 for an award of attorney

fees and costs. The only basis that the plaintiffs have made for such a request is RCW

13.50.100(10). That statute does not entitle them to fees and costs. Accordingly, we deny

their request for an award of fees and costs incurred in this appeal.




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J.M.I. v. State, No. 104167-5



                                             VI
                                        CONCLUSION

       Our civil rules allow parties to discover admissible evidence and information likely

to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, unless the information is privileged.

Because privileges impede the truth-finding function of trials, we narrowly construe them.

       Here, the State claims that RCW 74.04.060(1)(a) creates a privilege that precludes

it from producing the information sought by the plaintiffs. We disagree.

       We hold that while the information requested by the plaintiffs is privileged under

RCW 74.04.060(1)(a), an exception applies here: the information is discoverable because

the plaintiffs’ lawsuits go directly to the administration of the State’s foster care program.

We also hold that RCW 13.50.100 does not bar the plaintiffs’ discovery request. The

plaintiffs are not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal.

       We affirm the trial courts’ orders and remand for further proceedings.




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J.M.I. v. State, No. 104167-5




                                     _______________________________


WE CONCUR:




                                             Madsen, J.P.T.



                                              Yu, J.P.T.




                                15
J.M.I. v. State, No. 104167-5
(Stephens, C.J., concurring)




                                    No. 104167-5

       STEPHENS, C.J. (concurring)—I agree with the majority that the

confidentiality statute, RCW 13.50.100, permits the disclosure of the documents

at issue in these cases, and I join in affirming the trial courts’ orders

compelling discovery. I write separately because, in light of the legislature’s

enactment of RCW 13.50.100, the privilege under RCW 74.04.060(1)(a) should

not be read as applying to child welfare records held by the Department of

Children, Youth, and Families (DCYF). The majority holds that the privilege

contained in RCW 74.04.060(1)(a) applies to child welfare records held by

DCYF, but finds that the records in these cases are exempt because they are

being sought in a proceeding “directly concerned with the administration of these

programs.” RCW 74.04.060(1)(a). While I agree with the majority that if the

privilege applies, this exception clearly permits disclosure when a cause of

action involves “allegations that the State negligently failed to fulfill its duties to

a foster child,” I disagree with the premise.          Majority at 10. I therefore

respectfully concur.


                                          1
J.M.I. v. State, No. 104167-5
(Stephens, C.J., concurring)


       RCW 74.04.060(1)(a) is a general privilege statute. It should not apply to

child welfare records in the custody of DCYF because it was superseded by RCW

13.50.100, a later-enacted statute that specifically addresses juvenile records. RCW

74.04.060(1)(a) provides:

       For the protection of applicants and recipients, the department . . . [is]
       prohibited, except as hereinafter provided, from disclosing the contents
       of any records, files, papers and communications . . . . In any judicial
       proceeding, except such proceeding as is directly concerned with the
       administration of these programs, such records, files, papers and
       communications, and their contents, shall be deemed privileged
       communications.

Under the statute’s plain language, “department” is the Department of Social and

Health Services (DSHS). However, the majority holds that the privilege extends to

child welfare records held by DCYF because foster children and families are

“recipients” of state assistance and when the legislature transferred “‘[a]ll reports,

documents, surveys, books, records, files, papers, or written material in the

possession of [DSHS]’ . . . to DCYF,’” it also transferred the protection provided

by this general privilege. Majority at 9 (first and second alterations in original)

(quoting RCW 43.216.906(2)(a), .907(2)(a)).           I cannot join this reasoning

because we must narrowly construe a statutory privilege that derogates from the

common law and moreover, the majority’s interpretation does not comport with

our long-standing approach to general and specific statutes.



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J.M.I. v. State, No. 104167-5
(Stephens, C.J., concurring)


       Statutory privileges stand in derogation of the common law, and we have

repeatedly held that they must be “construed strictly.” Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs.

v. Latta, 92 Wn.2d 812, 819, 601 P.2d 520 (1979); Magney v. Truc Pham, 195 Wn.2d

795, 802, 466 P.3d 1077 (2020) (“when a privilege is created by statute and thus is

not a privilege found within the common law, it is considered to be in derogation

of—that is, an exemption from—the common law, and the statute must be strictly

construed”). We have also consistently applied a specific statute over a general one

when applying both would produce an incongruent or absurd result. Kustura v.

Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 169 Wn.2d 81, 88, 233 P.3d 853 (2010); Wash. Conserv.

Action Educ. Fund v. Hobbs, 3 Wn.3d 768, 771, 557 P.3d 669 (2024) (“where

overlapping statutes conflict, ‘[a] general statutory provision must yield to a more

specific statutory provision’” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting Wash. State Ass’n of Counties v. State, 199 Wn.2d 1, 13, 502 P.3d

825 (2022))). However, a more specific statute does not broadly invalidate a general

statute, but rather, “‘the [specific statute] will be considered as an exception to, or

qualification of, the general statute.’” Wash. State Ass’n of Counties, 199 Wn.2d at

13 (alteration in original) (quoting Wark v. Wash. Nat’l Guard, 87 Wn.2d 864, 867,

557 P.2d 844 (1976)).

       The majority holds that both the general privilege contained in RCW

74.04.060(1)(a) and the confidentiality protection of RCW 13.50.100 apply to

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J.M.I. v. State, No. 104167-5
(Stephens, C.J., concurring)


juvenile records. However, confidentiality and privilege are distinct concepts.

When a privilege applies, it operates to prohibit discovery under CR 26. As an

absolute bar to discovery, a privilege impedes the truth-seeking process inherent in

our judicial system and, as the majority notes, this is why “we strictly and narrowly

construe them to exclude the least amount of relevant evidence.” Majority at 6; Lowy

v. PeaceHealth, 174 Wn.2d 769, 778, 280 P.3d 1078 (2012). Confidentiality is a

distinct concept that does not create an absolute bar to discovery and judicial inquiry.

State v. Thompson, 54 Wn.2d 100, 104-05, 338 P.2d 319 (1959) (“It does not

necessarily follow from the use of the word ‘confidential,’ that it was the legislative

intention that this word have the same import as the word ‘privileged.’”); State v.

Harris, 51 Wn. App. 807, 813, 755 P.2d 825 (1988) (describing “judicial reluctance

to equate confidentiality requirements with testimonial privileges”).

       Unlike the general privilege in RCW 74.04.060(1)(a), RCW 13.50.100 is a

limited confidentiality statute that applies directly and exclusively to juvenile

records. Specifically, RCW 13.50.100(7) provides, “A juvenile, his or her parents,

the juvenile’s attorney, and the juvenile’s parent’s attorney, shall, upon request, be

given access to all records and information collected or retained by a juvenile justice

or care agency which pertain to the juvenile.” 1 In enacting RCW 13.50.100 against


1
 Ch. 13.50 RCW explicitly includes DCYF in its definition of “juvenile justice or care agency.”
RCW 13.50.010(1)(c).


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J.M.I. v. State, No. 104167-5
(Stephens, C.J., concurring)


the existing, general backdrop of RCW 74.04.060(1)(a), the legislature modified the

process for accessing juvenile records by designating such records as “confidential”

and clearly providing that they “shall be released only pursuant to this section.”

RCW 13.50.100(2) (emphasis added).              Construing RCW 13.50.100 as a

modification to the general privilege found in RCW 74.04.060(1)(a) gives both

statutes meaning, where the majority’s construction could render RCW 13.50.100

superfluous in certain instances. We presume the legislature does not engage in

superfluous acts and, instead, “we interpret and construe all statutes such that all the

language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless.” Landesberg

v. Fairway Vill. Homeowners Ass’n, 30 Wn. App. 2d 660, 669, 546 P.3d 502 (2024)

(citing City of Seattle v. Long, 198 Wn.2d 136, 148, 493 P.3d 94 (2021)).

Furthermore, this reading accords with our mandate to strictly construe the statutory

privilege contained in RCW 74.04.060(1)(a).

       Nonetheless, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that in these cases the

records sought clearly “pertain[] to the plaintiffs” and must be disclosed under

RCW 13.50.100(7). Majority at 12. I therefore respectfully concur in affirming

the trial courts’ orders.



                                               _______________________________




                                           5