State of Washington v. Zachary Gene Boyce

FILED
                                                                  APRIL 30, 2026
                                                           In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                          WA State Court of Appeals, Division III




         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                            DIVISION THREE

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                          )         No. 40700-4-III
                                               )
                      Respondent,              )
                                               )
               v.                              )         PUBLISHED OPINION
                                               )
 ZACHARY GENE BOYCE,                           )
                                               )
                      Appellant.               )

       LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — Zachary Boyce appeals the sentencing court’s inclusion

of his felony juvenile adjudications of guilt in his offender score. RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b),

which the legislature amended after Boyce committed his current offenses but before his

sentencing, prohibits counting most juvenile felony adjudications in an offender score.

       Both RCW 9.94A.345 and RCW 10.01.040 require an offender to be sentenced

based on the law at the time the offense was committed. The legislature can avoid this

result by including language in a new statute that gives it retroactive application. Here,

the legislature did not include any language that would give RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b)

retroactive application. We affirm the trial court’s calculation of Boyce’s offender score,

which included his juvenile adjudications of guilt.
No. 40700-4-III
State v. Boyce


                                       BACKGROUND

       On June 30, 2023, police arrested Zachary Boyce after an anonymous caller

reported hearing people yelling inside a house. Boyce’s criminal history included several

juvenile felony adjudications of guilt. At the time, a defendant’s offender score required

courts to count a prior violent juvenile felony adjudication of guilt as 1 point and a prior

nonviolent juvenile adjudication of guilty as ½ point. Former RCW 9.94A.525(7)

(2021).

       On May 11, 2023, the legislature enacted Engrossed House Bill 1324, which

amended RCW 9.94A.525 to eliminate most juvenile felony adjudications of guilt from

being included in a defendant’s offender score. LAWS OF 2023, ch. 415, § 2. The

legislature codified the amendment at RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) and gave it an effective date

of July 23, 2023. Id.

       In December 2023, Boyce pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm in

the first degree and felony harassment (intent to kill). Prior to his plea, he reserved the

right to appeal the inclusion of his juvenile felony adjudications in his offender score.

The trial court sentenced Boyce based on an offender score of 5, which included his prior

juvenile felony adjudications.

       Boyce appealed to this court.


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State v. Boyce


                                       ANALYSIS

       Boyce argues the sentencing court erred by including his prior juvenile felony

adjudications in his offender score. The question is whether Boyce’s sentence must be

based on the law in effect at the time he committed his offenses or at the time of his

sentencing. The answer depends on statutory construction, which we review de novo.

State v. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d 708, 713, 487 P.3d 482 (2021).

       We have rejected the arguments raised by Boyce in at least three published

opinions—State v. Gibson, 33 Wn. App. 2d 618, 563 P.3d 1079, review denied, 4 Wn.3d

1035, 570 P.3d 716 (2025); State v. Troutman, 30 Wn. App. 2d 592, 546 P.3d 458,

review denied, 3 Wn.3d 1016, 554 P.3d 1217 (2024); and State v. Tester, 30 Wn. App. 2d

650, 546 P.3d 94, review denied, 3 Wn.3d 1019, 556 P.3d 1094 (2024). We reject

Boyce’s argument here.

       Both RCW 9.94A.3451 and the savings clause, RCW 10.01.040,2 require a

defendant to be sentenced based on the law in effect at the time the offense was


       1
        RCW 9.94A.345 provides: “Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, any
sentence imposed under this chapter shall be determined in accordance with the law in
effect when the current offense was committed.”
       2
         RCW 10.01.040 provides in relevant part: “Whenever any criminal or penal
statute shall be amended or repealed, all offenses committed or penalties or forfeitures
incurred while it was in force shall be punished or enforced as if it were in force,
notwithstanding such amendment or repeal, unless a contrary intention is expressly

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No. 40700-4-III
State v. Boyce


committed. The savings clause applies to “substantive changes in the law,” which

includes changes to “the punishment for offenses or the type of punishments possible.”

Jenks, 197 Wn.2d at 721-22. Because the savings clause is in derogation of common

law, the legislature can avoid the savings clause by using less than express language.

Retroactivity “‘need only be expressed in words that fairly convey that intention.’”

Id. at 720 (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing examples of where the

legislature included sufficient language in the amended statute to give it retroactive

application) (quoting State v. Ross, 152 Wn.2d 220, 238, 95 P.3d 1225 (2004)). Here,

there is nothing in RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) that fairly conveys a legislative intent for

retroactive application. Boyce does not argue that RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) contains any

such language.

       In Gibson, the majority refused to apply a precipitating event analysis. 33 Wn.

App. 2d at 623. Under that analysis, a statute applies prospectively, not retroactively, if

the precipitating event under the statute occurred after the date of enactment. Jenks,

197 Wn.2d at 722. Application of a precipitating event analysis would likely result in

RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) being applied retroactively. Gibson, 33 Wn. App. 2d at 625-26

(Maxa, J. dissenting). However, Jenks suggests that a precipitating event analysis is


declared in the amendatory or repealing act.”

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No. 40700-4-III
State v. Boyce


reserved for statutory amendments affecting only attorney fees and costs of litigation.

197 Wn.2d at 723. Thus, a precipitating event analysis has no application here.

       Boyce seeks to avoid the result required by the savings clause by arguing that

RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) is a remedial statute. He cites the legislative intent of the

amendment, which includes giving “real effect to the juvenile system’s express goals

of rehabilitation and integration,” and recognizing “how grave disproportionality within

the juvenile legal system may subsequently impact sentencing ranges in adult court.”

LAWS OF 2023, ch. 415, § 1(1), (5). We note that this statement of intent is not part of the

statutory amendment. See RCW 9.94A.525.

       Even if RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) is remedial, we disagree that remedial

amendments to penal statutes require retroactive application. “[T]he general rule

that a remedial statute applies retroactively ‘does not apply when a statute is subject to

RCW 10.01.040.’” Troutman, 30 Wn. App. 2d at 598 n.6 (quoting State v. Jenks,

12 Wn. App. 2d 588, 600, 459 P.3d 389 (2020), aff’d, 197 Wn.2d 708). As noted above,

RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) is subject to the savings clause, RCW 10.01.040. “‘[A]bsent

language indicating a contrary intent, an amendment to a penal statute—even a patently

remedial one—must apply prospectively under RCW 10.01.040.’” Jenks, 12 Wn. App.




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State v. Boyce


2d at 600 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. McCarthy, 112 Wn. App. 231, 237,

48 P.3d 1014 (2002)).

       Ultimately, whether to grant RCW 9.94A.525(1)(b) retroactive application

is a question of legislative intent. There are two statutes, RCW 9.94A.345 and

RCW 10.01.040, that require defendants to be sentenced based on the law at the time the

offense was committed. The legislature knows how to avoid this result—it can include

words in the statutory amendment that fairly convey an intent for the amendment to

apply retroactively. Jenks, 197 Wn.2d at 720. As noted above, there is nothing in

RCW 9.94A.545(1)(b) that fairly conveys an intent for it to apply retroactively. We

conclude that the legislature did not intend for RCW 9.94A.545(1)(b) to apply

retroactively.

       We affirm the trial court.




                                                ________________________________
                                                Lawrence-Berrey, J.

WE CONCUR:



________________________________                ________________________________
Cooney, A.C.J.                                  Hill, J.

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