Court Filings

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated part of the Commonwealth Court's order that had sustained a preliminary objection to Christopher Rogalski's request for a writ of mandamus to remove disciplinary information from Department of Education websites. The Supreme Court directed the Commonwealth Court to reconsider that preliminary objection in light of its recent decision in T.G.A. v. Department of Education, 348 A.3d 1043 (Pa. 2025). All other parts of the Commonwealth Court's order were affirmed, and jurisdiction over the case was relinquished.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court and held that the judicially created "positive steps" test cannot disqualify an unemployment benefits claimant for self-employment when the claimant has not actually performed services for wages. The case involved a claimant who, after leaving employment, formed a business entity, created a website, and spent money advertising but had not yet performed services or received earnings. The Court ruled that Section 4(l)(2)(B) of the Unemployment Compensation Law requires proof that services were performed for wages before applying the control and independence inquiry, so aspirational or preparatory acts alone cannot bar benefits.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied appellants' challenge and affirmed the Commonwealth Court's April 2, 2026 order. The Court granted the appellants' request to supplement the record but upheld the lower court's decision that the candidate Al Buchtan’s nomination petition stands. The Court also ordered that Buchtan’s petition be treated as amended to list his legal residence as 100 Betty Boulevard, Carmichaels, Pennsylvania 15320, Greene County. Three justices recorded their dissent; a full opinion will follow explaining the detailed rationale.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered Mark LaVelle’s challenge to a Commonwealth Court standing order that deems candidates notified of petitions to set aside nomination petitions when the court posts the filing on its public website. LaVelle argued this practice violates Section 977 of the Election Code, which requires an order specifying the time and manner of notice to the candidate. The Justice writing separately expressed doubt about the standing order’s compliance with the statute but concluded any defect in notice would only require a new hearing, not dismissal. Because LaVelle had, by stipulation, fewer than the 300 valid signatures required for the ballot, the Court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s order for that independent reason.